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authorAndré Fabian Silva Delgado <emulatorman@parabola.nu>2015-08-05 17:04:01 -0300
committerAndré Fabian Silva Delgado <emulatorman@parabola.nu>2015-08-05 17:04:01 -0300
commit57f0f512b273f60d52568b8c6b77e17f5636edc0 (patch)
tree5e910f0e82173f4ef4f51111366a3f1299037a7b /security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
Initial import
Diffstat (limited to 'security/selinux/selinuxfs.c')
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/selinuxfs.c1893
1 files changed, 1893 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..3d2201413
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1893 @@
+/* Updated: Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@tresys.com>
+ *
+ * Added conditional policy language extensions
+ *
+ * Updated: Hewlett-Packard <paul@paul-moore.com>
+ *
+ * Added support for the policy capability bitmap
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2007 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
+ * Copyright (C) 2003 - 2004 Tresys Technology, LLC
+ * Copyright (C) 2004 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation, version 2.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/pagemap.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/mutex.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/major.h>
+#include <linux/seq_file.h>
+#include <linux/percpu.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/kobject.h>
+#include <linux/ctype.h>
+
+/* selinuxfs pseudo filesystem for exporting the security policy API.
+ Based on the proc code and the fs/nfsd/nfsctl.c code. */
+
+#include "flask.h"
+#include "avc.h"
+#include "avc_ss.h"
+#include "security.h"
+#include "objsec.h"
+#include "conditional.h"
+
+/* Policy capability filenames */
+static char *policycap_names[] = {
+ "network_peer_controls",
+ "open_perms",
+ "redhat1",
+ "always_check_network"
+};
+
+unsigned int selinux_checkreqprot = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE;
+
+static int __init checkreqprot_setup(char *str)
+{
+ unsigned long checkreqprot;
+ if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &checkreqprot))
+ selinux_checkreqprot = checkreqprot ? 1 : 0;
+ return 1;
+}
+__setup("checkreqprot=", checkreqprot_setup);
+
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(sel_mutex);
+
+/* global data for booleans */
+static struct dentry *bool_dir;
+static int bool_num;
+static char **bool_pending_names;
+static int *bool_pending_values;
+
+/* global data for classes */
+static struct dentry *class_dir;
+static unsigned long last_class_ino;
+
+static char policy_opened;
+
+/* global data for policy capabilities */
+static struct dentry *policycap_dir;
+
+/* Check whether a task is allowed to use a security operation. */
+static int task_has_security(struct task_struct *tsk,
+ u32 perms)
+{
+ const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+ u32 sid = 0;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ tsec = __task_cred(tsk)->security;
+ if (tsec)
+ sid = tsec->sid;
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ if (!tsec)
+ return -EACCES;
+
+ return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_SECURITY,
+ SECCLASS_SECURITY, perms, NULL);
+}
+
+enum sel_inos {
+ SEL_ROOT_INO = 2,
+ SEL_LOAD, /* load policy */
+ SEL_ENFORCE, /* get or set enforcing status */
+ SEL_CONTEXT, /* validate context */
+ SEL_ACCESS, /* compute access decision */
+ SEL_CREATE, /* compute create labeling decision */
+ SEL_RELABEL, /* compute relabeling decision */
+ SEL_USER, /* compute reachable user contexts */
+ SEL_POLICYVERS, /* return policy version for this kernel */
+ SEL_COMMIT_BOOLS, /* commit new boolean values */
+ SEL_MLS, /* return if MLS policy is enabled */
+ SEL_DISABLE, /* disable SELinux until next reboot */
+ SEL_MEMBER, /* compute polyinstantiation membership decision */
+ SEL_CHECKREQPROT, /* check requested protection, not kernel-applied one */
+ SEL_COMPAT_NET, /* whether to use old compat network packet controls */
+ SEL_REJECT_UNKNOWN, /* export unknown reject handling to userspace */
+ SEL_DENY_UNKNOWN, /* export unknown deny handling to userspace */
+ SEL_STATUS, /* export current status using mmap() */
+ SEL_POLICY, /* allow userspace to read the in kernel policy */
+ SEL_INO_NEXT, /* The next inode number to use */
+};
+
+static unsigned long sel_last_ino = SEL_INO_NEXT - 1;
+
+#define SEL_INITCON_INO_OFFSET 0x01000000
+#define SEL_BOOL_INO_OFFSET 0x02000000
+#define SEL_CLASS_INO_OFFSET 0x04000000
+#define SEL_POLICYCAP_INO_OFFSET 0x08000000
+#define SEL_INO_MASK 0x00ffffff
+
+#define TMPBUFLEN 12
+static ssize_t sel_read_enforce(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ char tmpbuf[TMPBUFLEN];
+ ssize_t length;
+
+ length = scnprintf(tmpbuf, TMPBUFLEN, "%d", selinux_enforcing);
+ return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, tmpbuf, length);
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
+static ssize_t sel_write_enforce(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+
+{
+ char *page = NULL;
+ ssize_t length;
+ int new_value;
+
+ length = -ENOMEM;
+ if (count >= PAGE_SIZE)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* No partial writes. */
+ length = -EINVAL;
+ if (*ppos != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ length = -ENOMEM;
+ page = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!page)
+ goto out;
+
+ length = -EFAULT;
+ if (copy_from_user(page, buf, count))
+ goto out;
+
+ length = -EINVAL;
+ if (sscanf(page, "%d", &new_value) != 1)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (new_value != selinux_enforcing) {
+ length = task_has_security(current, SECURITY__SETENFORCE);
+ if (length)
+ goto out;
+ audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_MAC_STATUS,
+ "enforcing=%d old_enforcing=%d auid=%u ses=%u",
+ new_value, selinux_enforcing,
+ from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)),
+ audit_get_sessionid(current));
+ selinux_enforcing = new_value;
+ if (selinux_enforcing)
+ avc_ss_reset(0);
+ selnl_notify_setenforce(selinux_enforcing);
+ selinux_status_update_setenforce(selinux_enforcing);
+ }
+ length = count;
+out:
+ free_page((unsigned long) page);
+ return length;
+}
+#else
+#define sel_write_enforce NULL
+#endif
+
+static const struct file_operations sel_enforce_ops = {
+ .read = sel_read_enforce,
+ .write = sel_write_enforce,
+ .llseek = generic_file_llseek,
+};
+
+static ssize_t sel_read_handle_unknown(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ char tmpbuf[TMPBUFLEN];
+ ssize_t length;
+ ino_t ino = file_inode(filp)->i_ino;
+ int handle_unknown = (ino == SEL_REJECT_UNKNOWN) ?
