diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/cifs/cifsencrypt.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | fs/cifs/cifsencrypt.c | 818 |
1 files changed, 818 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/fs/cifs/cifsencrypt.c b/fs/cifs/cifsencrypt.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..aa0dc2573 --- /dev/null +++ b/fs/cifs/cifsencrypt.c @@ -0,0 +1,818 @@ +/* + * fs/cifs/cifsencrypt.c + * + * Encryption and hashing operations relating to NTLM, NTLMv2. See MS-NLMP + * for more detailed information + * + * Copyright (C) International Business Machines Corp., 2005,2013 + * Author(s): Steve French (sfrench@us.ibm.com) + * + * This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License as published + * by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2.1 of the License, or + * (at your option) any later version. + * + * This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See + * the GNU Lesser General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public License + * along with this library; if not, write to the Free Software + * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +#include <linux/fs.h> +#include <linux/slab.h> +#include "cifspdu.h" +#include "cifsglob.h" +#include "cifs_debug.h" +#include "cifs_unicode.h" +#include "cifsproto.h" +#include "ntlmssp.h" +#include <linux/ctype.h> +#include <linux/random.h> +#include <linux/highmem.h> + +static int +cifs_crypto_shash_md5_allocate(struct TCP_Server_Info *server) +{ + int rc; + unsigned int size; + + if (server->secmech.sdescmd5 != NULL) + return 0; /* already allocated */ + + server->secmech.md5 = crypto_alloc_shash("md5", 0, 0); + if (IS_ERR(server->secmech.md5)) { + cifs_dbg(VFS, "could not allocate crypto md5\n"); + rc = PTR_ERR(server->secmech.md5); + server->secmech.md5 = NULL; + return rc; + } + + size = sizeof(struct shash_desc) + + crypto_shash_descsize(server->secmech.md5); + server->secmech.sdescmd5 = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!server->secmech.sdescmd5) { + crypto_free_shash(server->secmech.md5); + server->secmech.md5 = NULL; + return -ENOMEM; + } + server->secmech.sdescmd5->shash.tfm = server->secmech.md5; + server->secmech.sdescmd5->shash.flags = 0x0; + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Calculate and return the CIFS signature based on the mac key and SMB PDU. + * The 16 byte signature must be allocated by the caller. Note we only use the + * 1st eight bytes and that the smb header signature field on input contains + * the sequence number before this function is called. Also, this function + * should be called with the server->srv_mutex held. + */ +static int cifs_calc_signature(struct smb_rqst *rqst, + struct TCP_Server_Info *server, char *signature) +{ + int i; + int rc; + struct kvec *iov = rqst->rq_iov; + int n_vec = rqst->rq_nvec; + + if (iov == NULL || signature == NULL || server == NULL) + return -EINVAL; + + if (!server->secmech.sdescmd5) { + rc = cifs_crypto_shash_md5_allocate(server); + if (rc) { + cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Can't alloc md5 crypto\n", __func__); + return -1; + } + } + + rc = crypto_shash_init(&server->secmech.sdescmd5->shash); + if (rc) { + cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not init md5\n", __func__); + return rc; + } + + rc = crypto_shash_update(&server->secmech.sdescmd5->shash, + server->session_key.response, server->session_key.len); + if (rc) { + cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not update with response\n", __func__); + return rc; + } + + for (i = 0; i < n_vec; i++) { + if (iov[i].iov_len == 0) + continue; + if (iov[i].iov_base == NULL) { + cifs_dbg(VFS, "null iovec entry\n"); + return -EIO; + } + /* The first entry includes a length field (which does not get + signed that occupies the first 4 bytes before the header */ + if (i == 0) { + if (iov[0].iov_len <= 8) /* cmd field at offset 9 */ + break; /* nothing to sign or corrupt header */ + rc = + crypto_shash_update(&server->secmech.sdescmd5->shash, + iov[i].iov_base + 4, iov[i].iov_len - 4); + } else { + rc = + crypto_shash_update(&server->secmech.sdescmd5->shash, + iov[i].iov_base, iov[i].iov_len); + } + if (rc) { + cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not