Initial import

1 files changed, 818 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/fs/cifs/cifsencrypt.c b/fs/cifs/cifsencrypt.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..aa0dc2573
--- /dev/null
+++ b/fs/cifs/cifsencrypt.c
@@ -0,0 +1,818 @@
+/*
+ *   fs/cifs/cifsencrypt.c
+ *
+ *   Encryption and hashing operations relating to NTLM, NTLMv2.  See MS-NLMP
+ *   for more detailed information
+ *
+ *   Copyright (C) International Business Machines  Corp., 2005,2013
+ *   Author(s): Steve French (sfrench@us.ibm.com)
+ *
+ *   This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ *   it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License as published
+ *   by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2.1 of the License, or
+ *   (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ *   This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ *   but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ *   MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See
+ *   the GNU Lesser General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ *   You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public License
+ *   along with this library; if not, write to the Free Software
+ *   Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
+ */
+
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include "cifspdu.h"
+#include "cifsglob.h"
+#include "cifs_debug.h"
+#include "cifs_unicode.h"
+#include "cifsproto.h"
+#include "ntlmssp.h"
+#include <linux/ctype.h>
+#include <linux/random.h>
+#include <linux/highmem.h>
+
+static int
+cifs_crypto_shash_md5_allocate(struct TCP_Server_Info *server)
+{
+	int rc;
+	unsigned int size;
+
+	if (server->secmech.sdescmd5 != NULL)
+		return 0; /* already allocated */
+
+	server->secmech.md5 = crypto_alloc_shash("md5", 0, 0);
+	if (IS_ERR(server->secmech.md5)) {
+		cifs_dbg(VFS, "could not allocate crypto md5\n");
+		rc = PTR_ERR(server->secmech.md5);
+		server->secmech.md5 = NULL;
+		return rc;
+	}
+
+	size = sizeof(struct shash_desc) +
+			crypto_shash_descsize(server->secmech.md5);
+	server->secmech.sdescmd5 = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!server->secmech.sdescmd5) {
+		crypto_free_shash(server->secmech.md5);
+		server->secmech.md5 = NULL;
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+	server->secmech.sdescmd5->shash.tfm = server->secmech.md5;
+	server->secmech.sdescmd5->shash.flags = 0x0;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Calculate and return the CIFS signature based on the mac key and SMB PDU.
+ * The 16 byte signature must be allocated by the caller. Note we only use the
+ * 1st eight bytes and that the smb header signature field on input contains
+ * the sequence number before this function is called. Also, this function
+ * should be called with the server->srv_mutex held.
+ */
+static int cifs_calc_signature(struct smb_rqst *rqst,
+			struct TCP_Server_Info *server, char *signature)
+{
+	int i;
+	int rc;
+	struct kvec *iov = rqst->rq_iov;
+	int n_vec = rqst->rq_nvec;
+
+	if (iov == NULL || signature == NULL || server == NULL)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!server->secmech.sdescmd5) {
+		rc = cifs_crypto_shash_md5_allocate(server);
+		if (rc) {
+			cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Can't alloc md5 crypto\n", __func__);
+			return -1;
+		}
+	}
+
+	rc = crypto_shash_init(&server->secmech.sdescmd5->shash);
+	if (rc) {
+		cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not init md5\n", __func__);
+		return rc;
+	}
+
+	rc = crypto_shash_update(&server->secmech.sdescmd5->shash,
+		server->session_key.response, server->session_key.len);
+	if (rc) {
+		cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not update with response\n", __func__);
+		return rc;
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; i < n_vec; i++) {
