summaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/security/apparmor
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
Diffstat (limited to 'security/apparmor')
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/.gitignore5
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/Kconfig43
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/Makefile70
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c969
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/audit.c209
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/capability.c143
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/context.c222
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/crypto.c95
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/domain.c854
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/file.c458
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h120
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/include/apparmorfs.h104
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/include/audit.h147
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/include/capability.h48
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/include/context.h178
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/include/crypto.h36
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/include/domain.h36
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/include/file.h216
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/include/ipc.h28
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/include/match.h141
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/include/path.h32
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/include/policy.h408
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/include/policy_unpack.h39
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/include/procattr.h25
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/include/resource.h50
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/include/sid.h26
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/ipc.c111
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/lib.c106
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/lsm.c949
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/match.c428
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/path.c236
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/policy.c1301
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c805
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/procattr.c165
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/resource.c154
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/sid.c55
36 files changed, 9012 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/apparmor/.gitignore b/security/apparmor/.gitignore
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..9cdec70d7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/.gitignore
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+#
+# Generated include files
+#
+capability_names.h
+rlim_names.h
diff --git a/security/apparmor/Kconfig b/security/apparmor/Kconfig
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d49c53960
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/Kconfig
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+config SECURITY_APPARMOR
+ bool "AppArmor support"
+ depends on SECURITY && NET
+ select AUDIT
+ select SECURITY_PATH
+ select SECURITYFS
+ select SECURITY_NETWORK
+ default n
+ help
+ This enables the AppArmor security module.
+ Required userspace tools (if they are not included in your
+ distribution) and further information may be found at
+ http://apparmor.wiki.kernel.org
+
+ If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
+
+config SECURITY_APPARMOR_BOOTPARAM_VALUE
+ int "AppArmor boot parameter default value"
+ depends on SECURITY_APPARMOR
+ range 0 1
+ default 1
+ help
+ This option sets the default value for the kernel parameter
+ 'apparmor', which allows AppArmor to be enabled or disabled
+ at boot. If this option is set to 0 (zero), the AppArmor
+ kernel parameter will default to 0, disabling AppArmor at
+ boot. If this option is set to 1 (one), the AppArmor
+ kernel parameter will default to 1, enabling AppArmor at
+ boot.
+
+ If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer 1.
+
+config SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH
+ bool "SHA1 hash of loaded profiles"
+ depends on SECURITY_APPARMOR
+ depends on CRYPTO
+ select CRYPTO_SHA1
+ default y
+
+ help
+ This option selects whether sha1 hashing is done against loaded
+ profiles and exported for inspection to user space via the apparmor
+ filesystem.
diff --git a/security/apparmor/Makefile b/security/apparmor/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d693df874
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+# Makefile for AppArmor Linux Security Module
+#
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) += apparmor.o
+
+apparmor-y := apparmorfs.o audit.o capability.o context.o ipc.o lib.o match.o \
+ path.o domain.o policy.o policy_unpack.o procattr.o lsm.o \
+ resource.o sid.o file.o
+apparmor-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH) += crypto.o
+
+clean-files := capability_names.h rlim_names.h
+
+
+# Build a lower case string table of capability names
+# Transforms lines from
+# #define CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE 1
+# to
+# [1] = "dac_override",
+quiet_cmd_make-caps = GEN $@
+cmd_make-caps = echo "static const char *const capability_names[] = {" > $@ ;\
+ sed $< >>$@ -r -n -e '/CAP_FS_MASK/d' \
+ -e 's/^\#define[ \t]+CAP_([A-Z0-9_]+)[ \t]+([0-9]+)/[\2] = "\L\1",/p';\
+ echo "};" >> $@ ;\
+ echo -n '\#define AA_FS_CAPS_MASK "' >> $@ ;\
+ sed $< -r -n -e '/CAP_FS_MASK/d' \
+ -e 's/^\#define[ \t]+CAP_([A-Z0-9_]+)[ \t]+([0-9]+)/\L\1/p' | \
+ tr '\n' ' ' | sed -e 's/ $$/"\n/' >> $@
+
+
+# Build a lower case string table of rlimit names.
+# Transforms lines from
+# #define RLIMIT_STACK 3 /* max stack size */
+# to
+# [RLIMIT_STACK] = "stack",
+#
+# and build a second integer table (with the second sed cmd), that maps
+# RLIMIT defines to the order defined in asm-generic/resource.h This is
+# required by policy load to map policy ordering of RLIMITs to internal
+# ordering for architectures that redefine an RLIMIT.
+# Transforms lines from
+# #define RLIMIT_STACK 3 /* max stack size */
+# to
+# RLIMIT_STACK,
+#
+# and build the securityfs entries for the mapping.
+# Transforms lines from
+# #define RLIMIT_FSIZE 1 /* Maximum filesize */
+# #define RLIMIT_STACK 3 /* max stack size */
+# to
+# #define AA_FS_RLIMIT_MASK "fsize stack"
+quiet_cmd_make-rlim = GEN $@
+cmd_make-rlim = echo "static const char *const rlim_names[RLIM_NLIMITS] = {" \
+ > $@ ;\
+ sed $< >> $@ -r -n \
+ -e 's/^\# ?define[ \t]+(RLIMIT_([A-Z0-9_]+)).*/[\1] = "\L\2",/p';\
+ echo "};" >> $@ ;\
+ echo "static const int rlim_map[RLIM_NLIMITS] = {" >> $@ ;\
+ sed -r -n "s/^\# ?define[ \t]+(RLIMIT_[A-Z0-9_]+).*/\1,/p" $< >> $@ ;\
+ echo "};" >> $@ ; \
+ echo -n '\#define AA_FS_RLIMIT_MASK "' >> $@ ;\
+ sed -r -n 's/^\# ?define[ \t]+RLIMIT_([A-Z0-9_]+).*/\L\1/p' $< | \
+ tr '\n' ' ' | sed -e 's/ $$/"\n/' >> $@
+
+$(obj)/capability.o : $(obj)/capability_names.h
+$(obj)/resource.o : $(obj)/rlim_names.h
+$(obj)/capability_names.h : $(srctree)/include/uapi/linux/capability.h \
+ $(src)/Makefile
+ $(call cmd,make-caps)
+$(obj)/rlim_names.h : $(srctree)/include/uapi/asm-generic/resource.h \
+ $(src)/Makefile
+ $(call cmd,make-rlim)
diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ad4fa49ad
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
@@ -0,0 +1,969 @@
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor /sys/kernel/security/apparmor interface functions
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/ctype.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/seq_file.h>
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/namei.h>
+#include <linux/capability.h>
+#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
+
+#include "include/apparmor.h"
+#include "include/apparmorfs.h"
+#include "include/audit.h"
+#include "include/context.h"
+#include "include/crypto.h"
+#include "include/policy.h"
+#include "include/resource.h"
+
+/**
+ * aa_mangle_name - mangle a profile name to std profile layout form
+ * @name: profile name to mangle (NOT NULL)
+ * @target: buffer to store mangled name, same length as @name (MAYBE NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: length of mangled name
+ */
+static int mangle_name(char *name, char *target)
+{
+ char *t = target;
+
+ while (*name == '/' || *name == '.')
+ name++;
+
+ if (target) {
+ for (; *name; name++) {
+ if (*name == '/')
+ *(t)++ = '.';
+ else if (isspace(*name))
+ *(t)++ = '_';
+ else if (isalnum(*name) || strchr("._-", *name))
+ *(t)++ = *name;
+ }
+
+ *t = 0;
+ } else {
+ int len = 0;
+ for (; *name; name++) {
+ if (isalnum(*name) || isspace(*name) ||
+ strchr("/._-", *name))
+ len++;
+ }
+
+ return len;
+ }
+
+ return t - target;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_simple_write_to_buffer - common routine for getting policy from user
+ * @op: operation doing the user buffer copy
+ * @userbuf: user buffer to copy data from (NOT NULL)
+ * @alloc_size: size of user buffer (REQUIRES: @alloc_size >= @copy_size)
+ * @copy_size: size of data to copy from user buffer
+ * @pos: position write is at in the file (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: kernel buffer containing copy of user buffer data or an
+ * ERR_PTR on failure.
+ */
+static char *aa_simple_write_to_buffer(int op, const char __user *userbuf,
+ size_t alloc_size, size_t copy_size,
+ loff_t *pos)
+{
+ char *data;
+
+ BUG_ON(copy_size > alloc_size);
+
+ if (*pos != 0)
+ /* only writes from pos 0, that is complete writes */
+ return ERR_PTR(-ESPIPE);
+
+ /*
+ * Don't allow profile load/replace/remove from profiles that don't
+ * have CAP_MAC_ADMIN
+ */
+ if (!aa_may_manage_policy(op))
+ return ERR_PTR(-EACCES);
+
+ /* freed by caller to simple_write_to_buffer */
+ data = kvmalloc(alloc_size);
+ if (data == NULL)
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+ if (copy_from_user(data, userbuf, copy_size)) {
+ kvfree(data);
+ return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
+ }
+
+ return data;
+}
+
+
+/* .load file hook fn to load policy */
+static ssize_t profile_load(struct file *f, const char __user *buf, size_t size,
+ loff_t *pos)
+{
+ char *data;
+ ssize_t error;
+
+ data = aa_simple_write_to_buffer(OP_PROF_LOAD, buf, size, size, pos);
+
+ error = PTR_ERR(data);
+ if (!IS_ERR(data)) {
+ error = aa_replace_profiles(data, size, PROF_ADD);
+ kvfree(data);
+ }
+
+ return error;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations aa_fs_profile_load = {
+ .write = profile_load,
+ .llseek = default_llseek,
+};
+
+/* .replace file hook fn to load and/or replace policy */
+static ssize_t profile_replace(struct file *f, const char __user *buf,
+ size_t size, loff_t *pos)
+{
+ char *data;
+ ssize_t error;
+
+ data = aa_simple_write_to_buffer(OP_PROF_REPL, buf, size, size, pos);
+ error = PTR_ERR(data);
+ if (!IS_ERR(data)) {
+ error = aa_replace_profiles(data, size, PROF_REPLACE);
+ kvfree(data);
+ }
+
+ return error;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations aa_fs_profile_replace = {
+ .write = profile_replace,
+ .llseek = default_llseek,
+};
+
+/* .remove file hook fn to remove loaded policy */
+static ssize_t profile_remove(struct file *f, const char __user *buf,
+ size_t size, loff_t *pos)
+{
+ char *data;
+ ssize_t error;
+
+ /*
+ * aa_remove_profile needs a null terminated string so 1 extra
+ * byte is allocated and the copied data is null terminated.
+ */
+ data = aa_simple_write_to_buffer(OP_PROF_RM, buf, size + 1, size, pos);
+
+ error = PTR_ERR(data);
+ if (!IS_ERR(data)) {
+ data[size] = 0;
+ error = aa_remove_profiles(data, size);
+ kvfree(data);
+ }
+
+ return error;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations aa_fs_profile_remove = {
+ .write = profile_remove,
+ .llseek = default_llseek,
+};
+
+static int aa_fs_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
+{
+ struct aa_fs_entry *fs_file = seq->private;
+
+ if (!fs_file)
+ return 0;
+
+ switch (fs_file->v_type) {
+ case AA_FS_TYPE_BOOLEAN:
+ seq_printf(seq, "%s\n", fs_file->v.boolean ? "yes" : "no");
+ break;
+ case AA_FS_TYPE_STRING:
+ seq_printf(seq, "%s\n", fs_file->v.string);
+ break;
+ case AA_FS_TYPE_U64:
+ seq_printf(seq, "%#08lx\n", fs_file->v.u64);
+ break;
+ default:
+ /* Ignore unpritable entry types. */
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int aa_fs_seq_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+ return single_open(file, aa_fs_seq_show, inode->i_private);
+}
+
+const struct file_operations aa_fs_seq_file_ops = {
+ .owner = THIS_MODULE,
+ .open = aa_fs_seq_open,
+ .read = seq_read,
+ .llseek = seq_lseek,
+ .release = single_release,
+};
+
+static int aa_fs_seq_profile_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file,
+ int (*show)(struct seq_file *, void *))
+{
+ struct aa_replacedby *r = aa_get_replacedby(inode->i_private);
+ int error = single_open(file, show, r);
+
+ if (error) {
+ file->private_data = NULL;
+ aa_put_replacedby(r);
+ }
+
+ return error;
+}
+
+static int aa_fs_seq_profile_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+ struct seq_file *seq = (struct seq_file *) file->private_data;
+ if (seq)
+ aa_put_replacedby(seq->private);
+ return single_release(inode, file);
+}
+
+static int aa_fs_seq_profname_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
+{
+ struct aa_replacedby *r = seq->private;
+ struct aa_profile *profile = aa_get_profile_rcu(&r->profile);
+ seq_printf(seq, "%s\n", profile->base.name);
+ aa_put_profile(profile);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int aa_fs_seq_profname_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+ return aa_fs_seq_profile_open(inode, file, aa_fs_seq_profname_show);
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations aa_fs_profname_fops = {
+ .owner = THIS_MODULE,
+ .open = aa_fs_seq_profname_open,
+ .read = seq_read,
+ .llseek = seq_lseek,
+ .release = aa_fs_seq_profile_release,
+};
+
+static int aa_fs_seq_profmode_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
+{
+ struct aa_replacedby *r = seq->private;
+ struct aa_profile *profile = aa_get_profile_rcu(&r->profile);
+ seq_printf(seq, "%s\n", aa_profile_mode_names[profile->mode]);
+ aa_put_profile(profile);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int aa_fs_seq_profmode_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+ return aa_fs_seq_profile_open(inode, file, aa_fs_seq_profmode_show);
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations aa_fs_profmode_fops = {
+ .owner = THIS_MODULE,
+ .open = aa_fs_seq_profmode_open,
+ .read = seq_read,
+ .llseek = seq_lseek,
+ .release = aa_fs_seq_profile_release,
+};
+
+static int aa_fs_seq_profattach_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
+{
+ struct aa_replacedby *r = seq->private;
+ struct aa_profile *profile = aa_get_profile_rcu(&r->profile);
+ if (profile->attach)
+ seq_printf(seq, "%s\n", profile->attach);
+ else if (profile->xmatch)
+ seq_puts(seq, "<unknown>\n");
+ else
+ seq_printf(seq, "%s\n", profile->base.name);
+ aa_put_profile(profile);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int aa_fs_seq_profattach_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+ return aa_fs_seq_profile_open(inode, file, aa_fs_seq_profattach_show);
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations aa_fs_profattach_fops = {
+ .owner = THIS_MODULE,
+ .open = aa_fs_seq_profattach_open,
+ .read = seq_read,
+ .llseek = seq_lseek,
+ .release = aa_fs_seq_profile_release,
+};
+
+static int aa_fs_seq_hash_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
+{
+ struct aa_replacedby *r = seq->private;
+ struct aa_profile *profile = aa_get_profile_rcu(&r->profile);
+ unsigned int i, size = aa_hash_size();
+
+ if (profile->hash) {
+ for (i = 0; i < size; i++)
+ seq_printf(seq, "%.2x", profile->hash[i]);
+ seq_puts(seq, "\n");
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int aa_fs_seq_hash_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+ return single_open(file, aa_fs_seq_hash_show, inode->i_private);
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations aa_fs_seq_hash_fops = {
+ .owner = THIS_MODULE,
+ .open = aa_fs_seq_hash_open,
+ .read = seq_read,
+ .llseek = seq_lseek,
+ .release = single_release,
+};
+
+/** fns to setup dynamic per profile/namespace files **/
+void __aa_fs_profile_rmdir(struct aa_profile *profile)
+{
+ struct aa_profile *child;
+ int i;
+
+ if (!profile)
+ return;
+
+ list_for_each_entry(child, &profile->base.profiles, base.list)
+ __aa_fs_profile_rmdir(child);
+
+ for (i = AAFS_PROF_SIZEOF - 1; i >= 0; --i) {
+ struct aa_replacedby *r;
+ if (!profile->dents[i])
+ continue;
+
+ r = d_inode(profile->dents[i])->i_private;
+ securityfs_remove(profile->dents[i]);
+ aa_put_replacedby(r);
+ profile->dents[i] = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+void __aa_fs_profile_migrate_dents(struct aa_profile *old,
+ struct aa_profile *new)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < AAFS_PROF_SIZEOF; i++) {
+ new->dents[i] = old->dents[i];
+ old->dents[i] = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+static struct dentry *create_profile_file(struct dentry *dir, const char *name,
+ struct aa_profile *profile,
+ const struct file_operations *fops)
+{
+ struct aa_replacedby *r = aa_get_replacedby(profile->replacedby);
+ struct dentry *dent;
+
+ dent = securityfs_create_file(name, S_IFREG | 0444, dir, r, fops);
+ if (IS_ERR(dent))
+ aa_put_replacedby(r);
+
+ return dent;
+}
+
+/* requires lock be held */
+int __aa_fs_profile_mkdir(struct aa_profile *profile, struct dentry *parent)
+{
+ struct aa_profile *child;
+ struct dentry *dent = NULL, *dir;
+ int error;
+
+ if (!parent) {
+ struct aa_profile *p;
+ p = aa_deref_parent(profile);
+ dent = prof_dir(p);
+ /* adding to parent that previously didn't have children */
+ dent = securityfs_create_dir("profiles", dent);
+ if (IS_ERR(dent))
+ goto fail;
+ prof_child_dir(p) = parent = dent;
+ }
+
+ if (!profile->dirname) {
+ int len, id_len;
+ len = mangle_name(profile->base.name, NULL);
+ id_len = snprintf(NULL, 0, ".%ld", profile->ns->uniq_id);
+
+ profile->dirname = kmalloc(len + id_len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!profile->dirname)
+ goto fail;
+
+ mangle_name(profile->base.name, profile->dirname);
+ sprintf(profile->dirname + len, ".%ld", profile->ns->uniq_id++);
+ }
+
+ dent = securityfs_create_dir(profile->dirname, parent);
+ if (IS_ERR(dent))
+ goto fail;
+ prof_dir(profile) = dir = dent;
+
+ dent = create_profile_file(dir, "name", profile, &aa_fs_profname_fops);
+ if (IS_ERR(dent))
+ goto fail;
+ profile->dents[AAFS_PROF_NAME] = dent;
+
+ dent = create_profile_file(dir, "mode", profile, &aa_fs_profmode_fops);
+ if (IS_ERR(dent))
+ goto fail;
+ profile->dents[AAFS_PROF_MODE] = dent;
+
+ dent = create_profile_file(dir, "attach", profile,
+ &aa_fs_profattach_fops);
+ if (IS_ERR(dent))
+ goto fail;
+ profile->dents[AAFS_PROF_ATTACH] = dent;
+
+ if (profile->hash) {
+ dent = create_profile_file(dir, "sha1", profile,
+ &aa_fs_seq_hash_fops);
+ if (IS_ERR(dent))
+ goto fail;
+ profile->dents[AAFS_PROF_HASH] = dent;
+ }
+
+ list_for_each_entry(child, &profile->base.profiles, base.list) {
+ error = __aa_fs_profile_mkdir(child, prof_child_dir(profile));
+ if (error)
+ goto fail2;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+
+fail:
+ error = PTR_ERR(dent);
+
+fail2:
+ __aa_fs_profile_rmdir(profile);
+
+ return error;
+}
+
+void __aa_fs_namespace_rmdir(struct aa_namespace *ns)
+{
+ struct aa_namespace *sub;
+ struct aa_profile *child;
+ int i;
+
+ if (!ns)
+ return;
+
+ list_for_each_entry(child, &ns->base.profiles, base.list)
+ __aa_fs_profile_rmdir(child);
+
+ list_for_each_entry(sub, &ns->sub_ns, base.list) {
+ mutex_lock(&sub->lock);
+ __aa_fs_namespace_rmdir(sub);
+ mutex_unlock(&sub->lock);
+ }
+
+ for (i = AAFS_NS_SIZEOF - 1; i >= 0; --i) {
+ securityfs_remove(ns->dents[i]);
+ ns->dents[i] = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+int __aa_fs_namespace_mkdir(struct aa_namespace *ns, struct dentry *parent,
+ const char *name)
+{
+ struct aa_namespace *sub;
+ struct aa_profile *child;
+ struct dentry *dent, *dir;
+ int error;
+
+ if (!name)
+ name = ns->base.name;
+
+ dent = securityfs_create_dir(name, parent);
+ if (IS_ERR(dent))
+ goto fail;
+ ns_dir(ns) = dir = dent;
+
+ dent = securityfs_create_dir("profiles", dir);
+ if (IS_ERR(dent))
+ goto fail;
+ ns_subprofs_dir(ns) = dent;
+
+ dent = securityfs_create_dir("namespaces", dir);
+ if (IS_ERR(dent))
+ goto fail;
+ ns_subns_dir(ns) = dent;
+
+ list_for_each_entry(child, &ns->base.profiles, base.list) {
+ error = __aa_fs_profile_mkdir(child, ns_subprofs_dir(ns));
+ if (error)
+ goto fail2;
+ }
+
+ list_for_each_entry(sub, &ns->sub_ns, base.list) {
+ mutex_lock(&sub->lock);
+ error = __aa_fs_namespace_mkdir(sub, ns_subns_dir(ns), NULL);
+ mutex_unlock(&sub->lock);
+ if (error)
+ goto fail2;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+
+fail:
+ error = PTR_ERR(dent);
+
+fail2:
+ __aa_fs_namespace_rmdir(ns);
+
+ return error;
+}
+
+
+#define list_entry_next(pos, member) \
+ list_entry(pos->member.next, typeof(*pos), member)
+#define list_entry_is_head(pos, head, member) (&pos->member == (head))
+
+/**
+ * __next_namespace - find the next namespace to list
+ * @root: root namespace to stop search at (NOT NULL)
+ * @ns: current ns position (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Find the next namespace from @ns under @root and handle all locking needed
+ * while switching current namespace.
+ *
+ * Returns: next namespace or NULL if at last namespace under @root
+ * Requires: ns->parent->lock to be held
+ * NOTE: will not unlock root->lock
+ */
+static struct aa_namespace *__next_namespace(struct aa_namespace *root,
+ struct aa_namespace *ns)
+{
+ struct aa_namespace *parent, *next;
+
+ /* is next namespace a child */
+ if (!list_empty(&ns->sub_ns)) {
+ next = list_first_entry(&ns->sub_ns, typeof(*ns), base.list);
+ mutex_lock(&next->lock);
+ return next;
+ }
+
+ /* check if the next ns is a sibling, parent, gp, .. */
+ parent = ns->parent;
+ while (ns != root) {
+ mutex_unlock(&ns->lock);
+ next = list_entry_next(ns, base.list);
+ if (!list_entry_is_head(next, &parent->sub_ns, base.list)) {
+ mutex_lock(&next->lock);
+ return next;
+ }
+ ns = parent;
+ parent = parent->parent;
+ }
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * __first_profile - find the first profile in a namespace
+ * @root: namespace that is root of profiles being displayed (NOT NULL)
+ * @ns: namespace to start in (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: unrefcounted profile or NULL if no profile
+ * Requires: profile->ns.lock to be held
+ */
+static struct aa_profile *__first_profile(struct aa_namespace *root,
+ struct aa_namespace *ns)
+{
+ for (; ns; ns = __next_namespace(root, ns)) {
+ if (!list_empty(&ns->base.profiles))
+ return list_first_entry(&ns->base.profiles,
+ struct aa_profile, base.list);
+ }
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * __next_profile - step to the next profile in a profile tree
+ * @profile: current profile in tree (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Perform a depth first traversal on the profile tree in a namespace
+ *
+ * Returns: next profile or NULL if done
+ * Requires: profile->ns.lock to be held
+ */
+static struct aa_profile *__next_profile(struct aa_profile *p)
+{
+ struct aa_profile *parent;
+ struct aa_namespace *ns = p->ns;
+
+ /* is next profile a child */
+ if (!list_empty(&p->base.profiles))
+ return list_first_entry(&p->base.profiles, typeof(*p),
+ base.list);
+
+ /* is next profile a sibling, parent sibling, gp, sibling, .. */
+ parent = rcu_dereference_protected(p->parent,
+ mutex_is_locked(&p->ns->lock));
+ while (parent) {
+ p = list_entry_next(p, base.list);
+ if (!list_entry_is_head(p, &parent->base.profiles, base.list))
+ return p;
+ p = parent;
+ parent = rcu_dereference_protected(parent->parent,
+ mutex_is_locked(&parent->ns->lock));
+ }
+
+ /* is next another profile in the namespace */
+ p = list_entry_next(p, base.list);
+ if (!list_entry_is_head(p, &ns->base.profiles, base.list))
+ return p;
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * next_profile - step to the next profile in where ever it may be
+ * @root: root namespace (NOT NULL)
+ * @profile: current profile (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: next profile or NULL if there isn't one
+ */
+static struct aa_profile *next_profile(struct aa_namespace *root,
+ struct aa_profile *profile)
+{
+ struct aa_profile *next = __next_profile(profile);
+ if (next)
+ return next;
+
+ /* finished all profiles in namespace move to next namespace */
+ return __first_profile(root, __next_namespace(root, profile->ns));
+}
+
+/**
+ * p_start - start a depth first traversal of profile tree
+ * @f: seq_file to fill
+ * @pos: current position
+ *
+ * Returns: first profile under current namespace or NULL if none found
+ *
+ * acquires first ns->lock
+ */
+static void *p_start(struct seq_file *f, loff_t *pos)
+{
+ struct aa_profile *profile = NULL;
+ struct aa_namespace *root = aa_current_profile()->ns;
+ loff_t l = *pos;
+ f->private = aa_get_namespace(root);
+
+
+ /* find the first profile */
+ mutex_lock(&root->lock);
+ profile = __first_profile(root, root);
+
+ /* skip to position */
+ for (; profile && l > 0; l--)
+ profile = next_profile(root, profile);
+
+ return profile;
+}
+
+/**
+ * p_next - read the next profile entry
+ * @f: seq_file to fill
+ * @p: profile previously returned
+ * @pos: current position
+ *
+ * Returns: next profile after @p or NULL if none
+ *
+ * may acquire/release locks in namespace tree as necessary
+ */
+static void *p_next(struct seq_file *f, void *p, loff_t *pos)
+{
+ struct aa_profile *profile = p;
+ struct aa_namespace *ns = f->private;
+ (*pos)++;
+
+ return next_profile(ns, profile);
+}
+
+/**
+ * p_stop - stop depth first traversal
+ * @f: seq_file we are filling
+ * @p: the last profile writen
+ *
+ * Release all locking done by p_start/p_next on namespace tree
+ */
+static void p_stop(struct seq_file *f, void *p)
+{
+ struct aa_profile *profile = p;
+ struct aa_namespace *root = f->private, *ns;
+
+ if (profile) {
+ for (ns = profile->ns; ns && ns != root; ns = ns->parent)
+ mutex_unlock(&ns->lock);
+ }
+ mutex_unlock(&root->lock);
+ aa_put_namespace(root);
+}
+
+/**
+ * seq_show_profile - show a profile entry
+ * @f: seq_file to file
+ * @p: current position (profile) (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: error on failure
+ */
+static int seq_show_profile(struct seq_file *f, void *p)
+{
+ struct aa_profile *profile = (struct aa_profile *)p;
+ struct aa_namespace *root = f->private;
+
+ if (profile->ns != root)
+ seq_printf(f, ":%s://", aa_ns_name(root, profile->ns));
+ seq_printf(f, "%s (%s)\n", profile->base.hname,
+ aa_profile_mode_names[profile->mode]);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static const struct seq_operations aa_fs_profiles_op = {
+ .start = p_start,
+ .next = p_next,
+ .stop = p_stop,
+ .show = seq_show_profile,
+};
+
+static int profiles_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+ return seq_open(file, &aa_fs_profiles_op);
+}
+
+static int profiles_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+ return seq_release(inode, file);
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations aa_fs_profiles_fops = {
+ .open = profiles_open,
+ .read = seq_read,
+ .llseek = seq_lseek,
+ .release = profiles_release,
+};
+
+
+/** Base file system setup **/
+static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_file[] = {
+ AA_FS_FILE_STRING("mask", "create read write exec append mmap_exec " \
+ "link lock"),
+ { }
+};
+
+static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_domain[] = {
+ AA_FS_FILE_BOOLEAN("change_hat", 1),
+ AA_FS_FILE_BOOLEAN("change_hatv", 1),
+ AA_FS_FILE_BOOLEAN("change_onexec", 1),
+ AA_FS_FILE_BOOLEAN("change_profile", 1),
+ { }
+};
+
+static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_policy[] = {
+ AA_FS_FILE_BOOLEAN("set_load", 1),
+ {}
+};
+
+static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_features[] = {
+ AA_FS_DIR("policy", aa_fs_entry_policy),
+ AA_FS_DIR("domain", aa_fs_entry_domain),
+ AA_FS_DIR("file", aa_fs_entry_file),
+ AA_FS_FILE_U64("capability", VFS_CAP_FLAGS_MASK),
+ AA_FS_DIR("rlimit", aa_fs_entry_rlimit),
+ AA_FS_DIR("caps", aa_fs_entry_caps),
+ { }
+};
+
+static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_apparmor[] = {
+ AA_FS_FILE_FOPS(".load", 0640, &aa_fs_profile_load),
+ AA_FS_FILE_FOPS(".replace", 0640, &aa_fs_profile_replace),
+ AA_FS_FILE_FOPS(".remove", 0640, &aa_fs_profile_remove),
+ AA_FS_FILE_FOPS("profiles", 0640, &aa_fs_profiles_fops),
+ AA_FS_DIR("features", aa_fs_entry_features),
+ { }
+};
+
+static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry =
+ AA_FS_DIR("apparmor", aa_fs_entry_apparmor);
+
+/**
+ * aafs_create_file - create a file entry in the apparmor securityfs
+ * @fs_file: aa_fs_entry to build an entry for (NOT NULL)
+ * @parent: the parent dentry in the securityfs
+ *
+ * Use aafs_remove_file to remove entries created with this fn.
+ */
+static int __init aafs_create_file(struct aa_fs_entry *fs_file,
+ struct dentry *parent)
+{
+ int error = 0;
+
+ fs_file->dentry = securityfs_create_file(fs_file->name,
+ S_IFREG | fs_file->mode,
+ parent, fs_file,
+ fs_file->file_ops);
+ if (IS_ERR(fs_file->dentry)) {
+ error = PTR_ERR(fs_file->dentry);
+ fs_file->dentry = NULL;
+ }
+ return error;
+}
+
+static void __init aafs_remove_dir(struct aa_fs_entry *fs_dir);
+/**
+ * aafs_create_dir - recursively create a directory entry in the securityfs
+ * @fs_dir: aa_fs_entry (and all child entries) to build (NOT NULL)
+ * @parent: the parent dentry in the securityfs
+ *
+ * Use aafs_remove_dir to remove entries created with this fn.