+ security_get_reject_unknown() : !security_get_allow_unknown();
+
+ length = scnprintf(tmpbuf, TMPBUFLEN, "%d", handle_unknown);
+ return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, tmpbuf, length);
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations sel_handle_unknown_ops = {
+ .read = sel_read_handle_unknown,
+ .llseek = generic_file_llseek,
+};
+
+static int sel_open_handle_status(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
+{
+ struct page *status = selinux_kernel_status_page();
+
+ if (!status)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ filp->private_data = status;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static ssize_t sel_read_handle_status(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ struct page *status = filp->private_data;
+
+ BUG_ON(!status);
+
+ return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos,
+ page_address(status),
+ sizeof(struct selinux_kernel_status));
+}
+
+static int sel_mmap_handle_status(struct file *filp,
+ struct vm_area_struct *vma)
+{
+ struct page *status = filp->private_data;
+ unsigned long size = vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start;
+
+ BUG_ON(!status);
+
+ /* only allows one page from the head */
+ if (vma->vm_pgoff > 0 || size != PAGE_SIZE)
+ return -EIO;
+ /* disallow writable mapping */
+ if (vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE)
+ return -EPERM;
+ /* disallow mprotect() turns it into writable */
+ vma->vm_flags &= ~VM_MAYWRITE;
+
+ return remap_pfn_range(vma, vma->vm_start,
+ page_to_pfn(status),
+ size, vma->vm_page_prot);
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations sel_handle_status_ops = {
+ .open = sel_open_handle_status,
+ .read = sel_read_handle_status,
+ .mmap = sel_mmap_handle_status,
+ .llseek = generic_file_llseek,
+};
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
+static ssize_t sel_write_disable(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+
+{
+ char *page = NULL;
+ ssize_t length;
+ int new_value;
+
+ length = -ENOMEM;
+ if (count >= PAGE_SIZE)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* No partial writes. */
+ length = -EINVAL;
+ if (*ppos != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ length = -ENOMEM;
+ page = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!page)
+ goto out;
+
+ length = -EFAULT;
+ if (copy_from_user(page, buf, count))
+ goto out;
+
+ length = -EINVAL;
+ if (sscanf(page, "%d", &new_value) != 1)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (new_value) {
+ length = selinux_disable();
+ if (length)
+ goto out;
+ audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_MAC_STATUS,
+ "selinux=0 auid=%u ses=%u",
+ from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)),
+ audit_get_sessionid(current));
+ }
+
+ length = count;
+out:
+ free_page((unsigned long) page);
+ return length;
+}
+#else
+#define sel_write_disable NULL
+#endif
+
+static const struct file_operations sel_disable_ops = {
+ .write = sel_write_disable,
+ .llseek = generic_file_llseek,
+};
+
+static ssize_t sel_read_policyvers(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ char tmpbuf[TMPBUFLEN];
+ ssize_t length;
+
+ length = scnprintf(tmpbuf, TMPBUFLEN, "%u", POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX);
+ return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, tmpbuf, length);
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations sel_policyvers_ops = {
+ .read = sel_read_policyvers,
+ .llseek = generic_file_llseek,
+};
+
+/* declaration for sel_write_load */
+static int sel_make_bools(void);
+static int sel_make_classes(void);
+static int sel_make_policycap(void);
+
+/* declaration for sel_make_class_dirs */
+static struct dentry *sel_make_dir(struct dentry *dir, const char *name,
+ unsigned long *ino);
+
+static ssize_t sel_read_mls(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ char tmpbuf[TMPBUFLEN];
+ ssize_t length;
+
+ length = scnprintf(tmpbuf, TMPBUFLEN, "%d",
+ security_mls_enabled());
+ return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, tmpbuf, length);
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations sel_mls_ops = {
+ .read = sel_read_mls,
+ .llseek = generic_file_llseek,
+};
+
+struct policy_load_memory {
+ size_t len;
+ void *data;
+};
+
+static int sel_open_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
+{
+ struct policy_load_memory *plm = NULL;
+ int rc;
+
+ BUG_ON(filp->private_data);
+
+ mutex_lock(&sel_mutex);
+
+ rc = task_has_security(current, SECURITY__READ_POLICY);
+ if (rc)
+ goto err;
+
+ rc = -EBUSY;
+ if (policy_opened)
+ goto err;
+
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ plm = kzalloc(sizeof(*plm), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!plm)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (i_size_read(inode) != security_policydb_len()) {
+ mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
+ i_size_write(inode, security_policydb_len());
+ mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
+ }
+
+ rc = security_read_policy(&plm->data, &plm->len);
+ if (rc)
+ goto err;
+
+ policy_opened = 1;
+
+ filp->private_data = plm;
+
+ mutex_unlock(&sel_mutex);
+
+ return 0;
+err:
+ mutex_unlock(&sel_mutex);
+
+ if (plm)
+ vfree(plm->data);
+ kfree(plm);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int sel_release_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
+{
+ struct policy_load_memory *plm = filp->private_data;
+
+ BUG_ON(!plm);
+
+ policy_opened = 0;
+
+ vfree(plm->data);
+ kfree(plm);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static ssize_t sel_read_policy(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ struct policy_load_memory *plm = filp->private_data;
+ int ret;
+
+ mutex_lock(&sel_mutex);
+
+ ret = task_has_security(current, SECURITY__READ_POLICY);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+
+ ret = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, plm->data, plm->len);
+out:
+ mutex_unlock(&sel_mutex);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int sel_mmap_policy_fault(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
+ struct vm_fault *vmf)
+{
+ struct policy_load_memory *plm = vma->vm_file->private_data;
+ unsigned long offset;
+ struct page *page;
+
+ if (vmf->flags & (FAULT_FLAG_MKWRITE | FAULT_FLAG_WRITE))