+		if (iov[i].iov_len == 0)
+			continue;
+		if (iov[i].iov_base == NULL) {
+			cifs_dbg(VFS, "null iovec entry\n");
+			return -EIO;
+		}
+		/* The first entry includes a length field (which does not get
+		   signed that occupies the first 4 bytes before the header */
+		if (i == 0) {
+			if (iov[0].iov_len <= 8) /* cmd field at offset 9 */
+				break; /* nothing to sign or corrupt header */
+			rc =
+			crypto_shash_update(&server->secmech.sdescmd5->shash,
+				iov[i].iov_base + 4, iov[i].iov_len - 4);
+		} else {
+			rc =
+			crypto_shash_update(&server->secmech.sdescmd5->shash,
+				iov[i].iov_base, iov[i].iov_len);
+		}
+		if (rc) {
+			cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not update with payload\n",
+				 __func__);
+			return rc;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* now hash over the rq_pages array */
+	for (i = 0; i < rqst->rq_npages; i++) {
+		struct kvec p_iov;
+
+		cifs_rqst_page_to_kvec(rqst, i, &p_iov);
+		crypto_shash_update(&server->secmech.sdescmd5->shash,
+					p_iov.iov_base, p_iov.iov_len);
+		kunmap(rqst->rq_pages[i]);
+	}
+
+	rc = crypto_shash_final(&server->secmech.sdescmd5->shash, signature);
+	if (rc)
+		cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not generate md5 hash\n", __func__);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/* must be called with server->srv_mutex held */
+int cifs_sign_rqst(struct smb_rqst *rqst, struct TCP_Server_Info *server,
+		   __u32 *pexpected_response_sequence_number)
+{
+	int rc = 0;
+	char smb_signature[20];
+	struct smb_hdr *cifs_pdu = (struct smb_hdr *)rqst->rq_iov[0].iov_base;
+
+	if ((cifs_pdu == NULL) || (server == NULL))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!(cifs_pdu->Flags2 & SMBFLG2_SECURITY_SIGNATURE) ||
+	    server->tcpStatus == CifsNeedNegotiate)
+		return rc;
+
+	if (!server->session_estab) {
+		memcpy(cifs_pdu->Signature.SecuritySignature, "BSRSPYL", 8);
+		return rc;
+	}
+
+	cifs_pdu->Signature.Sequence.SequenceNumber =
+				cpu_to_le32(server->sequence_number);
+	cifs_pdu->Signature.Sequence.Reserved = 0;
+
+	*pexpected_response_sequence_number = ++server->sequence_number;
+	++server->sequence_number;
+
+	rc = cifs_calc_signature(rqst, server, smb_signature);
+	if (rc)
+		memset(cifs_pdu->Signature.SecuritySignature, 0, 8);
+	else
+		memcpy(cifs_pdu->Signature.SecuritySignature, smb_signature, 8);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+int cifs_sign_smbv(struct kvec *iov, int n_vec, struct TCP_Server_Info *server,
+		   __u32 *pexpected_response_sequence)
+{
+	struct smb_rqst rqst = { .rq_iov = iov,
+				 .rq_nvec = n_vec };
+
+	return cifs_sign_rqst(&rqst, server, pexpected_response_sequence);
+}
+
+/* must be called with server->srv_mutex held */
+int cifs_sign_smb(struct smb_hdr *cifs_pdu, struct TCP_Server_Info *server,
+		  __u32 *pexpected_response_sequence_number)
+{
+	struct kvec iov;
+
+	iov.iov_base = cifs_pdu;
+	iov.iov_len = be32_to_cpu(cifs_pdu->smb_buf_length) + 4;
+
+	return cifs_sign_smbv(&iov, 1, server,
+			      pexpected_response_sequence_number);
+}
+
+int cifs_verify_signature(struct smb_rqst *rqst,
+			  struct TCP_Server_Info *server,
+			  __u32 expected_sequence_number)
+{
+	unsigned int rc;
+	char server_response_sig[8];
+	char what_we_think_sig_should_be[20];
+	struct smb_hdr *cifs_pdu = (struct smb_hdr *)rqst->rq_iov[0].iov_base;
+
+	if (cifs_pdu == NULL || server == NULL)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!server->session_estab)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (cifs_pdu->Command == SMB_COM_LOCKING_ANDX) {
+		struct smb_com_lock_req *pSMB =
+			(struct smb_com_lock_req *)cifs_pdu;
+	    if (pSMB->LockType & LOCKING_ANDX_OPLOCK_RELEASE)
+			return 0;
+	}
+
+	/* BB what if signatures are supposed to be on for session but
+	   server does not send one? BB */
+