+ */
+static int __init aafs_create_dir(struct aa_fs_entry *fs_dir,
+ struct dentry *parent)
+{
+ struct aa_fs_entry *fs_file;
+ struct dentry *dir;
+ int error;
+
+ dir = securityfs_create_dir(fs_dir->name, parent);
+ if (IS_ERR(dir))
+ return PTR_ERR(dir);
+ fs_dir->dentry = dir;
+
+ for (fs_file = fs_dir->v.files; fs_file && fs_file->name; ++fs_file) {
+ if (fs_file->v_type == AA_FS_TYPE_DIR)
+ error = aafs_create_dir(fs_file, fs_dir->dentry);
+ else
+ error = aafs_create_file(fs_file, fs_dir->dentry);
+ if (error)
+ goto failed;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+
+failed:
+ aafs_remove_dir(fs_dir);
+
+ return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aafs_remove_file - drop a single file entry in the apparmor securityfs
+ * @fs_file: aa_fs_entry to detach from the securityfs (NOT NULL)
+ */
+static void __init aafs_remove_file(struct aa_fs_entry *fs_file)
+{
+ if (!fs_file->dentry)
+ return;
+
+ securityfs_remove(fs_file->dentry);
+ fs_file->dentry = NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aafs_remove_dir - recursively drop a directory entry from the securityfs
+ * @fs_dir: aa_fs_entry (and all child entries) to detach (NOT NULL)
+ */
+static void __init aafs_remove_dir(struct aa_fs_entry *fs_dir)
+{
+ struct aa_fs_entry *fs_file;
+
+ for (fs_file = fs_dir->v.files; fs_file && fs_file->name; ++fs_file) {
+ if (fs_file->v_type == AA_FS_TYPE_DIR)
+ aafs_remove_dir(fs_file);
+ else
+ aafs_remove_file(fs_file);
+ }
+
+ aafs_remove_file(fs_dir);
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_destroy_aafs - cleanup and free aafs
+ *
+ * releases dentries allocated by aa_create_aafs
+ */
+void __init aa_destroy_aafs(void)
+{
+ aafs_remove_dir(&aa_fs_entry);
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_create_aafs - create the apparmor security filesystem
+ *
+ * dentries created here are released by aa_destroy_aafs
+ *
+ * Returns: error on failure
+ */
+static int __init aa_create_aafs(void)
+{
+ int error;
+
+ if (!apparmor_initialized)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (aa_fs_entry.dentry) {
+ AA_ERROR("%s: AppArmor securityfs already exists\n", __func__);
+ return -EEXIST;
+ }
+
+ /* Populate fs tree. */
+ error = aafs_create_dir(&aa_fs_entry, NULL);
+ if (error)
+ goto error;
+
+ error = __aa_fs_namespace_mkdir(root_ns, aa_fs_entry.dentry,
+ "policy");
+ if (error)
+ goto error;
+
+ /* TODO: add support for apparmorfs_null and apparmorfs_mnt */
+
+ /* Report that AppArmor fs is enabled */
+ aa_info_message("AppArmor Filesystem Enabled");
+ return 0;
+
+error:
+ aa_destroy_aafs();
+ AA_ERROR("Error creating AppArmor securityfs\n");
+ return error;
+}
+
+fs_initcall(aa_create_aafs);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/audit.c b/security/apparmor/audit.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..89c786580
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/audit.c
@@ -0,0 +1,209 @@
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor auditing functions
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <linux/socket.h>
+
+#include "include/apparmor.h"
+#include "include/audit.h"
+#include "include/policy.h"
+
+const char *const op_table[] = {
+ "null",
+
+ "sysctl",
+ "capable",
+
+ "unlink",
+ "mkdir",
+ "rmdir",
+ "mknod",
+ "truncate",
+ "link",
+ "symlink",
+ "rename_src",
+ "rename_dest",
+ "chmod",
+ "chown",
+ "getattr",
+ "open",
+
+ "file_perm",
+ "file_lock",
+ "file_mmap",
+ "file_mprotect",
+
+ "create",
+ "post_create",
+ "bind",
+ "connect",
+ "listen",
+ "accept",
+ "sendmsg",
+ "recvmsg",
+ "getsockname",
+ "getpeername",
+ "getsockopt",
+ "setsockopt",
+ "socket_shutdown",
+
+ "ptrace",
+
+ "exec",
+ "change_hat",
+ "change_profile",
+ "change_onexec",
+
+ "setprocattr",
+ "setrlimit",
+
+ "profile_replace",
+ "profile_load",
+ "profile_remove"
+};
+
+const char *const audit_mode_names[] = {
+ "normal",
+ "quiet_denied",
+ "quiet",
+ "noquiet",
+ "all"
+};
+
+static const char *const aa_audit_type[] = {
+ "AUDIT",
+ "ALLOWED",
+ "DENIED",
+ "HINT",
+ "STATUS",
+ "ERROR",
+ "KILLED",
+ "AUTO"
+};
+
+/*
+ * Currently AppArmor auditing is fed straight into the audit framework.
+ *
+ * TODO:
+ * netlink interface for complain mode
+ * user auditing, - send user auditing to netlink interface
+ * system control of whether user audit messages go to system log
+ */
+
+/**
+ * audit_base - core AppArmor function.
+ * @ab: audit buffer to fill (NOT NULL)
+ * @ca: audit structure containing data to audit (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Record common AppArmor audit data from @sa
+ */
+static void audit_pre(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *ca)
+{
+ struct common_audit_data *sa = ca;
+
+ if (aa_g_audit_header) {
+ audit_log_format(ab, "apparmor=");
+ audit_log_string(ab, aa_audit_type[sa->aad->type]);
+ }
+
+ if (sa->aad->op) {
+ audit_log_format(ab, " operation=");
+ audit_log_string(ab, op_table[sa->aad->op]);
+ }
+
+ if (sa->aad->info) {
+ audit_log_format(ab, " info=");
+ audit_log_string(ab, sa->aad->info);
+ if (sa->aad->error)
+ audit_log_format(ab, " error=%d", sa->aad->error);
+ }
+
+ if (sa->aad->profile) {
+ struct aa_profile *profile = sa->aad->profile;
+ if (profile->ns != root_ns) {
+ audit_log_format(ab, " namespace=");
+ audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, profile->ns->base.hname);
+ }
+ audit_log_format(ab, " profile=");
+ audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, profile->base.hname);
+ }
+
+ if (sa->aad->name) {
+ audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
+ audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sa->aad->name);
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_audit_msg - Log a message to the audit subsystem
+ * @sa: audit event structure (NOT NULL)
+ * @cb: optional callback fn for type specific fields (MAYBE NULL)
+ */
+void aa_audit_msg(int type, struct common_audit_data *sa,
+ void (*cb) (struct audit_buffer *, void *))
+{
+ sa->aad->type = type;
+ common_lsm_audit(sa, audit_pre, cb);
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_audit - Log a profile based audit event to the audit subsystem
+ * @type: audit type for the message
+ * @profile: profile to check against (NOT NULL)
+ * @gfp: allocation flags to use
+ * @sa: audit event (NOT NULL)
+ * @cb: optional callback fn for type specific fields (MAYBE NULL)
+ *
+ * Handle default message switching based off of audit mode flags
+ *
+ * Returns: error on failure
+ */
+int aa_audit(int type, struct aa_profile *profile, gfp_t gfp,
+ struct common_audit_data *sa,
+ void (*cb) (struct audit_buffer *, void *))
+{
+ BUG_ON(!profile);
+
+ if (type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO) {
+ if (likely(!sa->aad->error)) {
+ if (AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_ALL)
+ return 0;
+ type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUDIT;
+ } else if (COMPLAIN_MODE(profile))
+ type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_ALLOWED;
+ else
+ type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED;
+ }
+ if (AUDIT_MODE(profile) == AUDIT_QUIET ||
+ (type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED &&
+ AUDIT_MODE(profile) == AUDIT_QUIET))
+ return sa->aad->error;
+
+ if (KILL_MODE(profile) && type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED)
+ type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL;
+
+ if (!unconfined(profile))
+ sa->aad->profile = profile;
+
+ aa_audit_msg(type, sa, cb);
+
+ if (sa->aad->type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL)
+ (void)send_sig_info(SIGKILL, NULL,
+ sa->u.tsk ? sa->u.tsk : current);
+
+ if (sa->aad->type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_ALLOWED)
+ return complain_error(sa->aad->error);
+
+ return sa->aad->error;
+}
diff --git a/security/apparmor/capability.c b/security/apparmor/capability.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..1101c6f64
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/capability.c
@@ -0,0 +1,143 @@
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor capability mediation functions
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/capability.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/gfp.h>
+
+#include "include/apparmor.h"
+#include "include/capability.h"
+#include "include/context.h"
+#include "include/policy.h"
+#include "include/audit.h"
+
+/*
+ * Table of capability names: we generate it from capabilities.h.
+ */
+#include "capability_names.h"
+
+struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_caps[] = {
+ AA_FS_FILE_STRING("mask", AA_FS_CAPS_MASK),
+ { }
+};
+
+struct audit_cache {
+ struct aa_profile *profile;
+ kernel_cap_t caps;
+};
+
+static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct audit_cache, audit_cache);
+
+/**
+ * audit_cb - call back for capability components of audit struct
+ * @ab - audit buffer (NOT NULL)
+ * @va - audit struct to audit data from (NOT NULL)
+ */
+static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
+{
+ struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
+ audit_log_format(ab, " capname=");
+ audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, capability_names[sa->u.cap]);
+}
+
+/**
+ * audit_caps - audit a capability
+ * @profile: profile being tested for confinement (NOT NULL)
+ * @cap: capability tested
+ * @error: error code returned by test
+ *
+ * Do auditing of capability and handle, audit/complain/kill modes switching
+ * and duplicate message elimination.
+ *
+ * Returns: 0 or sa->error on success, error code on failure
+ */
+static int audit_caps(struct aa_profile *profile, int cap, int error)
+{
+ struct audit_cache *ent;
+ int type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO;
+ struct common_audit_data sa;
+ struct apparmor_audit_data aad = {0,};
+ sa.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_CAP;
+ sa.aad = &aad;
+ sa.u.cap = cap;
+ sa.aad->op = OP_CAPABLE;
+ sa.aad->error = error;
+
+ if (likely(!error)) {
+ /* test if auditing is being forced */
+ if (likely((AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_ALL) &&
+ !cap_raised(profile->caps.audit, cap)))
+ return 0;
+ type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUDIT;
+ } else if (KILL_MODE(profile) ||
+ cap_raised(profile->caps.kill, cap)) {
+ type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL;
+ } else if (cap_raised(profile->caps.quiet, cap) &&
+ AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_NOQUIET &&
+ AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_ALL) {
+ /* quiet auditing */
+ return error;
+ }
+
+ /* Do simple duplicate message elimination */
+ ent = &get_cpu_var(audit_cache);
+ if (profile == ent->profile && cap_raised(ent->caps, cap)) {
+ put_cpu_var(audit_cache);
+ if (COMPLAIN_MODE(profile))
+ return complain_error(error);
+ return error;
+ } else {
+ aa_put_profile(ent->profile);
+ ent->profile = aa_get_profile(profile);
+ cap_raise(ent->caps, cap);
+ }
+ put_cpu_var(audit_cache);
+
+ return aa_audit(type, profile, GFP_ATOMIC, &sa, audit_cb);
+}
+
+/**
+ * profile_capable - test if profile allows use of capability @cap
+ * @profile: profile being enforced (NOT NULL, NOT unconfined)
+ * @cap: capability to test if allowed
+ *
+ * Returns: 0 if allowed else -EPERM
+ */
+static int profile_capable(struct aa_profile *profile, int cap)
+{
+ return cap_raised(profile->caps.allow, cap) ? 0 : -EPERM;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_capable - test permission to use capability
+ * @profile: profile being tested against (NOT NULL)
+ * @cap: capability to be tested
+ * @audit: whether an audit record should be generated
+ *
+ * Look up capability in profile capability set.
+ *
+ * Returns: 0 on success, or else an error code.
+ */
+int aa_capable(struct aa_profile *profile, int cap, int audit)
+{
+ int error = profile_capable(profile, cap);
+
+ if (!audit) {
+ if (COMPLAIN_MODE(profile))
+ return complain_error(error);
+ return error;
+ }
+
+ return audit_caps(profile, cap, error);
+}
diff --git a/security/apparmor/context.c b/security/apparmor/context.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..3064c6ced
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/context.c
@@ -0,0 +1,222 @@
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor functions used to manipulate object security
+ * contexts.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ *
+ *
+ * AppArmor sets confinement on every task, via the the aa_task_cxt and
+ * the aa_task_cxt.profile, both of which are required and are not allowed
+ * to be NULL. The aa_task_cxt is not reference counted and is unique
+ * to each cred (which is reference count). The profile pointed to by
+ * the task_cxt is reference counted.
+ *
+ * TODO
+ * If a task uses change_hat it currently does not return to the old
+ * cred or task context but instead creates a new one. Ideally the task
+ * should return to the previous cred if it has not been modified.
+ *
+ */
+
+#include "include/context.h"
+#include "include/policy.h"
+
+/**
+ * aa_alloc_task_context - allocate a new task_cxt
+ * @flags: gfp flags for allocation
+ *
+ * Returns: allocated buffer or NULL on failure
+ */
+struct aa_task_cxt *aa_alloc_task_context(gfp_t flags)
+{
+ return kzalloc(sizeof(struct aa_task_cxt), flags);
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_free_task_context - free a task_cxt
+ * @cxt: task_cxt to free (MAYBE NULL)
+ */
+void aa_free_task_context(struct aa_task_cxt *cxt)
+{
+ if (cxt) {
+ aa_put_profile(cxt->profile);
+ aa_put_profile(cxt->previous);
+ aa_put_profile(cxt->onexec);
+
+ kzfree(cxt);
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_dup_task_context - duplicate a task context, incrementing reference counts
+ * @new: a blank task context (NOT NULL)
+ * @old: the task context to copy (NOT NULL)
+ */
+void aa_dup_task_context(struct aa_task_cxt *new, const struct aa_task_cxt *old)
+{
+ *new = *old;
+ aa_get_profile(new->profile);
+ aa_get_profile(new->previous);
+ aa_get_profile(new->onexec);
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_get_task_profile - Get another task's profile
+ * @task: task to query (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: counted reference to @task's profile
+ */
+struct aa_profile *aa_get_task_profile(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+ struct aa_profile *p;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ p = aa_get_profile(__aa_task_profile(task));
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+
+ return p;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_replace_current_profile - replace the current tasks profiles
+ * @profile: new profile (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: 0 or error on failure
+ */
+int aa_replace_current_profile(struct aa_profile *profile)
+{
+ struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = current_cxt();
+ struct cred *new;
+ BUG_ON(!profile);
+
+ if (cxt->profile == profile)
+ return 0;
+
+ new = prepare_creds();
+ if (!new)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ cxt = cred_cxt(new);
+ if (unconfined(profile) || (cxt->profile->ns != profile->ns))
+ /* if switching to unconfined or a different profile namespace
+ * clear out context state
+ */
+ aa_clear_task_cxt_trans(cxt);
+
+ /* be careful switching cxt->profile, when racing replacement it
+ * is possible that cxt->profile->replacedby->profile is the reference
+ * keeping @profile valid, so make sure to get its reference before
+ * dropping the reference on cxt->profile */
+ aa_get_profile(profile);
+ aa_put_profile(cxt->profile);
+ cxt->profile = profile;
+
+ commit_creds(new);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_set_current_onexec - set the tasks change_profile to happen onexec
+ * @profile: system profile to set at exec (MAYBE NULL to clear value)
+ *
+ * Returns: 0 or error on failure
+ */
+int aa_set_current_onexec(struct aa_profile *profile)
+{
+ struct aa_task_cxt *cxt;
+ struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
+ if (!new)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ cxt = cred_cxt(new);
+ aa_get_profile(profile);
+ aa_put_profile(cxt->onexec);
+ cxt->onexec = profile;
+
+ commit_creds(new);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_set_current_hat - set the current tasks hat
+ * @profile: profile to set as the current hat (NOT NULL)
+ * @token: token value that must be specified to change from the hat
+ *
+ * Do switch of tasks hat. If the task is currently in a hat
+ * validate the token to match.
+ *
+ * Returns: 0 or error on failure
+ */
+int aa_set_current_hat(struct aa_profile *profile, u64 token)
+{
+ struct aa_task_cxt *cxt;
+ struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
+ if (!new)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ BUG_ON(!profile);
+
+ cxt = cred_cxt(new);
+ if (!cxt->previous) {
+ /* transfer refcount */
+ cxt->previous = cxt->profile;
+ cxt->token = token;
+ } else if (cxt->token == token) {
+ aa_put_profile(cxt->profile);
+ } else {
+ /* previous_profile && cxt->token != token */
+ abort_creds(new);
+ return -EACCES;
+ }
+ cxt->profile = aa_get_newest_profile(profile);
+ /* clear exec on switching context */
+ aa_put_profile(cxt->onexec);
+ cxt->onexec = NULL;
+
+ commit_creds(new);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_restore_previous_profile - exit from hat context restoring the profile
+ * @token: the token that must be matched to exit hat context
+ *
+ * Attempt to return out of a hat to the previous profile. The token
+ * must match the stored token value.
+ *
+ * Returns: 0 or error of failure
+ */
+int aa_restore_previous_profile(u64 token)
+{
+ struct aa_task_cxt *cxt;
+ struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
+ if (!new)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ cxt = cred_cxt(new);
+ if (cxt->token != token) {
+ abort_creds(new);
+ return -EACCES;
+ }
+ /* ignore restores when there is no saved profile */
+ if (!cxt->previous) {
+ abort_creds(new);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ aa_put_profile(cxt->profile);
+ cxt->profile = aa_get_newest_profile(cxt->previous);
+ BUG_ON(!cxt->profile);
+ /* clear exec && prev information when restoring to previous context */
+ aa_clear_task_cxt_trans(cxt);
+
+ commit_creds(new);
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/security/apparmor/crypto.c b/security/apparmor/crypto.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..532471d0b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/crypto.c
@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor policy loading interface function definitions.
+ *
+ * Copyright 2013 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ *
+ * Fns to provide a checksum of policy that has been loaded this can be
+ * compared to userspace policy compiles to check loaded policy is what
+ * it should be.
+ */
+
+#include <crypto/hash.h>
+
+#include "include/apparmor.h"
+#include "include/crypto.h"
+
+static unsigned int apparmor_hash_size;
+
+static struct crypto_shash *apparmor_tfm;
+
+unsigned int aa_hash_size(void)
+{
+ return apparmor_hash_size;
+}
+
+int aa_calc_profile_hash(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 version, void *start,
+ size_t len)
+{
+ struct {
+ struct shash_desc shash;
+ char ctx[crypto_shash_descsize(apparmor_tfm)];
+ } desc;
+ int error = -ENOMEM;
+ u32 le32_version = cpu_to_le32(version);
+
+ if (!apparmor_tfm)
+ return 0;
+
+ profile->hash = kzalloc(apparmor_hash_size, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!profile->hash)
+ goto fail;
+
+ desc.shash.tfm = apparmor_tfm;
+ desc.shash.flags = 0;
+
+ error = crypto_shash_init(&desc.shash);
+ if (error)
+ goto fail;
+ error = crypto_shash_update(&desc.shash, (u8 *) &le32_version, 4);
+ if (error)
+ goto fail;
+ error = crypto_shash_update(&desc.shash, (u8 *) start, len);
+ if (error)
+ goto fail;
+ error = crypto_shash_final(&desc.shash, profile->hash);
+ if (error)
+ goto fail;
+
+ return 0;
+
+fail:
+ kfree(profile->hash);
+ profile->hash = NULL;
+
+ return error;
+}
+
+static int __init init_profile_hash(void)
+{
+ struct crypto_shash *tfm;
+
+ if (!apparmor_initialized)
+ return 0;
+
+ tfm = crypto_alloc_shash("sha1", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
+ if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
+ int error = PTR_ERR(tfm);
+ AA_ERROR("failed to setup profile sha1 hashing: %d\n", error);
+ return error;
+ }
+ apparmor_tfm = tfm;
+ apparmor_hash_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(apparmor_tfm);
+
+ aa_info_message("AppArmor sha1 policy hashing enabled");
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+late_initcall(init_profile_hash);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d97cba3e3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c
@@ -0,0 +1,854 @@
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor policy attachment and domain transitions
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2002-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/fdtable.h>
+#include <linux/file.h>
+#include <linux/mount.h>
+#include <linux/syscalls.h>
+#include <linux/tracehook.h>
+#include <linux/personality.h>
+
+#include "include/audit.h"
+#include "include/apparmorfs.h"
+#include "include/context.h"
+#include "include/domain.h"
+#include "include/file.h"
+#include "include/ipc.h"
+#include "include/match.h"
+#include "include/path.h"
+#include "include/policy.h"
+
+/**
+ * aa_free_domain_entries - free entries in a domain table
+ * @domain: the domain table to free (MAYBE NULL)
+ */
+void aa_free_domain_entries(struct aa_domain *domain)
+{
+ int i;
+ if (domain) {
+ if (!domain->table)
+ return;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < domain->size; i++)
+ kzfree(domain->table[i]);
+ kzfree(domain->table);
+ domain->table = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * may_change_ptraced_domain - check if can change profile on ptraced task
+ * @to_profile: profile to change to (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Check if current is ptraced and if so if the tracing task is allowed
+ * to trace the new domain
+ *
+ * Returns: %0 or error if change not allowed
+ */
+static int may_change_ptraced_domain(struct aa_profile *to_profile)
+{
+ struct task_struct *tracer;
+ struct aa_profile *tracerp = NULL;
+ int error = 0;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ tracer = ptrace_parent(current);
+ if (tracer)
+ /* released below */
+ tracerp = aa_get_task_profile(tracer);
+
+ /* not ptraced */
+ if (!tracer || unconfined(tracerp))
+ goto out;
+
+ error = aa_may_ptrace(tracerp, to_profile, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH);
+
+out:
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ aa_put_profile(tracerp);
+
+ return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * change_profile_perms - find permissions for change_profile
+ * @profile: the current profile (NOT NULL)
+ * @ns: the namespace being switched to (NOT NULL)
+ * @name: the name of the profile to change to (NOT NULL)
+ * @request: requested perms
+ * @start: state to start matching in
+ *
+ * Returns: permission set
+ */
+static struct file_perms change_profile_perms(struct aa_profile *profile,
+ struct aa_namespace *ns,
+ const char *name, u32 request,
+ unsigned int start)
+{
+ struct file_perms perms;
+ struct path_cond cond = { };
+ unsigned int state;
+
+ if (unconfined(profile)) {
+ perms.allow = AA_MAY_CHANGE_PROFILE | AA_MAY_ONEXEC;
+ perms.audit = perms.quiet = perms.kill = 0;
+ return perms;
+ } else if (!profile->file.dfa) {
+ return nullperms;
+ } else if ((ns == profile->ns)) {
+ /* try matching against rules with out namespace prepended */
+ aa_str_perms(profile->file.dfa, start, name, &cond, &perms);
+ if (COMBINED_PERM_MASK(perms) & request)
+ return perms;
+ }
+
+ /* try matching with namespace name and then profile */
+ state = aa_dfa_match(profile->file.dfa, start, ns->base.name);
+ state = aa_dfa_match_len(profile->file.dfa, state, ":", 1);
+ aa_str_perms(profile->file.dfa, state, name, &cond, &perms);
+
+ return perms;
+}
+
+/**
+ * __attach_match_ - find an attachment match
+ * @name - to match against (NOT NULL)
+ * @head - profile list to walk (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Do a linear search on the profiles in the list. There is a matching
+ * preference where an exact match is preferred over a name which uses
+ * expressions to match, and matching expressions with the greatest
+ * xmatch_len are preferred.
+ *
+ * Requires: @head not be shared or have appropriate locks held
+ *
+ * Returns: profile or NULL if no match found
+ */
+static struct aa_profile *__attach_match(const char *name,
+ struct list_head *head)
+{
+ int len = 0;
+ struct aa_profile *profile, *candidate = NULL;
+
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(profile, head, base.list) {
+ if (profile->flags & PFLAG_NULL)
+ continue;
+ if (profile->xmatch && profile->xmatch_len > len) {
+ unsigned int state = aa_dfa_match(profile->xmatch,
+ DFA_START, name);
+ u32 perm = dfa_user_allow(profile->xmatch, state);
+ /* any accepting state means a valid match. */
+ if (perm & MAY_EXEC) {
+ candidate = profile;
+ len = profile->xmatch_len;
+ }
+ } else if (!strcmp(profile->base.name, name))
+ /* exact non-re match, no more searching required */
+ return profile;
+ }
+
+ return candidate;
+}
+
+/**
+ * find_attach - do attachment search for unconfined processes
+ * @ns: the current namespace (NOT NULL)
+ * @list: list to search (NOT NULL)
+ * @name: the executable name to match against (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: profile or NULL if no match found
+ */
+static struct aa_profile *find_attach(struct aa_namespace *ns,
+ struct list_head *list, const char *name)
+{
+ struct aa_profile *profile;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ profile = aa_get_profile(__attach_match(name, list));
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+
+ return profile;
+}
+
+/**
+ * separate_fqname - separate the namespace and profile names
+ * @fqname: the fqname name to split (NOT NULL)
+ * @ns_name: the namespace name if it exists (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * This is the xtable equivalent routine of aa_split_fqname. It finds the
+ * split in an xtable fqname which contains an embedded \0 instead of a :
+ * if a namespace is specified. This is done so the xtable is constant and
+ * isn't re-split on every lookup.
+ *
+ * Either the profile or namespace name may be optional but if the namespace
+ * is specified the profile name termination must be present. This results
+ * in the following possible encodings:
+ * profile_name\0
+ * :ns_name\0profile_name\0
+ * :ns_name\0\0
+ *
+ * NOTE: the xtable fqname is pre-validated at load time in unpack_trans_table
+ *
+ * Returns: profile name if it is specified else NULL
+ */
+static const char *separate_fqname(const char *fqname, const char **ns_name)
+{
+ const char *name;
+
+ if (fqname[0] == ':') {
+ /* In this case there is guaranteed to be two \0 terminators
+ * in the string. They are verified at load time by
+ * by unpack_trans_table
+ */
+ *ns_name = fqname + 1; /* skip : */
+ name = *ns_name + strlen(*ns_name) + 1;
+ if (!*name)
+ name = NULL;
+ } else {
+ *ns_name = NULL;
+ name = fqname;
+ }
+
+ return name;
+}
+
+static const char *next_name(int xtype, const char *name)
+{
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * x_table_lookup - lookup an x transition name via transition table
+ * @profile: current profile (NOT NULL)
+ * @xindex: index into x transition table
+ *
+ * Returns: refcounted profile, or NULL on failure (MAYBE NULL)
+ */
+static struct aa_profile *x_table_lookup(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 xindex)
+{
+ struct aa_profile *new_profile = NULL;
+ struct aa_namespace *ns = profile->ns;
+ u32 xtype = xindex & AA_X_TYPE_MASK;
+ int index = xindex & AA_X_INDEX_MASK;
+ const char *name;
+
+ /* index is guaranteed to be in range, validated at load time */
+ for (name = profile->file.trans.table[index]; !new_profile && name;
+ name = next_name(xtype, name)) {
+ struct aa_namespace *new_ns;
+ const char *xname = NULL;
+
+ new_ns = NULL;
+ if (xindex & AA_X_CHILD) {
+ /* release by caller */
+ new_profile = aa_find_child(profile, name);
+ continue;
+ } else if (*name == ':') {
+ /* switching namespace */
+ const char *ns_name;
+ xname = name = separate_fqname(name, &ns_name);
+ if (!xname)
+ /* no name so use profile name */
+ xname = profile->base.hname;
+ if (*ns_name == '@') {
+ /* TODO: variable support */
+ ;
+ }
+ /* released below */
+ new_ns = aa_find_namespace(ns, ns_name);
+ if (!new_ns)
+ continue;
+ } else if (*name == '@') {
+ /* TODO: variable support */
+ continue;
+ } else {
+ /* basic namespace lookup */
+ xname = name;
+ }
+
+ /* released by caller */
+ new_profile = aa_lookup_profile(new_ns ? new_ns : ns, xname);
+ aa_put_namespace(new_ns);
+ }
+
+ /* released by caller */
+ return new_profile;
+}
+
+/**
+ * x_to_profile - get target profile for a given xindex
+ * @profile: current profile (NOT NULL)
+ * @name: name to lookup (NOT NULL)
+ * @xindex: index into x transition table
+ *
+ * find profile for a transition index
+ *
+ * Returns: refcounted profile or NULL if not found available
+ */
+static struct aa_profile *x_to_profile(struct aa_profile *profile,
+ const char *name, u32 xindex)
+{
+ struct aa_profile *new_profile = NULL;
+ struct aa_namespace *ns = profile->ns;
+ u32 xtype = xindex & AA_X_TYPE_MASK;
+
+ switch (xtype) {
+ case AA_X_NONE:
+ /* fail exec unless ix || ux fallback - handled by caller */
+ return NULL;
+ case AA_X_NAME:
+ if (xindex & AA_X_CHILD)
+ /* released by caller */
+ new_profile = find_attach(ns, &profile->base.profiles,
+ name);
+ else
+ /* released by caller */
+ new_profile = find_attach(ns, &ns->base.profiles,
+ name);
+ break;
+ case AA_X_TABLE:
+ /* released by caller */
+ new_profile = x_table_lookup(profile, xindex);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* released by caller */
+ return new_profile;
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_bprm_set_creds - set the new creds on the bprm struct
+ * @bprm: binprm for the exec (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: %0 or error on failure
+ */
+int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+ struct aa_task_cxt *cxt;
+ struct aa_profile *profile, *new_profile = NULL;
+ struct aa_namespace *ns;
+ char *buffer = NULL;
+ unsigned int state;
+ struct file_perms perms = {};
+ struct path_cond cond = {
+ file_inode(bprm->file)->i_uid,
+ file_inode(bprm->file)->i_mode
+ };
+ const char *name = NULL, *target = NULL, *info = NULL;
+ int error = cap_bprm_set_creds(bprm);
+ if (error)
+ return error;
+
+ if (bprm->cred_prepared)
+ return 0;
+
+ cxt = cred_cxt(bprm->cred);
+ BUG_ON(!cxt);
+
+ profile = aa_get_newest_profile(cxt->profile);
+ /*
+ * get the namespace from the replacement profile as replacement
+ * can change the namespace
+ */
+ ns = profile->ns;
+ state = profile->file.start;
+
+ /* buffer freed below, name is pointer into buffer */
+ error = aa_path_name(&bprm->file->f_path, profile->path_flags, &buffer,
+ &name, &info);
+ if (error) {
+ if (unconfined(profile) ||
+ (profile->flags & PFLAG_IX_ON_NAME_ERROR))
+ error = 0;
+ name = bprm->filename;
+ goto audit;
+ }
+
+ /* Test for onexec first as onexec directives override other
+ * x transitions.
+ */
+ if (unconfined(profile)) {
+ /* unconfined task */
+ if (cxt->onexec)
+ /* change_profile on exec already been granted */
+ new_profile = aa_get_profile(cxt->onexec);
+ else
+ new_profile = find_attach(ns, &ns->base.profiles, name);
+ if (!new_profile)
+ goto cleanup;
+ /*
+ * NOTE: Domain transitions from unconfined are allowed
+ * even when no_new_privs is set because this aways results
+ * in a further reduction of permissions.
+ */
+ goto apply;
+ }
+
+ /* find exec permissions for name */
+ state = aa_str_perms(profile->file.dfa, state, name, &cond, &perms);
+ if (cxt->onexec) {
+ struct file_perms cp;
+ info = "change_profile onexec";
+ if (!(perms.allow & AA_MAY_ONEXEC))
+ goto audit;
+
+ /* test if this exec can be paired with change_profile onexec.