+ return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;
+
+ offset = vmf->pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT;
+ if (offset >= roundup(plm->len, PAGE_SIZE))
+ return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;
+
+ page = vmalloc_to_page(plm->data + offset);
+ get_page(page);
+
+ vmf->page = page;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static struct vm_operations_struct sel_mmap_policy_ops = {
+ .fault = sel_mmap_policy_fault,
+ .page_mkwrite = sel_mmap_policy_fault,
+};
+
+static int sel_mmap_policy(struct file *filp, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
+{
+ if (vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED) {
+ /* do not allow mprotect to make mapping writable */
+ vma->vm_flags &= ~VM_MAYWRITE;
+
+ if (vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE)
+ return -EACCES;
+ }
+
+ vma->vm_flags |= VM_DONTEXPAND | VM_DONTDUMP;
+ vma->vm_ops = &sel_mmap_policy_ops;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations sel_policy_ops = {
+ .open = sel_open_policy,
+ .read = sel_read_policy,
+ .mmap = sel_mmap_policy,
+ .release = sel_release_policy,
+ .llseek = generic_file_llseek,
+};
+
+static ssize_t sel_write_load(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+
+{
+ ssize_t length;
+ void *data = NULL;
+
+ mutex_lock(&sel_mutex);
+
+ length = task_has_security(current, SECURITY__LOAD_POLICY);
+ if (length)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* No partial writes. */
+ length = -EINVAL;
+ if (*ppos != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ length = -EFBIG;
+ if (count > 64 * 1024 * 1024)
+ goto out;
+
+ length = -ENOMEM;
+ data = vmalloc(count);
+ if (!data)
+ goto out;
+
+ length = -EFAULT;
+ if (copy_from_user(data, buf, count) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ length = security_load_policy(data, count);
+ if (length)
+ goto out;
+
+ length = sel_make_bools();
+ if (length)
+ goto out1;
+
+ length = sel_make_classes();
+ if (length)
+ goto out1;
+
+ length = sel_make_policycap();
+ if (length)
+ goto out1;
+
+ length = count;
+
+out1:
+ audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_MAC_POLICY_LOAD,
+ "policy loaded auid=%u ses=%u",
+ from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)),
+ audit_get_sessionid(current));
+out:
+ mutex_unlock(&sel_mutex);
+ vfree(data);
+ return length;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations sel_load_ops = {
+ .write = sel_write_load,
+ .llseek = generic_file_llseek,
+};
+
+static ssize_t sel_write_context(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
+{
+ char *canon = NULL;
+ u32 sid, len;
+ ssize_t length;
+
+ length = task_has_security(current, SECURITY__CHECK_CONTEXT);
+ if (length)
+ goto out;
+
+ length = security_context_to_sid(buf, size, &sid, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (length)
+ goto out;
+
+ length = security_sid_to_context(sid, &canon, &len);
+ if (length)
+ goto out;
+
+ length = -ERANGE;
+ if (len > SIMPLE_TRANSACTION_LIMIT) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: context size (%u) exceeds "
+ "payload max\n", __func__, len);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(buf, canon, len);
+ length = len;
+out:
+ kfree(canon);
+ return length;
+}
+
+static ssize_t sel_read_checkreqprot(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ char tmpbuf[TMPBUFLEN];
+ ssize_t length;
+
+ length = scnprintf(tmpbuf, TMPBUFLEN, "%u", selinux_checkreqprot);
+ return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, tmpbuf, length);
+}
+
+static ssize_t sel_write_checkreqprot(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ char *page = NULL;
+ ssize_t length;
+ unsigned int new_value;
+
+ length = task_has_security(current, SECURITY__SETCHECKREQPROT);
+ if (length)
+ goto out;
+
+ length = -ENOMEM;
+ if (count >= PAGE_SIZE)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* No partial writes. */
+ length = -EINVAL;
+ if (*ppos != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ length = -ENOMEM;
+ page = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!page)
+ goto out;
+
+ length = -EFAULT;
+ if (copy_from_user(page, buf, count))
+ goto out;
+
+ length = -EINVAL;
+ if (sscanf(page, "%u", &new_value) != 1)
+ goto out;
+
+ selinux_checkreqprot = new_value ? 1 : 0;
+ length = count;
+out:
+ free_page((unsigned long) page);
+ return length;
+}
+static const struct file_operations sel_checkreqprot_ops = {
+ .read = sel_read_checkreqprot,
+ .write = sel_write_checkreqprot,
+ .llseek = generic_file_llseek,
+};
+
+/*
+ * Remaining nodes use transaction based IO methods like nfsd/nfsctl.c
+ */
+static ssize_t sel_write_access(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size);
+static ssize_t sel_write_create(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size);
+static ssize_t sel_write_relabel(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size);
+static ssize_t sel_write_user(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size);
+static ssize_t sel_write_member(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size);
+
+static ssize_t (*write_op[])(struct file *, char *, size_t) = {
+ [SEL_ACCESS] = sel_write_access,
+ [SEL_CREATE] = sel_write_create,
+ [SEL_RELABEL] = sel_write_relabel,
+ [SEL_USER] = sel_write_user,
+ [SEL_MEMBER] = sel_write_member,
+ [SEL_CONTEXT] = sel_write_context,
+};
+
+static ssize_t selinux_transaction_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, size_t size, loff_t *pos)
+{
+ ino_t ino = file_inode(file)->i_ino;
+ char *data;
+ ssize_t rv;
+
+ if (ino >= ARRAY_SIZE(write_op) || !write_op[ino])
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ data = simple_transaction_get(file, buf, size);
+ if (IS_ERR(data))
+ return PTR_ERR(data);
+
+ rv = write_op[ino](file, data, size);
+ if (rv > 0) {
+ simple_transaction_set(file, rv);
+ rv = size;
+ }
+ return rv;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations transaction_ops = {
+ .write = selinux_transaction_write,
+ .read = simple_transaction_read,
+ .release = simple_transaction_release,
+ .llseek = generic_file_llseek,
+};
+
+/*
+ * payload - write methods
+ * If the method has a response, the response should be put in buf,
+ * and the length returned. Otherwise return 0 or and -error.