+	/* Do not need to verify session setups with signature "BSRSPYL "  */
+	if (memcmp(cifs_pdu->Signature.SecuritySignature, "BSRSPYL ", 8) == 0)
+		cifs_dbg(FYI, "dummy signature received for smb command 0x%x\n",
+			 cifs_pdu->Command);
+
+	/* save off the origiginal signature so we can modify the smb and check
+		its signature against what the server sent */
+	memcpy(server_response_sig, cifs_pdu->Signature.SecuritySignature, 8);
+
+	cifs_pdu->Signature.Sequence.SequenceNumber =
+					cpu_to_le32(expected_sequence_number);
+	cifs_pdu->Signature.Sequence.Reserved = 0;
+
+	mutex_lock(&server->srv_mutex);
+	rc = cifs_calc_signature(rqst, server, what_we_think_sig_should_be);
+	mutex_unlock(&server->srv_mutex);
+
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+/*	cifs_dump_mem("what we think it should be: ",
+		      what_we_think_sig_should_be, 16); */
+
+	if (memcmp(server_response_sig, what_we_think_sig_should_be, 8))
+		return -EACCES;
+	else
+		return 0;
+
+}
+
+/* first calculate 24 bytes ntlm response and then 16 byte session key */
+int setup_ntlm_response(struct cifs_ses *ses, const struct nls_table *nls_cp)
+{
+	int rc = 0;
+	unsigned int temp_len = CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE + CIFS_AUTH_RESP_SIZE;
+	char temp_key[CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE];
+
+	if (!ses)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	ses->auth_key.response = kmalloc(temp_len, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!ses->auth_key.response)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	ses->auth_key.len = temp_len;
+
+	rc = SMBNTencrypt(ses->password, ses->server->cryptkey,
+			ses->auth_key.response + CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE, nls_cp);
+	if (rc) {
+		cifs_dbg(FYI, "%s Can't generate NTLM response, error: %d\n",
+			 __func__, rc);
+		return rc;
+	}
+
+	rc = E_md4hash(ses->password, temp_key, nls_cp);
+	if (rc) {
+		cifs_dbg(FYI, "%s Can't generate NT hash, error: %d\n",
+			 __func__, rc);
+		return rc;
+	}
+
+	rc = mdfour(ses->auth_key.response, temp_key, CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE);
+	if (rc)
+		cifs_dbg(FYI, "%s Can't generate NTLM session key, error: %d\n",
+			 __func__, rc);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_WEAK_PW_HASH
+int calc_lanman_hash(const char *password, const char *cryptkey, bool encrypt,
+			char *lnm_session_key)
+{
+	int i;
+	int rc;
+	char password_with_pad[CIFS_ENCPWD_SIZE];
+
+	memset(password_with_pad, 0, CIFS_ENCPWD_SIZE);
+	if (password)
+		strncpy(password_with_pad, password, CIFS_ENCPWD_SIZE);
+
+	if (!encrypt && global_secflags & CIFSSEC_MAY_PLNTXT) {
+		memcpy(lnm_session_key, password_with_pad,
+			CIFS_ENCPWD_SIZE);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	/* calculate old style session key */
+	/* calling toupper is less broken than repeatedly
+	calling nls_toupper would be since that will never
+	work for UTF8, but neither handles multibyte code pages
+	but the only alternative would be converting to UCS-16 (Unicode)
+	(using a routine something like UniStrupr) then
+	uppercasing and then converting back from Unicode - which
+	would only worth doing it if we knew it were utf8. Basically
+	utf8 and other multibyte codepages each need their own strupper
+	function since a byte at a time will ont work. */
+
+	for (i = 0; i < CIFS_ENCPWD_SIZE; i++)
+		password_with_pad[i] = toupper(password_with_pad[i]);
+
+	rc = SMBencrypt(password_with_pad, cryptkey, lnm_session_key);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+#endif /* CIFS_WEAK_PW_HASH */
+
+/* Build a proper attribute value/target info pairs blob.
+ * Fill in netbios and dns domain name and workstation name
+ * and client time (total five av pairs and + one end of fields indicator.
+ * Allocate domain name which gets freed when session struct is deallocated.