+ * onexec permission is linked to exec with a standard pairing
+ * exec\0change_profile
+ */
+ state = aa_dfa_null_transition(profile->file.dfa, state);
+ cp = change_profile_perms(profile, cxt->onexec->ns,
+ cxt->onexec->base.name,
+ AA_MAY_ONEXEC, state);
+
+ if (!(cp.allow & AA_MAY_ONEXEC))
+ goto audit;
+ new_profile = aa_get_newest_profile(cxt->onexec);
+ goto apply;
+ }
+
+ if (perms.allow & MAY_EXEC) {
+ /* exec permission determine how to transition */
+ new_profile = x_to_profile(profile, name, perms.xindex);
+ if (!new_profile) {
+ if (perms.xindex & AA_X_INHERIT) {
+ /* (p|c|n)ix - don't change profile but do
+ * use the newest version, which was picked
+ * up above when getting profile
+ */
+ info = "ix fallback";
+ new_profile = aa_get_profile(profile);
+ goto x_clear;
+ } else if (perms.xindex & AA_X_UNCONFINED) {
+ new_profile = aa_get_newest_profile(ns->unconfined);
+ info = "ux fallback";
+ } else {
+ error = -ENOENT;
+ info = "profile not found";
+ /* remove MAY_EXEC to audit as failure */
+ perms.allow &= ~MAY_EXEC;
+ }
+ }
+ } else if (COMPLAIN_MODE(profile)) {
+ /* no exec permission - are we in learning mode */
+ new_profile = aa_new_null_profile(profile, 0);
+ if (!new_profile) {
+ error = -ENOMEM;
+ info = "could not create null profile";
+ } else {
+ error = -EACCES;
+ target = new_profile->base.hname;
+ }
+ perms.xindex |= AA_X_UNSAFE;
+ } else
+ /* fail exec */
+ error = -EACCES;
+
+ /*
+ * Policy has specified a domain transition, if no_new_privs then
+ * fail the exec.
+ */
+ if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS) {
+ aa_put_profile(new_profile);
+ error = -EPERM;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if (!new_profile)
+ goto audit;
+
+ if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
+ /* FIXME: currently don't mediate shared state */
+ ;
+ }
+
+ if (bprm->unsafe & (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
+ error = may_change_ptraced_domain(new_profile);
+ if (error) {
+ aa_put_profile(new_profile);
+ goto audit;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Determine if secure exec is needed.
+ * Can be at this point for the following reasons:
+ * 1. unconfined switching to confined
+ * 2. confined switching to different confinement
+ * 3. confined switching to unconfined
+ *
+ * Cases 2 and 3 are marked as requiring secure exec
+ * (unless policy specified "unsafe exec")
+ *
+ * bprm->unsafe is used to cache the AA_X_UNSAFE permission
+ * to avoid having to recompute in secureexec
+ */
+ if (!(perms.xindex & AA_X_UNSAFE)) {
+ AA_DEBUG("scrubbing environment variables for %s profile=%s\n",
+ name, new_profile->base.hname);
+ bprm->unsafe |= AA_SECURE_X_NEEDED;
+ }
+apply:
+ target = new_profile->base.hname;
+ /* when transitioning profiles clear unsafe personality bits */
+ bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
+
+x_clear:
+ aa_put_profile(cxt->profile);
+ /* transfer new profile reference will be released when cxt is freed */
+ cxt->profile = new_profile;
+
+ /* clear out all temporary/transitional state from the context */
+ aa_clear_task_cxt_trans(cxt);
+
+audit:
+ error = aa_audit_file(profile, &perms, GFP_KERNEL, OP_EXEC, MAY_EXEC,
+ name, target, cond.uid, info, error);
+
+cleanup:
+ aa_put_profile(profile);
+ kfree(buffer);
+
+ return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_bprm_secureexec - determine if secureexec is needed
+ * @bprm: binprm for exec (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: %1 if secureexec is needed else %0
+ */
+int apparmor_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+ int ret = cap_bprm_secureexec(bprm);
+
+ /* the decision to use secure exec is computed in set_creds
+ * and stored in bprm->unsafe.
+ */
+ if (!ret && (bprm->unsafe & AA_SECURE_X_NEEDED))
+ ret = 1;
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_bprm_committing_creds - do task cleanup on committing new creds
+ * @bprm: binprm for the exec (NOT NULL)
+ */
+void apparmor_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+ struct aa_profile *profile = __aa_current_profile();
+ struct aa_task_cxt *new_cxt = cred_cxt(bprm->cred);
+
+ /* bail out if unconfined or not changing profile */
+ if ((new_cxt->profile == profile) ||
+ (unconfined(new_cxt->profile)))
+ return;
+
+ current->pdeath_signal = 0;
+
+ /* reset soft limits and set hard limits for the new profile */
+ __aa_transition_rlimits(profile, new_cxt->profile);
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_bprm_commited_cred - do cleanup after new creds committed
+ * @bprm: binprm for the exec (NOT NULL)
+ */
+void apparmor_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+ /* TODO: cleanup signals - ipc mediation */
+ return;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Functions for self directed profile change
+ */
+
+/**
+ * new_compound_name - create an hname with @n2 appended to @n1
+ * @n1: base of hname (NOT NULL)
+ * @n2: name to append (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: new name or NULL on error
+ */
+static char *new_compound_name(const char *n1, const char *n2)
+{
+ char *name = kmalloc(strlen(n1) + strlen(n2) + 3, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (name)
+ sprintf(name, "%s//%s", n1, n2);
+ return name;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_change_hat - change hat to/from subprofile
+ * @hats: vector of hat names to try changing into (MAYBE NULL if @count == 0)
+ * @count: number of hat names in @hats
+ * @token: magic value to validate the hat change
+ * @permtest: true if this is just a permission test
+ *
+ * Change to the first profile specified in @hats that exists, and store
+ * the @hat_magic in the current task context. If the count == 0 and the
+ * @token matches that stored in the current task context, return to the
+ * top level profile.
+ *
+ * Returns %0 on success, error otherwise.
+ */
+int aa_change_hat(const char *hats[], int count, u64 token, bool permtest)
+{
+ const struct cred *cred;
+ struct aa_task_cxt *cxt;
+ struct aa_profile *profile, *previous_profile, *hat = NULL;
+ char *name = NULL;
+ int i;
+ struct file_perms perms = {};
+ const char *target = NULL, *info = NULL;
+ int error = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Fail explicitly requested domain transitions if no_new_privs.
+ * There is no exception for unconfined as change_hat is not
+ * available.
+ */
+ if (task_no_new_privs(current))
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ /* released below */
+ cred = get_current_cred();
+ cxt = cred_cxt(cred);
+ profile = aa_cred_profile(cred);
+ previous_profile = cxt->previous;
+
+ if (unconfined(profile)) {
+ info = "unconfined";
+ error = -EPERM;
+ goto audit;
+ }
+
+ if (count) {
+ /* attempting to change into a new hat or switch to a sibling */
+ struct aa_profile *root;
+ if (PROFILE_IS_HAT(profile))
+ root = aa_get_profile_rcu(&profile->parent);
+ else
+ root = aa_get_profile(profile);
+
+ /* find first matching hat */
+ for (i = 0; i < count && !hat; i++)
+ /* released below */
+ hat = aa_find_child(root, hats[i]);
+ if (!hat) {
+ if (!COMPLAIN_MODE(root) || permtest) {
+ if (list_empty(&root->base.profiles))
+ error = -ECHILD;
+ else
+ error = -ENOENT;
+ aa_put_profile(root);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * In complain mode and failed to match any hats.
+ * Audit the failure is based off of the first hat
+ * supplied. This is done due how userspace
+ * interacts with change_hat.
+ *
+ * TODO: Add logging of all failed hats
+ */
+
+ /* freed below */
+ name = new_compound_name(root->base.hname, hats[0]);
+ aa_put_profile(root);
+ target = name;
+ /* released below */
+ hat = aa_new_null_profile(profile, 1);
+ if (!hat) {
+ info = "failed null profile create";
+ error = -ENOMEM;
+ goto audit;
+ }
+ } else {
+ aa_put_profile(root);
+ target = hat->base.hname;
+ if (!PROFILE_IS_HAT(hat)) {
+ info = "target not hat";
+ error = -EPERM;
+ goto audit;
+ }
+ }
+
+ error = may_change_ptraced_domain(hat);
+ if (error) {
+ info = "ptraced";
+ error = -EPERM;
+ goto audit;
+ }
+
+ if (!permtest) {
+ error = aa_set_current_hat(hat, token);
+ if (error == -EACCES)
+ /* kill task in case of brute force attacks */
+ perms.kill = AA_MAY_CHANGEHAT;
+ else if (name && !error)
+ /* reset error for learning of new hats */
+ error = -ENOENT;
+ }
+ } else if (previous_profile) {
+ /* Return to saved profile. Kill task if restore fails
+ * to avoid brute force attacks
+ */
+ target = previous_profile->base.hname;
+ error = aa_restore_previous_profile(token);
+ perms.kill = AA_MAY_CHANGEHAT;
+ } else
+ /* ignore restores when there is no saved profile */
+ goto out;
+
+audit:
+ if (!permtest)
+ error = aa_audit_file(profile, &perms, GFP_KERNEL,
+ OP_CHANGE_HAT, AA_MAY_CHANGEHAT, NULL,
+ target, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, info, error);
+
+out:
+ aa_put_profile(hat);
+ kfree(name);
+ put_cred(cred);
+
+ return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_change_profile - perform a one-way profile transition
+ * @ns_name: name of the profile namespace to change to (MAYBE NULL)
+ * @hname: name of profile to change to (MAYBE NULL)
+ * @onexec: whether this transition is to take place immediately or at exec
+ * @permtest: true if this is just a permission test
+ *
+ * Change to new profile @name. Unlike with hats, there is no way
+ * to change back. If @name isn't specified the current profile name is
+ * used.
+ * If @onexec then the transition is delayed until
+ * the next exec.
+ *
+ * Returns %0 on success, error otherwise.
+ */
+int aa_change_profile(const char *ns_name, const char *hname, bool onexec,
+ bool permtest)
+{
+ const struct cred *cred;
+ struct aa_profile *profile, *target = NULL;
+ struct aa_namespace *ns = NULL;
+ struct file_perms perms = {};
+ const char *name = NULL, *info = NULL;
+ int op, error = 0;
+ u32 request;
+
+ if (!hname && !ns_name)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (onexec) {
+ request = AA_MAY_ONEXEC;
+ op = OP_CHANGE_ONEXEC;
+ } else {
+ request = AA_MAY_CHANGE_PROFILE;
+ op = OP_CHANGE_PROFILE;
+ }
+
+ cred = get_current_cred();
+ profile = aa_cred_profile(cred);
+
+ /*
+ * Fail explicitly requested domain transitions if no_new_privs
+ * and not unconfined.
+ * Domain transitions from unconfined are allowed even when
+ * no_new_privs is set because this aways results in a reduction
+ * of permissions.
+ */
+ if (task_no_new_privs(current) && !unconfined(profile)) {
+ put_cred(cred);
+ return -EPERM;
+ }
+
+ if (ns_name) {
+ /* released below */
+ ns = aa_find_namespace(profile->ns, ns_name);
+ if (!ns) {
+ /* we don't create new namespace in complain mode */
+ name = ns_name;
+ info = "namespace not found";
+ error = -ENOENT;
+ goto audit;
+ }
+ } else
+ /* released below */
+ ns = aa_get_namespace(profile->ns);
+
+ /* if the name was not specified, use the name of the current profile */
+ if (!hname) {
+ if (unconfined(profile))
+ hname = ns->unconfined->base.hname;
+ else
+ hname = profile->base.hname;
+ }
+
+ perms = change_profile_perms(profile, ns, hname, request,
+ profile->file.start);
+ if (!(perms.allow & request)) {
+ error = -EACCES;
+ goto audit;
+ }
+
+ /* released below */
+ target = aa_lookup_profile(ns, hname);
+ if (!target) {
+ info = "profile not found";
+ error = -ENOENT;
+ if (permtest || !COMPLAIN_MODE(profile))
+ goto audit;
+ /* released below */
+ target = aa_new_null_profile(profile, 0);
+ if (!target) {
+ info = "failed null profile create";
+ error = -ENOMEM;
+ goto audit;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* check if tracing task is allowed to trace target domain */
+ error = may_change_ptraced_domain(target);
+ if (error) {
+ info = "ptrace prevents transition";
+ goto audit;
+ }
+
+ if (permtest)
+ goto audit;
+
+ if (onexec)
+ error = aa_set_current_onexec(target);
+ else
+ error = aa_replace_current_profile(target);
+
+audit:
+ if (!permtest)
+ error = aa_audit_file(profile, &perms, GFP_KERNEL, op, request,
+ name, hname, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, info, error);
+
+ aa_put_namespace(ns);
+ aa_put_profile(target);
+ put_cred(cred);
+
+ return error;
+}
diff --git a/security/apparmor/file.c b/security/apparmor/file.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..913f377a0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/file.c
@@ -0,0 +1,458 @@
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor mediation of files
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ */
+
+#include "include/apparmor.h"
+#include "include/audit.h"
+#include "include/file.h"
+#include "include/match.h"
+#include "include/path.h"
+#include "include/policy.h"
+
+struct file_perms nullperms;
+
+
+/**
+ * audit_file_mask - convert mask to permission string
+ * @buffer: buffer to write string to (NOT NULL)
+ * @mask: permission mask to convert
+ */
+static void audit_file_mask(struct audit_buffer *ab, u32 mask)
+{
+ char str[10];
+
+ char *m = str;
+
+ if (mask & AA_EXEC_MMAP)
+ *m++ = 'm';
+ if (mask & (MAY_READ | AA_MAY_META_READ))
+ *m++ = 'r';
+ if (mask & (MAY_WRITE | AA_MAY_META_WRITE | AA_MAY_CHMOD |
+ AA_MAY_CHOWN))
+ *m++ = 'w';
+ else if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
+ *m++ = 'a';
+ if (mask & AA_MAY_CREATE)
+ *m++ = 'c';
+ if (mask & AA_MAY_DELETE)
+ *m++ = 'd';
+ if (mask & AA_MAY_LINK)
+ *m++ = 'l';
+ if (mask & AA_MAY_LOCK)
+ *m++ = 'k';
+ if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
+ *m++ = 'x';
+ *m = '\0';
+
+ audit_log_string(ab, str);
+}
+
+/**
+ * file_audit_cb - call back for file specific audit fields
+ * @ab: audit_buffer (NOT NULL)
+ * @va: audit struct to audit values of (NOT NULL)
+ */
+static void file_audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
+{
+ struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
+ kuid_t fsuid = current_fsuid();
+
+ if (sa->aad->fs.request & AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK) {
+ audit_log_format(ab, " requested_mask=");
+ audit_file_mask(ab, sa->aad->fs.request);
+ }
+ if (sa->aad->fs.denied & AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK) {
+ audit_log_format(ab, " denied_mask=");
+ audit_file_mask(ab, sa->aad->fs.denied);
+ }
+ if (sa->aad->fs.request & AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK) {
+ audit_log_format(ab, " fsuid=%d",
+ from_kuid(&init_user_ns, fsuid));
+ audit_log_format(ab, " ouid=%d",
+ from_kuid(&init_user_ns, sa->aad->fs.ouid));
+ }
+
+ if (sa->aad->fs.target) {
+ audit_log_format(ab, " target=");
+ audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sa->aad->fs.target);
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_audit_file - handle the auditing of file operations
+ * @profile: the profile being enforced (NOT NULL)
+ * @perms: the permissions computed for the request (NOT NULL)
+ * @gfp: allocation flags
+ * @op: operation being mediated
+ * @request: permissions requested
+ * @name: name of object being mediated (MAYBE NULL)
+ * @target: name of target (MAYBE NULL)
+ * @ouid: object uid
+ * @info: extra information message (MAYBE NULL)
+ * @error: 0 if operation allowed else failure error code
+ *
+ * Returns: %0 or error on failure
+ */
+int aa_audit_file(struct aa_profile *profile, struct file_perms *perms,
+ gfp_t gfp, int op, u32 request, const char *name,
+ const char *target, kuid_t ouid, const char *info, int error)
+{
+ int type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO;
+ struct common_audit_data sa;
+ struct apparmor_audit_data aad = {0,};
+ sa.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE;
+ sa.aad = &aad;
+ aad.op = op,
+ aad.fs.request = request;
+ aad.name = name;
+ aad.fs.target = target;
+ aad.fs.ouid = ouid;
+ aad.info = info;
+ aad.error = error;
+
+ if (likely(!sa.aad->error)) {
+ u32 mask = perms->audit;
+
+ if (unlikely(AUDIT_MODE(profile) == AUDIT_ALL))
+ mask = 0xffff;
+
+ /* mask off perms that are not being force audited */
+ sa.aad->fs.request &= mask;
+
+ if (likely(!sa.aad->fs.request))
+ return 0;
+ type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUDIT;
+ } else {
+ /* only report permissions that were denied */
+ sa.aad->fs.request = sa.aad->fs.request & ~perms->allow;
+
+ if (sa.aad->fs.request & perms->kill)
+ type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL;
+
+ /* quiet known rejects, assumes quiet and kill do not overlap */
+ if ((sa.aad->fs.request & perms->quiet) &&
+ AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_NOQUIET &&
+ AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_ALL)
+ sa.aad->fs.request &= ~perms->quiet;
+
+ if (!sa.aad->fs.request)
+ return COMPLAIN_MODE(profile) ? 0 : sa.aad->error;
+ }
+
+ sa.aad->fs.denied = sa.aad->fs.request & ~perms->allow;
+ return aa_audit(type, profile, gfp, &sa, file_audit_cb);
+}
+
+/**
+ * map_old_perms - map old file perms layout to the new layout
+ * @old: permission set in old mapping
+ *
+ * Returns: new permission mapping
+ */
+static u32 map_old_perms(u32 old)
+{
+ u32 new = old & 0xf;
+ if (old & MAY_READ)
+ new |= AA_MAY_META_READ;
+ if (old & MAY_WRITE)
+ new |= AA_MAY_META_WRITE | AA_MAY_CREATE | AA_MAY_DELETE |
+ AA_MAY_CHMOD | AA_MAY_CHOWN;
+ if (old & 0x10)
+ new |= AA_MAY_LINK;
+ /* the old mapping lock and link_subset flags where overlaid
+ * and use was determined by part of a pair that they were in
+ */
+ if (old & 0x20)
+ new |= AA_MAY_LOCK | AA_LINK_SUBSET;
+ if (old & 0x40) /* AA_EXEC_MMAP */
+ new |= AA_EXEC_MMAP;
+
+ return new;
+}
+
+/**
+ * compute_perms - convert dfa compressed perms to internal perms
+ * @dfa: dfa to compute perms for (NOT NULL)
+ * @state: state in dfa
+ * @cond: conditions to consider (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * TODO: convert from dfa + state to permission entry, do computation conversion
+ * at load time.
+ *
+ * Returns: computed permission set
+ */
+static struct file_perms compute_perms(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int state,
+ struct path_cond *cond)
+{
+ struct file_perms perms;
+
+ /* FIXME: change over to new dfa format
+ * currently file perms are encoded in the dfa, new format
+ * splits the permissions from the dfa. This mapping can be
+ * done at profile load
+ */
+ perms.kill = 0;
+
+ if (uid_eq(current_fsuid(), cond->uid)) {
+ perms.allow = map_old_perms(dfa_user_allow(dfa, state));
+ perms.audit = map_old_perms(dfa_user_audit(dfa, state));
+ perms.quiet = map_old_perms(dfa_user_quiet(dfa, state));
+ perms.xindex = dfa_user_xindex(dfa, state);
+ } else {
+ perms.allow = map_old_perms(dfa_other_allow(dfa, state));
+ perms.audit = map_old_perms(dfa_other_audit(dfa, state));
+ perms.quiet = map_old_perms(dfa_other_quiet(dfa, state));
+ perms.xindex = dfa_other_xindex(dfa, state);
+ }
+ perms.allow |= AA_MAY_META_READ;
+
+ /* change_profile wasn't determined by ownership in old mapping */
+ if (ACCEPT_TABLE(dfa)[state] & 0x80000000)
+ perms.allow |= AA_MAY_CHANGE_PROFILE;
+ if (ACCEPT_TABLE(dfa)[state] & 0x40000000)
+ perms.allow |= AA_MAY_ONEXEC;
+
+ return perms;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_str_perms - find permission that match @name
+ * @dfa: to match against (MAYBE NULL)
+ * @state: state to start matching in
+ * @name: string to match against dfa (NOT NULL)
+ * @cond: conditions to consider for permission set computation (NOT NULL)
+ * @perms: Returns - the permissions found when matching @name
+ *
+ * Returns: the final state in @dfa when beginning @start and walking @name
+ */
+unsigned int aa_str_perms(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start,
+ const char *name, struct path_cond *cond,
+ struct file_perms *perms)
+{
+ unsigned int state;
+ if (!dfa) {
+ *perms = nullperms;
+ return DFA_NOMATCH;
+ }
+
+ state = aa_dfa_match(dfa, start, name);
+ *perms = compute_perms(dfa, state, cond);
+
+ return state;
+}
+
+/**
+ * is_deleted - test if a file has been completely unlinked
+ * @dentry: dentry of file to test for deletion (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: %1 if deleted else %0
+ */
+static inline bool is_deleted(struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+ if (d_unlinked(dentry) && d_backing_inode(dentry)->i_nlink == 0)
+ return 1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_path_perm - do permissions check & audit for @path
+ * @op: operation being checked
+ * @profile: profile being enforced (NOT NULL)
+ * @path: path to check permissions of (NOT NULL)
+ * @flags: any additional path flags beyond what the profile specifies
+ * @request: requested permissions
+ * @cond: conditional info for this request (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: %0 else error if access denied or other error
+ */
+int aa_path_perm(int op, struct aa_profile *profile, struct path *path,
+ int flags, u32 request, struct path_cond *cond)
+{
+ char *buffer = NULL;
+ struct file_perms perms = {};
+ const char *name, *info = NULL;
+ int error;
+
+ flags |= profile->path_flags | (S_ISDIR(cond->mode) ? PATH_IS_DIR : 0);
+ error = aa_path_name(path, flags, &buffer, &name, &info);
+ if (error) {
+ if (error == -ENOENT && is_deleted(path->dentry)) {
+ /* Access to open files that are deleted are
+ * give a pass (implicit delegation)
+ */
+ error = 0;
+ info = NULL;
+ perms.allow = request;
+ }
+ } else {
+ aa_str_perms(profile->file.dfa, profile->file.start, name, cond,
+ &perms);
+ if (request & ~perms.allow)
+ error = -EACCES;
+ }
+ error = aa_audit_file(profile, &perms, GFP_KERNEL, op, request, name,
+ NULL, cond->uid, info, error);
+ kfree(buffer);
+
+ return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * xindex_is_subset - helper for aa_path_link
+ * @link: link permission set
+ * @target: target permission set
+ *
+ * test target x permissions are equal OR a subset of link x permissions
+ * this is done as part of the subset test, where a hardlink must have
+ * a subset of permissions that the target has.
+ *
+ * Returns: %1 if subset else %0
+ */
+static inline bool xindex_is_subset(u32 link, u32 target)
+{
+ if (((link & ~AA_X_UNSAFE) != (target & ~AA_X_UNSAFE)) ||
+ ((link & AA_X_UNSAFE) && !(target & AA_X_UNSAFE)))
+ return 0;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_path_link - Handle hard link permission check
+ * @profile: the profile being enforced (NOT NULL)
+ * @old_dentry: the target dentry (NOT NULL)
+ * @new_dir: directory the new link will be created in (NOT NULL)
+ * @new_dentry: the link being created (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Handle the permission test for a link & target pair. Permission
+ * is encoded as a pair where the link permission is determined
+ * first, and if allowed, the target is tested. The target test
+ * is done from the point of the link match (not start of DFA)
+ * making the target permission dependent on the link permission match.
+ *
+ * The subset test if required forces that permissions granted
+ * on link are a subset of the permission granted to target.
+ *
+ * Returns: %0 if allowed else error
+ */
+int aa_path_link(struct aa_profile *profile, struct dentry *old_dentry,
+ struct path *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
+{
+ struct path link = { new_dir->mnt, new_dentry };
+ struct path target = { new_dir->mnt, old_dentry };
+ struct path_cond cond = {
+ d_backing_inode(old_dentry)->i_uid,
+ d_backing_inode(old_dentry)->i_mode
+ };
+ char *buffer = NULL, *buffer2 = NULL;
+ const char *lname, *tname = NULL, *info = NULL;
+ struct file_perms lperms, perms;
+ u32 request = AA_MAY_LINK;
+ unsigned int state;
+ int error;
+
+ lperms = nullperms;
+
+ /* buffer freed below, lname is pointer in buffer */
+ error = aa_path_name(&link, profile->path_flags, &buffer, &lname,
+ &info);
+ if (error)
+ goto audit;
+
+ /* buffer2 freed below, tname is pointer in buffer2 */
+ error = aa_path_name(&target, profile->path_flags, &buffer2, &tname,
+ &info);
+ if (error)
+ goto audit;
+
+ error = -EACCES;
+ /* aa_str_perms - handles the case of the dfa being NULL */
+ state = aa_str_perms(profile->file.dfa, profile->file.start, lname,
+ &cond, &lperms);
+
+ if (!(lperms.allow & AA_MAY_LINK))
+ goto audit;
+
+ /* test to see if target can be paired with link */
+ state = aa_dfa_null_transition(profile->file.dfa, state);
+ aa_str_perms(profile->file.dfa, state, tname, &cond, &perms);
+
+ /* force audit/quiet masks for link are stored in the second entry
+ * in the link pair.
+ */
+ lperms.audit = perms.audit;
+ lperms.quiet = perms.quiet;
+ lperms.kill = perms.kill;
+
+ if (!(perms.allow & AA_MAY_LINK)) {
+ info = "target restricted";
+ goto audit;
+ }
+
+ /* done if link subset test is not required */
+ if (!(perms.allow & AA_LINK_SUBSET))
+ goto done_tests;
+
+ /* Do link perm subset test requiring allowed permission on link are a
+ * subset of the allowed permissions on target.
+ */
+ aa_str_perms(profile->file.dfa, profile->file.start, tname, &cond,
+ &perms);
+
+ /* AA_MAY_LINK is not considered in the subset test */
+ request = lperms.allow & ~AA_MAY_LINK;
+ lperms.allow &= perms.allow | AA_MAY_LINK;
+
+ request |= AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK & (lperms.allow & ~perms.allow);
+ if (request & ~lperms.allow) {
+ goto audit;
+ } else if ((lperms.allow & MAY_EXEC) &&
+ !xindex_is_subset(lperms.xindex, perms.xindex)) {
+ lperms.allow &= ~MAY_EXEC;
+ request |= MAY_EXEC;
+ info = "link not subset of target";
+ goto audit;
+ }
+
+done_tests:
+ error = 0;
+
+audit:
+ error = aa_audit_file(profile, &lperms, GFP_KERNEL, OP_LINK, request,
+ lname, tname, cond.uid, info, error);
+ kfree(buffer);
+ kfree(buffer2);
+
+ return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_file_perm - do permission revalidation check & audit for @file
+ * @op: operation being checked
+ * @profile: profile being enforced (NOT NULL)
+ * @file: file to revalidate access permissions on (NOT NULL)
+ * @request: requested permissions
+ *
+ * Returns: %0 if access allowed else error
+ */
+int aa_file_perm(int op, struct aa_profile *profile, struct file *file,
+ u32 request)
+{
+ struct path_cond cond = {
+ .uid = file_inode(file)->i_uid,
+ .mode = file_inode(file)->i_mode
+ };
+
+ return aa_path_perm(op, profile, &file->f_path, PATH_DELEGATE_DELETED,
+ request, &cond);
+}
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h b/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e4ea62663
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h
@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor basic global and lib definitions
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ */
+
+#ifndef __APPARMOR_H
+#define __APPARMOR_H
+
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+
+#include "match.h"
+
+/*
+ * Class of mediation types in the AppArmor policy db
+ */
+#define AA_CLASS_ENTRY 0
+#define AA_CLASS_UNKNOWN 1
+#define AA_CLASS_FILE 2
+#define AA_CLASS_CAP 3
+#define AA_CLASS_NET 4
+#define AA_CLASS_RLIMITS 5
+#define AA_CLASS_DOMAIN 6
+
+#define AA_CLASS_LAST AA_CLASS_DOMAIN
+
+/* Control parameters settable through module/boot flags */
+extern enum audit_mode aa_g_audit;
+extern bool aa_g_audit_header;
+extern bool aa_g_debug;
+extern bool aa_g_lock_policy;
+extern bool aa_g_logsyscall;
+extern bool aa_g_paranoid_load;
+extern unsigned int aa_g_path_max;
+
+/*
+ * DEBUG remains global (no per profile flag) since it is mostly used in sysctl
+ * which is not related to profile accesses.
+ */
+
+#define AA_DEBUG(fmt, args...) \
+ do { \
+ if (aa_g_debug && printk_ratelimit()) \
+ printk(KERN_DEBUG "AppArmor: " fmt, ##args); \
+ } while (0)
+
+#define AA_ERROR(fmt, args...) \
+ do { \
+ if (printk_ratelimit()) \
+ printk(KERN_ERR "AppArmor: " fmt, ##args); \
+ } while (0)
+
+/* Flag indicating whether initialization completed */
+extern int apparmor_initialized __initdata;
+
+/* fn's in lib */
+char *aa_split_fqname(char *args, char **ns_name);
+void aa_info_message(const char *str);
+void *__aa_kvmalloc(size_t size, gfp_t flags);
+
+static inline void *kvmalloc(size_t size)
+{
+ return __aa_kvmalloc(size, 0);
+}
+
+static inline void *kvzalloc(size_t size)
+{
+ return __aa_kvmalloc(size, __GFP_ZERO);
+}
+
+/* returns 0 if kref not incremented */
+static inline int kref_get_not0(struct kref *kref)
+{
+ return atomic_inc_not_zero(&kref->refcount);
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_strneq - compare null terminated @str to a non null terminated substring
+ * @str: a null terminated string
+ * @sub: a substring, not necessarily null terminated
+ * @len: length of @sub to compare
+ *
+ * The @str string must be full consumed for this to be considered a match
+ */
+static inline bool aa_strneq(const char *str, const char *sub, int len)
+{
+ return !strncmp(str, sub, len) && !str[len];
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_dfa_null_transition - step to next state after null character
+ * @dfa: the dfa to match against
+ * @start: the state of the dfa to start matching in
+ *
+ * aa_dfa_null_transition transitions to the next state after a null
+ * character which is not used in standard matching and is only
+ * used to separate pairs.