+ */
+
+static ssize_t sel_write_access(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
+{
+ char *scon = NULL, *tcon = NULL;
+ u32 ssid, tsid;
+ u16 tclass;
+ struct av_decision avd;
+ ssize_t length;
+
+ length = task_has_security(current, SECURITY__COMPUTE_AV);
+ if (length)
+ goto out;
+
+ length = -ENOMEM;
+ scon = kzalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!scon)
+ goto out;
+
+ length = -ENOMEM;
+ tcon = kzalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!tcon)
+ goto out;
+
+ length = -EINVAL;
+ if (sscanf(buf, "%s %s %hu", scon, tcon, &tclass) != 3)
+ goto out;
+
+ length = security_context_to_sid(scon, strlen(scon) + 1, &ssid,
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (length)
+ goto out;
+
+ length = security_context_to_sid(tcon, strlen(tcon) + 1, &tsid,
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (length)
+ goto out;
+
+ security_compute_av_user(ssid, tsid, tclass, &avd);
+
+ length = scnprintf(buf, SIMPLE_TRANSACTION_LIMIT,
+ "%x %x %x %x %u %x",
+ avd.allowed, 0xffffffff,
+ avd.auditallow, avd.auditdeny,
+ avd.seqno, avd.flags);
+out:
+ kfree(tcon);
+ kfree(scon);
+ return length;
+}
+
+static ssize_t sel_write_create(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
+{
+ char *scon = NULL, *tcon = NULL;
+ char *namebuf = NULL, *objname = NULL;
+ u32 ssid, tsid, newsid;
+ u16 tclass;
+ ssize_t length;
+ char *newcon = NULL;
+ u32 len;
+ int nargs;
+
+ length = task_has_security(current, SECURITY__COMPUTE_CREATE);
+ if (length)
+ goto out;
+
+ length = -ENOMEM;
+ scon = kzalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!scon)
+ goto out;
+
+ length = -ENOMEM;
+ tcon = kzalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!tcon)
+ goto out;
+
+ length = -ENOMEM;
+ namebuf = kzalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!namebuf)
+ goto out;
+
+ length = -EINVAL;
+ nargs = sscanf(buf, "%s %s %hu %s", scon, tcon, &tclass, namebuf);
+ if (nargs < 3 || nargs > 4)
+ goto out;
+ if (nargs == 4) {
+ /*
+ * If and when the name of new object to be queried contains
+ * either whitespace or multibyte characters, they shall be
+ * encoded based on the percentage-encoding rule.
+ * If not encoded, the sscanf logic picks up only left-half
+ * of the supplied name; splitted by a whitespace unexpectedly.
+ */
+ char *r, *w;
+ int c1, c2;
+
+ r = w = namebuf;
+ do {
+ c1 = *r++;
+ if (c1 == '+')
+ c1 = ' ';
+ else if (c1 == '%') {
+ c1 = hex_to_bin(*r++);
+ if (c1 < 0)
+ goto out;
+ c2 = hex_to_bin(*r++);
+ if (c2 < 0)
+ goto out;
+ c1 = (c1 << 4) | c2;
+ }
+ *w++ = c1;
+ } while (c1 != '\0');
+
+ objname = namebuf;
+ }
+
+ length = security_context_to_sid(scon, strlen(scon) + 1, &ssid,
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (length)
+ goto out;
+
+ length = security_context_to_sid(tcon, strlen(tcon) + 1, &tsid,
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (length)
+ goto out;
+
+ length = security_transition_sid_user(ssid, tsid, tclass,
+ objname, &newsid);
+ if (length)
+ goto out;
+
+ length = security_sid_to_context(newsid, &newcon, &len);
+ if (length)
+ goto out;
+
+ length = -ERANGE;
+ if (len > SIMPLE_TRANSACTION_LIMIT) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: context size (%u) exceeds "
+ "payload max\n", __func__, len);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(buf, newcon, len);
+ length = len;
+out:
+ kfree(newcon);
+ kfree(namebuf);
+ kfree(tcon);
+ kfree(scon);
+ return length;
+}
+
+static ssize_t sel_write_relabel(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
+{
+ char *scon = NULL, *tcon = NULL;
+ u32 ssid, tsid, newsid;
+ u16 tclass;
+ ssize_t length;
+ char *newcon = NULL;
+ u32 len;
+
+ length = task_has_security(current, SECURITY__COMPUTE_RELABEL);
+ if (length)
+ goto out;
+
+ length = -ENOMEM;
+ scon = kzalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!scon)
+ goto out;
+
+ length = -ENOMEM;
+ tcon = kzalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!tcon)
+ goto out;
+
+ length = -EINVAL;
+ if (sscanf(buf, "%s %s %hu", scon, tcon, &tclass) != 3)
+ goto out;
+
+ length = security_context_to_sid(scon, strlen(scon) + 1, &ssid,
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (length)
+ goto out;
+
+ length = security_context_to_sid(tcon, strlen(tcon) + 1, &tsid,
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (length)
+ goto out;
+
+ length = security_change_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, &newsid);
+ if (length)
+ goto out;
+
+ length = security_sid_to_context(newsid, &newcon, &len);
+ if (length)
+ goto out;
+
+ length = -ERANGE;
+ if (len > SIMPLE_TRANSACTION_LIMIT)
+ goto out;
+
+ memcpy(buf, newcon, len);
+ length = len;
+out:
+ kfree(newcon);
+ kfree(tcon);
+ kfree(scon);
+ return length;
+}
+
+static ssize_t sel_write_user(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
+{
+ char *con = NULL, *user = NULL, *ptr;
+ u32 sid, *sids = NULL;
+ ssize_t length;
+ char *newcon;
+ int i, rc;
+ u32 len, nsids;
+
+ length = task_has_security(current, SECURITY__COMPUTE_USER);
+ if (length)
+ goto out;
+
+ length = -ENOMEM;
+ con = kzalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!con)
+ goto out;
+
+ length = -ENOMEM;
+ user = kzalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!user)
+ goto out;
+
+ length = -EINVAL;
+ if (sscanf(buf, "%s %s", con, user) != 2)
+ goto out;
+
+ length = security_context_to_sid(con, strlen(con) + 1, &sid, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (length)
+ goto out;
+
+ length = security_get_user_sids(sid, user, &sids, &nsids);
+ if (length)
+ goto out;
+
+ length = sprintf(buf, "%u", nsids) + 1;
+ ptr = buf + length;
+ for (i = 0; i < nsids; i++) {
+ rc = security_sid_to_context(sids[i], &newcon, &len);
+ if (rc) {
+ length = rc;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((length + len) >= SIMPLE_TRANSACTION_LIMIT) {
+ kfree(newcon);
+ length = -ERANGE;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ memcpy(ptr, newcon, len);
+ kfree(newcon);