+ */
+static int
+build_avpair_blob(struct cifs_ses *ses, const struct nls_table *nls_cp)
+{
+	unsigned int dlen;
+	unsigned int size = 2 * sizeof(struct ntlmssp2_name);
+	char *defdmname = "WORKGROUP";
+	unsigned char *blobptr;
+	struct ntlmssp2_name *attrptr;
+
+	if (!ses->domainName) {
+		ses->domainName = kstrdup(defdmname, GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!ses->domainName)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	dlen = strlen(ses->domainName);
+
+	/*
+	 * The length of this blob is two times the size of a
+	 * structure (av pair) which holds name/size
+	 * ( for NTLMSSP_AV_NB_DOMAIN_NAME followed by NTLMSSP_AV_EOL ) +
+	 * unicode length of a netbios domain name
+	 */
+	ses->auth_key.len = size + 2 * dlen;
+	ses->auth_key.response = kzalloc(ses->auth_key.len, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!ses->auth_key.response) {
+		ses->auth_key.len = 0;
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	blobptr = ses->auth_key.response;
+	attrptr = (struct ntlmssp2_name *) blobptr;
+
+	/*
+	 * As defined in MS-NTLM 3.3.2, just this av pair field
+	 * is sufficient as part of the temp
+	 */
+	attrptr->type = cpu_to_le16(NTLMSSP_AV_NB_DOMAIN_NAME);
+	attrptr->length = cpu_to_le16(2 * dlen);
+	blobptr = (unsigned char *)attrptr + sizeof(struct ntlmssp2_name);
+	cifs_strtoUTF16((__le16 *)blobptr, ses->domainName, dlen, nls_cp);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* Server has provided av pairs/target info in the type 2 challenge
+ * packet and we have plucked it and stored within smb session.
+ * We parse that blob here to find netbios domain name to be used
+ * as part of ntlmv2 authentication (in Target String), if not already
+ * specified on the command line.
+ * If this function returns without any error but without fetching
+ * domain name, authentication may fail against some server but
+ * may not fail against other (those who are not very particular
+ * about target string i.e. for some, just user name might suffice.
+ */
+static int
+find_domain_name(struct cifs_ses *ses, const struct nls_table *nls_cp)
+{
+	unsigned int attrsize;
+	unsigned int type;
+	unsigned int onesize = sizeof(struct ntlmssp2_name);
+	unsigned char *blobptr;
+	unsigned char *blobend;
+	struct ntlmssp2_name *attrptr;
+
+	if (!ses->auth_key.len || !ses->auth_key.response)
+		return 0;
+
+	blobptr = ses->auth_key.response;
+	blobend = blobptr + ses->auth_key.len;
+
+	while (blobptr + onesize < blobend) {
+		attrptr = (struct ntlmssp2_name *) blobptr;
+		type = le16_to_cpu(attrptr->type);
+		if (type == NTLMSSP_AV_EOL)
+			break;
+		blobptr += 2; /* advance attr type */
+		attrsize = le16_to_cpu(attrptr->length);
+		blobptr += 2; /* advance attr size */
+		if (blobptr + attrsize > blobend)
+			break;
+		if (type == NTLMSSP_AV_NB_DOMAIN_NAME) {
+			if (!attrsize || attrsize >= CIFS_MAX_DOMAINNAME_LEN)
+				break;
+			if (!ses->domainName) {
+				ses->domainName =
+					kmalloc(attrsize + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+				if (!ses->domainName)
+						return -ENOMEM;
+				cifs_from_utf16(ses->domainName,
+					(__le16 *)blobptr, attrsize, attrsize,
+					nls_cp, NO_MAP_UNI_RSVD);
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+		blobptr += attrsize; /* advance attr  value */
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int calc_ntlmv2_hash(struct cifs_ses *ses, char *ntlmv2_hash,
+			    const struct nls_table *nls_cp)
+{
+	int rc = 0;
+	int len;
+	char nt_hash[CIFS_NTHASH_SIZE];
+	__le16 *user;
+	wchar_t *domain;
+	wchar_t *server;
+
+	if (!ses->server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5) {
+		cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: can't generate ntlmv2 hash\n", __func__);
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	/* calculate md4 hash of password */