+ */
+static inline unsigned int aa_dfa_null_transition(struct aa_dfa *dfa,
+ unsigned int start)
+{
+ /* the null transition only needs the string's null terminator byte */
+ return aa_dfa_next(dfa, start, 0);
+}
+
+static inline bool mediated_filesystem(struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+ return !(dentry->d_sb->s_flags & MS_NOUSER);
+}
+
+#endif /* __APPARMOR_H */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/apparmorfs.h b/security/apparmor/include/apparmorfs.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..414e56878
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/apparmorfs.h
@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor filesystem definitions.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ */
+
+#ifndef __AA_APPARMORFS_H
+#define __AA_APPARMORFS_H
+
+enum aa_fs_type {
+ AA_FS_TYPE_BOOLEAN,
+ AA_FS_TYPE_STRING,
+ AA_FS_TYPE_U64,
+ AA_FS_TYPE_FOPS,
+ AA_FS_TYPE_DIR,
+};
+
+struct aa_fs_entry;
+
+struct aa_fs_entry {
+ const char *name;
+ struct dentry *dentry;
+ umode_t mode;
+ enum aa_fs_type v_type;
+ union {
+ bool boolean;
+ char *string;
+ unsigned long u64;
+ struct aa_fs_entry *files;
+ } v;
+ const struct file_operations *file_ops;
+};
+
+extern const struct file_operations aa_fs_seq_file_ops;
+
+#define AA_FS_FILE_BOOLEAN(_name, _value) \
+ { .name = (_name), .mode = 0444, \
+ .v_type = AA_FS_TYPE_BOOLEAN, .v.boolean = (_value), \
+ .file_ops = &aa_fs_seq_file_ops }
+#define AA_FS_FILE_STRING(_name, _value) \
+ { .name = (_name), .mode = 0444, \
+ .v_type = AA_FS_TYPE_STRING, .v.string = (_value), \
+ .file_ops = &aa_fs_seq_file_ops }
+#define AA_FS_FILE_U64(_name, _value) \
+ { .name = (_name), .mode = 0444, \
+ .v_type = AA_FS_TYPE_U64, .v.u64 = (_value), \
+ .file_ops = &aa_fs_seq_file_ops }
+#define AA_FS_FILE_FOPS(_name, _mode, _fops) \
+ { .name = (_name), .v_type = AA_FS_TYPE_FOPS, \
+ .mode = (_mode), .file_ops = (_fops) }
+#define AA_FS_DIR(_name, _value) \
+ { .name = (_name), .v_type = AA_FS_TYPE_DIR, .v.files = (_value) }
+
+extern void __init aa_destroy_aafs(void);
+
+struct aa_profile;
+struct aa_namespace;
+
+enum aafs_ns_type {
+ AAFS_NS_DIR,
+ AAFS_NS_PROFS,
+ AAFS_NS_NS,
+ AAFS_NS_COUNT,
+ AAFS_NS_MAX_COUNT,
+ AAFS_NS_SIZE,
+ AAFS_NS_MAX_SIZE,
+ AAFS_NS_OWNER,
+ AAFS_NS_SIZEOF,
+};
+
+enum aafs_prof_type {
+ AAFS_PROF_DIR,
+ AAFS_PROF_PROFS,
+ AAFS_PROF_NAME,
+ AAFS_PROF_MODE,
+ AAFS_PROF_ATTACH,
+ AAFS_PROF_HASH,
+ AAFS_PROF_SIZEOF,
+};
+
+#define ns_dir(X) ((X)->dents[AAFS_NS_DIR])
+#define ns_subns_dir(X) ((X)->dents[AAFS_NS_NS])
+#define ns_subprofs_dir(X) ((X)->dents[AAFS_NS_PROFS])
+
+#define prof_dir(X) ((X)->dents[AAFS_PROF_DIR])
+#define prof_child_dir(X) ((X)->dents[AAFS_PROF_PROFS])
+
+void __aa_fs_profile_rmdir(struct aa_profile *profile);
+void __aa_fs_profile_migrate_dents(struct aa_profile *old,
+ struct aa_profile *new);
+int __aa_fs_profile_mkdir(struct aa_profile *profile, struct dentry *parent);
+void __aa_fs_namespace_rmdir(struct aa_namespace *ns);
+int __aa_fs_namespace_mkdir(struct aa_namespace *ns, struct dentry *parent,
+ const char *name);
+
+#endif /* __AA_APPARMORFS_H */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ba3dfd17f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
@@ -0,0 +1,147 @@
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor auditing function definitions.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ */
+
+#ifndef __AA_AUDIT_H
+#define __AA_AUDIT_H
+
+#include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_audit.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+
+#include "file.h"
+
+struct aa_profile;
+
+extern const char *const audit_mode_names[];
+#define AUDIT_MAX_INDEX 5
+enum audit_mode {
+ AUDIT_NORMAL, /* follow normal auditing of accesses */
+ AUDIT_QUIET_DENIED, /* quiet all denied access messages */
+ AUDIT_QUIET, /* quiet all messages */
+ AUDIT_NOQUIET, /* do not quiet audit messages */
+ AUDIT_ALL /* audit all accesses */
+};
+
+enum audit_type {
+ AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUDIT,
+ AUDIT_APPARMOR_ALLOWED,
+ AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED,
+ AUDIT_APPARMOR_HINT,
+ AUDIT_APPARMOR_STATUS,
+ AUDIT_APPARMOR_ERROR,
+ AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL,
+ AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO
+};
+
+extern const char *const op_table[];
+enum aa_ops {
+ OP_NULL,
+
+ OP_SYSCTL,
+ OP_CAPABLE,
+
+ OP_UNLINK,
+ OP_MKDIR,
+ OP_RMDIR,
+ OP_MKNOD,
+ OP_TRUNC,
+ OP_LINK,
+ OP_SYMLINK,
+ OP_RENAME_SRC,
+ OP_RENAME_DEST,
+ OP_CHMOD,
+ OP_CHOWN,
+ OP_GETATTR,
+ OP_OPEN,
+
+ OP_FPERM,
+ OP_FLOCK,
+ OP_FMMAP,
+ OP_FMPROT,
+
+ OP_CREATE,
+ OP_POST_CREATE,
+ OP_BIND,
+ OP_CONNECT,
+ OP_LISTEN,
+ OP_ACCEPT,
+ OP_SENDMSG,
+ OP_RECVMSG,
+ OP_GETSOCKNAME,
+ OP_GETPEERNAME,
+ OP_GETSOCKOPT,
+ OP_SETSOCKOPT,
+ OP_SOCK_SHUTDOWN,
+
+ OP_PTRACE,
+
+ OP_EXEC,
+ OP_CHANGE_HAT,
+ OP_CHANGE_PROFILE,
+ OP_CHANGE_ONEXEC,
+
+ OP_SETPROCATTR,
+ OP_SETRLIMIT,
+
+ OP_PROF_REPL,
+ OP_PROF_LOAD,
+ OP_PROF_RM,
+};
+
+
+struct apparmor_audit_data {
+ int error;
+ int op;
+ int type;
+ void *profile;
+ const char *name;
+ const char *info;
+ union {
+ void *target;
+ struct {
+ long pos;
+ void *target;
+ } iface;
+ struct {
+ int rlim;
+ unsigned long max;
+ } rlim;
+ struct {
+ const char *target;
+ u32 request;
+ u32 denied;
+ kuid_t ouid;
+ } fs;
+ };
+};
+
+/* define a short hand for apparmor_audit_data structure */
+#define aad apparmor_audit_data
+
+void aa_audit_msg(int type, struct common_audit_data *sa,
+ void (*cb) (struct audit_buffer *, void *));
+int aa_audit(int type, struct aa_profile *profile, gfp_t gfp,
+ struct common_audit_data *sa,
+ void (*cb) (struct audit_buffer *, void *));
+
+static inline int complain_error(int error)
+{
+ if (error == -EPERM || error == -EACCES)
+ return 0;
+ return error;
+}
+
+#endif /* __AA_AUDIT_H */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/capability.h b/security/apparmor/include/capability.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..fc3fa381d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/capability.h
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor capability mediation definitions.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2013 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ */
+
+#ifndef __AA_CAPABILITY_H
+#define __AA_CAPABILITY_H
+
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+
+#include "apparmorfs.h"
+
+struct aa_profile;
+
+/* aa_caps - confinement data for capabilities
+ * @allowed: capabilities mask
+ * @audit: caps that are to be audited
+ * @quiet: caps that should not be audited
+ * @kill: caps that when requested will result in the task being killed
+ * @extended: caps that are subject finer grained mediation
+ */
+struct aa_caps {
+ kernel_cap_t allow;
+ kernel_cap_t audit;
+ kernel_cap_t quiet;
+ kernel_cap_t kill;
+ kernel_cap_t extended;
+};
+
+extern struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_caps[];
+
+int aa_capable(struct aa_profile *profile, int cap, int audit);
+
+static inline void aa_free_cap_rules(struct aa_caps *caps)
+{
+ /* NOP */
+}
+
+#endif /* __AA_CAPBILITY_H */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/context.h b/security/apparmor/include/context.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..6bf65798e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/context.h
@@ -0,0 +1,178 @@
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor contexts used to associate "labels" to objects.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ */
+
+#ifndef __AA_CONTEXT_H
+#define __AA_CONTEXT_H
+
+#include <linux/cred.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+
+#include "policy.h"
+
+#define cred_cxt(X) (X)->security
+#define current_cxt() cred_cxt(current_cred())
+
+/* struct aa_file_cxt - the AppArmor context the file was opened in
+ * @perms: the permission the file was opened with
+ *
+ * The file_cxt could currently be directly stored in file->f_security
+ * as the profile reference is now stored in the f_cred. However the
+ * cxt struct will expand in the future so we keep the struct.
+ */
+struct aa_file_cxt {
+ u16 allow;
+};
+
+/**
+ * aa_alloc_file_context - allocate file_cxt
+ * @gfp: gfp flags for allocation
+ *
+ * Returns: file_cxt or NULL on failure
+ */
+static inline struct aa_file_cxt *aa_alloc_file_context(gfp_t gfp)
+{
+ return kzalloc(sizeof(struct aa_file_cxt), gfp);
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_free_file_context - free a file_cxt
+ * @cxt: file_cxt to free (MAYBE_NULL)
+ */
+static inline void aa_free_file_context(struct aa_file_cxt *cxt)
+{
+ if (cxt)
+ kzfree(cxt);
+}
+
+/**
+ * struct aa_task_cxt - primary label for confined tasks
+ * @profile: the current profile (NOT NULL)
+ * @exec: profile to transition to on next exec (MAYBE NULL)
+ * @previous: profile the task may return to (MAYBE NULL)
+ * @token: magic value the task must know for returning to @previous_profile
+ *
+ * Contains the task's current profile (which could change due to
+ * change_hat). Plus the hat_magic needed during change_hat.
+ *
+ * TODO: make so a task can be confined by a stack of contexts
+ */
+struct aa_task_cxt {
+ struct aa_profile *profile;
+ struct aa_profile *onexec;
+ struct aa_profile *previous;
+ u64 token;
+};
+
+struct aa_task_cxt *aa_alloc_task_context(gfp_t flags);
+void aa_free_task_context(struct aa_task_cxt *cxt);
+void aa_dup_task_context(struct aa_task_cxt *new,
+ const struct aa_task_cxt *old);
+int aa_replace_current_profile(struct aa_profile *profile);
+int aa_set_current_onexec(struct aa_profile *profile);
+int aa_set_current_hat(struct aa_profile *profile, u64 token);
+int aa_restore_previous_profile(u64 cookie);
+struct aa_profile *aa_get_task_profile(struct task_struct *task);
+
+
+/**
+ * aa_cred_profile - obtain cred's profiles
+ * @cred: cred to obtain profiles from (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: confining profile
+ *
+ * does NOT increment reference count
+ */
+static inline struct aa_profile *aa_cred_profile(const struct cred *cred)
+{
+ struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = cred_cxt(cred);
+ BUG_ON(!cxt || !cxt->profile);
+ return cxt->profile;
+}
+
+/**
+ * __aa_task_profile - retrieve another task's profile
+ * @task: task to query (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: @task's profile without incrementing its ref count
+ *
+ * If @task != current needs to be called in RCU safe critical section
+ */
+static inline struct aa_profile *__aa_task_profile(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+ return aa_cred_profile(__task_cred(task));
+}
+
+/**
+ * __aa_task_is_confined - determine if @task has any confinement
+ * @task: task to check confinement of (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * If @task != current needs to be called in RCU safe critical section
+ */
+static inline bool __aa_task_is_confined(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+ return !unconfined(__aa_task_profile(task));
+}
+
+/**
+ * __aa_current_profile - find the current tasks confining profile
+ *
+ * Returns: up to date confining profile or the ns unconfined profile (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * This fn will not update the tasks cred to the most up to date version
+ * of the profile so it is safe to call when inside of locks.
+ */
+static inline struct aa_profile *__aa_current_profile(void)
+{
+ return aa_cred_profile(current_cred());
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_current_profile - find the current tasks confining profile and do updates
+ *
+ * Returns: up to date confining profile or the ns unconfined profile (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * This fn will update the tasks cred structure if the profile has been
+ * replaced. Not safe to call inside locks
+ */
+static inline struct aa_profile *aa_current_profile(void)
+{
+ const struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = current_cxt();
+ struct aa_profile *profile;
+ BUG_ON(!cxt || !cxt->profile);
+
+ if (PROFILE_INVALID(cxt->profile)) {
+ profile = aa_get_newest_profile(cxt->profile);
+ aa_replace_current_profile(profile);
+ aa_put_profile(profile);
+ cxt = current_cxt();
+ }
+
+ return cxt->profile;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_clear_task_cxt_trans - clear transition tracking info from the cxt
+ * @cxt: task context to clear (NOT NULL)
+ */
+static inline void aa_clear_task_cxt_trans(struct aa_task_cxt *cxt)
+{
+ aa_put_profile(cxt->previous);
+ aa_put_profile(cxt->onexec);
+ cxt->previous = NULL;
+ cxt->onexec = NULL;
+ cxt->token = 0;
+}
+
+#endif /* __AA_CONTEXT_H */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/crypto.h b/security/apparmor/include/crypto.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..dc418e502
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/crypto.h
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor policy loading interface function definitions.
+ *
+ * Copyright 2013 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ */
+
+#ifndef __APPARMOR_CRYPTO_H
+#define __APPARMOR_CRYPTO_H
+
+#include "policy.h"
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH
+unsigned int aa_hash_size(void);
+int aa_calc_profile_hash(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 version, void *start,
+ size_t len);
+#else
+static inline int aa_calc_profile_hash(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 version,
+ void *start, size_t len)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline unsigned int aa_hash_size(void)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* __APPARMOR_CRYPTO_H */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/domain.h b/security/apparmor/include/domain.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..de04464f0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/domain.h
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor security domain transition function definitions.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/binfmts.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+
+#ifndef __AA_DOMAIN_H
+#define __AA_DOMAIN_H
+
+struct aa_domain {
+ int size;
+ char **table;
+};
+
+int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
+int apparmor_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
+void apparmor_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
+void apparmor_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
+
+void aa_free_domain_entries(struct aa_domain *domain);
+int aa_change_hat(const char *hats[], int count, u64 token, bool permtest);
+int aa_change_profile(const char *ns_name, const char *name, bool onexec,
+ bool permtest);
+
+#endif /* __AA_DOMAIN_H */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/file.h b/security/apparmor/include/file.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..2c922b86b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/file.h
@@ -0,0 +1,216 @@
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor file mediation function definitions.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ */
+
+#ifndef __AA_FILE_H
+#define __AA_FILE_H
+
+#include "domain.h"
+#include "match.h"
+
+struct aa_profile;
+struct path;
+
+/*
+ * We use MAY_EXEC, MAY_WRITE, MAY_READ, MAY_APPEND and the following flags
+ * for profile permissions
+ */
+#define AA_MAY_CREATE 0x0010
+#define AA_MAY_DELETE 0x0020
+#define AA_MAY_META_WRITE 0x0040
+#define AA_MAY_META_READ 0x0080
+
+#define AA_MAY_CHMOD 0x0100
+#define AA_MAY_CHOWN 0x0200
+#define AA_MAY_LOCK 0x0400
+#define AA_EXEC_MMAP 0x0800
+
+#define AA_MAY_LINK 0x1000
+#define AA_LINK_SUBSET AA_MAY_LOCK /* overlaid */
+#define AA_MAY_ONEXEC 0x40000000 /* exec allows onexec */
+#define AA_MAY_CHANGE_PROFILE 0x80000000
+#define AA_MAY_CHANGEHAT 0x80000000 /* ctrl auditing only */
+
+#define AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC | MAY_APPEND |\
+ AA_MAY_CREATE | AA_MAY_DELETE | \
+ AA_MAY_META_READ | AA_MAY_META_WRITE | \
+ AA_MAY_CHMOD | AA_MAY_CHOWN | AA_MAY_LOCK | \
+ AA_EXEC_MMAP | AA_MAY_LINK)
+
+/*
+ * The xindex is broken into 3 parts
+ * - index - an index into either the exec name table or the variable table
+ * - exec type - which determines how the executable name and index are used
+ * - flags - which modify how the destination name is applied
+ */
+#define AA_X_INDEX_MASK 0x03ff
+
+#define AA_X_TYPE_MASK 0x0c00
+#define AA_X_TYPE_SHIFT 10
+#define AA_X_NONE 0x0000
+#define AA_X_NAME 0x0400 /* use executable name px */
+#define AA_X_TABLE 0x0800 /* use a specified name ->n# */
+
+#define AA_X_UNSAFE 0x1000
+#define AA_X_CHILD 0x2000 /* make >AA_X_NONE apply to children */
+#define AA_X_INHERIT 0x4000
+#define AA_X_UNCONFINED 0x8000
+
+/* AA_SECURE_X_NEEDED - is passed in the bprm->unsafe field */
+#define AA_SECURE_X_NEEDED 0x8000
+
+/* need to make conditional which ones are being set */
+struct path_cond {
+ kuid_t uid;
+ umode_t mode;
+};
+
+/* struct file_perms - file permission
+ * @allow: mask of permissions that are allowed
+ * @audit: mask of permissions to force an audit message for
+ * @quiet: mask of permissions to quiet audit messages for
+ * @kill: mask of permissions that when matched will kill the task
+ * @xindex: exec transition index if @allow contains MAY_EXEC
+ *
+ * The @audit and @queit mask should be mutually exclusive.
+ */
+struct file_perms {
+ u32 allow;
+ u32 audit;
+ u32 quiet;
+ u32 kill;
+ u16 xindex;
+};
+
+extern struct file_perms nullperms;
+
+#define COMBINED_PERM_MASK(X) ((X).allow | (X).audit | (X).quiet | (X).kill)
+
+/* FIXME: split perms from dfa and match this to description
+ * also add delegation info.
+ */
+static inline u16 dfa_map_xindex(u16 mask)
+{
+ u16 old_index = (mask >> 10) & 0xf;
+ u16 index = 0;
+
+ if (mask & 0x100)
+ index |= AA_X_UNSAFE;
+ if (mask & 0x200)
+ index |= AA_X_INHERIT;
+ if (mask & 0x80)
+ index |= AA_X_UNCONFINED;
+
+ if (old_index == 1) {
+ index |= AA_X_UNCONFINED;
+ } else if (old_index == 2) {
+ index |= AA_X_NAME;
+ } else if (old_index == 3) {
+ index |= AA_X_NAME | AA_X_CHILD;
+ } else if (old_index) {
+ index |= AA_X_TABLE;
+ index |= old_index - 4;
+ }
+
+ return index;
+}
+
+/*
+ * map old dfa inline permissions to new format
+ */
+#define dfa_user_allow(dfa, state) (((ACCEPT_TABLE(dfa)[state]) & 0x7f) | \
+ ((ACCEPT_TABLE(dfa)[state]) & 0x80000000))
+#define dfa_user_audit(dfa, state) ((ACCEPT_TABLE2(dfa)[state]) & 0x7f)
+#define dfa_user_quiet(dfa, state) (((ACCEPT_TABLE2(dfa)[state]) >> 7) & 0x7f)
+#define dfa_user_xindex(dfa, state) \
+ (dfa_map_xindex(ACCEPT_TABLE(dfa)[state] & 0x3fff))
+
+#define dfa_other_allow(dfa, state) ((((ACCEPT_TABLE(dfa)[state]) >> 14) & \
+ 0x7f) | \
+ ((ACCEPT_TABLE(dfa)[state]) & 0x80000000))
+#define dfa_other_audit(dfa, state) (((ACCEPT_TABLE2(dfa)[state]) >> 14) & 0x7f)
+#define dfa_other_quiet(dfa, state) \
+ ((((ACCEPT_TABLE2(dfa)[state]) >> 7) >> 14) & 0x7f)
+#define dfa_other_xindex(dfa, state) \
+ dfa_map_xindex((ACCEPT_TABLE(dfa)[state] >> 14) & 0x3fff)
+
+int aa_audit_file(struct aa_profile *profile, struct file_perms *perms,
+ gfp_t gfp, int op, u32 request, const char *name,
+ const char *target, kuid_t ouid, const char *info, int error);
+
+/**
+ * struct aa_file_rules - components used for file rule permissions
+ * @dfa: dfa to match path names and conditionals against
+ * @perms: permission table indexed by the matched state accept entry of @dfa
+ * @trans: transition table for indexed by named x transitions
+ *
+ * File permission are determined by matching a path against @dfa and then
+ * then using the value of the accept entry for the matching state as
+ * an index into @perms. If a named exec transition is required it is
+ * looked up in the transition table.
+ */
+struct aa_file_rules {
+ unsigned int start;
+ struct aa_dfa *dfa;
+ /* struct perms perms; */
+ struct aa_domain trans;
+ /* TODO: add delegate table */
+};
+
+unsigned int aa_str_perms(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start,
+ const char *name, struct path_cond *cond,
+ struct file_perms *perms);
+
+int aa_path_perm(int op, struct aa_profile *profile, struct path *path,
+ int flags, u32 request, struct path_cond *cond);
+
+int aa_path_link(struct aa_profile *profile, struct dentry *old_dentry,
+ struct path *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry);
+
+int aa_file_perm(int op, struct aa_profile *profile, struct file *file,
+ u32 request);
+
+static inline void aa_free_file_rules(struct aa_file_rules *rules)
+{
+ aa_put_dfa(rules->dfa);
+ aa_free_domain_entries(&rules->trans);
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_map_file_perms - map file flags to AppArmor permissions
+ * @file: open file to map flags to AppArmor permissions
+ *
+ * Returns: apparmor permission set for the file
+ */
+static inline u32 aa_map_file_to_perms(struct file *file)
+{
+ int flags = file->f_flags;
+ u32 perms = 0;
+
+ if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)
+ perms |= MAY_WRITE;
+ if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
+ perms |= MAY_READ;
+
+ if ((flags & O_APPEND) && (perms & MAY_WRITE))
+ perms = (perms & ~MAY_WRITE) | MAY_APPEND;
+ /* trunc implies write permission */
+ if (flags & O_TRUNC)
+ perms |= MAY_WRITE;
+ if (flags & O_CREAT)
+ perms |= AA_MAY_CREATE;
+
+ return perms;
+}
+
+#endif /* __AA_FILE_H */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/ipc.h b/security/apparmor/include/ipc.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..288ca76e2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/ipc.h
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor ipc mediation function definitions.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ */
+
+#ifndef __AA_IPC_H
+#define __AA_IPC_H
+
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+
+struct aa_profile;
+
+int aa_may_ptrace(struct aa_profile *tracer, struct aa_profile *tracee,
+ unsigned int mode);
+
+int aa_ptrace(struct task_struct *tracer, struct task_struct *tracee,
+ unsigned int mode);
+
+#endif /* __AA_IPC_H */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/match.h b/security/apparmor/include/match.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..001c43aa0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/match.h
@@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor policy dfa matching engine definitions.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2012 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ */
+
+#ifndef __AA_MATCH_H
+#define __AA_MATCH_H
+
+#include <linux/kref.h>
+
+#define DFA_NOMATCH 0
+#define DFA_START 1
+
+
+/**
+ * The format used for transition tables is based on the GNU flex table
+ * file format (--tables-file option; see Table File Format in the flex
+ * info pages and the flex sources for documentation). The magic number
+ * used in the header is 0x1B5E783D instead of 0xF13C57B1 though, because
+ * new tables have been defined and others YY_ID_CHK (check) and YY_ID_DEF
+ * (default) tables are used slightly differently (see the apparmor-parser
+ * package).
+ *
+ *
+ * The data in the packed dfa is stored in network byte order, and the tables
+ * are arranged for flexibility. We convert the table data to host native
+ * byte order.
+ *
+ * The dfa begins with a table set header, and is followed by the actual
+ * tables.
+ */
+
+#define YYTH_MAGIC 0x1B5E783D
+
+struct table_set_header {
+ u32 th_magic; /* YYTH_MAGIC */
+ u32 th_hsize;
+ u32 th_ssize;
+ u16 th_flags;
+ char th_version[];
+};
+
+/* The YYTD_ID are one less than flex table mappings. The flex id
+ * has 1 subtracted at table load time, this allows us to directly use the
+ * ID's as indexes.
+ */
+#define YYTD_ID_ACCEPT 0
+#define YYTD_ID_BASE 1
+#define YYTD_ID_CHK 2
+#define YYTD_ID_DEF 3
+#define YYTD_ID_EC 4
+#define YYTD_ID_META 5
+#define YYTD_ID_ACCEPT2 6
+#define YYTD_ID_NXT 7
+#define YYTD_ID_TSIZE 8
+
+#define YYTD_DATA8 1
+#define YYTD_DATA16 2
+#define YYTD_DATA32 4
+#define YYTD_DATA64 8
+
+/* ACCEPT & ACCEPT2 tables gets 6 dedicated flags, YYTD_DATAX define the
+ * first flags
+ */
+#define ACCEPT1_FLAGS(X) ((X) & 0x3f)
+#define ACCEPT2_FLAGS(X) ACCEPT1_FLAGS((X) >> YYTD_ID_ACCEPT2)
+#define TO_ACCEPT1_FLAG(X) ACCEPT1_FLAGS(X)
+#define TO_ACCEPT2_FLAG(X) (ACCEPT1_FLAGS(X) << YYTD_ID_ACCEPT2)
+#define DFA_FLAG_VERIFY_STATES 0x1000
+
+struct table_header {
+ u16 td_id;
+ u16 td_flags;
+ u32 td_hilen;
+ u32 td_lolen;
+ char td_data[];
+};
+
+#define DEFAULT_TABLE(DFA) ((u16 *)((DFA)->tables[YYTD_ID_DEF]->td_data))
+#define BASE_TABLE(DFA) ((u32 *)((DFA)->tables[YYTD_ID_BASE]->td_data))
+#define NEXT_TABLE(DFA) ((u16 *)((DFA)->tables[YYTD_ID_NXT]->td_data))
+#define CHECK_TABLE(DFA) ((u16 *)((DFA)->tables[YYTD_ID_CHK]->td_data))
+#define EQUIV_TABLE(DFA) ((u8 *)((DFA)->tables[YYTD_ID_EC]->td_data))
+#define ACCEPT_TABLE(DFA) ((u32 *)((DFA)->tables[YYTD_ID_ACCEPT]->td_data))
+#define ACCEPT_TABLE2(DFA) ((u32 *)((DFA)->tables[YYTD_ID_ACCEPT2]->td_data))
+
+struct aa_dfa {
+ struct kref count;
+ u16 flags;
+ struct table_header *tables[YYTD_ID_TSIZE];
+};
+
+#define byte_to_byte(X) (X)
+
+#define UNPACK_ARRAY(TABLE, BLOB, LEN, TYPE, NTOHX) \
+ do { \
+ typeof(LEN) __i; \
+ TYPE *__t = (TYPE *) TABLE; \
+ TYPE *__b = (TYPE *) BLOB; \
+ for (__i = 0; __i < LEN; __i++) { \
+ __t[__i] = NTOHX(__b[__i]); \
+ } \
+ } while (0)
+
+static inline size_t table_size(size_t len, size_t el_size)
+{
+ return ALIGN(sizeof(struct table_header) + len * el_size, 8);
+}
+
+struct aa_dfa *aa_dfa_unpack(void *blob, size_t size, int flags);
+unsigned int aa_dfa_match_len(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start,
+ const char *str, int len);
+unsigned int aa_dfa_match(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start,
+ const char *str);
+unsigned int aa_dfa_next(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int state,
+ const char c);
+
+void aa_dfa_free_kref(struct kref *kref);
+
+/**
+ * aa_put_dfa - put a dfa refcount
+ * @dfa: dfa to put refcount (MAYBE NULL)
+ *
+ * Requires: if @dfa != NULL that a valid refcount be held
+ */
+static inline void aa_put_dfa(struct aa_dfa *dfa)
+{
+ if (dfa)
+ kref_put(&dfa->count, aa_dfa_free_kref);
+}
+
+#endif /* __AA_MATCH_H */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/path.h b/security/apparmor/include/path.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..286ac75dc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/path.h
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor basic path manipulation function definitions.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ */
+
+#ifndef __AA_PATH_H
+#define __AA_PATH_H
+
+
+enum path_flags {
+ PATH_IS_DIR = 0x1, /* path is a directory */
+ PATH_CONNECT_PATH = 0x4, /* connect disconnected paths to / */
+ PATH_CHROOT_REL = 0x8, /* do path lookup relative to chroot */
+ PATH_CHROOT_NSCONNECT = 0x10, /* connect paths that are at ns root */
+
+ PATH_DELEGATE_DELETED = 0x08000, /* delegate deleted files */
+ PATH_MEDIATE_DELETED = 0x10000, /* mediate deleted paths */
+};
+
+int aa_path_name(struct path *path, int flags, char **buffer,
+ const char **name, const char **info);
+
+#endif /* __AA_PATH_H */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/policy.h b/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c28b0f20a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
@@ -0,0 +1,408 @@
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor policy definitions.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ */
+
+#ifndef __AA_POLICY_H
+#define __AA_POLICY_H
+
+#include <linux/capability.h>
+#include <linux/cred.h>
+#include <linux/kref.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/socket.h>
+
+#include "apparmor.h"
+#include "audit.h"
+#include "capability.h"
+#include "domain.h"
+#include "file.h"
+#include "resource.h"
+
+extern const char *const aa_profile_mode_names[];
+#define APPARMOR_MODE_NAMES_MAX_INDEX 4
+
+#define PROFILE_MODE(_profile, _mode) \
+ ((aa_g_profile_mode == (_mode)) || \
+ ((_profile)->mode == (_mode)))
+
+#define COMPLAIN_MODE(_profile) PROFILE_MODE((_profile), APPARMOR_COMPLAIN)
+
+#define KILL_MODE(_profile) PROFILE_MODE((_profile), APPARMOR_KILL)
+
+#define PROFILE_IS_HAT(_profile) ((_profile)->flags & PFLAG_HAT)
+
+#define PROFILE_INVALID(_profile) ((_profile)->flags & PFLAG_INVALID)
+
+#define on_list_rcu(X) (!list_empty(X) && (X)->prev != LIST_POISON2)
+
+/*
+ * FIXME: currently need a clean way to replace and remove profiles as a
+ * set. It should be done at the namespace level.
+ * Either, with a set of profiles loaded at the namespace level or via
+ * a mark and remove marked interface.