+ ptr += len;
+ length += len;
+ }
+out:
+ kfree(sids);
+ kfree(user);
+ kfree(con);
+ return length;
+}
+
+static ssize_t sel_write_member(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
+{
+ char *scon = NULL, *tcon = NULL;
+ u32 ssid, tsid, newsid;
+ u16 tclass;
+ ssize_t length;
+ char *newcon = NULL;
+ u32 len;
+
+ length = task_has_security(current, SECURITY__COMPUTE_MEMBER);
+ if (length)
+ goto out;
+
+ length = -ENOMEM;
+ scon = kzalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!scon)
+ goto out;
+
+ length = -ENOMEM;
+ tcon = kzalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!tcon)
+ goto out;
+
+ length = -EINVAL;
+ if (sscanf(buf, "%s %s %hu", scon, tcon, &tclass) != 3)
+ goto out;
+
+ length = security_context_to_sid(scon, strlen(scon) + 1, &ssid,
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (length)
+ goto out;
+
+ length = security_context_to_sid(tcon, strlen(tcon) + 1, &tsid,
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (length)
+ goto out;
+
+ length = security_member_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, &newsid);
+ if (length)
+ goto out;
+
+ length = security_sid_to_context(newsid, &newcon, &len);
+ if (length)
+ goto out;
+
+ length = -ERANGE;
+ if (len > SIMPLE_TRANSACTION_LIMIT) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: context size (%u) exceeds "
+ "payload max\n", __func__, len);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(buf, newcon, len);
+ length = len;
+out:
+ kfree(newcon);
+ kfree(tcon);
+ kfree(scon);
+ return length;
+}
+
+static struct inode *sel_make_inode(struct super_block *sb, int mode)
+{
+ struct inode *ret = new_inode(sb);
+
+ if (ret) {
+ ret->i_mode = mode;
+ ret->i_atime = ret->i_mtime = ret->i_ctime = CURRENT_TIME;
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static ssize_t sel_read_bool(struct file *filep, char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ char *page = NULL;
+ ssize_t length;
+ ssize_t ret;
+ int cur_enforcing;
+ unsigned index = file_inode(filep)->i_ino & SEL_INO_MASK;
+ const char *name = filep->f_path.dentry->d_name.name;
+
+ mutex_lock(&sel_mutex);
+
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ if (index >= bool_num || strcmp(name, bool_pending_names[index]))
+ goto out;
+
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ page = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!page)
+ goto out;
+
+ cur_enforcing = security_get_bool_value(index);
+ if (cur_enforcing < 0) {
+ ret = cur_enforcing;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ length = scnprintf(page, PAGE_SIZE, "%d %d", cur_enforcing,
+ bool_pending_values[index]);
+ ret = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, page, length);
+out:
+ mutex_unlock(&sel_mutex);
+ free_page((unsigned long)page);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static ssize_t sel_write_bool(struct file *filep, const char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ char *page = NULL;
+ ssize_t length;
+ int new_value;
+ unsigned index = file_inode(filep)->i_ino & SEL_INO_MASK;
+ const char *name = filep->f_path.dentry->d_name.name;
+
+ mutex_lock(&sel_mutex);
+
+ length = task_has_security(current, SECURITY__SETBOOL);
+ if (length)
+ goto out;
+
+ length = -EINVAL;
+ if (index >= bool_num || strcmp(name, bool_pending_names[index]))
+ goto out;
+
+ length = -ENOMEM;
+ if (count >= PAGE_SIZE)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* No partial writes. */
+ length = -EINVAL;
+ if (*ppos != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ length = -ENOMEM;
+ page = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!page)
+ goto out;
+
+ length = -EFAULT;
+ if (copy_from_user(page, buf, count))
+ goto out;
+
+ length = -EINVAL;
+ if (sscanf(page, "%d", &new_value) != 1)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (new_value)
+ new_value = 1;
+
+ bool_pending_values[index] = new_value;
+ length = count;
+
+out:
+ mutex_unlock(&sel_mutex);
+ free_page((unsigned long) page);
+ return length;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations sel_bool_ops = {
+ .read = sel_read_bool,
+ .write = sel_write_bool,
+ .llseek = generic_file_llseek,
+};
+
+static ssize_t sel_commit_bools_write(struct file *filep,
+ const char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ char *page = NULL;
+ ssize_t length;
+ int new_value;
+
+ mutex_lock(&sel_mutex);
+
+ length = task_has_security(current, SECURITY__SETBOOL);
+ if (length)
+ goto out;
+
+ length = -ENOMEM;
+ if (count >= PAGE_SIZE)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* No partial writes. */
+ length = -EINVAL;
+ if (*ppos != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ length = -ENOMEM;
+ page = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!page)
+ goto out;
+
+ length = -EFAULT;
+ if (copy_from_user(page, buf, count))
+ goto out;
+
+ length = -EINVAL;
+ if (sscanf(page, "%d", &new_value) != 1)
+ goto out;
+
+ length = 0;
+ if (new_value && bool_pending_values)
+ length = security_set_bools(bool_num, bool_pending_values);
+
+ if (!length)
+ length = count;
+
+out:
+ mutex_unlock(&sel_mutex);
+ free_page((unsigned long) page);
+ return length;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations sel_commit_bools_ops = {
+ .write = sel_commit_bools_write,
+ .llseek = generic_file_llseek,
+};
+
+static void sel_remove_entries(struct dentry *de)
+{
+ d_genocide(de);
+ shrink_dcache_parent(de);
+}
+
+#define BOOL_DIR_NAME "booleans"
+
+static int sel_make_bools(void)
+{
+ int i, ret;
+ ssize_t len;
+ struct dentry *dentry = NULL;
+ struct dentry *dir = bool_dir;
+ struct inode *inode = NULL;
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+ char **names = NULL, *page;
+ int num;
+ int *values = NULL;
+ u32 sid;
+
+ /* remove any existing files */
+ for (i = 0; i < bool_num; i++)
+ kfree(bool_pending_names[i]);
+ kfree(bool_pending_names);
+ kfree(bool_pending_values);
+ bool_num = 0;
+ bool_pending_names = NULL;
+ bool_pending_values = NULL;
+