+	E_md4hash(ses->password, nt_hash, nls_cp);
+
+	rc = crypto_shash_setkey(ses->server->secmech.hmacmd5, nt_hash,
+				CIFS_NTHASH_SIZE);
+	if (rc) {
+		cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not set NT Hash as a key\n", __func__);
+		return rc;
+	}
+
+	rc = crypto_shash_init(&ses->server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5->shash);
+	if (rc) {
+		cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: could not init hmacmd5\n", __func__);
+		return rc;
+	}
+
+	/* convert ses->user_name to unicode */
+	len = ses->user_name ? strlen(ses->user_name) : 0;
+	user = kmalloc(2 + (len * 2), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (user == NULL) {
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		return rc;
+	}
+
+	if (len) {
+		len = cifs_strtoUTF16(user, ses->user_name, len, nls_cp);
+		UniStrupr(user);
+	} else {
+		memset(user, '\0', 2);
+	}
+
+	rc = crypto_shash_update(&ses->server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5->shash,
+				(char *)user, 2 * len);
+	kfree(user);
+	if (rc) {
+		cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not update with user\n", __func__);
+		return rc;
+	}
+
+	/* convert ses->domainName to unicode and uppercase */
+	if (ses->domainName) {
+		len = strlen(ses->domainName);
+
+		domain = kmalloc(2 + (len * 2), GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (domain == NULL) {
+			rc = -ENOMEM;
+			return rc;
+		}
+		len = cifs_strtoUTF16((__le16 *)domain, ses->domainName, len,
+				      nls_cp);
+		rc =
+		crypto_shash_update(&ses->server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5->shash,
+					(char *)domain, 2 * len);
+		kfree(domain);
+		if (rc) {
+			cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not update with domain\n",
+				 __func__);
+			return rc;
+		}
+	} else {
+		/* We use ses->serverName if no domain name available */
+		len = strlen(ses->serverName);
+
+		server = kmalloc(2 + (len * 2), GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (server == NULL) {
+			rc = -ENOMEM;
+			return rc;
+		}
+		len = cifs_strtoUTF16((__le16 *)server, ses->serverName, len,
+					nls_cp);
+		rc =
+		crypto_shash_update(&ses->server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5->shash,
+					(char *)server, 2 * len);
+		kfree(server);
+		if (rc) {
+			cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not update with server\n",
+				 __func__);
+			return rc;
+		}
+	}
+
+	rc = crypto_shash_final(&ses->server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5->shash,
+					ntlmv2_hash);
+	if (rc)
+		cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not generate md5 hash\n", __func__);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int
+CalcNTLMv2_response(const struct cifs_ses *ses, char *ntlmv2_hash)
+{
+	int rc;
+	struct ntlmv2_resp *ntlmv2 = (struct ntlmv2_resp *)
+	    (ses->auth_key.response + CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE);
+	unsigned int hash_len;
+
+	/* The MD5 hash starts at challenge_key.key */
+	hash_len = ses->auth_key.len - (CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE +
+		offsetof(struct ntlmv2_resp, challenge.key[0]));
+
+	if (!ses->server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5) {
+		cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: can't generate ntlmv2 hash\n", __func__);
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	rc = crypto_shash_setkey(ses->server->secmech.hmacmd5,
+				 ntlmv2_hash, CIFS_HMAC_MD5_HASH_SIZE);
+	if (rc) {
+		cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not set NTLMV2 Hash as a key\n",
+			 __func__);
+		return rc;
+	}
+
+	rc = crypto_shash_init(&ses->server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5->shash);
+	if (rc) {
+		cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: could not init hmacmd5\n", __func__);
+		return rc;
+	}
+