+ */
+enum profile_mode {
+ APPARMOR_ENFORCE, /* enforce access rules */
+ APPARMOR_COMPLAIN, /* allow and log access violations */
+ APPARMOR_KILL, /* kill task on access violation */
+ APPARMOR_UNCONFINED, /* profile set to unconfined */
+};
+
+enum profile_flags {
+ PFLAG_HAT = 1, /* profile is a hat */
+ PFLAG_NULL = 4, /* profile is null learning profile */
+ PFLAG_IX_ON_NAME_ERROR = 8, /* fallback to ix on name lookup fail */
+ PFLAG_IMMUTABLE = 0x10, /* don't allow changes/replacement */
+ PFLAG_USER_DEFINED = 0x20, /* user based profile - lower privs */
+ PFLAG_NO_LIST_REF = 0x40, /* list doesn't keep profile ref */
+ PFLAG_OLD_NULL_TRANS = 0x100, /* use // as the null transition */
+ PFLAG_INVALID = 0x200, /* profile replaced/removed */
+ PFLAG_NS_COUNT = 0x400, /* carries NS ref count */
+
+ /* These flags must correspond with PATH_flags */
+ PFLAG_MEDIATE_DELETED = 0x10000, /* mediate instead delegate deleted */
+};
+
+struct aa_profile;
+
+/* struct aa_policy - common part of both namespaces and profiles
+ * @name: name of the object
+ * @hname - The hierarchical name
+ * @list: list policy object is on
+ * @profiles: head of the profiles list contained in the object
+ */
+struct aa_policy {
+ char *name;
+ char *hname;
+ struct list_head list;
+ struct list_head profiles;
+};
+
+/* struct aa_ns_acct - accounting of profiles in namespace
+ * @max_size: maximum space allowed for all profiles in namespace
+ * @max_count: maximum number of profiles that can be in this namespace
+ * @size: current size of profiles
+ * @count: current count of profiles (includes null profiles)
+ */
+struct aa_ns_acct {
+ int max_size;
+ int max_count;
+ int size;
+ int count;
+};
+
+/* struct aa_namespace - namespace for a set of profiles
+ * @base: common policy
+ * @parent: parent of namespace
+ * @lock: lock for modifying the object
+ * @acct: accounting for the namespace
+ * @unconfined: special unconfined profile for the namespace
+ * @sub_ns: list of namespaces under the current namespace.
+ * @uniq_null: uniq value used for null learning profiles
+ * @uniq_id: a unique id count for the profiles in the namespace
+ * @dents: dentries for the namespaces file entries in apparmorfs
+ *
+ * An aa_namespace defines the set profiles that are searched to determine
+ * which profile to attach to a task. Profiles can not be shared between
+ * aa_namespaces and profile names within a namespace are guaranteed to be
+ * unique. When profiles in separate namespaces have the same name they
+ * are NOT considered to be equivalent.
+ *
+ * Namespaces are hierarchical and only namespaces and profiles below the
+ * current namespace are visible.
+ *
+ * Namespace names must be unique and can not contain the characters :/\0
+ *
+ * FIXME TODO: add vserver support of namespaces (can it all be done in
+ * userspace?)
+ */
+struct aa_namespace {
+ struct aa_policy base;
+ struct aa_namespace *parent;
+ struct mutex lock;
+ struct aa_ns_acct acct;
+ struct aa_profile *unconfined;
+ struct list_head sub_ns;
+ atomic_t uniq_null;
+ long uniq_id;
+
+ struct dentry *dents[AAFS_NS_SIZEOF];
+};
+
+/* struct aa_policydb - match engine for a policy
+ * dfa: dfa pattern match
+ * start: set of start states for the different classes of data
+ */
+struct aa_policydb {
+ /* Generic policy DFA specific rule types will be subsections of it */
+ struct aa_dfa *dfa;
+ unsigned int start[AA_CLASS_LAST + 1];
+
+};
+
+struct aa_replacedby {
+ struct kref count;
+ struct aa_profile __rcu *profile;
+};
+
+
+/* struct aa_profile - basic confinement data
+ * @base - base components of the profile (name, refcount, lists, lock ...)
+ * @count: reference count of the obj
+ * @rcu: rcu head used when removing from @list
+ * @parent: parent of profile
+ * @ns: namespace the profile is in
+ * @replacedby: is set to the profile that replaced this profile
+ * @rename: optional profile name that this profile renamed
+ * @attach: human readable attachment string
+ * @xmatch: optional extended matching for unconfined executables names
+ * @xmatch_len: xmatch prefix len, used to determine xmatch priority
+ * @audit: the auditing mode of the profile
+ * @mode: the enforcement mode of the profile
+ * @flags: flags controlling profile behavior
+ * @path_flags: flags controlling path generation behavior
+ * @size: the memory consumed by this profiles rules
+ * @policy: general match rules governing policy
+ * @file: The set of rules governing basic file access and domain transitions
+ * @caps: capabilities for the profile
+ * @rlimits: rlimits for the profile
+ *
+ * @dents: dentries for the profiles file entries in apparmorfs
+ * @dirname: name of the profile dir in apparmorfs
+ *
+ * The AppArmor profile contains the basic confinement data. Each profile
+ * has a name, and exists in a namespace. The @name and @exec_match are
+ * used to determine profile attachment against unconfined tasks. All other
+ * attachments are determined by profile X transition rules.
+ *
+ * The @replacedby struct is write protected by the profile lock.
+ *
+ * Profiles have a hierarchy where hats and children profiles keep
+ * a reference to their parent.
+ *
+ * Profile names can not begin with a : and can not contain the \0
+ * character. If a profile name begins with / it will be considered when
+ * determining profile attachment on "unconfined" tasks.
+ */
+struct aa_profile {
+ struct aa_policy base;
+ struct kref count;
+ struct rcu_head rcu;
+ struct aa_profile __rcu *parent;
+
+ struct aa_namespace *ns;
+ struct aa_replacedby *replacedby;
+ const char *rename;
+
+ const char *attach;
+ struct aa_dfa *xmatch;
+ int xmatch_len;
+ enum audit_mode audit;
+ long mode;
+ long flags;
+ u32 path_flags;
+ int size;
+
+ struct aa_policydb policy;
+ struct aa_file_rules file;
+ struct aa_caps caps;
+ struct aa_rlimit rlimits;
+
+ unsigned char *hash;
+ char *dirname;
+ struct dentry *dents[AAFS_PROF_SIZEOF];
+};
+
+extern struct aa_namespace *root_ns;
+extern enum profile_mode aa_g_profile_mode;
+
+void aa_add_profile(struct aa_policy *common, struct aa_profile *profile);
+
+bool aa_ns_visible(struct aa_namespace *curr, struct aa_namespace *view);
+const char *aa_ns_name(struct aa_namespace *parent, struct aa_namespace *child);
+int aa_alloc_root_ns(void);
+void aa_free_root_ns(void);
+void aa_free_namespace_kref(struct kref *kref);
+
+struct aa_namespace *aa_find_namespace(struct aa_namespace *root,
+ const char *name);
+
+
+void aa_free_replacedby_kref(struct kref *kref);
+struct aa_profile *aa_alloc_profile(const char *name);
+struct aa_profile *aa_new_null_profile(struct aa_profile *parent, int hat);
+void aa_free_profile(struct aa_profile *profile);
+void aa_free_profile_kref(struct kref *kref);
+struct aa_profile *aa_find_child(struct aa_profile *parent, const char *name);
+struct aa_profile *aa_lookup_profile(struct aa_namespace *ns, const char *name);
+struct aa_profile *aa_match_profile(struct aa_namespace *ns, const char *name);
+
+ssize_t aa_replace_profiles(void *udata, size_t size, bool noreplace);
+ssize_t aa_remove_profiles(char *name, size_t size);
+
+#define PROF_ADD 1
+#define PROF_REPLACE 0
+
+#define unconfined(X) ((X)->mode == APPARMOR_UNCONFINED)
+
+
+static inline struct aa_profile *aa_deref_parent(struct aa_profile *p)
+{
+ return rcu_dereference_protected(p->parent,
+ mutex_is_locked(&p->ns->lock));
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_get_profile - increment refcount on profile @p
+ * @p: profile (MAYBE NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: pointer to @p if @p is NULL will return NULL
+ * Requires: @p must be held with valid refcount when called
+ */
+static inline struct aa_profile *aa_get_profile(struct aa_profile *p)
+{
+ if (p)
+ kref_get(&(p->count));
+
+ return p;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_get_profile_not0 - increment refcount on profile @p found via lookup
+ * @p: profile (MAYBE NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: pointer to @p if @p is NULL will return NULL
+ * Requires: @p must be held with valid refcount when called
+ */
+static inline struct aa_profile *aa_get_profile_not0(struct aa_profile *p)
+{
+ if (p && kref_get_not0(&p->count))
+ return p;
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_get_profile_rcu - increment a refcount profile that can be replaced
+ * @p: pointer to profile that can be replaced (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: pointer to a refcounted profile.
+ * else NULL if no profile
+ */
+static inline struct aa_profile *aa_get_profile_rcu(struct aa_profile __rcu **p)
+{
+ struct aa_profile *c;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ do {
+ c = rcu_dereference(*p);
+ } while (c && !kref_get_not0(&c->count));
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+
+ return c;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_get_newest_profile - find the newest version of @profile
+ * @profile: the profile to check for newer versions of
+ *
+ * Returns: refcounted newest version of @profile taking into account
+ * replacement, renames and removals
+ * return @profile.
+ */
+static inline struct aa_profile *aa_get_newest_profile(struct aa_profile *p)
+{
+ if (!p)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (PROFILE_INVALID(p))
+ return aa_get_profile_rcu(&p->replacedby->profile);
+
+ return aa_get_profile(p);
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_put_profile - decrement refcount on profile @p
+ * @p: profile (MAYBE NULL)
+ */
+static inline void aa_put_profile(struct aa_profile *p)
+{
+ if (p)
+ kref_put(&p->count, aa_free_profile_kref);
+}
+
+static inline struct aa_replacedby *aa_get_replacedby(struct aa_replacedby *p)
+{
+ if (p)
+ kref_get(&(p->count));
+
+ return p;
+}
+
+static inline void aa_put_replacedby(struct aa_replacedby *p)
+{
+ if (p)
+ kref_put(&p->count, aa_free_replacedby_kref);
+}
+
+/* requires profile list write lock held */
+static inline void __aa_update_replacedby(struct aa_profile *orig,
+ struct aa_profile *new)
+{
+ struct aa_profile *tmp;
+ tmp = rcu_dereference_protected(orig->replacedby->profile,
+ mutex_is_locked(&orig->ns->lock));
+ rcu_assign_pointer(orig->replacedby->profile, aa_get_profile(new));
+ orig->flags |= PFLAG_INVALID;
+ aa_put_profile(tmp);
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_get_namespace - increment references count on @ns
+ * @ns: namespace to increment reference count of (MAYBE NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: pointer to @ns, if @ns is NULL returns NULL
+ * Requires: @ns must be held with valid refcount when called
+ */
+static inline struct aa_namespace *aa_get_namespace(struct aa_namespace *ns)
+{
+ if (ns)
+ aa_get_profile(ns->unconfined);
+
+ return ns;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_put_namespace - decrement refcount on @ns
+ * @ns: namespace to put reference of
+ *
+ * Decrement reference count of @ns and if no longer in use free it
+ */
+static inline void aa_put_namespace(struct aa_namespace *ns)
+{
+ if (ns)
+ aa_put_profile(ns->unconfined);
+}
+
+static inline int AUDIT_MODE(struct aa_profile *profile)
+{
+ if (aa_g_audit != AUDIT_NORMAL)
+ return aa_g_audit;
+
+ return profile->audit;
+}
+
+bool aa_may_manage_policy(int op);
+
+#endif /* __AA_POLICY_H */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/policy_unpack.h b/security/apparmor/include/policy_unpack.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c214fb88b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/policy_unpack.h
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor policy loading interface function definitions.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ */
+
+#ifndef __POLICY_INTERFACE_H
+#define __POLICY_INTERFACE_H
+
+#include <linux/list.h>
+
+struct aa_load_ent {
+ struct list_head list;
+ struct aa_profile *new;
+ struct aa_profile *old;
+ struct aa_profile *rename;
+};
+
+void aa_load_ent_free(struct aa_load_ent *ent);
+struct aa_load_ent *aa_load_ent_alloc(void);
+
+#define PACKED_FLAG_HAT 1
+
+#define PACKED_MODE_ENFORCE 0
+#define PACKED_MODE_COMPLAIN 1
+#define PACKED_MODE_KILL 2
+#define PACKED_MODE_UNCONFINED 3
+
+int aa_unpack(void *udata, size_t size, struct list_head *lh, const char **ns);
+
+#endif /* __POLICY_INTERFACE_H */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/procattr.h b/security/apparmor/include/procattr.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..6bd5f33d9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/procattr.h
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor /proc/<pid>/attr/ interface function definitions.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ */
+
+#ifndef __AA_PROCATTR_H
+#define __AA_PROCATTR_H
+
+#define AA_DO_TEST 1
+#define AA_ONEXEC 1
+
+int aa_getprocattr(struct aa_profile *profile, char **string);
+int aa_setprocattr_changehat(char *args, size_t size, int test);
+int aa_setprocattr_changeprofile(char *fqname, bool onexec, int test);
+
+#endif /* __AA_PROCATTR_H */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/resource.h b/security/apparmor/include/resource.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d3f4cf027
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/resource.h
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor resource limits function definitions.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ */
+
+#ifndef __AA_RESOURCE_H
+#define __AA_RESOURCE_H
+
+#include <linux/resource.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+
+#include "apparmorfs.h"
+
+struct aa_profile;
+
+/* struct aa_rlimit - rlimit settings for the profile
+ * @mask: which hard limits to set
+ * @limits: rlimit values that override task limits
+ *
+ * AppArmor rlimits are used to set confined task rlimits. Only the
+ * limits specified in @mask will be controlled by apparmor.
+ */
+struct aa_rlimit {
+ unsigned int mask;
+ struct rlimit limits[RLIM_NLIMITS];
+};
+
+extern struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_rlimit[];
+
+int aa_map_resource(int resource);
+int aa_task_setrlimit(struct aa_profile *profile, struct task_struct *,
+ unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim);
+
+void __aa_transition_rlimits(struct aa_profile *old, struct aa_profile *new);
+
+static inline void aa_free_rlimit_rules(struct aa_rlimit *rlims)
+{
+ /* NOP */
+}
+
+#endif /* __AA_RESOURCE_H */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/sid.h b/security/apparmor/include/sid.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..513ca0e48
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/sid.h
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor security identifier (sid) definitions
+ *
+ * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ */
+
+#ifndef __AA_SID_H
+#define __AA_SID_H
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+
+/* sid value that will not be allocated */
+#define AA_SID_INVALID 0
+#define AA_SID_ALLOC AA_SID_INVALID
+
+u32 aa_alloc_sid(void);
+void aa_free_sid(u32 sid);
+
+#endif /* __AA_SID_H */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/ipc.c b/security/apparmor/ipc.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..777ac1c47
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/ipc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor ipc mediation
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/gfp.h>
+#include <linux/ptrace.h>
+
+#include "include/audit.h"
+#include "include/capability.h"
+#include "include/context.h"
+#include "include/policy.h"
+#include "include/ipc.h"
+
+/* call back to audit ptrace fields */
+static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
+{
+ struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
+ audit_log_format(ab, " target=");
+ audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sa->aad->target);
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_audit_ptrace - do auditing for ptrace
+ * @profile: profile being enforced (NOT NULL)
+ * @target: profile being traced (NOT NULL)
+ * @error: error condition
+ *
+ * Returns: %0 or error code
+ */
+static int aa_audit_ptrace(struct aa_profile *profile,
+ struct aa_profile *target, int error)
+{
+ struct common_audit_data sa;
+ struct apparmor_audit_data aad = {0,};
+ sa.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE;
+ sa.aad = &aad;
+ aad.op = OP_PTRACE;
+ aad.target = target;
+ aad.error = error;
+
+ return aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO, profile, GFP_ATOMIC, &sa,
+ audit_cb);
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_may_ptrace - test if tracer task can trace the tracee
+ * @tracer: profile of the task doing the tracing (NOT NULL)
+ * @tracee: task to be traced
+ * @mode: whether PTRACE_MODE_READ || PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH
+ *
+ * Returns: %0 else error code if permission denied or error
+ */
+int aa_may_ptrace(struct aa_profile *tracer, struct aa_profile *tracee,
+ unsigned int mode)
+{
+ /* TODO: currently only based on capability, not extended ptrace
+ * rules,
+ * Test mode for PTRACE_MODE_READ || PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH
+ */
+
+ if (unconfined(tracer) || tracer == tracee)
+ return 0;
+ /* log this capability request */
+ return aa_capable(tracer, CAP_SYS_PTRACE, 1);
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_ptrace - do ptrace permission check and auditing
+ * @tracer: task doing the tracing (NOT NULL)
+ * @tracee: task being traced (NOT NULL)
+ * @mode: ptrace mode either PTRACE_MODE_READ || PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH
+ *
+ * Returns: %0 else error code if permission denied or error
+ */
+int aa_ptrace(struct task_struct *tracer, struct task_struct *tracee,
+ unsigned int mode)
+{
+ /*
+ * tracer can ptrace tracee when
+ * - tracer is unconfined ||
+ * - tracer is in complain mode
+ * - tracer has rules allowing it to trace tracee currently this is:
+ * - confined by the same profile ||
+ * - tracer profile has CAP_SYS_PTRACE
+ */
+
+ struct aa_profile *tracer_p = aa_get_task_profile(tracer);
+ int error = 0;
+
+ if (!unconfined(tracer_p)) {
+ struct aa_profile *tracee_p = aa_get_task_profile(tracee);
+
+ error = aa_may_ptrace(tracer_p, tracee_p, mode);
+ error = aa_audit_ptrace(tracer_p, tracee_p, error);
+
+ aa_put_profile(tracee_p);
+ }
+ aa_put_profile(tracer_p);
+
+ return error;
+}
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lib.c b/security/apparmor/lib.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c1827e068
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/lib.c
@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains basic common functions used in AppArmor
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
+
+#include "include/audit.h"
+#include "include/apparmor.h"
+
+
+/**
+ * aa_split_fqname - split a fqname into a profile and namespace name
+ * @fqname: a full qualified name in namespace profile format (NOT NULL)
+ * @ns_name: pointer to portion of the string containing the ns name (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: profile name or NULL if one is not specified
+ *
+ * Split a namespace name from a profile name (see policy.c for naming
+ * description). If a portion of the name is missing it returns NULL for
+ * that portion.
+ *
+ * NOTE: may modify the @fqname string. The pointers returned point
+ * into the @fqname string.
+ */
+char *aa_split_fqname(char *fqname, char **ns_name)
+{
+ char *name = strim(fqname);
+
+ *ns_name = NULL;
+ if (name[0] == ':') {
+ char *split = strchr(&name[1], ':');
+ *ns_name = skip_spaces(&name[1]);
+ if (split) {
+ /* overwrite ':' with \0 */
+ *split++ = 0;
+ if (strncmp(split, "//", 2) == 0)
+ split += 2;
+ name = skip_spaces(split);
+ } else
+ /* a ns name without a following profile is allowed */
+ name = NULL;
+ }
+ if (name && *name == 0)
+ name = NULL;
+
+ return name;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_info_message - log a none profile related status message
+ * @str: message to log
+ */
+void aa_info_message(const char *str)
+{
+ if (audit_enabled) {
+ struct common_audit_data sa;
+ struct apparmor_audit_data aad = {0,};
+ sa.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE;
+ sa.aad = &aad;
+ aad.info = str;
+ aa_audit_msg(AUDIT_APPARMOR_STATUS, &sa, NULL);
+ }
+ printk(KERN_INFO "AppArmor: %s\n", str);
+}
+
+/**
+ * __aa_kvmalloc - do allocation preferring kmalloc but falling back to vmalloc
+ * @size: how many bytes of memory are required
+ * @flags: the type of memory to allocate (see kmalloc).
+ *
+ * Return: allocated buffer or NULL if failed
+ *
+ * It is possible that policy being loaded from the user is larger than
+ * what can be allocated by kmalloc, in those cases fall back to vmalloc.
+ */
+void *__aa_kvmalloc(size_t size, gfp_t flags)
+{
+ void *buffer = NULL;
+
+ if (size == 0)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /* do not attempt kmalloc if we need more than 16 pages at once */
+ if (size <= (16*PAGE_SIZE))
+ buffer = kmalloc(size, flags | GFP_NOIO | __GFP_NOWARN);
+ if (!buffer) {
+ if (flags & __GFP_ZERO)
+ buffer = vzalloc(size);
+ else
+ buffer = vmalloc(size);
+ }
+ return buffer;
+}
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e5f156143
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -0,0 +1,949 @@
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor LSM hooks.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/moduleparam.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/mman.h>
+#include <linux/mount.h>
+#include <linux/namei.h>
+#include <linux/ptrace.h>
+#include <linux/ctype.h>
+#include <linux/sysctl.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
+#include <net/sock.h>
+
+#include "include/apparmor.h"
+#include "include/apparmorfs.h"
+#include "include/audit.h"
+#include "include/capability.h"
+#include "include/context.h"
+#include "include/file.h"
+#include "include/ipc.h"
+#include "include/path.h"
+#include "include/policy.h"
+#include "include/procattr.h"
+
+/* Flag indicating whether initialization completed */
+int apparmor_initialized __initdata;
+
+/*
+ * LSM hook functions
+ */
+
+/*
+ * free the associated aa_task_cxt and put its profiles
+ */
+static void apparmor_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
+{
+ aa_free_task_context(cred_cxt(cred));
+ cred_cxt(cred) = NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * allocate the apparmor part of blank credentials
+ */
+static int apparmor_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
+{
+ /* freed by apparmor_cred_free */
+ struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = aa_alloc_task_context(gfp);
+ if (!cxt)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ cred_cxt(cred) = cxt;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * prepare new aa_task_cxt for modification by prepare_cred block
+ */
+static int apparmor_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
+ gfp_t gfp)
+{
+ /* freed by apparmor_cred_free */
+ struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = aa_alloc_task_context(gfp);
+ if (!cxt)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ aa_dup_task_context(cxt, cred_cxt(old));
+ cred_cxt(new) = cxt;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * transfer the apparmor data to a blank set of creds
+ */
+static void apparmor_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
+{
+ const struct aa_task_cxt *old_cxt = cred_cxt(old);
+ struct aa_task_cxt *new_cxt = cred_cxt(new);
+
+ aa_dup_task_context(new_cxt, old_cxt);
+}
+
+static int apparmor_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
+ unsigned int mode)
+{
+ int error = cap_ptrace_access_check(child, mode);
+ if (error)
+ return error;
+
+ return aa_ptrace(current, child, mode);
+}
+
+static int apparmor_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
+{
+ int error = cap_ptrace_traceme(parent);
+ if (error)
+ return error;
+
+ return aa_ptrace(parent, current, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH);
+}
+
+/* Derived from security/commoncap.c:cap_capget */
+static int apparmor_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
+ kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
+{
+ struct aa_profile *profile;
+ const struct cred *cred;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ cred = __task_cred(target);
+ profile = aa_cred_profile(cred);
+
+ *effective = cred->cap_effective;
+ *inheritable = cred->cap_inheritable;
+ *permitted = cred->cap_permitted;
+
+ if (!unconfined(profile) && !COMPLAIN_MODE(profile)) {
+ *effective = cap_intersect(*effective, profile->caps.allow);
+ *permitted = cap_intersect(*permitted, profile->caps.allow);
+ }
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int apparmor_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
+ int cap, int audit)
+{
+ struct aa_profile *profile;
+ /* cap_capable returns 0 on success, else -EPERM */
+ int error = cap_capable(cred, ns, cap, audit);
+ if (!error) {
+ profile = aa_cred_profile(cred);
+ if (!unconfined(profile))
+ error = aa_capable(profile, cap, audit);
+ }
+ return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * common_perm - basic common permission check wrapper fn for paths
+ * @op: operation being checked
+ * @path: path to check permission of (NOT NULL)
+ * @mask: requested permissions mask
+ * @cond: conditional info for the permission request (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied
+ */
+static int common_perm(int op, struct path *path, u32 mask,
+ struct path_cond *cond)
+{
+ struct aa_profile *profile;
+ int error = 0;
+
+ profile = __aa_current_profile();
+ if (!unconfined(profile))
+ error = aa_path_perm(op, profile, path, 0, mask, cond);
+
+ return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * common_perm_dir_dentry - common permission wrapper when path is dir, dentry
+ * @op: operation being checked
+ * @dir: directory of the dentry (NOT NULL)
+ * @dentry: dentry to check (NOT NULL)
+ * @mask: requested permissions mask
+ * @cond: conditional info for the permission request (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied
+ */
+static int common_perm_dir_dentry(int op, struct path *dir,
+ struct dentry *dentry, u32 mask,
+ struct path_cond *cond)
+{
+ struct path path = { dir->mnt, dentry };
+
+ return common_perm(op, &path, mask, cond);
+}
+
+/**
+ * common_perm_mnt_dentry - common permission wrapper when mnt, dentry
+ * @op: operation being checked
+ * @mnt: mount point of dentry (NOT NULL)
+ * @dentry: dentry to check (NOT NULL)
+ * @mask: requested permissions mask
+ *
+ * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied
+ */
+static int common_perm_mnt_dentry(int op, struct vfsmount *mnt,
+ struct dentry *dentry, u32 mask)
+{
+ struct path path = { mnt, dentry };
+ struct path_cond cond = { d_backing_inode(dentry)->i_uid,
+ d_backing_inode(dentry)->i_mode
+ };
+
+ return common_perm(op, &path, mask, &cond);
+}
+
+/**
+ * common_perm_rm - common permission wrapper for operations doing rm
+ * @op: operation being checked
+ * @dir: directory that the dentry is in (NOT NULL)
+ * @dentry: dentry being rm'd (NOT NULL)
+ * @mask: requested permission mask
+ *
+ * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied
+ */
+static int common_perm_rm(int op, struct path *dir,
+ struct dentry *dentry, u32 mask)
+{
+ struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
+ struct path_cond cond = { };
+
+ if (!inode || !dir->mnt || !mediated_filesystem(dentry))
+ return 0;
+
+ cond.uid = inode->i_uid;
+ cond.mode = inode->i_mode;
+
+ return common_perm_dir_dentry(op, dir, dentry, mask, &cond);
+}
+
+/**
+ * common_perm_create - common permission wrapper for operations doing create
+ * @op: operation being checked
+ * @dir: directory that dentry will be created in (NOT NULL)
+ * @dentry: dentry to create (NOT NULL)
+ * @mask: request permission mask
+ * @mode: created file mode
+ *
+ * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied
+ */
+static int common_perm_create(int op, struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
+ u32 mask, umode_t mode)
+{
+ struct path_cond cond = { current_fsuid(), mode };
+
+ if (!dir->mnt || !mediated_filesystem(dir->dentry))
+ return 0;
+
+ return common_perm_dir_dentry(op, dir, dentry, mask, &cond);
+}
+
+static int apparmor_path_unlink(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+ return common_perm_rm(OP_UNLINK, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_DELETE);
+}
+
+static int apparmor_path_mkdir(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
+ umode_t mode)
+{
+ return common_perm_create(OP_MKDIR, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_CREATE,
+ S_IFDIR);
+}
+
+static int apparmor_path_rmdir(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+ return common_perm_rm(OP_RMDIR, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_DELETE);
+}
+
+static int apparmor_path_mknod(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
+ umode_t mode, unsigned int dev)
+{
+ return common_perm_create(OP_MKNOD, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_CREATE, mode);
+}
+
+static int apparmor_path_truncate(struct path *path)
+{
+ struct path_cond cond = { d_backing_inode(path->dentry)->i_uid,
+ d_backing_inode(path->dentry)->i_mode
+ };
+
+ if (!path->mnt || !mediated_filesystem(path->dentry))
+ return 0;
+
+ return common_perm(OP_TRUNC, path, MAY_WRITE | AA_MAY_META_WRITE,
+ &cond);
+}
+
+static int apparmor_path_symlink(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
+ const char *old_name)
+{
+ return common_perm_create(OP_SYMLINK, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_CREATE,
+ S_IFLNK);
+}
+
+static int apparmor_path_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct path *new_dir,
+ struct dentry *new_dentry)
+{
+ struct aa_profile *profile;
+ int error = 0;
+
+ if (!mediated_filesystem(old_dentry))
+ return 0;
+
+ profile = aa_current_profile();
+ if (!unconfined(profile))
+ error = aa_path_link(profile, old_dentry, new_dir, new_dentry);
+ return error;
+}
+
+static int apparmor_path_rename(struct path *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
+ struct path *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
+{
+ struct aa_profile *profile;
+ int error = 0;
+
+ if (!mediated_filesystem(old_dentry))
+ return 0;
+
+ profile = aa_current_profile();
+ if (!unconfined(profile)) {
+ struct path old_path = { old_dir->mnt, old_dentry };
+ struct path new_path = { new_dir->mnt, new_dentry };
+ struct path_cond cond = { d_backing_inode(old_dentry)->i_uid,
+ d_backing_inode(old_dentry)->i_mode
+ };
+
+ error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_SRC, profile, &old_path, 0,
+ MAY_READ | AA_MAY_META_READ | MAY_WRITE |
+ AA_MAY_META_WRITE | AA_MAY_DELETE,
+ &cond);
+ if (!error)
+ error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_DEST, profile, &new_path,
+ 0, MAY_WRITE | AA_MAY_META_WRITE |
+ AA_MAY_CREATE, &cond);
+
+ }
+ return error;
+}
+
+static int apparmor_path_chmod(struct path *path, umode_t mode)
+{
+ if (!mediated_filesystem(path->dentry))
+ return 0;
+
+ return common_perm_mnt_dentry(OP_CHMOD, path->mnt, path->dentry, AA_MAY_CHMOD);
+}
+
+static int apparmor_path_chown(struct path *path, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid)
+{
+ struct path_cond cond = { d_backing_inode(path->dentry)->i_uid,
+ d_backing_inode(path->dentry)->i_mode
+ };
+
+ if (!mediated_filesystem(path->dentry))
+ return 0;
+
+ return common_perm(OP_CHOWN, path, AA_MAY_CHOWN, &cond);
+}
+
+static int apparmor_inode_getattr(const struct path *path)
+{
+ if (!mediated_filesystem(path->dentry))
+ return 0;
+
+ return common_perm_mnt_dentry(OP_GETATTR, path->mnt, path->dentry,
+ AA_MAY_META_READ);
+}
+
+static int apparmor_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
+{
+ struct aa_file_cxt *fcxt = file->f_security;
+ struct aa_profile *profile;
+ int error = 0;
+
+ if (!mediated_filesystem(file->f_path.dentry))
+ return 0;
+
+ /* If in exec, permission is handled by bprm hooks.
+ * Cache permissions granted by the previous exec check, with
+ * implicit read and executable mmap which are required to
+ * actually execute the image.
+ */
+ if (current->in_execve) {
+ fcxt->allow = MAY_EXEC | MAY_READ | AA_EXEC_MMAP;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ profile = aa_cred_profile(cred);
+ if (!unconfined(profile)) {
+ struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
+ struct path_cond cond = { inode->i_uid, inode->i_mode };
+
+ error = aa_path_perm(OP_OPEN, profile, &file->f_path, 0,
+ aa_map_file_to_perms(file), &cond);
+ /* todo cache full allowed permissions set and state */
+ fcxt->allow = aa_map_file_to_perms(file);
+ }
+
+ return error;
+}
+
+static int apparmor_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
+{
+ /* freed by apparmor_file_free_security */
+ file->f_security = aa_alloc_file_context(GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!file->f_security)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ return 0;
+
+}
+
+static void apparmor_file_free_security(struct file *file)
+{
+ struct aa_file_cxt *cxt = file->f_security;
+
+ aa_free_file_context(cxt);
+}
+
+static int common_file_perm(int op, struct file *file, u32 mask)
+{
+ struct aa_file_cxt *fcxt = file->f_security;
+ struct aa_profile *profile, *fprofile = aa_cred_profile(file->f_cred);
+ int error = 0;
+
+ BUG_ON(!fprofile);
+
+ if (!file->f_path.mnt ||
+ !mediated_filesystem(file->f_path.dentry))
+ return 0;
+
+ profile = __aa_current_profile();
+
+ /* revalidate access, if task is unconfined, or the cached cred
+ * doesn't match or if the request is for more permissions than
+ * was granted.