+ sel_remove_entries(dir);
+
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ page = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!page)
+ goto out;
+
+ ret = security_get_bools(&num, &names, &values);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ dentry = d_alloc_name(dir, names[i]);
+ if (!dentry)
+ goto out;
+
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ inode = sel_make_inode(dir->d_sb, S_IFREG | S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR);
+ if (!inode)
+ goto out;
+
+ ret = -ENAMETOOLONG;
+ len = snprintf(page, PAGE_SIZE, "/%s/%s", BOOL_DIR_NAME, names[i]);
+ if (len >= PAGE_SIZE)
+ goto out;
+
+ isec = (struct inode_security_struct *)inode->i_security;
+ ret = security_genfs_sid("selinuxfs", page, SECCLASS_FILE, &sid);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+
+ isec->sid = sid;
+ isec->initialized = 1;
+ inode->i_fop = &sel_bool_ops;
+ inode->i_ino = i|SEL_BOOL_INO_OFFSET;
+ d_add(dentry, inode);
+ }
+ bool_num = num;
+ bool_pending_names = names;
+ bool_pending_values = values;
+
+ free_page((unsigned long)page);
+ return 0;
+out:
+ free_page((unsigned long)page);
+
+ if (names) {
+ for (i = 0; i < num; i++)
+ kfree(names[i]);
+ kfree(names);
+ }
+ kfree(values);
+ sel_remove_entries(dir);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+#define NULL_FILE_NAME "null"
+
+struct path selinux_null;
+
+static ssize_t sel_read_avc_cache_threshold(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ char tmpbuf[TMPBUFLEN];
+ ssize_t length;
+
+ length = scnprintf(tmpbuf, TMPBUFLEN, "%u", avc_cache_threshold);
+ return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, tmpbuf, length);
+}
+
+static ssize_t sel_write_avc_cache_threshold(struct file *file,
+ const char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+
+{
+ char *page = NULL;
+ ssize_t ret;
+ int new_value;
+
+ ret = task_has_security(current, SECURITY__SETSECPARAM);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ if (count >= PAGE_SIZE)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* No partial writes. */
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ if (*ppos != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ page = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!page)
+ goto out;
+
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+ if (copy_from_user(page, buf, count))
+ goto out;
+
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ if (sscanf(page, "%u", &new_value) != 1)
+ goto out;
+
+ avc_cache_threshold = new_value;
+
+ ret = count;
+out:
+ free_page((unsigned long)page);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static ssize_t sel_read_avc_hash_stats(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ char *page;
+ ssize_t length;
+
+ page = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!page)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ length = avc_get_hash_stats(page);
+ if (length >= 0)
+ length = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, page, length);
+ free_page((unsigned long)page);
+
+ return length;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations sel_avc_cache_threshold_ops = {
+ .read = sel_read_avc_cache_threshold,
+ .write = sel_write_avc_cache_threshold,
+ .llseek = generic_file_llseek,
+};
+
+static const struct file_operations sel_avc_hash_stats_ops = {
+ .read = sel_read_avc_hash_stats,
+ .llseek = generic_file_llseek,
+};
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_AVC_STATS
+static struct avc_cache_stats *sel_avc_get_stat_idx(loff_t *idx)
+{
+ int cpu;
+
+ for (cpu = *idx; cpu < nr_cpu_ids; ++cpu) {
+ if (!cpu_possible(cpu))
+ continue;
+ *idx = cpu + 1;
+ return &per_cpu(avc_cache_stats, cpu);
+ }
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static void *sel_avc_stats_seq_start(struct seq_file *seq, loff_t *pos)
+{
+ loff_t n = *pos - 1;
+
+ if (*pos == 0)
+ return SEQ_START_TOKEN;
+
+ return sel_avc_get_stat_idx(&n);
+}
+
+static void *sel_avc_stats_seq_next(struct seq_file *seq, void *v, loff_t *pos)
+{
+ return sel_avc_get_stat_idx(pos);
+}
+
+static int sel_avc_stats_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
+{
+ struct avc_cache_stats *st = v;
+
+ if (v == SEQ_START_TOKEN)
+ seq_printf(seq, "lookups hits misses allocations reclaims "
+ "frees\n");
+ else {
+ unsigned int lookups = st->lookups;
+ unsigned int misses = st->misses;
+ unsigned int hits = lookups - misses;
+ seq_printf(seq, "%u %u %u %u %u %u\n", lookups,
+ hits, misses, st->allocations,
+ st->reclaims, st->frees);
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void sel_avc_stats_seq_stop(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
+{ }
+
+static const struct seq_operations sel_avc_cache_stats_seq_ops = {
+ .start = sel_avc_stats_seq_start,
+ .next = sel_avc_stats_seq_next,
+ .show = sel_avc_stats_seq_show,
+ .stop = sel_avc_stats_seq_stop,
+};
+
+static int sel_open_avc_cache_stats(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+ return seq_open(file, &sel_avc_cache_stats_seq_ops);
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations sel_avc_cache_stats_ops = {
+ .open = sel_open_avc_cache_stats,
+ .read = seq_read,
+ .llseek = seq_lseek,
+ .release = seq_release,
+};
+#endif
+
+static int sel_make_avc_files(struct dentry *dir)
+{
+ int i;
+ static struct tree_descr files[] = {
+ { "cache_threshold",
+ &sel_avc_cache_threshold_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR },
+ { "hash_stats", &sel_avc_hash_stats_ops, S_IRUGO },
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_AVC_STATS
+ { "cache_stats", &sel_avc_cache_stats_ops, S_IRUGO },
+#endif
+ };
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(files); i++) {
+ struct inode *inode;
+ struct dentry *dentry;
+
+ dentry = d_alloc_name(dir, files[i].name);
+ if (!dentry)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ inode = sel_make_inode(dir->d_sb, S_IFREG|files[i].mode);
+ if (!inode)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ inode->i_fop = files[i].ops;