+	if (ses->server->negflavor == CIFS_NEGFLAVOR_EXTENDED)
+		memcpy(ntlmv2->challenge.key,
+		       ses->ntlmssp->cryptkey, CIFS_SERVER_CHALLENGE_SIZE);
+	else
+		memcpy(ntlmv2->challenge.key,
+		       ses->server->cryptkey, CIFS_SERVER_CHALLENGE_SIZE);
+	rc = crypto_shash_update(&ses->server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5->shash,
+				 ntlmv2->challenge.key, hash_len);
+	if (rc) {
+		cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not update with response\n", __func__);
+		return rc;
+	}
+
+	/* Note that the MD5 digest over writes anon.challenge_key.key */
+	rc = crypto_shash_final(&ses->server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5->shash,
+				ntlmv2->ntlmv2_hash);
+	if (rc)
+		cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not generate md5 hash\n", __func__);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int crypto_hmacmd5_alloc(struct TCP_Server_Info *server)
+{
+	int rc;
+	unsigned int size;
+
+	/* check if already allocated */
+	if (server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5)
+		return 0;
+
+	server->secmech.hmacmd5 = crypto_alloc_shash("hmac(md5)", 0, 0);
+	if (IS_ERR(server->secmech.hmacmd5)) {
+		cifs_dbg(VFS, "could not allocate crypto hmacmd5\n");
+		rc = PTR_ERR(server->secmech.hmacmd5);
+		server->secmech.hmacmd5 = NULL;
+		return rc;
+	}
+
+	size = sizeof(struct shash_desc) +
+			crypto_shash_descsize(server->secmech.hmacmd5);
+	server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5 = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5) {
+		crypto_free_shash(server->secmech.hmacmd5);
+		server->secmech.hmacmd5 = NULL;
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+	server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5->shash.tfm = server->secmech.hmacmd5;
+	server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5->shash.flags = 0x0;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+setup_ntlmv2_rsp(struct cifs_ses *ses, const struct nls_table *nls_cp)
+{
+	int rc;
+	int baselen;
+	unsigned int tilen;
+	struct ntlmv2_resp *ntlmv2;
+	char ntlmv2_hash[16];
+	unsigned char *tiblob = NULL; /* target info blob */
+
+	if (ses->server->negflavor == CIFS_NEGFLAVOR_EXTENDED) {
+		if (!ses->domainName) {
+			rc = find_domain_name(ses, nls_cp);
+			if (rc) {
+				cifs_dbg(VFS, "error %d finding domain name\n",
+					 rc);
+				goto setup_ntlmv2_rsp_ret;
+			}
+		}
+	} else {
+		rc = build_avpair_blob(ses, nls_cp);
+		if (rc) {
+			cifs_dbg(VFS, "error %d building av pair blob\n", rc);
+			goto setup_ntlmv2_rsp_ret;
+		}
+	}
+
+	baselen = CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE + sizeof(struct ntlmv2_resp);
+	tilen = ses->auth_key.len;
+	tiblob = ses->auth_key.response;
+
+	ses->auth_key.response = kmalloc(baselen + tilen, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!ses->auth_key.response) {
+		rc = ENOMEM;
+		ses->auth_key.len = 0;
+		goto setup_ntlmv2_rsp_ret;
+	}
+	ses->auth_key.len += baselen;
+
+	ntlmv2 = (struct ntlmv2_resp *)
+			(ses->auth_key.response + CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE);
+	ntlmv2->blob_signature = cpu_to_le32(0x00000101);
+	ntlmv2->reserved = 0;
+	/* Must be within 5 minutes of the server */
+	ntlmv2->time = cpu_to_le64(cifs_UnixTimeToNT(CURRENT_TIME));
+	get_random_bytes(&ntlmv2->client_chal, sizeof(ntlmv2->client_chal));
+	ntlmv2->reserved2 = 0;
+
+	memcpy(ses->auth_key.response + baselen, tiblob, tilen);
+
+	rc = crypto_hmacmd5_alloc(ses->server);
+	if (rc) {
+		cifs_dbg(VFS, "could not crypto alloc hmacmd5 rc %d\n", rc);
+		goto setup_ntlmv2_rsp_ret;
+	}
+
+	/* calculate ntlmv2_hash */
+	rc = calc_ntlmv2_hash(ses, ntlmv2_hash, nls_cp);
+	if (rc) {
+		cifs_dbg(VFS, "could not get v2 hash rc %d\n", rc);
+		goto setup_ntlmv2_rsp_ret;
+	}
+
+	/* calculate first part of the client response (CR1) */