update with payload\n", + __func__); + return rc; + } + } + + /* now hash over the rq_pages array */ + for (i = 0; i < rqst->rq_npages; i++) { + struct kvec p_iov; + + cifs_rqst_page_to_kvec(rqst, i, &p_iov); + crypto_shash_update(&server->secmech.sdescmd5->shash, + p_iov.iov_base, p_iov.iov_len); + kunmap(rqst->rq_pages[i]); + } + + rc = crypto_shash_final(&server->secmech.sdescmd5->shash, signature); + if (rc) + cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not generate md5 hash\n", __func__); + + return rc; +} + +/* must be called with server->srv_mutex held */ +int cifs_sign_rqst(struct smb_rqst *rqst, struct TCP_Server_Info *server, + __u32 *pexpected_response_sequence_number) +{ + int rc = 0; + char smb_signature[20]; + struct smb_hdr *cifs_pdu = (struct smb_hdr *)rqst->rq_iov[0].iov_base; + + if ((cifs_pdu == NULL) || (server == NULL)) + return -EINVAL; + + if (!(cifs_pdu->Flags2 & SMBFLG2_SECURITY_SIGNATURE) || + server->tcpStatus == CifsNeedNegotiate) + return rc; + + if (!server->session_estab) { + memcpy(cifs_pdu->Signature.SecuritySignature, "BSRSPYL", 8); + return rc; + } + + cifs_pdu->Signature.Sequence.SequenceNumber = + cpu_to_le32(server->sequence_number); + cifs_pdu->Signature.Sequence.Reserved = 0; + + *pexpected_response_sequence_number = ++server->sequence_number; + ++server->sequence_number; + + rc = cifs_calc_signature(rqst, server, smb_signature); + if (rc) + memset(cifs_pdu->Signature.SecuritySignature, 0, 8); + else + memcpy(cifs_pdu->Signature.SecuritySignature, smb_signature, 8); + + return rc; +} + +int cifs_sign_smbv(struct kvec *iov, int n_vec, struct TCP_Server_Info *server, + __u32 *pexpected_response_sequence) +{ + struct smb_rqst rqst = { .rq_iov = iov, + .rq_nvec = n_vec }; + + return cifs_sign_rqst(&rqst, server, pexpected_response_sequence); +} + +/* must be called with server->srv_mutex held */ +int cifs_sign_smb(struct smb_hdr *cifs_pdu, struct TCP_Server_Info *server, + __u32 *pexpected_response_sequence_number) +{ + struct kvec iov; + + iov.iov_base = cifs_pdu; + iov.iov_len = be32_to_cpu(cifs_pdu->smb_buf_length) + 4; + + return cifs_sign_smbv(&iov, 1, server, + pexpected_response_sequence_number); +} + +int cifs_verify_signature(struct smb_rqst *rqst, + struct TCP_Server_Info *server, + __u32 expected_sequence_number) +{ + unsigned int rc; + char server_response_sig[8]; + char what_we_think_sig_should_be[20]; + struct smb_hdr *cifs_pdu = (struct smb_hdr *)rqst->rq_iov[0].iov_base; + + if (cifs_pdu == NULL || server == NULL) + return -EINVAL; + + if (!server->session_estab) + return 0; + + if (cifs_pdu->Command == SMB_COM_LOCKING_ANDX) { + struct smb_com_lock_req *pSMB = + (struct smb_com_lock_req *)cifs_pdu; + if (pSMB->LockType & LOCKING_ANDX_OPLOCK_RELEASE) + return 0; + } + + /* BB what if signatures are supposed to be on for session but + server does not send one? BB */ + + /* Do not need to verify session setups with signature "BSRSPYL " */ + if (memcmp(cifs_pdu->Signature.SecuritySignature, "BSRSPYL ", 8) == 0) + cifs_dbg(FYI, "dummy signature received for smb command 0x%x\n", + cifs_pdu->Command); + + /* save off the origiginal signature so we can modify the smb and check + its signature against what the server sent */ + memcpy(server_response_sig, cifs_pdu->Signature.SecuritySignature, 8); + + cifs_pdu->Signature.Sequence.SequenceNumber = + cpu_to_le32(expected_sequence_number); + cifs_pdu->Signature.Sequence.Reserved = 0; + + mutex_lock(&server->srv_mutex); + rc = cifs_calc_signature(rqst, server, what_we_think_sig_should_be); + mutex_unlock(&server->srv_mutex); + + if (rc) + return rc; + +/* cifs_dump_mem("what we think it should be: ", + what_we_think_sig_should_be, 16); */ + + if (memcmp(server_response_sig, what_we_think_sig_should_be, 8)) + return -EACCES; + else + return 0; + +} + +/* first calculate 24 bytes ntlm response and then 16 byte session key */ +int setup_ntlm_response(struct cifs_ses *ses, const struct nls_table *nls_cp) +{ + int rc = 0; + unsigned int temp_len = CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE + CIFS_AUTH_RESP_SIZE; + char temp_key[CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE]; + + if (!ses) + return -EINVAL; + + ses->auth_key.response = kmalloc(temp_len, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!ses->auth_key.response) + return -ENOMEM; + + ses->auth_key.len = temp_len; + + rc = SMBNTencrypt(ses->password, ses->server->cryptkey, + ses->auth_key.response + CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE, nls_cp); + if (rc) { + cifs_dbg(FYI, "%s Can't generate NTLM response, error: %d\n", + __func__, rc); + return rc; + } + + rc = E_md4hash(ses->password, temp_key, nls_cp); + if (rc) { + cifs_dbg(FYI, "%s Can't generate NT hash, error: %d\n", + __func__, rc); + return rc; + } + + rc = mdfour(ses->auth_key.response, temp_key, CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE); + if (rc) + cifs_dbg(FYI, "%s Can't generate NTLM session key, error: %d\n", + __func__, rc); + + return rc; +} + +#ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_WEAK_PW_HASH +int calc_lanman_hash(const char *password, const char *cryptkey, bool encrypt, + char *lnm_session_key) +{ + int i; + int rc; + char password_with_pad[CIFS_ENCPWD_SIZE]; + + memset(password_with_pad, 0, CIFS_ENCPWD_SIZE); + if (password) + strncpy(password_with_pad, password, CIFS_ENCPWD_SIZE); + + if (!encrypt && global_secflags & CIFSSEC_MAY_PLNTXT) { + memcpy(lnm_session_key, password_with_pad, + CIFS_ENCPWD_SIZE); + return 0; + } + + /* calculate old style session key */ + /* calling toupper is less broken than repeatedly + calling nls_toupper would be since that will never + work for UTF8, but neither handles multibyte code pages + but the only alternative would be converting to UCS-16 (Unicode) + (using a routine something like UniStrupr) then + uppercasing and then converting back from Unicode - which + would only worth doing it if we knew it were utf8. Basically + utf8 and other multibyte codepages each need their own strupper + function since a byte at a time will ont work. */ + + for (i = 0; i < CIFS_ENCPWD_SIZE; i++) + password_with_pad[i] = toupper(password_with_pad[i]); + + rc = SMBencrypt(password_with_pad, cryptkey, lnm_session_key); + + return rc; +} +#endif /* CIFS_WEAK_PW_HASH */ + +/* Build a proper attribute value/target info pairs blob. + * Fill in netbios and dns domain name and workstation name + * and client time (total five av pairs and + one end of fields indicator. + * Allocate domain name which gets freed when session struct is deallocated. + */ +static int +build_avpair_blob(struct cifs_ses *ses, const struct nls_table *nls_cp) +{ + unsigned int dlen; + unsigned int size = 2 * sizeof(struct ntlmssp2_name); + char *defdmname = "WORKGROUP"; + unsigned char *blobptr; + struct ntlmssp2_name *attrptr; + + if (!ses->domainName) { + ses->domainName = kstrdup(defdmname, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!ses->domainName) + return -ENOMEM; + } + + dlen = strlen(ses->domainName); + + /* + * The length of this blob is two times the size of a + * structure (av pair) which holds name/size + * ( for NTLMSSP_AV_NB_DOMAIN_NAME followed by NTLMSSP_AV_EOL ) + + * unicode length of a netbios domain name + */ + ses->auth_key.len = size + 2 * dlen; + ses->auth_key.response = kzalloc(ses->auth_key.len, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!ses->auth_key.response) { + ses->auth_key.len = 0; + return -ENOMEM; + } + + blobptr = ses->auth_key.response; + attrptr = (struct ntlmssp2_name *) blobptr; + + /* + * As defined in MS-NTLM 3.3.2, just this av pair field + * is sufficient as part of the temp + */ + attrptr->type = cpu_to_le16(NTLMSSP_AV_NB_DOMAIN_NAME); + attrptr->length = cpu_to_le16(2 * dlen); + blobptr = (unsigned char *)attrptr + sizeof(struct ntlmssp2_name); + cifs_strtoUTF16((__le16 *)blobptr, ses->domainName, dlen, nls_cp); + + return 0; +} + +/* Server has provided av pairs/target info in the type 2 challenge + * packet and we have plucked it and stored within smb session. + * We parse that blob here to find netbios domain name to be used + * as part of ntlmv2 authentication (in Target String), if not already + * specified on the command line. + * If this function returns without any error but without fetching + * domain name, authentication may fail against some server but + * may not fail against other (those who are not very particular + * about target string