+ inode->i_ino = ++sel_last_ino;
+ d_add(dentry, inode);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static ssize_t sel_read_initcon(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ char *con;
+ u32 sid, len;
+ ssize_t ret;
+
+ sid = file_inode(file)->i_ino&SEL_INO_MASK;
+ ret = security_sid_to_context(sid, &con, &len);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ ret = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, con, len);
+ kfree(con);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations sel_initcon_ops = {
+ .read = sel_read_initcon,
+ .llseek = generic_file_llseek,
+};
+
+static int sel_make_initcon_files(struct dentry *dir)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 1; i <= SECINITSID_NUM; i++) {
+ struct inode *inode;
+ struct dentry *dentry;
+ dentry = d_alloc_name(dir, security_get_initial_sid_context(i));
+ if (!dentry)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ inode = sel_make_inode(dir->d_sb, S_IFREG|S_IRUGO);
+ if (!inode)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ inode->i_fop = &sel_initcon_ops;
+ inode->i_ino = i|SEL_INITCON_INO_OFFSET;
+ d_add(dentry, inode);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline unsigned long sel_class_to_ino(u16 class)
+{
+ return (class * (SEL_VEC_MAX + 1)) | SEL_CLASS_INO_OFFSET;
+}
+
+static inline u16 sel_ino_to_class(unsigned long ino)
+{
+ return (ino & SEL_INO_MASK) / (SEL_VEC_MAX + 1);
+}
+
+static inline unsigned long sel_perm_to_ino(u16 class, u32 perm)
+{
+ return (class * (SEL_VEC_MAX + 1) + perm) | SEL_CLASS_INO_OFFSET;
+}
+
+static inline u32 sel_ino_to_perm(unsigned long ino)
+{
+ return (ino & SEL_INO_MASK) % (SEL_VEC_MAX + 1);
+}
+
+static ssize_t sel_read_class(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ unsigned long ino = file_inode(file)->i_ino;
+ char res[TMPBUFLEN];
+ ssize_t len = snprintf(res, sizeof(res), "%d", sel_ino_to_class(ino));
+ return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, res, len);
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations sel_class_ops = {
+ .read = sel_read_class,
+ .llseek = generic_file_llseek,
+};
+
+static ssize_t sel_read_perm(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ unsigned long ino = file_inode(file)->i_ino;
+ char res[TMPBUFLEN];
+ ssize_t len = snprintf(res, sizeof(res), "%d", sel_ino_to_perm(ino));
+ return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, res, len);
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations sel_perm_ops = {
+ .read = sel_read_perm,
+ .llseek = generic_file_llseek,
+};
+
+static ssize_t sel_read_policycap(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ int value;
+ char tmpbuf[TMPBUFLEN];
+ ssize_t length;
+ unsigned long i_ino = file_inode(file)->i_ino;
+
+ value = security_policycap_supported(i_ino & SEL_INO_MASK);
+ length = scnprintf(tmpbuf, TMPBUFLEN, "%d", value);
+
+ return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, tmpbuf, length);
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations sel_policycap_ops = {
+ .read = sel_read_policycap,
+ .llseek = generic_file_llseek,
+};
+
+static int sel_make_perm_files(char *objclass, int classvalue,
+ struct dentry *dir)
+{
+ int i, rc, nperms;
+ char **perms;
+
+ rc = security_get_permissions(objclass, &perms, &nperms);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < nperms; i++) {
+ struct inode *inode;
+ struct dentry *dentry;
+
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ dentry = d_alloc_name(dir, perms[i]);
+ if (!dentry)
+ goto out;
+
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ inode = sel_make_inode(dir->d_sb, S_IFREG|S_IRUGO);
+ if (!inode)
+ goto out;
+
+ inode->i_fop = &sel_perm_ops;
+ /* i+1 since perm values are 1-indexed */
+ inode->i_ino = sel_perm_to_ino(classvalue, i + 1);
+ d_add(dentry, inode);
+ }
+ rc = 0;
+out:
+ for (i = 0; i < nperms; i++)
+ kfree(perms[i]);
+ kfree(perms);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int sel_make_class_dir_entries(char *classname, int index,
+ struct dentry *dir)
+{
+ struct dentry *dentry = NULL;
+ struct inode *inode = NULL;
+ int rc;
+
+ dentry = d_alloc_name(dir, "index");
+ if (!dentry)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ inode = sel_make_inode(dir->d_sb, S_IFREG|S_IRUGO);
+ if (!inode)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ inode->i_fop = &sel_class_ops;
+ inode->i_ino = sel_class_to_ino(index);
+ d_add(dentry, inode);
+
+ dentry = sel_make_dir(dir, "perms", &last_class_ino);
+ if (IS_ERR(dentry))
+ return PTR_ERR(dentry);
+
+ rc = sel_make_perm_files(classname, index, dentry);
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int sel_make_classes(void)
+{
+ int rc, nclasses, i;
+ char **classes;
+
+ /* delete any existing entries */
+ sel_remove_entries(class_dir);
+
+ rc = security_get_classes(&classes, &nclasses);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ /* +2 since classes are 1-indexed */
+ last_class_ino = sel_class_to_ino(nclasses + 2);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < nclasses; i++) {
+ struct dentry *class_name_dir;
+
+ class_name_dir = sel_make_dir(class_dir, classes[i],
+ &last_class_ino);
+ if (IS_ERR(class_name_dir)) {
+ rc = PTR_ERR(class_name_dir);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* i+1 since class values are 1-indexed */
+ rc = sel_make_class_dir_entries(classes[i], i + 1,
+ class_name_dir);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ }
+ rc = 0;
+out:
+ for (i = 0; i < nclasses; i++)
+ kfree(classes[i]);
+ kfree(classes);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int sel_make_policycap(void)
+{
+ unsigned int iter;
+ struct dentry *dentry = NULL;
+ struct inode *inode = NULL;
+
+ sel_remove_entries(policycap_dir);
+
+ for (iter = 0; iter <= POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX; iter++) {
+ if (iter < ARRAY_SIZE(policycap_names))
+ dentry = d_alloc_name(policycap_dir,
+ policycap_names[iter]);
+ else
+ dentry = d_alloc_name(policycap_dir, "unknown");