+ *
+ * Note: the test for !unconfined(fprofile) is to handle file
+ * delegation from unconfined tasks
+ */
+ if (!unconfined(profile) && !unconfined(fprofile) &&
+ ((fprofile != profile) || (mask & ~fcxt->allow)))
+ error = aa_file_perm(op, profile, file, mask);
+
+ return error;
+}
+
+static int apparmor_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
+{
+ return common_file_perm(OP_FPERM, file, mask);
+}
+
+static int apparmor_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
+{
+ u32 mask = AA_MAY_LOCK;
+
+ if (cmd == F_WRLCK)
+ mask |= MAY_WRITE;
+
+ return common_file_perm(OP_FLOCK, file, mask);
+}
+
+static int common_mmap(int op, struct file *file, unsigned long prot,
+ unsigned long flags)
+{
+ int mask = 0;
+
+ if (!file || !file->f_security)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (prot & PROT_READ)
+ mask |= MAY_READ;
+ /*
+ * Private mappings don't require write perms since they don't
+ * write back to the files
+ */
+ if ((prot & PROT_WRITE) && !(flags & MAP_PRIVATE))
+ mask |= MAY_WRITE;
+ if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
+ mask |= AA_EXEC_MMAP;
+
+ return common_file_perm(op, file, mask);
+}
+
+static int apparmor_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
+ unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
+{
+ return common_mmap(OP_FMMAP, file, prot, flags);
+}
+
+static int apparmor_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
+ unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot)
+{
+ return common_mmap(OP_FMPROT, vma->vm_file, prot,
+ !(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED) ? MAP_PRIVATE : 0);
+}
+
+static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
+ char **value)
+{
+ int error = -ENOENT;
+ /* released below */
+ const struct cred *cred = get_task_cred(task);
+ struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = cred_cxt(cred);
+ struct aa_profile *profile = NULL;
+
+ if (strcmp(name, "current") == 0)
+ profile = aa_get_newest_profile(cxt->profile);
+ else if (strcmp(name, "prev") == 0 && cxt->previous)
+ profile = aa_get_newest_profile(cxt->previous);
+ else if (strcmp(name, "exec") == 0 && cxt->onexec)
+ profile = aa_get_newest_profile(cxt->onexec);
+ else
+ error = -EINVAL;
+
+ if (profile)
+ error = aa_getprocattr(profile, value);
+
+ aa_put_profile(profile);
+ put_cred(cred);
+
+ return error;
+}
+
+static int apparmor_setprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
+ void *value, size_t size)
+{
+ struct common_audit_data sa;
+ struct apparmor_audit_data aad = {0,};
+ char *command, *args = value;
+ size_t arg_size;
+ int error;
+
+ if (size == 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ /* args points to a PAGE_SIZE buffer, AppArmor requires that
+ * the buffer must be null terminated or have size <= PAGE_SIZE -1
+ * so that AppArmor can null terminate them
+ */
+ if (args[size - 1] != '\0') {
+ if (size == PAGE_SIZE)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ args[size] = '\0';
+ }
+
+ /* task can only write its own attributes */
+ if (current != task)
+ return -EACCES;
+
+ args = value;
+ args = strim(args);
+ command = strsep(&args, " ");
+ if (!args)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ args = skip_spaces(args);
+ if (!*args)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ arg_size = size - (args - (char *) value);
+ if (strcmp(name, "current") == 0) {
+ if (strcmp(command, "changehat") == 0) {
+ error = aa_setprocattr_changehat(args, arg_size,
+ !AA_DO_TEST);
+ } else if (strcmp(command, "permhat") == 0) {
+ error = aa_setprocattr_changehat(args, arg_size,
+ AA_DO_TEST);
+ } else if (strcmp(command, "changeprofile") == 0) {
+ error = aa_setprocattr_changeprofile(args, !AA_ONEXEC,
+ !AA_DO_TEST);
+ } else if (strcmp(command, "permprofile") == 0) {
+ error = aa_setprocattr_changeprofile(args, !AA_ONEXEC,
+ AA_DO_TEST);
+ } else
+ goto fail;
+ } else if (strcmp(name, "exec") == 0) {
+ if (strcmp(command, "exec") == 0)
+ error = aa_setprocattr_changeprofile(args, AA_ONEXEC,
+ !AA_DO_TEST);
+ else
+ goto fail;
+ } else
+ /* only support the "current" and "exec" process attributes */
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (!error)
+ error = size;
+ return error;
+
+fail:
+ sa.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE;
+ sa.aad = &aad;
+ aad.profile = aa_current_profile();
+ aad.op = OP_SETPROCATTR;
+ aad.info = name;
+ aad.error = -EINVAL;
+ aa_audit_msg(AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED, &sa, NULL);
+ return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+static int apparmor_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *task,
+ unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim)
+{
+ struct aa_profile *profile = __aa_current_profile();
+ int error = 0;
+
+ if (!unconfined(profile))
+ error = aa_task_setrlimit(profile, task, resource, new_rlim);
+
+ return error;
+}
+
+static struct security_operations apparmor_ops = {
+ .name = "apparmor",
+
+ .ptrace_access_check = apparmor_ptrace_access_check,
+ .ptrace_traceme = apparmor_ptrace_traceme,
+ .capget = apparmor_capget,
+ .capable = apparmor_capable,
+
+ .path_link = apparmor_path_link,
+ .path_unlink = apparmor_path_unlink,
+ .path_symlink = apparmor_path_symlink,
+ .path_mkdir = apparmor_path_mkdir,
+ .path_rmdir = apparmor_path_rmdir,
+ .path_mknod = apparmor_path_mknod,
+ .path_rename = apparmor_path_rename,
+ .path_chmod = apparmor_path_chmod,
+ .path_chown = apparmor_path_chown,
+ .path_truncate = apparmor_path_truncate,
+ .inode_getattr = apparmor_inode_getattr,
+
+ .file_open = apparmor_file_open,
+ .file_permission = apparmor_file_permission,
+ .file_alloc_security = apparmor_file_alloc_security,
+ .file_free_security = apparmor_file_free_security,
+ .mmap_file = apparmor_mmap_file,
+ .mmap_addr = cap_mmap_addr,
+ .file_mprotect = apparmor_file_mprotect,
+ .file_lock = apparmor_file_lock,
+
+ .getprocattr = apparmor_getprocattr,
+ .setprocattr = apparmor_setprocattr,
+
+ .cred_alloc_blank = apparmor_cred_alloc_blank,
+ .cred_free = apparmor_cred_free,
+ .cred_prepare = apparmor_cred_prepare,
+ .cred_transfer = apparmor_cred_transfer,
+
+ .bprm_set_creds = apparmor_bprm_set_creds,
+ .bprm_committing_creds = apparmor_bprm_committing_creds,
+ .bprm_committed_creds = apparmor_bprm_committed_creds,
+ .bprm_secureexec = apparmor_bprm_secureexec,
+
+ .task_setrlimit = apparmor_task_setrlimit,
+};
+
+/*
+ * AppArmor sysfs module parameters
+ */
+
+static int param_set_aabool(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp);
+static int param_get_aabool(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp);
+#define param_check_aabool param_check_bool
+static struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aabool = {
+ .flags = KERNEL_PARAM_OPS_FL_NOARG,
+ .set = param_set_aabool,
+ .get = param_get_aabool
+};
+
+static int param_set_aauint(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp);
+static int param_get_aauint(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp);
+#define param_check_aauint param_check_uint
+static struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aauint = {
+ .set = param_set_aauint,
+ .get = param_get_aauint
+};
+
+static int param_set_aalockpolicy(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp);
+static int param_get_aalockpolicy(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp);
+#define param_check_aalockpolicy param_check_bool
+static struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aalockpolicy = {
+ .flags = KERNEL_PARAM_OPS_FL_NOARG,
+ .set = param_set_aalockpolicy,
+ .get = param_get_aalockpolicy
+};
+
+static int param_set_audit(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp);
+static int param_get_audit(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp);
+
+static int param_set_mode(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp);
+static int param_get_mode(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp);
+
+/* Flag values, also controllable via /sys/module/apparmor/parameters
+ * We define special types as we want to do additional mediation.
+ */
+
+/* AppArmor global enforcement switch - complain, enforce, kill */
+enum profile_mode aa_g_profile_mode = APPARMOR_ENFORCE;
+module_param_call(mode, param_set_mode, param_get_mode,
+ &aa_g_profile_mode, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
+
+/* Debug mode */
+bool aa_g_debug;
+module_param_named(debug, aa_g_debug, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
+
+/* Audit mode */
+enum audit_mode aa_g_audit;
+module_param_call(audit, param_set_audit, param_get_audit,
+ &aa_g_audit, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
+
+/* Determines if audit header is included in audited messages. This
+ * provides more context if the audit daemon is not running
+ */
+bool aa_g_audit_header = 1;
+module_param_named(audit_header, aa_g_audit_header, aabool,
+ S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
+
+/* lock out loading/removal of policy
+ * TODO: add in at boot loading of policy, which is the only way to
+ * load policy, if lock_policy is set
+ */
+bool aa_g_lock_policy;
+module_param_named(lock_policy, aa_g_lock_policy, aalockpolicy,
+ S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
+
+/* Syscall logging mode */
+bool aa_g_logsyscall;
+module_param_named(logsyscall, aa_g_logsyscall, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
+
+/* Maximum pathname length before accesses will start getting rejected */
+unsigned int aa_g_path_max = 2 * PATH_MAX;
+module_param_named(path_max, aa_g_path_max, aauint, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
+
+/* Determines how paranoid loading of policy is and how much verification
+ * on the loaded policy is done.
+ */
+bool aa_g_paranoid_load = 1;
+module_param_named(paranoid_load, aa_g_paranoid_load, aabool,
+ S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
+
+/* Boot time disable flag */
+static bool apparmor_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
+module_param_named(enabled, apparmor_enabled, bool, S_IRUGO);
+
+static int __init apparmor_enabled_setup(char *str)
+{
+ unsigned long enabled;
+ int error = kstrtoul(str, 0, &enabled);
+ if (!error)
+ apparmor_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+__setup("apparmor=", apparmor_enabled_setup);
+
+/* set global flag turning off the ability to load policy */
+static int param_set_aalockpolicy(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
+{
+ if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
+ if (aa_g_lock_policy)
+ return -EACCES;
+ return param_set_bool(val, kp);
+}
+
+static int param_get_aalockpolicy(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp)
+{
+ if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
+ return param_get_bool(buffer, kp);
+}
+
+static int param_set_aabool(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
+{
+ if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
+ return param_set_bool(val, kp);
+}
+
+static int param_get_aabool(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp)
+{
+ if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
+ return param_get_bool(buffer, kp);
+}
+
+static int param_set_aauint(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
+{
+ if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
+ return param_set_uint(val, kp);
+}
+
+static int param_get_aauint(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp)
+{
+ if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
+ return param_get_uint(buffer, kp);
+}
+
+static int param_get_audit(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp)
+{
+ if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ if (!apparmor_enabled)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ return sprintf(buffer, "%s", audit_mode_names[aa_g_audit]);
+}
+
+static int param_set_audit(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp)
+{
+ int i;
+ if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ if (!apparmor_enabled)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (!val)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_MAX_INDEX; i++) {
+ if (strcmp(val, audit_mode_names[i]) == 0) {
+ aa_g_audit = i;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+static int param_get_mode(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp)
+{
+ if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ if (!apparmor_enabled)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ return sprintf(buffer, "%s", aa_profile_mode_names[aa_g_profile_mode]);
+}
+
+static int param_set_mode(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp)
+{
+ int i;
+ if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ if (!apparmor_enabled)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (!val)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < APPARMOR_MODE_NAMES_MAX_INDEX; i++) {
+ if (strcmp(val, aa_profile_mode_names[i]) == 0) {
+ aa_g_profile_mode = i;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * AppArmor init functions
+ */
+
+/**
+ * set_init_cxt - set a task context and profile on the first task.
+ *
+ * TODO: allow setting an alternate profile than unconfined
+ */
+static int __init set_init_cxt(void)
+{
+ struct cred *cred = (struct cred *)current->real_cred;
+ struct aa_task_cxt *cxt;
+
+ cxt = aa_alloc_task_context(GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!cxt)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ cxt->profile = aa_get_profile(root_ns->unconfined);
+ cred_cxt(cred) = cxt;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int __init apparmor_init(void)
+{
+ int error;
+
+ if (!apparmor_enabled || !security_module_enable(&apparmor_ops)) {
+ aa_info_message("AppArmor disabled by boot time parameter");
+ apparmor_enabled = 0;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ error = aa_alloc_root_ns();
+ if (error) {
+ AA_ERROR("Unable to allocate default profile namespace\n");
+ goto alloc_out;
+ }
+
+ error = set_init_cxt();
+ if (error) {
+ AA_ERROR("Failed to set context on init task\n");
+ goto register_security_out;
+ }
+
+ error = register_security(&apparmor_ops);
+ if (error) {
+ struct cred *cred = (struct cred *)current->real_cred;
+ aa_free_task_context(cred_cxt(cred));
+ cred_cxt(cred) = NULL;
+ AA_ERROR("Unable to register AppArmor\n");
+ goto register_security_out;
+ }
+
+ /* Report that AppArmor successfully initialized */
+ apparmor_initialized = 1;
+ if (aa_g_profile_mode == APPARMOR_COMPLAIN)
+ aa_info_message("AppArmor initialized: complain mode enabled");
+ else if (aa_g_profile_mode == APPARMOR_KILL)
+ aa_info_message("AppArmor initialized: kill mode enabled");
+ else
+ aa_info_message("AppArmor initialized");
+
+ return error;
+
+register_security_out:
+ aa_free_root_ns();
+
+alloc_out:
+ aa_destroy_aafs();
+
+ apparmor_enabled = 0;
+ return error;
+}
+
+security_initcall(apparmor_init);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/match.c b/security/apparmor/match.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..727eb4200
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/match.c
@@ -0,0 +1,428 @@
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor dfa based regular expression matching engine
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2012 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/kref.h>
+
+#include "include/apparmor.h"
+#include "include/match.h"
+
+#define base_idx(X) ((X) & 0xffffff)
+
+/**
+ * unpack_table - unpack a dfa table (one of accept, default, base, next check)
+ * @blob: data to unpack (NOT NULL)
+ * @bsize: size of blob
+ *
+ * Returns: pointer to table else NULL on failure
+ *
+ * NOTE: must be freed by kvfree (not kfree)
+ */
+static struct table_header *unpack_table(char *blob, size_t bsize)
+{
+ struct table_header *table = NULL;
+ struct table_header th;
+ size_t tsize;
+
+ if (bsize < sizeof(struct table_header))
+ goto out;
+
+ /* loaded td_id's start at 1, subtract 1 now to avoid doing
+ * it every time we use td_id as an index
+ */
+ th.td_id = be16_to_cpu(*(u16 *) (blob)) - 1;
+ th.td_flags = be16_to_cpu(*(u16 *) (blob + 2));
+ th.td_lolen = be32_to_cpu(*(u32 *) (blob + 8));
+ blob += sizeof(struct table_header);
+
+ if (!(th.td_flags == YYTD_DATA16 || th.td_flags == YYTD_DATA32 ||
+ th.td_flags == YYTD_DATA8))
+ goto out;
+
+ tsize = table_size(th.td_lolen, th.td_flags);
+ if (bsize < tsize)
+ goto out;
+
+ table = kvzalloc(tsize);
+ if (table) {
+ *table = th;
+ if (th.td_flags == YYTD_DATA8)
+ UNPACK_ARRAY(table->td_data, blob, th.td_lolen,
+ u8, byte_to_byte);
+ else if (th.td_flags == YYTD_DATA16)
+ UNPACK_ARRAY(table->td_data, blob, th.td_lolen,
+ u16, be16_to_cpu);
+ else if (th.td_flags == YYTD_DATA32)
+ UNPACK_ARRAY(table->td_data, blob, th.td_lolen,
+ u32, be32_to_cpu);
+ else
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+out:
+ /* if table was vmalloced make sure the page tables are synced
+ * before it is used, as it goes live to all cpus.
+ */
+ if (is_vmalloc_addr(table))
+ vm_unmap_aliases();
+ return table;
+fail:
+ kvfree(table);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * verify_dfa - verify that transitions and states in the tables are in bounds.
+ * @dfa: dfa to test (NOT NULL)
+ * @flags: flags controlling what type of accept table are acceptable
+ *
+ * Assumes dfa has gone through the first pass verification done by unpacking
+ * NOTE: this does not valid accept table values
+ *
+ * Returns: %0 else error code on failure to verify
+ */
+static int verify_dfa(struct aa_dfa *dfa, int flags)
+{
+ size_t i, state_count, trans_count;
+ int error = -EPROTO;
+
+ /* check that required tables exist */
+ if (!(dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_DEF] &&
+ dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_BASE] &&
+ dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_NXT] && dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_CHK]))
+ goto out;
+
+ /* accept.size == default.size == base.size */
+ state_count = dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_BASE]->td_lolen;
+ if (ACCEPT1_FLAGS(flags)) {
+ if (!dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_ACCEPT])
+ goto out;
+ if (state_count != dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_ACCEPT]->td_lolen)
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (ACCEPT2_FLAGS(flags)) {
+ if (!dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_ACCEPT2])
+ goto out;
+ if (state_count != dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_ACCEPT2]->td_lolen)
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (state_count != dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_DEF]->td_lolen)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* next.size == chk.size */
+ trans_count = dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_NXT]->td_lolen;
+ if (trans_count != dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_CHK]->td_lolen)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* if equivalence classes then its table size must be 256 */
+ if (dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_EC] &&
+ dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_EC]->td_lolen != 256)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (flags & DFA_FLAG_VERIFY_STATES) {
+ for (i = 0; i < state_count; i++) {
+ if (DEFAULT_TABLE(dfa)[i] >= state_count)
+ goto out;
+ if (base_idx(BASE_TABLE(dfa)[i]) + 255 >= trans_count) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "AppArmor DFA next/check upper "
+ "bounds error\n");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < trans_count; i++) {
+ if (NEXT_TABLE(dfa)[i] >= state_count)
+ goto out;
+ if (CHECK_TABLE(dfa)[i] >= state_count)
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+
+ error = 0;
+out:
+ return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * dfa_free - free a dfa allocated by aa_dfa_unpack
+ * @dfa: the dfa to free (MAYBE NULL)
+ *
+ * Requires: reference count to dfa == 0
+ */
+static void dfa_free(struct aa_dfa *dfa)
+{
+ if (dfa) {
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(dfa->tables); i++) {
+ kvfree(dfa->tables[i]);
+ dfa->tables[i] = NULL;
+ }
+ kfree(dfa);
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_dfa_free_kref - free aa_dfa by kref (called by aa_put_dfa)
+ * @kr: kref callback for freeing of a dfa (NOT NULL)
+ */
+void aa_dfa_free_kref(struct kref *kref)
+{
+ struct aa_dfa *dfa = container_of(kref, struct aa_dfa, count);
+ dfa_free(dfa);
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_dfa_unpack - unpack the binary tables of a serialized dfa
+ * @blob: aligned serialized stream of data to unpack (NOT NULL)
+ * @size: size of data to unpack
+ * @flags: flags controlling what type of accept tables are acceptable
+ *
+ * Unpack a dfa that has been serialized. To find information on the dfa
+ * format look in Documentation/security/apparmor.txt
+ * Assumes the dfa @blob stream has been aligned on a 8 byte boundary
+ *
+ * Returns: an unpacked dfa ready for matching or ERR_PTR on failure
+ */
+struct aa_dfa *aa_dfa_unpack(void *blob, size_t size, int flags)
+{
+ int hsize;
+ int error = -ENOMEM;
+ char *data = blob;
+ struct table_header *table = NULL;
+ struct aa_dfa *dfa = kzalloc(sizeof(struct aa_dfa), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!dfa)
+ goto fail;
+
+ kref_init(&dfa->count);
+
+ error = -EPROTO;
+
+ /* get dfa table set header */
+ if (size < sizeof(struct table_set_header))
+ goto fail;
+
+ if (ntohl(*(u32 *) data) != YYTH_MAGIC)
+ goto fail;
+
+ hsize = ntohl(*(u32 *) (data + 4));
+ if (size < hsize)
+ goto fail;
+
+ dfa->flags = ntohs(*(u16 *) (data + 12));
+ data += hsize;
+ size -= hsize;
+
+ while (size > 0) {
+ table = unpack_table(data, size);
+ if (!table)
+ goto fail;
+
+ switch (table->td_id) {
+ case YYTD_ID_ACCEPT:
+ if (!(table->td_flags & ACCEPT1_FLAGS(flags)))
+ goto fail;
+ break;
+ case YYTD_ID_ACCEPT2:
+ if (!(table->td_flags & ACCEPT2_FLAGS(flags)))
+ goto fail;
+ break;
+ case YYTD_ID_BASE:
+ if (table->td_flags != YYTD_DATA32)
+ goto fail;
+ break;
+ case YYTD_ID_DEF:
+ case YYTD_ID_NXT:
+ case YYTD_ID_CHK:
+ if (table->td_flags != YYTD_DATA16)
+ goto fail;
+ break;
+ case YYTD_ID_EC:
+ if (table->td_flags != YYTD_DATA8)
+ goto fail;
+ break;
+ default:
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ /* check for duplicate table entry */
+ if (dfa->tables[table->td_id])
+ goto fail;
+ dfa->tables[table->td_id] = table;
+ data += table_size(table->td_lolen, table->td_flags);
+ size -= table_size(table->td_lolen, table->td_flags);
+ table = NULL;
+ }
+
+ error = verify_dfa(dfa, flags);
+ if (error)
+ goto fail;
+
+ return dfa;
+
+fail:
+ kvfree(table);
+ dfa_free(dfa);
+ return ERR_PTR(error);
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_dfa_match_len - traverse @dfa to find state @str stops at
+ * @dfa: the dfa to match @str against (NOT NULL)
+ * @start: the state of the dfa to start matching in
+ * @str: the string of bytes to match against the dfa (NOT NULL)
+ * @len: length of the string of bytes to match
+ *
+ * aa_dfa_match_len will match @str against the dfa and return the state it
+ * finished matching in. The final state can be used to look up the accepting
+ * label, or as the start state of a continuing match.
+ *
+ * This function will happily match again the 0 byte and only finishes
+ * when @len input is consumed.
+ *
+ * Returns: final state reached after input is consumed
+ */
+unsigned int aa_dfa_match_len(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start,
+ const char *str, int len)
+{
+ u16 *def = DEFAULT_TABLE(dfa);
+ u32 *base = BASE_TABLE(dfa);
+ u16 *next = NEXT_TABLE(dfa);
+ u16 *check = CHECK_TABLE(dfa);
+ unsigned int state = start, pos;
+
+ if (state == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* current state is <state>, matching character *str */
+ if (dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_EC]) {
+ /* Equivalence class table defined */
+ u8 *equiv = EQUIV_TABLE(dfa);
+ /* default is direct to next state */
+ for (; len; len--) {
+ pos = base_idx(base[state]) + equiv[(u8) *str++];
+ if (check[pos] == state)
+ state = next[pos];
+ else
+ state = def[state];
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* default is direct to next state */
+ for (; len; len--) {
+ pos = base_idx(base[state]) + (u8) *str++;
+ if (check[pos] == state)
+ state = next[pos];
+ else
+ state = def[state];
+ }
+ }
+
+ return state;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_dfa_match - traverse @dfa to find state @str stops at
+ * @dfa: the dfa to match @str against (NOT NULL)
+ * @start: the state of the dfa to start matching in
+ * @str: the null terminated string of bytes to match against the dfa (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * aa_dfa_match will match @str against the dfa and return the state it
+ * finished matching in. The final state can be used to look up the accepting
+ * label, or as the start state of a continuing match.
+ *
+ * Returns: final state reached after input is consumed
+ */
+unsigned int aa_dfa_match(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start,
+ const char *str)
+{
+ u16 *def = DEFAULT_TABLE(dfa);
+ u32 *base = BASE_TABLE(dfa);
+ u16 *next = NEXT_TABLE(dfa);
+ u16 *check = CHECK_TABLE(dfa);
+ unsigned int state = start, pos;
+
+ if (state == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* current state is <state>, matching character *str */
+ if (dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_EC]) {
+ /* Equivalence class table defined */
+ u8 *equiv = EQUIV_TABLE(dfa);
+ /* default is direct to next state */
+ while (*str) {
+ pos = base_idx(base[state]) + equiv[(u8) *str++];
+ if (check[pos] == state)
+ state = next[pos];
+ else
+ state = def[state];
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* default is direct to next state */
+ while (*str) {
+ pos = base_idx(base[state]) + (u8) *str++;
+ if (check[pos] == state)
+ state = next[pos];
+ else
+ state = def[state];
+ }
+ }
+
+ return state;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_dfa_next - step one character to the next state in the dfa
+ * @dfa: the dfa to tranverse (NOT NULL)
+ * @state: the state to start in
+ * @c: the input character to transition on
+ *
+ * aa_dfa_match will step through the dfa by one input character @c
+ *
+ * Returns: state reach after input @c
+ */
+unsigned int aa_dfa_next(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int state,
+ const char c)
+{
+ u16 *def = DEFAULT_TABLE(dfa);
+ u32 *base = BASE_TABLE(dfa);
+ u16 *next = NEXT_TABLE(dfa);
+ u16 *check = CHECK_TABLE(dfa);
+ unsigned int pos;
+
+ /* current state is <state>, matching character *str */
+ if (dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_EC]) {
+ /* Equivalence class table defined */
+ u8 *equiv = EQUIV_TABLE(dfa);
+ /* default is direct to next state */
+
+ pos = base_idx(base[state]) + equiv[(u8) c];
+ if (check[pos] == state)
+ state = next[pos];
+ else
+ state = def[state];
+ } else {
+ /* default is direct to next state */
+ pos = base_idx(base[state]) + (u8) c;
+ if (check[pos] == state)
+ state = next[pos];
+ else
+ state = def[state];
+ }
+
+ return state;
+}
diff --git a/security/apparmor/path.c b/security/apparmor/path.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..71e0e3a15
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/path.c
@@ -0,0 +1,236 @@
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor function for pathnames
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/magic.h>
+#include <linux/mount.h>
+#include <linux/namei.h>
+#include <linux/nsproxy.h>
+#include <linux/path.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/fs_struct.h>
+
+#include "include/apparmor.h"
+#include "include/path.h"
+#include "include/policy.h"
+
+
+/* modified from dcache.c */
+static int prepend(char **buffer, int buflen, const char *str, int namelen)
+{
+ buflen -= namelen;
+ if (buflen < 0)
+ return -ENAMETOOLONG;
+ *buffer -= namelen;
+ memcpy(*buffer, str, namelen);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#define CHROOT_NSCONNECT (PATH_CHROOT_REL | PATH_CHROOT_NSCONNECT)
+
+/**
+ * d_namespace_path - lookup a name associated with a given path
+ * @path: path to lookup (NOT NULL)
+ * @buf: buffer to store path to (NOT NULL)
+ * @buflen: length of @buf
+ * @name: Returns - pointer for start of path name with in @buf (NOT NULL)
+ * @flags: flags controlling path lookup
+ *
+ * Handle path name lookup.
+ *
+ * Returns: %0 else error code if path lookup fails
+ * When no error the path name is returned in @name which points to
+ * to a position in @buf
+ */
+static int d_namespace_path(struct path *path, char *buf, int buflen,
+ char **name, int flags)
+{
+ char *res;
+ int error = 0;
+ int connected = 1;
+
+ if (path->mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_INTERNAL) {
+ /* it's not mounted anywhere */
+ res = dentry_path(path->dentry, buf, buflen);
+ *name = res;
+ if (IS_ERR(res)) {
+ *name = buf;
+ return PTR_ERR(res);
+ }
+ if (path->dentry->d_sb->s_magic == PROC_SUPER_MAGIC &&
+ strncmp(*name, "/sys/", 5) == 0) {
+ /* TODO: convert over to using a per namespace
+ * control instead of hard coded /proc
+ */
+ return prepend(name, *name - buf, "/proc", 5);
+ }
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* resolve paths relative to chroot?*/
+ if (flags & PATH_CHROOT_REL) {
+ struct path root;
+ get_fs_root(current->fs, &root);
+ res = __d_path(path, &root, buf, buflen);
+ path_put(&root);
+ } else {
+ res = d_absolute_path(path, buf, buflen);
+ if (!our_mnt(path->mnt))
+ connected = 0;
+ }
+
+ /* handle error conditions - and still allow a partial path to
+ * be returned.
+ */
+ if (!res || IS_ERR(res)) {
+ if (PTR_ERR(res) == -ENAMETOOLONG)
+ return -ENAMETOOLONG;
+ connected = 0;
+ res = dentry_path_raw(path->dentry, buf, buflen);
+ if (IS_ERR(res)) {
+ error = PTR_ERR(res);
+ *name = buf;
+ goto out;
+ };
+ } else if (!our_mnt(path->mnt))
+ connected = 0;
+
+ *name = res;
+
+ /* Handle two cases:
+ * 1. A deleted dentry && profile is not allowing mediation of deleted
+ * 2. On some filesystems, newly allocated dentries appear to the
+ * security_path hooks as a deleted dentry except without an inode
+ * allocated.
+ */
+ if (d_unlinked(path->dentry) && d_is_positive(path->dentry) &&
+ !(flags & PATH_MEDIATE_DELETED)) {
+ error = -ENOENT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* If the path is not connected to the expected root,
+ * check if it is a sysctl and handle specially else remove any
+ * leading / that __d_path may have returned.
+ * Unless
+ * specifically directed to connect the path,
+ * OR
+ * if in a chroot and doing chroot relative paths and the path
+ * resolves to the namespace root (would be connected outside
+ * of chroot) and specifically directed to connect paths to
+ * namespace root.
+ */
+ if (!connected) {
+ if (!(flags & PATH_CONNECT_PATH) &&
+ !(((flags & CHROOT_NSCONNECT) == CHROOT_NSCONNECT) &&
+ our_mnt(path->mnt))) {
+ /* disconnected path, don't return pathname starting
+ * with '/'
+ */
+ error = -EACCES;
+ if (*res == '/')
+ *name = res + 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+out:
+ return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * get_name_to_buffer - get the pathname to a buffer ensure dir / is appended
+ * @path: path to get name for (NOT NULL)
+ * @flags: flags controlling path lookup
+ * @buffer: buffer to put name in (NOT NULL)
+ * @size: size of buffer
+ * @name: Returns - contains position of path name in @buffer (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: %0 else error on failure
+ */
+static int get_name_to_buffer(struct path *path, int flags, char *buffer,
+ int size, char **name, const char **info)
+{
+ int adjust = (flags & PATH_IS_DIR) ? 1 : 0;
+ int error = d_namespace_path(path, buffer, size - adjust, name, flags);
+
+ if (!error && (flags & PATH_IS_DIR) && (*name)[1] != '\0')
+ /*
+ * Append "/" to the pathname. The root directory is a special
+ * case; it already ends in slash.