+	rc = CalcNTLMv2_response(ses, ntlmv2_hash);
+	if (rc) {
+		cifs_dbg(VFS, "Could not calculate CR1 rc: %d\n", rc);
+		goto setup_ntlmv2_rsp_ret;
+	}
+
+	/* now calculate the session key for NTLMv2 */
+	rc = crypto_shash_setkey(ses->server->secmech.hmacmd5,
+		ntlmv2_hash, CIFS_HMAC_MD5_HASH_SIZE);
+	if (rc) {
+		cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not set NTLMV2 Hash as a key\n",
+			 __func__);
+		goto setup_ntlmv2_rsp_ret;
+	}
+
+	rc = crypto_shash_init(&ses->server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5->shash);
+	if (rc) {
+		cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not init hmacmd5\n", __func__);
+		goto setup_ntlmv2_rsp_ret;
+	}
+
+	rc = crypto_shash_update(&ses->server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5->shash,
+		ntlmv2->ntlmv2_hash,
+		CIFS_HMAC_MD5_HASH_SIZE);
+	if (rc) {
+		cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not update with response\n", __func__);
+		goto setup_ntlmv2_rsp_ret;
+	}
+
+	rc = crypto_shash_final(&ses->server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5->shash,
+		ses->auth_key.response);
+	if (rc)
+		cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not generate md5 hash\n", __func__);
+
+setup_ntlmv2_rsp_ret:
+	kfree(tiblob);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+int
+calc_seckey(struct cifs_ses *ses)
+{
+	int rc;
+	struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm_arc4;
+	struct scatterlist sgin, sgout;
+	struct blkcipher_desc desc;
+	unsigned char sec_key[CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE]; /* a nonce */
+
+	get_random_bytes(sec_key, CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE);
+
+	tfm_arc4 = crypto_alloc_blkcipher("ecb(arc4)", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
+	if (IS_ERR(tfm_arc4)) {
+		rc = PTR_ERR(tfm_arc4);
+		cifs_dbg(VFS, "could not allocate crypto API arc4\n");
+		return rc;
+	}
+
+	desc.tfm = tfm_arc4;
+
+	rc = crypto_blkcipher_setkey(tfm_arc4, ses->auth_key.response,
+					CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE);
+	if (rc) {
+		cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not set response as a key\n",
+			 __func__);
+		return rc;
+	}
+
+	sg_init_one(&sgin, sec_key, CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE);
+	sg_init_one(&sgout, ses->ntlmssp->ciphertext, CIFS_CPHTXT_SIZE);
+
+	rc = crypto_blkcipher_encrypt(&desc, &sgout, &sgin, CIFS_CPHTXT_SIZE);
+	if (rc) {
+		cifs_dbg(VFS, "could not encrypt session key rc: %d\n", rc);
+		crypto_free_blkcipher(tfm_arc4);
+		return rc;
+	}
+
+	/* make secondary_key/nonce as session key */
+	memcpy(ses->auth_key.response, sec_key, CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE);
+	/* and make len as that of session key only */
+	ses->auth_key.len = CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE;
+
+	crypto_free_blkcipher(tfm_arc4);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+void
+cifs_crypto_shash_release(struct TCP_Server_Info *server)
+{
+	if (server->secmech.cmacaes) {
+		crypto_free_shash(server->secmech.cmacaes);
+		server->secmech.cmacaes = NULL;
+	}
+
+	if (server->secmech.hmacsha256) {
+		crypto_free_shash(server->secmech.hmacsha256);
+		server->secmech.hmacsha256 = NULL;
+	}
+
+	if (server->secmech.md5) {
+		crypto_free_shash(server->secmech.md5);
+		server->secmech.md5 = NULL;
+	}
+
+	if (server->secmech.hmacmd5) {
+		crypto_free_shash(server->secmech.hmacmd5);
+		server->secmech.hmacmd5 = NULL;
+	}
+
+	kfree(server->secmech.sdesccmacaes);
+	server->secmech.sdesccmacaes = NULL;
+	kfree(server->secmech.sdeschmacsha256);
+	server->secmech.sdeschmacsha256 = NULL;
+	kfree(server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5);
+	server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5 = NULL;
+	kfree(server->secmech.sdescmd5);
+	server->secmech.sdescmd5 = NULL;
+}