+
+ if (dentry == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ inode = sel_make_inode(policycap_dir->d_sb, S_IFREG | S_IRUGO);
+ if (inode == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ inode->i_fop = &sel_policycap_ops;
+ inode->i_ino = iter | SEL_POLICYCAP_INO_OFFSET;
+ d_add(dentry, inode);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static struct dentry *sel_make_dir(struct dentry *dir, const char *name,
+ unsigned long *ino)
+{
+ struct dentry *dentry = d_alloc_name(dir, name);
+ struct inode *inode;
+
+ if (!dentry)
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+ inode = sel_make_inode(dir->d_sb, S_IFDIR | S_IRUGO | S_IXUGO);
+ if (!inode) {
+ dput(dentry);
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+ }
+
+ inode->i_op = &simple_dir_inode_operations;
+ inode->i_fop = &simple_dir_operations;
+ inode->i_ino = ++(*ino);
+ /* directory inodes start off with i_nlink == 2 (for "." entry) */
+ inc_nlink(inode);
+ d_add(dentry, inode);
+ /* bump link count on parent directory, too */
+ inc_nlink(d_inode(dir));
+
+ return dentry;
+}
+
+static int sel_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
+{
+ int ret;
+ struct dentry *dentry;
+ struct inode *inode;
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+
+ static struct tree_descr selinux_files[] = {
+ [SEL_LOAD] = {"load", &sel_load_ops, S_IRUSR|S_IWUSR},
+ [SEL_ENFORCE] = {"enforce", &sel_enforce_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+ [SEL_CONTEXT] = {"context", &transaction_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO},
+ [SEL_ACCESS] = {"access", &transaction_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO},
+ [SEL_CREATE] = {"create", &transaction_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO},
+ [SEL_RELABEL] = {"relabel", &transaction_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO},
+ [SEL_USER] = {"user", &transaction_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO},
+ [SEL_POLICYVERS] = {"policyvers", &sel_policyvers_ops, S_IRUGO},
+ [SEL_COMMIT_BOOLS] = {"commit_pending_bools", &sel_commit_bools_ops, S_IWUSR},
+ [SEL_MLS] = {"mls", &sel_mls_ops, S_IRUGO},
+ [SEL_DISABLE] = {"disable", &sel_disable_ops, S_IWUSR},
+ [SEL_MEMBER] = {"member", &transaction_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO},
+ [SEL_CHECKREQPROT] = {"checkreqprot", &sel_checkreqprot_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+ [SEL_REJECT_UNKNOWN] = {"reject_unknown", &sel_handle_unknown_ops, S_IRUGO},
+ [SEL_DENY_UNKNOWN] = {"deny_unknown", &sel_handle_unknown_ops, S_IRUGO},
+ [SEL_STATUS] = {"status", &sel_handle_status_ops, S_IRUGO},
+ [SEL_POLICY] = {"policy", &sel_policy_ops, S_IRUGO},
+ /* last one */ {""}
+ };
+ ret = simple_fill_super(sb, SELINUX_MAGIC, selinux_files);
+ if (ret)
+ goto err;
+
+ bool_dir = sel_make_dir(sb->s_root, BOOL_DIR_NAME, &sel_last_ino);
+ if (IS_ERR(bool_dir)) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(bool_dir);
+ bool_dir = NULL;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ dentry = d_alloc_name(sb->s_root, NULL_FILE_NAME);
+ if (!dentry)
+ goto err;
+
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ inode = sel_make_inode(sb, S_IFCHR | S_IRUGO | S_IWUGO);
+ if (!inode)
+ goto err;
+
+ inode->i_ino = ++sel_last_ino;
+ isec = (struct inode_security_struct *)inode->i_security;
+ isec->sid = SECINITSID_DEVNULL;
+ isec->sclass = SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
+ isec->initialized = 1;
+
+ init_special_inode(inode, S_IFCHR | S_IRUGO | S_IWUGO, MKDEV(MEM_MAJOR, 3));
+ d_add(dentry, inode);
+ selinux_null.dentry = dentry;
+
+ dentry = sel_make_dir(sb->s_root, "avc", &sel_last_ino);
+ if (IS_ERR(dentry)) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(dentry);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ ret = sel_make_avc_files(dentry);
+ if (ret)
+ goto err;
+
+ dentry = sel_make_dir(sb->s_root, "initial_contexts", &sel_last_ino);
+ if (IS_ERR(dentry)) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(dentry);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ ret = sel_make_initcon_files(dentry);
+ if (ret)
+ goto err;
+
+ class_dir = sel_make_dir(sb->s_root, "class", &sel_last_ino);
+ if (IS_ERR(class_dir)) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(class_dir);
+ class_dir = NULL;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ policycap_dir = sel_make_dir(sb->s_root, "policy_capabilities", &sel_last_ino);
+ if (IS_ERR(policycap_dir)) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(policycap_dir);
+ policycap_dir = NULL;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ return 0;
+err:
+ printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: failed while creating inodes\n",
+ __func__);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static struct dentry *sel_mount(struct file_system_type *fs_type,
+ int flags, const char *dev_name, void *data)
+{
+ return mount_single(fs_type, flags, data, sel_fill_super);
+}
+
+static struct file_system_type sel_fs_type = {
+ .name = "selinuxfs",
+ .mount = sel_mount,
+ .kill_sb = kill_litter_super,
+};
+
+struct vfsmount *selinuxfs_mount;
+
+static int __init init_sel_fs(void)
+{
+ int err;
+
+ if (!selinux_enabled)
+ return 0;
+
+ err = sysfs_create_mount_point(fs_kobj, "selinux");
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ err = register_filesystem(&sel_fs_type);
+ if (err) {
+ sysfs_remove_mount_point(fs_kobj, "selinux");
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ selinux_null.mnt = selinuxfs_mount = kern_mount(&sel_fs_type);
+ if (IS_ERR(selinuxfs_mount)) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "selinuxfs: could not mount!\n");
+ err = PTR_ERR(selinuxfs_mount);
+ selinuxfs_mount = NULL;
+ }
+
+ return err;
+}
+
+__initcall(init_sel_fs);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
+void exit_sel_fs(void)
+{
+ sysfs_remove_mount_point(fs_kobj, "selinux");
+ kern_unmount(selinuxfs_mount);
+ unregister_filesystem(&sel_fs_type);
+}
+#endif