+ */
+ strcpy(&buffer[size - 2], "/");
+
+ if (info && error) {
+ if (error == -ENOENT)
+ *info = "Failed name lookup - deleted entry";
+ else if (error == -EACCES)
+ *info = "Failed name lookup - disconnected path";
+ else if (error == -ENAMETOOLONG)
+ *info = "Failed name lookup - name too long";
+ else
+ *info = "Failed name lookup";
+ }
+
+ return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_path_name - compute the pathname of a file
+ * @path: path the file (NOT NULL)
+ * @flags: flags controlling path name generation
+ * @buffer: buffer that aa_get_name() allocated (NOT NULL)
+ * @name: Returns - the generated path name if !error (NOT NULL)
+ * @info: Returns - information on why the path lookup failed (MAYBE NULL)
+ *
+ * @name is a pointer to the beginning of the pathname (which usually differs
+ * from the beginning of the buffer), or NULL. If there is an error @name
+ * may contain a partial or invalid name that can be used for audit purposes,
+ * but it can not be used for mediation.
+ *
+ * We need PATH_IS_DIR to indicate whether the file is a directory or not
+ * because the file may not yet exist, and so we cannot check the inode's
+ * file type.
+ *
+ * Returns: %0 else error code if could retrieve name
+ */
+int aa_path_name(struct path *path, int flags, char **buffer, const char **name,
+ const char **info)
+{
+ char *buf, *str = NULL;
+ int size = 256;
+ int error;
+
+ *name = NULL;
+ *buffer = NULL;
+ for (;;) {
+ /* freed by caller */
+ buf = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!buf)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ error = get_name_to_buffer(path, flags, buf, size, &str, info);
+ if (error != -ENAMETOOLONG)
+ break;
+
+ kfree(buf);
+ size <<= 1;
+ if (size > aa_g_path_max)
+ return -ENAMETOOLONG;
+ *info = NULL;
+ }
+ *buffer = buf;
+ *name = str;
+
+ return error;
+}
diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy.c b/security/apparmor/policy.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..705c2879d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/policy.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1301 @@
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor policy manipulation functions
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ *
+ *
+ * AppArmor policy is based around profiles, which contain the rules a
+ * task is confined by. Every task in the system has a profile attached
+ * to it determined either by matching "unconfined" tasks against the
+ * visible set of profiles or by following a profiles attachment rules.
+ *
+ * Each profile exists in a profile namespace which is a container of
+ * visible profiles. Each namespace contains a special "unconfined" profile,
+ * which doesn't enforce any confinement on a task beyond DAC.
+ *
+ * Namespace and profile names can be written together in either
+ * of two syntaxes.
+ * :namespace:profile - used by kernel interfaces for easy detection
+ * namespace://profile - used by policy
+ *
+ * Profile names can not start with : or @ or ^ and may not contain \0
+ *
+ * Reserved profile names
+ * unconfined - special automatically generated unconfined profile
+ * inherit - special name to indicate profile inheritance
+ * null-XXXX-YYYY - special automatically generated learning profiles
+ *
+ * Namespace names may not start with / or @ and may not contain \0 or :
+ * Reserved namespace names
+ * user-XXXX - user defined profiles
+ *
+ * a // in a profile or namespace name indicates a hierarchical name with the
+ * name before the // being the parent and the name after the child.
+ *
+ * Profile and namespace hierarchies serve two different but similar purposes.
+ * The namespace contains the set of visible profiles that are considered
+ * for attachment. The hierarchy of namespaces allows for virtualizing
+ * the namespace so that for example a chroot can have its own set of profiles
+ * which may define some local user namespaces.
+ * The profile hierarchy severs two distinct purposes,
+ * - it allows for sub profiles or hats, which allows an application to run
+ * subprograms under its own profile with different restriction than it
+ * self, and not have it use the system profile.
+ * eg. if a mail program starts an editor, the policy might make the
+ * restrictions tighter on the editor tighter than the mail program,
+ * and definitely different than general editor restrictions
+ * - it allows for binary hierarchy of profiles, so that execution history
+ * is preserved. This feature isn't exploited by AppArmor reference policy
+ * but is allowed. NOTE: this is currently suboptimal because profile
+ * aliasing is not currently implemented so that a profile for each
+ * level must be defined.
+ * eg. /bin/bash///bin/ls as a name would indicate /bin/ls was started
+ * from /bin/bash
+ *
+ * A profile or namespace name that can contain one or more // separators
+ * is referred to as an hname (hierarchical).
+ * eg. /bin/bash//bin/ls
+ *
+ * An fqname is a name that may contain both namespace and profile hnames.
+ * eg. :ns:/bin/bash//bin/ls
+ *
+ * NOTES:
+ * - locking of profile lists is currently fairly coarse. All profile
+ * lists within a namespace use the namespace lock.
+ * FIXME: move profile lists to using rcu_lists
+ */
+
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+
+#include "include/apparmor.h"
+#include "include/capability.h"
+#include "include/context.h"
+#include "include/file.h"
+#include "include/ipc.h"
+#include "include/match.h"
+#include "include/path.h"
+#include "include/policy.h"
+#include "include/policy_unpack.h"
+#include "include/resource.h"
+
+
+/* root profile namespace */
+struct aa_namespace *root_ns;
+
+const char *const aa_profile_mode_names[] = {
+ "enforce",
+ "complain",
+ "kill",
+ "unconfined",
+};
+
+/**
+ * hname_tail - find the last component of an hname
+ * @name: hname to find the base profile name component of (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: the tail (base profile name) name component of an hname
+ */
+static const char *hname_tail(const char *hname)
+{
+ char *split;
+ hname = strim((char *)hname);
+ for (split = strstr(hname, "//"); split; split = strstr(hname, "//"))
+ hname = split + 2;
+
+ return hname;
+}
+
+/**
+ * policy_init - initialize a policy structure
+ * @policy: policy to initialize (NOT NULL)
+ * @prefix: prefix name if any is required. (MAYBE NULL)
+ * @name: name of the policy, init will make a copy of it (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Note: this fn creates a copy of strings passed in
+ *
+ * Returns: true if policy init successful
+ */
+static bool policy_init(struct aa_policy *policy, const char *prefix,
+ const char *name)
+{
+ /* freed by policy_free */
+ if (prefix) {
+ policy->hname = kmalloc(strlen(prefix) + strlen(name) + 3,
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (policy->hname)
+ sprintf(policy->hname, "%s//%s", prefix, name);
+ } else
+ policy->hname = kstrdup(name, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!policy->hname)
+ return 0;
+ /* base.name is a substring of fqname */
+ policy->name = (char *)hname_tail(policy->hname);
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&policy->list);
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&policy->profiles);
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/**
+ * policy_destroy - free the elements referenced by @policy
+ * @policy: policy that is to have its elements freed (NOT NULL)
+ */
+static void policy_destroy(struct aa_policy *policy)
+{
+ /* still contains profiles -- invalid */
+ if (on_list_rcu(&policy->profiles)) {
+ AA_ERROR("%s: internal error, "
+ "policy '%s' still contains profiles\n",
+ __func__, policy->name);
+ BUG();
+ }
+ if (on_list_rcu(&policy->list)) {
+ AA_ERROR("%s: internal error, policy '%s' still on list\n",
+ __func__, policy->name);
+ BUG();
+ }
+
+ /* don't free name as its a subset of hname */
+ kzfree(policy->hname);
+}
+
+/**
+ * __policy_find - find a policy by @name on a policy list
+ * @head: list to search (NOT NULL)
+ * @name: name to search for (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Requires: rcu_read_lock be held
+ *
+ * Returns: unrefcounted policy that match @name or NULL if not found
+ */
+static struct aa_policy *__policy_find(struct list_head *head, const char *name)
+{
+ struct aa_policy *policy;
+
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(policy, head, list) {
+ if (!strcmp(policy->name, name))
+ return policy;
+ }
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * __policy_strn_find - find a policy that's name matches @len chars of @str
+ * @head: list to search (NOT NULL)
+ * @str: string to search for (NOT NULL)
+ * @len: length of match required
+ *
+ * Requires: rcu_read_lock be held
+ *
+ * Returns: unrefcounted policy that match @str or NULL if not found
+ *
+ * if @len == strlen(@strlen) then this is equiv to __policy_find
+ * other wise it allows searching for policy by a partial match of name
+ */
+static struct aa_policy *__policy_strn_find(struct list_head *head,
+ const char *str, int len)
+{
+ struct aa_policy *policy;
+
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(policy, head, list) {
+ if (aa_strneq(policy->name, str, len))
+ return policy;
+ }
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Routines for AppArmor namespaces
+ */
+
+static const char *hidden_ns_name = "---";
+/**
+ * aa_ns_visible - test if @view is visible from @curr
+ * @curr: namespace to treat as the parent (NOT NULL)
+ * @view: namespace to test if visible from @curr (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: true if @view is visible from @curr else false
+ */
+bool aa_ns_visible(struct aa_namespace *curr, struct aa_namespace *view)
+{
+ if (curr == view)
+ return true;
+
+ for ( ; view; view = view->parent) {
+ if (view->parent == curr)
+ return true;
+ }
+ return false;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_na_name - Find the ns name to display for @view from @curr
+ * @curr - current namespace (NOT NULL)
+ * @view - namespace attempting to view (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: name of @view visible from @curr
+ */
+const char *aa_ns_name(struct aa_namespace *curr, struct aa_namespace *view)
+{
+ /* if view == curr then the namespace name isn't displayed */
+ if (curr == view)
+ return "";
+
+ if (aa_ns_visible(curr, view)) {
+ /* at this point if a ns is visible it is in a view ns
+ * thus the curr ns.hname is a prefix of its name.
+ * Only output the virtualized portion of the name
+ * Add + 2 to skip over // separating curr hname prefix
+ * from the visible tail of the views hname
+ */
+ return view->base.hname + strlen(curr->base.hname) + 2;
+ } else
+ return hidden_ns_name;
+}
+
+/**
+ * alloc_namespace - allocate, initialize and return a new namespace
+ * @prefix: parent namespace name (MAYBE NULL)
+ * @name: a preallocated name (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: refcounted namespace or NULL on failure.
+ */
+static struct aa_namespace *alloc_namespace(const char *prefix,
+ const char *name)
+{
+ struct aa_namespace *ns;
+
+ ns = kzalloc(sizeof(*ns), GFP_KERNEL);
+ AA_DEBUG("%s(%p)\n", __func__, ns);
+ if (!ns)
+ return NULL;
+ if (!policy_init(&ns->base, prefix, name))
+ goto fail_ns;
+
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ns->sub_ns);
+ mutex_init(&ns->lock);
+
+ /* released by free_namespace */
+ ns->unconfined = aa_alloc_profile("unconfined");
+ if (!ns->unconfined)
+ goto fail_unconfined;
+
+ ns->unconfined->flags = PFLAG_IX_ON_NAME_ERROR |
+ PFLAG_IMMUTABLE | PFLAG_NS_COUNT;
+ ns->unconfined->mode = APPARMOR_UNCONFINED;
+
+ /* ns and ns->unconfined share ns->unconfined refcount */
+ ns->unconfined->ns = ns;
+
+ atomic_set(&ns->uniq_null, 0);
+
+ return ns;
+
+fail_unconfined:
+ kzfree(ns->base.hname);
+fail_ns:
+ kzfree(ns);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * free_namespace - free a profile namespace
+ * @ns: the namespace to free (MAYBE NULL)
+ *
+ * Requires: All references to the namespace must have been put, if the
+ * namespace was referenced by a profile confining a task,
+ */
+static void free_namespace(struct aa_namespace *ns)
+{
+ if (!ns)
+ return;
+
+ policy_destroy(&ns->base);
+ aa_put_namespace(ns->parent);
+
+ ns->unconfined->ns = NULL;
+ aa_free_profile(ns->unconfined);
+ kzfree(ns);
+}
+
+/**
+ * __aa_find_namespace - find a namespace on a list by @name
+ * @head: list to search for namespace on (NOT NULL)
+ * @name: name of namespace to look for (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: unrefcounted namespace
+ *
+ * Requires: rcu_read_lock be held
+ */
+static struct aa_namespace *__aa_find_namespace(struct list_head *head,
+ const char *name)
+{
+ return (struct aa_namespace *)__policy_find(head, name);
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_find_namespace - look up a profile namespace on the namespace list
+ * @root: namespace to search in (NOT NULL)
+ * @name: name of namespace to find (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: a refcounted namespace on the list, or NULL if no namespace
+ * called @name exists.
+ *
+ * refcount released by caller
+ */
+struct aa_namespace *aa_find_namespace(struct aa_namespace *root,
+ const char *name)
+{
+ struct aa_namespace *ns = NULL;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ ns = aa_get_namespace(__aa_find_namespace(&root->sub_ns, name));
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+
+ return ns;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_prepare_namespace - find an existing or create a new namespace of @name
+ * @name: the namespace to find or add (MAYBE NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: refcounted namespace or NULL if failed to create one
+ */
+static struct aa_namespace *aa_prepare_namespace(const char *name)
+{
+ struct aa_namespace *ns, *root;
+
+ root = aa_current_profile()->ns;
+
+ mutex_lock(&root->lock);
+
+ /* if name isn't specified the profile is loaded to the current ns */
+ if (!name) {
+ /* released by caller */
+ ns = aa_get_namespace(root);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* try and find the specified ns and if it doesn't exist create it */
+ /* released by caller */
+ ns = aa_get_namespace(__aa_find_namespace(&root->sub_ns, name));
+ if (!ns) {
+ ns = alloc_namespace(root->base.hname, name);
+ if (!ns)
+ goto out;
+ if (__aa_fs_namespace_mkdir(ns, ns_subns_dir(root), name)) {
+ AA_ERROR("Failed to create interface for ns %s\n",
+ ns->base.name);
+ free_namespace(ns);
+ ns = NULL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ ns->parent = aa_get_namespace(root);
+ list_add_rcu(&ns->base.list, &root->sub_ns);
+ /* add list ref */
+ aa_get_namespace(ns);
+ }
+out:
+ mutex_unlock(&root->lock);
+
+ /* return ref */
+ return ns;
+}
+
+/**
+ * __list_add_profile - add a profile to a list
+ * @list: list to add it to (NOT NULL)
+ * @profile: the profile to add (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * refcount @profile, should be put by __list_remove_profile
+ *
+ * Requires: namespace lock be held, or list not be shared
+ */
+static void __list_add_profile(struct list_head *list,
+ struct aa_profile *profile)
+{
+ list_add_rcu(&profile->base.list, list);
+ /* get list reference */
+ aa_get_profile(profile);
+}
+
+/**
+ * __list_remove_profile - remove a profile from the list it is on
+ * @profile: the profile to remove (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * remove a profile from the list, warning generally removal should
+ * be done with __replace_profile as most profile removals are
+ * replacements to the unconfined profile.
+ *
+ * put @profile list refcount
+ *
+ * Requires: namespace lock be held, or list not have been live
+ */
+static void __list_remove_profile(struct aa_profile *profile)
+{
+ list_del_rcu(&profile->base.list);
+ aa_put_profile(profile);
+}
+
+static void __profile_list_release(struct list_head *head);
+
+/**
+ * __remove_profile - remove old profile, and children
+ * @profile: profile to be replaced (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Requires: namespace list lock be held, or list not be shared
+ */
+static void __remove_profile(struct aa_profile *profile)
+{
+ /* release any children lists first */
+ __profile_list_release(&profile->base.profiles);
+ /* released by free_profile */
+ __aa_update_replacedby(profile, profile->ns->unconfined);
+ __aa_fs_profile_rmdir(profile);
+ __list_remove_profile(profile);
+}
+
+/**
+ * __profile_list_release - remove all profiles on the list and put refs
+ * @head: list of profiles (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Requires: namespace lock be held
+ */
+static void __profile_list_release(struct list_head *head)
+{
+ struct aa_profile *profile, *tmp;
+ list_for_each_entry_safe(profile, tmp, head, base.list)
+ __remove_profile(profile);
+}
+
+static void __ns_list_release(struct list_head *head);
+
+/**
+ * destroy_namespace - remove everything contained by @ns
+ * @ns: namespace to have it contents removed (NOT NULL)
+ */
+static void destroy_namespace(struct aa_namespace *ns)
+{
+ if (!ns)
+ return;
+
+ mutex_lock(&ns->lock);
+ /* release all profiles in this namespace */
+ __profile_list_release(&ns->base.profiles);
+
+ /* release all sub namespaces */
+ __ns_list_release(&ns->sub_ns);
+
+ if (ns->parent)
+ __aa_update_replacedby(ns->unconfined, ns->parent->unconfined);
+ __aa_fs_namespace_rmdir(ns);
+ mutex_unlock(&ns->lock);
+}
+
+/**
+ * __remove_namespace - remove a namespace and all its children
+ * @ns: namespace to be removed (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Requires: ns->parent->lock be held and ns removed from parent.
+ */
+static void __remove_namespace(struct aa_namespace *ns)
+{
+ /* remove ns from namespace list */
+ list_del_rcu(&ns->base.list);
+ destroy_namespace(ns);
+ aa_put_namespace(ns);
+}
+
+/**
+ * __ns_list_release - remove all profile namespaces on the list put refs
+ * @head: list of profile namespaces (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Requires: namespace lock be held
+ */
+static void __ns_list_release(struct list_head *head)
+{
+ struct aa_namespace *ns, *tmp;
+ list_for_each_entry_safe(ns, tmp, head, base.list)
+ __remove_namespace(ns);
+
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_alloc_root_ns - allocate the root profile namespace
+ *
+ * Returns: %0 on success else error
+ *
+ */
+int __init aa_alloc_root_ns(void)
+{
+ /* released by aa_free_root_ns - used as list ref*/
+ root_ns = alloc_namespace(NULL, "root");
+ if (!root_ns)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+ /**
+ * aa_free_root_ns - free the root profile namespace
+ */
+void __init aa_free_root_ns(void)
+ {
+ struct aa_namespace *ns = root_ns;
+ root_ns = NULL;
+
+ destroy_namespace(ns);
+ aa_put_namespace(ns);
+}
+
+
+static void free_replacedby(struct aa_replacedby *r)
+{
+ if (r) {
+ /* r->profile will not be updated any more as r is dead */
+ aa_put_profile(rcu_dereference_protected(r->profile, true));
+ kzfree(r);
+ }
+}
+
+
+void aa_free_replacedby_kref(struct kref *kref)
+{
+ struct aa_replacedby *r = container_of(kref, struct aa_replacedby,
+ count);
+ free_replacedby(r);
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_free_profile - free a profile
+ * @profile: the profile to free (MAYBE NULL)
+ *
+ * Free a profile, its hats and null_profile. All references to the profile,
+ * its hats and null_profile must have been put.
+ *
+ * If the profile was referenced from a task context, free_profile() will
+ * be called from an rcu callback routine, so we must not sleep here.
+ */
+void aa_free_profile(struct aa_profile *profile)
+{
+ AA_DEBUG("%s(%p)\n", __func__, profile);
+
+ if (!profile)
+ return;
+
+ /* free children profiles */
+ policy_destroy(&profile->base);
+ aa_put_profile(rcu_access_pointer(profile->parent));
+
+ aa_put_namespace(profile->ns);
+ kzfree(profile->rename);
+
+ aa_free_file_rules(&profile->file);
+ aa_free_cap_rules(&profile->caps);
+ aa_free_rlimit_rules(&profile->rlimits);
+
+ kzfree(profile->dirname);
+ aa_put_dfa(profile->xmatch);
+ aa_put_dfa(profile->policy.dfa);
+ aa_put_replacedby(profile->replacedby);
+
+ kzfree(profile->hash);
+ kzfree(profile);
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_free_profile_rcu - free aa_profile by rcu (called by aa_free_profile_kref)
+ * @head: rcu_head callback for freeing of a profile (NOT NULL)
+ */
+static void aa_free_profile_rcu(struct rcu_head *head)
+{
+ struct aa_profile *p = container_of(head, struct aa_profile, rcu);
+ if (p->flags & PFLAG_NS_COUNT)
+ free_namespace(p->ns);
+ else
+ aa_free_profile(p);
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_free_profile_kref - free aa_profile by kref (called by aa_put_profile)
+ * @kr: kref callback for freeing of a profile (NOT NULL)
+ */
+void aa_free_profile_kref(struct kref *kref)
+{
+ struct aa_profile *p = container_of(kref, struct aa_profile, count);
+ call_rcu(&p->rcu, aa_free_profile_rcu);
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_alloc_profile - allocate, initialize and return a new profile
+ * @hname: name of the profile (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: refcount profile or NULL on failure
+ */
+struct aa_profile *aa_alloc_profile(const char *hname)
+{
+ struct aa_profile *profile;
+
+ /* freed by free_profile - usually through aa_put_profile */
+ profile = kzalloc(sizeof(*profile), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!profile)
+ return NULL;
+
+ profile->replacedby = kzalloc(sizeof(struct aa_replacedby), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!profile->replacedby)
+ goto fail;
+ kref_init(&profile->replacedby->count);
+
+ if (!policy_init(&profile->base, NULL, hname))
+ goto fail;
+ kref_init(&profile->count);
+
+ /* refcount released by caller */
+ return profile;
+
+fail:
+ kzfree(profile->replacedby);
+ kzfree(profile);
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_new_null_profile - create a new null-X learning profile
+ * @parent: profile that caused this profile to be created (NOT NULL)
+ * @hat: true if the null- learning profile is a hat
+ *
+ * Create a null- complain mode profile used in learning mode. The name of
+ * the profile is unique and follows the format of parent//null-<uniq>.
+ *
+ * null profiles are added to the profile list but the list does not
+ * hold a count on them so that they are automatically released when
+ * not in use.
+ *
+ * Returns: new refcounted profile else NULL on failure
+ */
+struct aa_profile *aa_new_null_profile(struct aa_profile *parent, int hat)
+{
+ struct aa_profile *profile = NULL;
+ char *name;
+ int uniq = atomic_inc_return(&parent->ns->uniq_null);
+
+ /* freed below */
+ name = kmalloc(strlen(parent->base.hname) + 2 + 7 + 8, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!name)
+ goto fail;
+ sprintf(name, "%s//null-%x", parent->base.hname, uniq);
+
+ profile = aa_alloc_profile(name);
+ kfree(name);
+ if (!profile)
+ goto fail;
+
+ profile->mode = APPARMOR_COMPLAIN;
+ profile->flags = PFLAG_NULL;
+ if (hat)
+ profile->flags |= PFLAG_HAT;
+
+ /* released on free_profile */
+ rcu_assign_pointer(profile->parent, aa_get_profile(parent));
+ profile->ns = aa_get_namespace(parent->ns);
+
+ mutex_lock(&profile->ns->lock);
+ __list_add_profile(&parent->base.profiles, profile);
+ mutex_unlock(&profile->ns->lock);
+
+ /* refcount released by caller */
+ return profile;
+
+fail:
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/* TODO: profile accounting - setup in remove */
+
+/**
+ * __find_child - find a profile on @head list with a name matching @name
+ * @head: list to search (NOT NULL)
+ * @name: name of profile (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Requires: rcu_read_lock be held
+ *
+ * Returns: unrefcounted profile ptr, or NULL if not found
+ */
+static struct aa_profile *__find_child(struct list_head *head, const char *name)
+{
+ return (struct aa_profile *)__policy_find(head, name);
+}
+
+/**
+ * __strn_find_child - find a profile on @head list using substring of @name
+ * @head: list to search (NOT NULL)
+ * @name: name of profile (NOT NULL)
+ * @len: length of @name substring to match
+ *
+ * Requires: rcu_read_lock be held
+ *
+ * Returns: unrefcounted profile ptr, or NULL if not found
+ */
+static struct aa_profile *__strn_find_child(struct list_head *head,
+ const char *name, int len)
+{
+ return (struct aa_profile *)__policy_strn_find(head, name, len);
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_find_child - find a profile by @name in @parent
+ * @parent: profile to search (NOT NULL)
+ * @name: profile name to search for (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: a refcounted profile or NULL if not found
+ */
+struct aa_profile *aa_find_child(struct aa_profile *parent, const char *name)
+{
+ struct aa_profile *profile;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ profile = aa_get_profile(__find_child(&parent->base.profiles, name));
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+
+ /* refcount released by caller */
+ return profile;
+}
+
+/**
+ * __lookup_parent - lookup the parent of a profile of name @hname
+ * @ns: namespace to lookup profile in (NOT NULL)
+ * @hname: hierarchical profile name to find parent of (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Lookups up the parent of a fully qualified profile name, the profile
+ * that matches hname does not need to exist, in general this
+ * is used to load a new profile.
+ *
+ * Requires: rcu_read_lock be held
+ *
+ * Returns: unrefcounted policy or NULL if not found
+ */
+static struct aa_policy *__lookup_parent(struct aa_namespace *ns,
+ const char *hname)
+{
+ struct aa_policy *policy;
+ struct aa_profile *profile = NULL;
+ char *split;
+
+ policy = &ns->base;
+
+ for (split = strstr(hname, "//"); split;) {
+ profile = __strn_find_child(&policy->profiles, hname,
+ split - hname);
+ if (!profile)
+ return NULL;
+ policy = &profile->base;
+ hname = split + 2;
+ split = strstr(hname, "//");
+ }
+ if (!profile)
+ return &ns->base;
+ return &profile->base;
+}
+
+/**
+ * __lookup_profile - lookup the profile matching @hname
+ * @base: base list to start looking up profile name from (NOT NULL)
+ * @hname: hierarchical profile name (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Requires: rcu_read_lock be held
+ *
+ * Returns: unrefcounted profile pointer or NULL if not found
+ *
+ * Do a relative name lookup, recursing through profile tree.
+ */
+static struct aa_profile *__lookup_profile(struct aa_policy *base,
+ const char *hname)
+{
+ struct aa_profile *profile = NULL;
+ char *split;
+
+ for (split = strstr(hname, "//"); split;) {
+ profile = __strn_find_child(&base->profiles, hname,
+ split - hname);
+ if (!profile)
+ return NULL;
+
+ base = &profile->base;
+ hname = split + 2;
+ split = strstr(hname, "//");
+ }
+
+ profile = __find_child(&base->profiles, hname);
+
+ return profile;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_lookup_profile - find a profile by its full or partial name
+ * @ns: the namespace to start from (NOT NULL)
+ * @hname: name to do lookup on. Does not contain namespace prefix (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: refcounted profile or NULL if not found
+ */
+struct aa_profile *aa_lookup_profile(struct aa_namespace *ns, const char *hname)
+{
+ struct aa_profile *profile;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ do {
+ profile = __lookup_profile(&ns->base, hname);
+ } while (profile && !aa_get_profile_not0(profile));
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+
+ /* the unconfined profile is not in the regular profile list */
+ if (!profile && strcmp(hname, "unconfined") == 0)
+ profile = aa_get_newest_profile(ns->unconfined);
+
+ /* refcount released by caller */
+ return profile;
+}
+
+/**
+ * replacement_allowed - test to see if replacement is allowed
+ * @profile: profile to test if it can be replaced (MAYBE NULL)
+ * @noreplace: true if replacement shouldn't be allowed but addition is okay
+ * @info: Returns - info about why replacement failed (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: %0 if replacement allowed else error code
+ */
+static int replacement_allowed(struct aa_profile *profile, int noreplace,
+ const char **info)
+{
+ if (profile) {
+ if (profile->flags & PFLAG_IMMUTABLE) {
+ *info = "cannot replace immutible profile";
+ return -EPERM;
+ } else if (noreplace) {
+ *info = "profile already exists";
+ return -EEXIST;
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_audit_policy - Do auditing of policy changes
+ * @op: policy operation being performed
+ * @gfp: memory allocation flags
+ * @name: name of profile being manipulated (NOT NULL)
+ * @info: any extra information to be audited (MAYBE NULL)
+ * @error: error code
+ *
+ * Returns: the error to be returned after audit is done
+ */
+static int audit_policy(int op, gfp_t gfp, const char *name, const char *info,
+ int error)
+{
+ struct common_audit_data sa;
+ struct apparmor_audit_data aad = {0,};
+ sa.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE;
+ sa.aad = &aad;
+ aad.op = op;
+ aad.name = name;
+ aad.info = info;
+ aad.error = error;
+
+ return aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_STATUS, __aa_current_profile(), gfp,
+ &sa, NULL);
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_may_manage_policy - can the current task manage policy
+ * @op: the policy manipulation operation being done
+ *
+ * Returns: true if the task is allowed to manipulate policy
+ */
+bool aa_may_manage_policy(int op)
+{
+ /* check if loading policy is locked out */
+ if (aa_g_lock_policy) {
+ audit_policy(op, GFP_KERNEL, NULL, "policy_locked", -EACCES);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) {
+ audit_policy(op, GFP_KERNEL, NULL, "not policy admin", -EACCES);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static struct aa_profile *__list_lookup_parent(struct list_head *lh,
+ struct aa_profile *profile)
+{
+ const char *base = hname_tail(profile->base.hname);
+ long len = base - profile->base.hname;
+ struct aa_load_ent *ent;
+
+ /* parent won't have trailing // so remove from len */
+ if (len <= 2)
+ return NULL;
+ len -= 2;
+
+ list_for_each_entry(ent, lh, list) {
+ if (ent->new == profile)
+ continue;
+ if (strncmp(ent->new->base.hname, profile->base.hname, len) ==
+ 0 && ent->new->base.hname[len] == 0)
+ return ent->new;
+ }
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * __replace_profile - replace @old with @new on a list
+ * @old: profile to be replaced (NOT NULL)
+ * @new: profile to replace @old with (NOT NULL)
+ * @share_replacedby: transfer @old->replacedby to @new
+ *
+ * Will duplicate and refcount elements that @new inherits from @old
+ * and will inherit @old children.
+ *
+ * refcount @new for list, put @old list refcount
+ *
+ * Requires: namespace list lock be held, or list not be shared
+ */
+static void __replace_profile(struct aa_profile *old, struct aa_profile *new,
+ bool share_replacedby)
+{
+ struct aa_profile *child, *tmp;
+
+ if (!list_empty(&old->base.profiles)) {
+ LIST_HEAD(lh);
+ list_splice_init_rcu(&old->base.profiles, &lh, synchronize_rcu);
+
+ list_for_each_entry_safe(child, tmp, &lh, base.list) {
+ struct aa_profile *p;
+
+ list_del_init(&child->base.list);
+ p = __find_child(&new->base.profiles, child->base.name);
+ if (p) {
+ /* @p replaces @child */
+ __replace_profile(child, p, share_replacedby);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /* inherit @child and its children */
+ /* TODO: update hname of inherited children */
+ /* list refcount transferred to @new */
+ p = aa_deref_parent(child);
+ rcu_assign_pointer(child->parent, aa_get_profile(new));
+ list_add_rcu(&child->base.list, &new->base.profiles);
+ aa_put_profile(p);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!rcu_access_pointer(new->parent)) {
+ struct aa_profile *parent = aa_deref_parent(old);
+ rcu_assign_pointer(new->parent, aa_get_profile(parent));
+ }
+ __aa_update_replacedby(old, new);
+ if (share_replacedby) {
+ aa_put_replacedby(new->replacedby);
+ new->replacedby = aa_get_replacedby(old->replacedby);
+ } else if (!rcu_access_pointer(new->replacedby->profile))
+ /* aafs interface uses replacedby */
+ rcu_assign_pointer(new->replacedby->profile,
+ aa_get_profile(new));
+ __aa_fs_profile_migrate_dents(old, new);
+
+ if (list_empty(&new->base.list)) {
+ /* new is not on a list already */
+ list_replace_rcu(&old->base.list, &new->base.list);
+ aa_get_profile(new);
+ aa_put_profile(old);
+ } else
+ __list_remove_profile(old);
+}
+
+/**
+ * __lookup_replace - lookup replacement information for a profile
+ * @ns - namespace the lookup occurs in
+ * @hname - name of profile to lookup
+ * @noreplace - true if not replacing an existing profile
+ * @p - Returns: profile to be replaced
+ * @info - Returns: info string on why lookup failed
+ *
+ * Returns: profile to replace (no ref) on success else ptr error
+ */
+static int __lookup_replace(struct aa_namespace *ns, const char *hname,
+ bool noreplace, struct aa_profile **p,
+ const char **info)
+{
+ *p = aa_get_profile(__lookup_profile(&ns->base, hname));
+ if (*p) {
+ int error = replacement_allowed(*p, noreplace, info);
+ if (error) {
+ *info = "profile can not be replaced";
+ return error;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_replace_profiles - replace profile(s) on the profile list
+ * @udata: serialized data stream (NOT NULL)
+ * @size: size of the serialized data stream
+ * @noreplace: true if only doing addition, no replacement allowed
+ *
+ * unpack and replace a profile on the profile list and uses of that profile
+ * by any aa_task_cxt. If the profile does not exist on the profile list
+ * it is added.