i.e. for some, just user name might suffice. + */ +static int +find_domain_name(struct cifs_ses *ses, const struct nls_table *nls_cp) +{ + unsigned int attrsize; + unsigned int type; + unsigned int onesize = sizeof(struct ntlmssp2_name); + unsigned char *blobptr; + unsigned char *blobend; + struct ntlmssp2_name *attrptr; + + if (!ses->auth_key.len || !ses->auth_key.response) + return 0; + + blobptr = ses->auth_key.response; + blobend = blobptr + ses->auth_key.len; + + while (blobptr + onesize < blobend) { + attrptr = (struct ntlmssp2_name *) blobptr; + type = le16_to_cpu(attrptr->type); + if (type == NTLMSSP_AV_EOL) + break; + blobptr += 2; /* advance attr type */ + attrsize = le16_to_cpu(attrptr->length); + blobptr += 2; /* advance attr size */ + if (blobptr + attrsize > blobend) + break; + if (type == NTLMSSP_AV_NB_DOMAIN_NAME) { + if (!attrsize || attrsize >= CIFS_MAX_DOMAINNAME_LEN) + break; + if (!ses->domainName) { + ses->domainName = + kmalloc(attrsize + 1, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!ses->domainName) + return -ENOMEM; + cifs_from_utf16(ses->domainName, + (__le16 *)blobptr, attrsize, attrsize, + nls_cp, NO_MAP_UNI_RSVD); + break; + } + } + blobptr += attrsize; /* advance attr value */ + } + + return 0; +} + +static int calc_ntlmv2_hash(struct cifs_ses *ses, char *ntlmv2_hash, + const struct nls_table *nls_cp) +{ + int rc = 0; + int len; + char nt_hash[CIFS_NTHASH_SIZE]; + __le16 *user; + wchar_t *domain; + wchar_t *server; + + if (!ses->server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5) { + cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: can't generate ntlmv2 hash\n", __func__); + return -1; + } + + /* calculate md4 hash of password */ + E_md4hash(ses->password, nt_hash, nls_cp); + + rc = crypto_shash_setkey(ses->server->secmech.hmacmd5, nt_hash, + CIFS_NTHASH_SIZE); + if (rc) { + cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not set NT Hash as a key\n", __func__); + return rc; + } + + rc = crypto_shash_init(&ses->server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5->shash); + if (rc) { + cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: could not init hmacmd5\n", __func__); + return rc; + } + + /* convert ses->user_name to unicode */ + len = ses->user_name ? strlen(ses->user_name) : 0; + user = kmalloc(2 + (len * 2), GFP_KERNEL); + if (user == NULL) { + rc = -ENOMEM; + return rc; + } + + if (len) { + len = cifs_strtoUTF16(user, ses->user_name, len, nls_cp); + UniStrupr(user); + } else { + memset(user, '\0', 2); + } + + rc = crypto_shash_update(&ses->server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5->shash, + (char *)user, 2 * len); + kfree(user); + if (rc) { + cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not update with user\n", __func__); + return rc; + } + + /* convert ses->domainName to unicode and uppercase */ + if (ses->domainName) { + len = strlen(ses->domainName); + + domain = kmalloc(2 + (len * 2), GFP_KERNEL); + if (domain == NULL) { + rc = -ENOMEM; + return rc; + } + len = cifs_strtoUTF16((__le16 *)domain, ses->domainName, len, + nls_cp); + rc = + crypto_shash_update(&ses->server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5->shash, + (char *)domain, 2 * len); + kfree(domain); + if (rc) { + cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not update with domain\n", + __func__); + return rc; + } + } else { + /* We use ses->serverName if no domain name available */ + len = strlen(ses->serverName); + + server = kmalloc(2 + (len * 2), GFP_KERNEL); + if (server == NULL) { + rc = -ENOMEM; + return rc; + } + len = cifs_strtoUTF16((__le16 *)server, ses->serverName, len, + nls_cp); + rc = + crypto_shash_update(&ses->server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5->shash, + (char *)server, 2 * len); + kfree(server); + if (rc) { + cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not update with server\n", + __func__); + return rc; + } + } + + rc = crypto_shash_final(&ses->server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5->shash, + ntlmv2_hash); + if (rc) + cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not generate md5 hash\n", __func__); + + return rc; +} + +static int +CalcNTLMv2_response(const struct cifs_ses *ses, char *ntlmv2_hash) +{ + int rc; + struct ntlmv2_resp *ntlmv2 = (struct ntlmv2_resp *) + (ses->auth_key.response + CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE); + unsigned int hash_len; + + /* The MD5 hash starts at challenge_key.key */ + hash_len = ses->auth_key.len - (CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE + + offsetof(struct ntlmv2_resp, challenge.key[0])); + + if (!ses->server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5) { + cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: can't generate ntlmv2 hash\n", __func__); + return -1; + } + + rc = crypto_shash_setkey(ses->server->secmech.hmacmd5, + ntlmv2_hash, CIFS_HMAC_MD5_HASH_SIZE); + if (rc) { + cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not set NTLMV2 Hash as a key\n", + __func__); + return rc; + } + + rc = crypto_shash_init(&ses->server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5->shash); + if (rc) { + cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: could not init hmacmd5\n", __func__); + return rc; + } + + if (ses->server->negflavor == CIFS_NEGFLAVOR_EXTENDED) + memcpy(ntlmv2->challenge.key, + ses->ntlmssp->cryptkey, CIFS_SERVER_CHALLENGE_SIZE); + else + memcpy(ntlmv2->challenge.key, + ses->server->cryptkey, CIFS_SERVER_CHALLENGE_SIZE); + rc = crypto_shash_update(&ses->server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5->shash, + ntlmv2->challenge.key, hash_len); + if (rc) { + cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not update with response\n", __func__); + return rc; + } + + /* Note that the MD5 digest over writes anon.challenge_key.key */ + rc = crypto_shash_final(&ses->server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5->shash, + ntlmv2->ntlmv2_hash); + if (rc) + cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not generate md5 hash\n", __func__); + + return rc; +} + +static int crypto_hmacmd5_alloc(struct TCP_Server_Info *server) +{ + int rc; + unsigned int size; + + /* check if already allocated */ + if (server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5) + return 0; + + server->secmech.hmacmd5 = crypto_alloc_shash("hmac(md5)", 0, 0); + if (IS_ERR(server->secmech.hmacmd5)) { + cifs_dbg(VFS, "could not allocate crypto hmacmd5\n"); + rc = PTR_ERR(server->secmech.hmacmd5); + server->secmech.hmacmd5 = NULL; + return rc; + } + + size = sizeof(struct shash_desc) + + crypto_shash_descsize(server->secmech.hmacmd5); + server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5 = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5) { + crypto_free_shash(server->secmech.hmacmd5); + server->secmech.hmacmd5 = NULL; + return -ENOMEM; + } + server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5->shash.tfm = server->secmech.hmacmd5; + server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5->shash.flags = 0x0; + + return 0; +} + +int +setup_ntlmv2_rsp(struct cifs_ses *ses, const struct nls_table *nls_cp) +{ + int rc; + int baselen; + unsigned int tilen; + struct ntlmv2_resp *ntlmv2; + char ntlmv2_hash[16]; + unsigned char *tiblob = NULL; /* target info blob */ + + if (ses->server->negflavor == CIFS_NEGFLAVOR_EXTENDED) { + if (!ses->domainName) { + rc = find_domain_name(ses, nls_cp); + if (rc) { + cifs_dbg(VFS, "error %d finding domain name\n", + rc); + goto setup_ntlmv2_rsp_ret; + } + } + } else { + rc = build_avpair_blob(ses, nls_cp); + if (rc) { + cifs_dbg(VFS, "error %d building av pair blob\n", rc); + goto setup_ntlmv2_rsp_ret; + } + } + + baselen = CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE + sizeof(struct ntlmv2_resp); + tilen = ses->auth_key.len; + tiblob = ses->auth_key.response; + + ses->auth_key.response = kmalloc(baselen + tilen, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!ses->auth_key.response) { + rc = ENOMEM; + ses->auth_key.len = 0; + goto setup_ntlmv2_rsp_ret; + } + ses->auth_key.len += baselen; + + ntlmv2 = (struct ntlmv2_resp *) + (ses->auth_key.response + CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE); + ntlmv2->blob_signature = cpu_to_le32(0x00000101); + ntlmv2->reserved = 0; + /* Must be within 5 minutes of the server */ + ntlmv2->time = cpu_to_le64(cifs_UnixTimeToNT(CURRENT_TIME)); + get_random_bytes(&ntlmv2->client_chal, sizeof(ntlmv2->client_chal)); + ntlmv2->reserved2 = 0; + + memcpy(ses->auth_key.response + baselen, tiblob, tilen); + + rc = crypto_hmacmd5_alloc(ses->server); + if (rc) { + cifs_dbg(VFS, "could not crypto alloc hmacmd5 rc %d\n", rc); + goto setup_ntlmv2_rsp_ret; + } + + /* calculate ntlmv2_hash */ + rc = calc_ntlmv2_hash(ses, ntlmv2_hash, nls_cp); + if (rc) { + cifs_dbg(VFS, "could not get v2 hash rc %d\n", rc); + goto setup_ntlmv2_rsp_ret; + } + + /* calculate first part of the client response (CR1) */ + rc = CalcNTLMv2_response(ses, ntlmv2_hash); + if (rc) { + cifs_dbg(VFS, "Could not calculate CR1 rc: %d\n", rc); + goto setup_ntlmv2_rsp_ret; + } + + /* now calculate the session key for NTLMv2 */ + rc = crypto_shash_setkey(ses->server->secmech.hmacmd5, + ntlmv2_hash, CIFS_HMAC_MD5_HASH_SIZE); + if (rc) { + cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not set NTLMV2 Hash as a key\n", + __func__); + goto setup_ntlmv2_rsp_ret; + } + + rc = crypto_shash_init(&ses->server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5->shash); + if (rc) { + cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not init hmacmd5\n", __func__); + goto setup_ntlmv2_rsp_ret; + } + + rc = crypto_shash_update(&ses->server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5->shash, + ntlmv2->ntlmv2_hash, + CIFS_HMAC_MD5_HASH_SIZE); + if (rc) { + cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not update with response\n", __func__); + goto setup_ntlmv2_rsp_ret; + } + + rc = crypto_shash_final(&ses->server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5->shash, + ses->auth_key.response); + if (rc) + cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not generate md5 hash\n", __func__); + +setup_ntlmv2_rsp_ret: + kfree(tiblob); + + return rc; +} + +int +calc_seckey(struct cifs_ses *ses) +{ + int rc; + struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm_arc4; + struct scatterlist sgin, sgout; + struct blkcipher_desc desc; + unsigned char sec_key[CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE]; /* a nonce */ + + get_random_bytes(sec_key, CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE); + + tfm_arc4 = crypto_alloc_blkcipher("ecb(arc4)", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC); + if (IS_ERR(tfm_arc4)) { + rc = PTR_ERR(tfm_arc4); + cifs_dbg(VFS, "could not allocate crypto API arc4\n"); + return rc; + } + + desc.tfm = tfm_arc4; + + rc = crypto_blkcipher_setkey(tfm_arc4, ses->auth_key.response, + CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE); + if (rc) { + cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not set response as a key\n", + __func__); + return rc; + } + + sg_init_one(&sgin, sec_key, CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE); + sg_init_one(&sgout, ses->ntlmssp->ciphertext, CIFS_CPHTXT_SIZE); + + rc = crypto_blkcipher_encrypt(&desc, &sgout, &sgin, CIFS_CPHTXT_SIZE); + if (rc) { + cifs_dbg(VFS, "could not encrypt session key rc: %d\n", rc); + crypto_free_blkcipher(tfm_arc4); + return rc; + } + + /* make secondary_key/nonce as session key */ + memcpy(ses->auth_key.response, sec_key, CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE); + /* and make len as that of session key only */ + ses->auth_key.len = CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE; + + crypto_free_blkcipher(tfm_arc4); + + return rc; +} + +void +cifs_crypto_shash_release(struct TCP_Server_Info *server) +{ + if (server->secmech.cmacaes) { + crypto_free_shash(server->secmech.cmacaes); + server->secmech.cmacaes = NULL; + } + + if (server->secmech.hmacsha256) { + crypto_free_shash(server->secmech.hmacsha256); + server->secmech.hmacsha256 = NULL; + } + + if (server->secmech.md5) { + crypto_free_shash(server->secmech.md5); + server->secmech.md5 = NULL; + } + + if (server->secmech.hmacmd5) { + crypto_free_shash(server->secmech.hmacmd5); + server->secmech.hmacmd5 = NULL; + } + + kfree(server->secmech.sdesccmacaes); + server->secmech.sdesccmacaes = NULL; + kfree(server->secmech.sdeschmacsha256); + server->secmech.sdeschmacsha256 = NULL; + kfree(server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5); + server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5 = NULL; + kfree(server->secmech.sdescmd5); + server->secmech.sdescmd5 = NULL; +} |