+ *
+ * Returns: size of data consumed else error code on failure.
+ */
+ssize_t aa_replace_profiles(void *udata, size_t size, bool noreplace)
+{
+ const char *ns_name, *name = NULL, *info = NULL;
+ struct aa_namespace *ns = NULL;
+ struct aa_load_ent *ent, *tmp;
+ int op = OP_PROF_REPL;
+ ssize_t error;
+ LIST_HEAD(lh);
+
+ /* released below */
+ error = aa_unpack(udata, size, &lh, &ns_name);
+ if (error)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* released below */
+ ns = aa_prepare_namespace(ns_name);
+ if (!ns) {
+ info = "failed to prepare namespace";
+ error = -ENOMEM;
+ name = ns_name;
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ mutex_lock(&ns->lock);
+ /* setup parent and ns info */
+ list_for_each_entry(ent, &lh, list) {
+ struct aa_policy *policy;
+
+ name = ent->new->base.hname;
+ error = __lookup_replace(ns, ent->new->base.hname, noreplace,
+ &ent->old, &info);
+ if (error)
+ goto fail_lock;
+
+ if (ent->new->rename) {
+ error = __lookup_replace(ns, ent->new->rename,
+ noreplace, &ent->rename,
+ &info);
+ if (error)
+ goto fail_lock;
+ }
+
+ /* released when @new is freed */
+ ent->new->ns = aa_get_namespace(ns);
+
+ if (ent->old || ent->rename)
+ continue;
+
+ /* no ref on policy only use inside lock */
+ policy = __lookup_parent(ns, ent->new->base.hname);
+ if (!policy) {
+ struct aa_profile *p;
+ p = __list_lookup_parent(&lh, ent->new);
+ if (!p) {
+ error = -ENOENT;
+ info = "parent does not exist";
+ name = ent->new->base.hname;
+ goto fail_lock;
+ }
+ rcu_assign_pointer(ent->new->parent, aa_get_profile(p));
+ } else if (policy != &ns->base) {
+ /* released on profile replacement or free_profile */
+ struct aa_profile *p = (struct aa_profile *) policy;
+ rcu_assign_pointer(ent->new->parent, aa_get_profile(p));
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* create new fs entries for introspection if needed */
+ list_for_each_entry(ent, &lh, list) {
+ if (ent->old) {
+ /* inherit old interface files */
+
+ /* if (ent->rename)
+ TODO: support rename */
+ /* } else if (ent->rename) {
+ TODO: support rename */
+ } else {
+ struct dentry *parent;
+ if (rcu_access_pointer(ent->new->parent)) {
+ struct aa_profile *p;
+ p = aa_deref_parent(ent->new);
+ parent = prof_child_dir(p);
+ } else
+ parent = ns_subprofs_dir(ent->new->ns);
+ error = __aa_fs_profile_mkdir(ent->new, parent);
+ }
+
+ if (error) {
+ info = "failed to create ";
+ goto fail_lock;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Done with checks that may fail - do actual replacement */
+ list_for_each_entry_safe(ent, tmp, &lh, list) {
+ list_del_init(&ent->list);
+ op = (!ent->old && !ent->rename) ? OP_PROF_LOAD : OP_PROF_REPL;
+
+ audit_policy(op, GFP_ATOMIC, ent->new->base.name, NULL, error);
+
+ if (ent->old) {
+ __replace_profile(ent->old, ent->new, 1);
+ if (ent->rename) {
+ /* aafs interface uses replacedby */
+ struct aa_replacedby *r = ent->new->replacedby;
+ rcu_assign_pointer(r->profile,
+ aa_get_profile(ent->new));
+ __replace_profile(ent->rename, ent->new, 0);
+ }
+ } else if (ent->rename) {
+ /* aafs interface uses replacedby */
+ rcu_assign_pointer(ent->new->replacedby->profile,
+ aa_get_profile(ent->new));
+ __replace_profile(ent->rename, ent->new, 0);
+ } else if (ent->new->parent) {
+ struct aa_profile *parent, *newest;
+ parent = aa_deref_parent(ent->new);
+ newest = aa_get_newest_profile(parent);
+
+ /* parent replaced in this atomic set? */
+ if (newest != parent) {
+ aa_get_profile(newest);
+ aa_put_profile(parent);
+ rcu_assign_pointer(ent->new->parent, newest);
+ } else
+ aa_put_profile(newest);
+ /* aafs interface uses replacedby */
+ rcu_assign_pointer(ent->new->replacedby->profile,
+ aa_get_profile(ent->new));
+ __list_add_profile(&parent->base.profiles, ent->new);
+ } else {
+ /* aafs interface uses replacedby */
+ rcu_assign_pointer(ent->new->replacedby->profile,
+ aa_get_profile(ent->new));
+ __list_add_profile(&ns->base.profiles, ent->new);
+ }
+ aa_load_ent_free(ent);
+ }
+ mutex_unlock(&ns->lock);
+
+out:
+ aa_put_namespace(ns);
+
+ if (error)
+ return error;
+ return size;
+
+fail_lock:
+ mutex_unlock(&ns->lock);
+fail:
+ error = audit_policy(op, GFP_KERNEL, name, info, error);
+
+ list_for_each_entry_safe(ent, tmp, &lh, list) {
+ list_del_init(&ent->list);
+ aa_load_ent_free(ent);
+ }
+
+ goto out;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_remove_profiles - remove profile(s) from the system
+ * @fqname: name of the profile or namespace to remove (NOT NULL)
+ * @size: size of the name
+ *
+ * Remove a profile or sub namespace from the current namespace, so that
+ * they can not be found anymore and mark them as replaced by unconfined
+ *
+ * NOTE: removing confinement does not restore rlimits to preconfinemnet values
+ *
+ * Returns: size of data consume else error code if fails
+ */
+ssize_t aa_remove_profiles(char *fqname, size_t size)
+{
+ struct aa_namespace *root, *ns = NULL;
+ struct aa_profile *profile = NULL;
+ const char *name = fqname, *info = NULL;
+ ssize_t error = 0;
+
+ if (*fqname == 0) {
+ info = "no profile specified";
+ error = -ENOENT;
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ root = aa_current_profile()->ns;
+
+ if (fqname[0] == ':') {
+ char *ns_name;
+ name = aa_split_fqname(fqname, &ns_name);
+ /* released below */
+ ns = aa_find_namespace(root, ns_name);
+ if (!ns) {
+ info = "namespace does not exist";
+ error = -ENOENT;
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ } else
+ /* released below */
+ ns = aa_get_namespace(root);
+
+ if (!name) {
+ /* remove namespace - can only happen if fqname[0] == ':' */
+ mutex_lock(&ns->parent->lock);
+ __remove_namespace(ns);
+ mutex_unlock(&ns->parent->lock);
+ } else {
+ /* remove profile */
+ mutex_lock(&ns->lock);
+ profile = aa_get_profile(__lookup_profile(&ns->base, name));
+ if (!profile) {
+ error = -ENOENT;
+ info = "profile does not exist";
+ goto fail_ns_lock;
+ }
+ name = profile->base.hname;
+ __remove_profile(profile);
+ mutex_unlock(&ns->lock);
+ }
+
+ /* don't fail removal if audit fails */
+ (void) audit_policy(OP_PROF_RM, GFP_KERNEL, name, info, error);
+ aa_put_namespace(ns);
+ aa_put_profile(profile);
+ return size;
+
+fail_ns_lock:
+ mutex_unlock(&ns->lock);
+ aa_put_namespace(ns);
+
+fail:
+ (void) audit_policy(OP_PROF_RM, GFP_KERNEL, name, info, error);
+ return error;
+}
diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..a689f1093
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
@@ -0,0 +1,805 @@
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor functions for unpacking policy loaded from
+ * userspace.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ *
+ * AppArmor uses a serialized binary format for loading policy. To find
+ * policy format documentation look in Documentation/security/apparmor.txt
+ * All policy is validated before it is used.
+ */
+
+#include <asm/unaligned.h>
+#include <linux/ctype.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+
+#include "include/apparmor.h"
+#include "include/audit.h"
+#include "include/context.h"
+#include "include/crypto.h"
+#include "include/match.h"
+#include "include/policy.h"
+#include "include/policy_unpack.h"
+
+/*
+ * The AppArmor interface treats data as a type byte followed by the
+ * actual data. The interface has the notion of a a named entry
+ * which has a name (AA_NAME typecode followed by name string) followed by
+ * the entries typecode and data. Named types allow for optional
+ * elements and extensions to be added and tested for without breaking
+ * backwards compatibility.
+ */
+
+enum aa_code {
+ AA_U8,
+ AA_U16,
+ AA_U32,
+ AA_U64,
+ AA_NAME, /* same as string except it is items name */
+ AA_STRING,
+ AA_BLOB,
+ AA_STRUCT,
+ AA_STRUCTEND,
+ AA_LIST,
+ AA_LISTEND,
+ AA_ARRAY,
+ AA_ARRAYEND,
+};
+
+/*
+ * aa_ext is the read of the buffer containing the serialized profile. The
+ * data is copied into a kernel buffer in apparmorfs and then handed off to
+ * the unpack routines.
+ */
+struct aa_ext {
+ void *start;
+ void *end;
+ void *pos; /* pointer to current position in the buffer */
+ u32 version;
+};
+
+/* audit callback for unpack fields */
+static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
+{
+ struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
+ if (sa->aad->iface.target) {
+ struct aa_profile *name = sa->aad->iface.target;
+ audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
+ audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, name->base.hname);
+ }
+ if (sa->aad->iface.pos)
+ audit_log_format(ab, " offset=%ld", sa->aad->iface.pos);
+}
+
+/**
+ * audit_iface - do audit message for policy unpacking/load/replace/remove
+ * @new: profile if it has been allocated (MAYBE NULL)
+ * @name: name of the profile being manipulated (MAYBE NULL)
+ * @info: any extra info about the failure (MAYBE NULL)
+ * @e: buffer position info
+ * @error: error code
+ *
+ * Returns: %0 or error
+ */
+static int audit_iface(struct aa_profile *new, const char *name,
+ const char *info, struct aa_ext *e, int error)
+{
+ struct aa_profile *profile = __aa_current_profile();
+ struct common_audit_data sa;
+ struct apparmor_audit_data aad = {0,};
+ sa.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE;
+ sa.aad = &aad;
+ if (e)
+ aad.iface.pos = e->pos - e->start;
+ aad.iface.target = new;
+ aad.name = name;
+ aad.info = info;
+ aad.error = error;
+
+ return aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_STATUS, profile, GFP_KERNEL, &sa,
+ audit_cb);
+}
+
+/* test if read will be in packed data bounds */
+static bool inbounds(struct aa_ext *e, size_t size)
+{
+ return (size <= e->end - e->pos);
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_u16_chunck - test and do bounds checking for a u16 size based chunk
+ * @e: serialized data read head (NOT NULL)
+ * @chunk: start address for chunk of data (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: the size of chunk found with the read head at the end of the chunk.
+ */
+static size_t unpack_u16_chunk(struct aa_ext *e, char **chunk)
+{
+ size_t size = 0;
+
+ if (!inbounds(e, sizeof(u16)))
+ return 0;
+ size = le16_to_cpu(get_unaligned((u16 *) e->pos));
+ e->pos += sizeof(u16);
+ if (!inbounds(e, size))
+ return 0;
+ *chunk = e->pos;
+ e->pos += size;
+ return size;
+}
+
+/* unpack control byte */
+static bool unpack_X(struct aa_ext *e, enum aa_code code)
+{
+ if (!inbounds(e, 1))
+ return 0;
+ if (*(u8 *) e->pos != code)
+ return 0;
+ e->pos++;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/**
+ * unpack_nameX - check is the next element is of type X with a name of @name
+ * @e: serialized data extent information (NOT NULL)
+ * @code: type code
+ * @name: name to match to the serialized element. (MAYBE NULL)
+ *
+ * check that the next serialized data element is of type X and has a tag
+ * name @name. If @name is specified then there must be a matching
+ * name element in the stream. If @name is NULL any name element will be
+ * skipped and only the typecode will be tested.
+ *
+ * Returns 1 on success (both type code and name tests match) and the read
+ * head is advanced past the headers
+ *
+ * Returns: 0 if either match fails, the read head does not move
+ */
+static bool unpack_nameX(struct aa_ext *e, enum aa_code code, const char *name)
+{
+ /*
+ * May need to reset pos if name or type doesn't match
+ */
+ void *pos = e->pos;
+ /*
+ * Check for presence of a tagname, and if present name size
+ * AA_NAME tag value is a u16.
+ */
+ if (unpack_X(e, AA_NAME)) {
+ char *tag = NULL;
+ size_t size = unpack_u16_chunk(e, &tag);
+ /* if a name is specified it must match. otherwise skip tag */
+ if (name && (!size || strcmp(name, tag)))
+ goto fail;
+ } else if (name) {
+ /* if a name is specified and there is no name tag fail */
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ /* now check if type code matches */
+ if (unpack_X(e, code))
+ return 1;
+
+fail:
+ e->pos = pos;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static bool unpack_u32(struct aa_ext *e, u32 *data, const char *name)
+{
+ if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_U32, name)) {
+ if (!inbounds(e, sizeof(u32)))
+ return 0;
+ if (data)
+ *data = le32_to_cpu(get_unaligned((u32 *) e->pos));
+ e->pos += sizeof(u32);
+ return 1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static bool unpack_u64(struct aa_ext *e, u64 *data, const char *name)
+{
+ if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_U64, name)) {
+ if (!inbounds(e, sizeof(u64)))
+ return 0;
+ if (data)
+ *data = le64_to_cpu(get_unaligned((u64 *) e->pos));
+ e->pos += sizeof(u64);
+ return 1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static size_t unpack_array(struct aa_ext *e, const char *name)
+{
+ if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_ARRAY, name)) {
+ int size;
+ if (!inbounds(e, sizeof(u16)))
+ return 0;
+ size = (int)le16_to_cpu(get_unaligned((u16 *) e->pos));
+ e->pos += sizeof(u16);
+ return size;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static size_t unpack_blob(struct aa_ext *e, char **blob, const char *name)
+{
+ if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_BLOB, name)) {
+ u32 size;
+ if (!inbounds(e, sizeof(u32)))
+ return 0;
+ size = le32_to_cpu(get_unaligned((u32 *) e->pos));
+ e->pos += sizeof(u32);
+ if (inbounds(e, (size_t) size)) {
+ *blob = e->pos;
+ e->pos += size;
+ return size;
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int unpack_str(struct aa_ext *e, const char **string, const char *name)
+{
+ char *src_str;
+ size_t size = 0;
+ void *pos = e->pos;
+ *string = NULL;
+ if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRING, name)) {
+ size = unpack_u16_chunk(e, &src_str);
+ if (size) {
+ /* strings are null terminated, length is size - 1 */
+ if (src_str[size - 1] != 0)
+ goto fail;
+ *string = src_str;
+ }
+ }
+ return size;
+
+fail:
+ e->pos = pos;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int unpack_strdup(struct aa_ext *e, char **string, const char *name)
+{
+ const char *tmp;
+ void *pos = e->pos;
+ int res = unpack_str(e, &tmp, name);
+ *string = NULL;
+
+ if (!res)
+ return 0;
+
+ *string = kmemdup(tmp, res, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!*string) {
+ e->pos = pos;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return res;
+}
+
+#define DFA_VALID_PERM_MASK 0xffffffff
+#define DFA_VALID_PERM2_MASK 0xffffffff
+
+/**
+ * verify_accept - verify the accept tables of a dfa
+ * @dfa: dfa to verify accept tables of (NOT NULL)
+ * @flags: flags governing dfa
+ *
+ * Returns: 1 if valid accept tables else 0 if error
+ */
+static bool verify_accept(struct aa_dfa *dfa, int flags)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ /* verify accept permissions */
+ for (i = 0; i < dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_ACCEPT]->td_lolen; i++) {
+ int mode = ACCEPT_TABLE(dfa)[i];
+
+ if (mode & ~DFA_VALID_PERM_MASK)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (ACCEPT_TABLE2(dfa)[i] & ~DFA_VALID_PERM2_MASK)
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/**
+ * unpack_dfa - unpack a file rule dfa
+ * @e: serialized data extent information (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * returns dfa or ERR_PTR or NULL if no dfa
+ */
+static struct aa_dfa *unpack_dfa(struct aa_ext *e)
+{
+ char *blob = NULL;
+ size_t size;
+ struct aa_dfa *dfa = NULL;
+
+ size = unpack_blob(e, &blob, "aadfa");
+ if (size) {
+ /*
+ * The dfa is aligned with in the blob to 8 bytes
+ * from the beginning of the stream.
+ * alignment adjust needed by dfa unpack
+ */
+ size_t sz = blob - (char *) e->start -
+ ((e->pos - e->start) & 7);
+ size_t pad = ALIGN(sz, 8) - sz;
+ int flags = TO_ACCEPT1_FLAG(YYTD_DATA32) |
+ TO_ACCEPT2_FLAG(YYTD_DATA32);
+
+
+ if (aa_g_paranoid_load)
+ flags |= DFA_FLAG_VERIFY_STATES;
+
+ dfa = aa_dfa_unpack(blob + pad, size - pad, flags);
+
+ if (IS_ERR(dfa))
+ return dfa;
+
+ if (!verify_accept(dfa, flags))
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ return dfa;
+
+fail:
+ aa_put_dfa(dfa);
+ return ERR_PTR(-EPROTO);
+}
+
+/**
+ * unpack_trans_table - unpack a profile transition table
+ * @e: serialized data extent information (NOT NULL)
+ * @profile: profile to add the accept table to (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: 1 if table successfully unpacked
+ */
+static bool unpack_trans_table(struct aa_ext *e, struct aa_profile *profile)
+{
+ void *pos = e->pos;
+
+ /* exec table is optional */
+ if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCT, "xtable")) {
+ int i, size;
+
+ size = unpack_array(e, NULL);
+ /* currently 4 exec bits and entries 0-3 are reserved iupcx */
+ if (size > 16 - 4)
+ goto fail;
+ profile->file.trans.table = kzalloc(sizeof(char *) * size,
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!profile->file.trans.table)
+ goto fail;
+
+ profile->file.trans.size = size;
+ for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
+ char *str;
+ int c, j, size2 = unpack_strdup(e, &str, NULL);
+ /* unpack_strdup verifies that the last character is
+ * null termination byte.
+ */
+ if (!size2)
+ goto fail;
+ profile->file.trans.table[i] = str;
+ /* verify that name doesn't start with space */
+ if (isspace(*str))
+ goto fail;
+
+ /* count internal # of internal \0 */
+ for (c = j = 0; j < size2 - 2; j++) {
+ if (!str[j])
+ c++;
+ }
+ if (*str == ':') {
+ /* beginning with : requires an embedded \0,
+ * verify that exactly 1 internal \0 exists
+ * trailing \0 already verified by unpack_strdup
+ */
+ if (c != 1)
+ goto fail;
+ /* first character after : must be valid */
+ if (!str[1])
+ goto fail;
+ } else if (c)
+ /* fail - all other cases with embedded \0 */
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ if (!unpack_nameX(e, AA_ARRAYEND, NULL))
+ goto fail;
+ if (!unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCTEND, NULL))
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ return 1;
+
+fail:
+ aa_free_domain_entries(&profile->file.trans);
+ e->pos = pos;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static bool unpack_rlimits(struct aa_ext *e, struct aa_profile *profile)
+{
+ void *pos = e->pos;
+
+ /* rlimits are optional */
+ if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCT, "rlimits")) {
+ int i, size;
+ u32 tmp = 0;
+ if (!unpack_u32(e, &tmp, NULL))
+ goto fail;
+ profile->rlimits.mask = tmp;
+
+ size = unpack_array(e, NULL);
+ if (size > RLIM_NLIMITS)
+ goto fail;
+ for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
+ u64 tmp2 = 0;
+ int a = aa_map_resource(i);
+ if (!unpack_u64(e, &tmp2, NULL))
+ goto fail;
+ profile->rlimits.limits[a].rlim_max = tmp2;
+ }
+ if (!unpack_nameX(e, AA_ARRAYEND, NULL))
+ goto fail;
+ if (!unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCTEND, NULL))
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ return 1;
+
+fail:
+ e->pos = pos;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * unpack_profile - unpack a serialized profile
+ * @e: serialized data extent information (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * NOTE: unpack profile sets audit struct if there is a failure
+ */
+static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e)
+{
+ struct aa_profile *profile = NULL;
+ const char *name = NULL;
+ int i, error = -EPROTO;
+ kernel_cap_t tmpcap;
+ u32 tmp;
+
+ /* check that we have the right struct being passed */
+ if (!unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCT, "profile"))
+ goto fail;
+ if (!unpack_str(e, &name, NULL))
+ goto fail;
+
+ profile = aa_alloc_profile(name);
+ if (!profile)
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+ /* profile renaming is optional */
+ (void) unpack_str(e, &profile->rename, "rename");
+
+ /* attachment string is optional */
+ (void) unpack_str(e, &profile->attach, "attach");
+
+ /* xmatch is optional and may be NULL */
+ profile->xmatch = unpack_dfa(e);
+ if (IS_ERR(profile->xmatch)) {
+ error = PTR_ERR(profile->xmatch);
+ profile->xmatch = NULL;
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ /* xmatch_len is not optional if xmatch is set */
+ if (profile->xmatch) {
+ if (!unpack_u32(e, &tmp, NULL))
+ goto fail;
+ profile->xmatch_len = tmp;
+ }
+
+ /* per profile debug flags (complain, audit) */
+ if (!unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCT, "flags"))
+ goto fail;
+ if (!unpack_u32(e, &tmp, NULL))
+ goto fail;
+ if (tmp & PACKED_FLAG_HAT)
+ profile->flags |= PFLAG_HAT;
+ if (!unpack_u32(e, &tmp, NULL))
+ goto fail;
+ if (tmp == PACKED_MODE_COMPLAIN)
+ profile->mode = APPARMOR_COMPLAIN;
+ else if (tmp == PACKED_MODE_KILL)
+ profile->mode = APPARMOR_KILL;
+ else if (tmp == PACKED_MODE_UNCONFINED)
+ profile->mode = APPARMOR_UNCONFINED;
+ if (!unpack_u32(e, &tmp, NULL))
+ goto fail;
+ if (tmp)
+ profile->audit = AUDIT_ALL;
+
+ if (!unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCTEND, NULL))
+ goto fail;
+
+ /* path_flags is optional */
+ if (unpack_u32(e, &profile->path_flags, "path_flags"))
+ profile->path_flags |= profile->flags & PFLAG_MEDIATE_DELETED;
+ else
+ /* set a default value if path_flags field is not present */
+ profile->path_flags = PFLAG_MEDIATE_DELETED;
+
+ if (!unpack_u32(e, &(profile->caps.allow.cap[0]), NULL))
+ goto fail;
+ if (!unpack_u32(e, &(profile->caps.audit.cap[0]), NULL))
+ goto fail;
+ if (!unpack_u32(e, &(profile->caps.quiet.cap[0]), NULL))
+ goto fail;
+ if (!unpack_u32(e, &tmpcap.cap[0], NULL))
+ goto fail;
+
+ if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCT, "caps64")) {
+ /* optional upper half of 64 bit caps */
+ if (!unpack_u32(e, &(profile->caps.allow.cap[1]), NULL))
+ goto fail;
+ if (!unpack_u32(e, &(profile->caps.audit.cap[1]), NULL))
+ goto fail;
+ if (!unpack_u32(e, &(profile->caps.quiet.cap[1]), NULL))
+ goto fail;
+ if (!unpack_u32(e, &(tmpcap.cap[1]), NULL))
+ goto fail;
+ if (!unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCTEND, NULL))
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCT, "capsx")) {
+ /* optional extended caps mediation mask */
+ if (!unpack_u32(e, &(profile->caps.extended.cap[0]), NULL))
+ goto fail;
+ if (!unpack_u32(e, &(profile->caps.extended.cap[1]), NULL))
+ goto fail;
+ if (!unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCTEND, NULL))
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ if (!unpack_rlimits(e, profile))
+ goto fail;
+
+ if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCT, "policydb")) {
+ /* generic policy dfa - optional and may be NULL */
+ profile->policy.dfa = unpack_dfa(e);
+ if (IS_ERR(profile->policy.dfa)) {
+ error = PTR_ERR(profile->policy.dfa);
+ profile->policy.dfa = NULL;
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ if (!unpack_u32(e, &profile->policy.start[0], "start"))
+ /* default start state */
+ profile->policy.start[0] = DFA_START;
+ /* setup class index */
+ for (i = AA_CLASS_FILE; i <= AA_CLASS_LAST; i++) {
+ profile->policy.start[i] =
+ aa_dfa_next(profile->policy.dfa,
+ profile->policy.start[0],
+ i);
+ }
+ if (!unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCTEND, NULL))
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ /* get file rules */
+ profile->file.dfa = unpack_dfa(e);
+ if (IS_ERR(profile->file.dfa)) {
+ error = PTR_ERR(profile->file.dfa);
+ profile->file.dfa = NULL;
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ if (!unpack_u32(e, &profile->file.start, "dfa_start"))
+ /* default start state */
+ profile->file.start = DFA_START;
+
+ if (!unpack_trans_table(e, profile))
+ goto fail;
+
+ if (!unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCTEND, NULL))
+ goto fail;
+
+ return profile;
+
+fail:
+ if (profile)
+ name = NULL;
+ else if (!name)
+ name = "unknown";
+ audit_iface(profile, name, "failed to unpack profile", e, error);
+ aa_free_profile(profile);
+
+ return ERR_PTR(error);
+}
+
+/**
+ * verify_head - unpack serialized stream header
+ * @e: serialized data read head (NOT NULL)
+ * @required: whether the header is required or optional
+ * @ns: Returns - namespace if one is specified else NULL (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: error or 0 if header is good
+ */
+static int verify_header(struct aa_ext *e, int required, const char **ns)
+{
+ int error = -EPROTONOSUPPORT;
+ const char *name = NULL;
+ *ns = NULL;
+
+ /* get the interface version */
+ if (!unpack_u32(e, &e->version, "version")) {
+ if (required) {
+ audit_iface(NULL, NULL, "invalid profile format", e,
+ error);
+ return error;
+ }
+
+ /* check that the interface version is currently supported */
+ if (e->version != 5) {
+ audit_iface(NULL, NULL, "unsupported interface version",
+ e, error);
+ return error;
+ }
+ }
+
+
+ /* read the namespace if present */
+ if (unpack_str(e, &name, "namespace")) {
+ if (*ns && strcmp(*ns, name))
+ audit_iface(NULL, NULL, "invalid ns change", e, error);
+ else if (!*ns)
+ *ns = name;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static bool verify_xindex(int xindex, int table_size)
+{
+ int index, xtype;
+ xtype = xindex & AA_X_TYPE_MASK;
+ index = xindex & AA_X_INDEX_MASK;
+ if (xtype == AA_X_TABLE && index > table_size)
+ return 0;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* verify dfa xindexes are in range of transition tables */
+static bool verify_dfa_xindex(struct aa_dfa *dfa, int table_size)
+{
+ int i;
+ for (i = 0; i < dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_ACCEPT]->td_lolen; i++) {
+ if (!verify_xindex(dfa_user_xindex(dfa, i), table_size))
+ return 0;
+ if (!verify_xindex(dfa_other_xindex(dfa, i), table_size))
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/**
+ * verify_profile - Do post unpack analysis to verify profile consistency
+ * @profile: profile to verify (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: 0 if passes verification else error
+ */
+static int verify_profile(struct aa_profile *profile)
+{
+ if (aa_g_paranoid_load) {
+ if (profile->file.dfa &&
+ !verify_dfa_xindex(profile->file.dfa,
+ profile->file.trans.size)) {
+ audit_iface(profile, NULL, "Invalid named transition",
+ NULL, -EPROTO);
+ return -EPROTO;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void aa_load_ent_free(struct aa_load_ent *ent)
+{
+ if (ent) {
+ aa_put_profile(ent->rename);
+ aa_put_profile(ent->old);
+ aa_put_profile(ent->new);
+ kzfree(ent);
+ }
+}
+
+struct aa_load_ent *aa_load_ent_alloc(void)
+{
+ struct aa_load_ent *ent = kzalloc(sizeof(*ent), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (ent)
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ent->list);
+ return ent;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_unpack - unpack packed binary profile(s) data loaded from user space
+ * @udata: user data copied to kmem (NOT NULL)
+ * @size: the size of the user data
+ * @lh: list to place unpacked profiles in a aa_repl_ws
+ * @ns: Returns namespace profile is in if specified else NULL (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Unpack user data and return refcounted allocated profile(s) stored in
+ * @lh in order of discovery, with the list chain stored in base.list
+ * or error
+ *
+ * Returns: profile(s) on @lh else error pointer if fails to unpack
+ */
+int aa_unpack(void *udata, size_t size, struct list_head *lh, const char **ns)
+{
+ struct aa_load_ent *tmp, *ent;
+ struct aa_profile *profile = NULL;
+ int error;
+ struct aa_ext e = {
+ .start = udata,
+ .end = udata + size,
+ .pos = udata,
+ };
+
+ *ns = NULL;
+ while (e.pos < e.end) {
+ void *start;
+ error = verify_header(&e, e.pos == e.start, ns);
+ if (error)
+ goto fail;
+
+ start = e.pos;
+ profile = unpack_profile(&e);
+ if (IS_ERR(profile)) {
+ error = PTR_ERR(profile);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ error = verify_profile(profile);
+ if (error)
+ goto fail_profile;
+
+ error = aa_calc_profile_hash(profile, e.version, start,
+ e.pos - start);
+ if (error)
+ goto fail_profile;
+
+ ent = aa_load_ent_alloc();
+ if (!ent) {
+ error = -ENOMEM;
+ goto fail_profile;
+ }
+
+ ent->new = profile;
+ list_add_tail(&ent->list, lh);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+
+fail_profile:
+ aa_put_profile(profile);
+
+fail:
+ list_for_each_entry_safe(ent, tmp, lh, list) {
+ list_del_init(&ent->list);
+ aa_load_ent_free(ent);
+ }
+
+ return error;
+}
diff --git a/security/apparmor/procattr.c b/security/apparmor/procattr.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..b125acc9a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/procattr.c
@@ -0,0 +1,165 @@
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor /proc/<pid>/attr/ interface functions
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ */
+
+#include "include/apparmor.h"
+#include "include/context.h"
+#include "include/policy.h"
+#include "include/domain.h"
+#include "include/procattr.h"
+
+
+/**
+ * aa_getprocattr - Return the profile information for @profile
+ * @profile: the profile to print profile info about (NOT NULL)
+ * @string: Returns - string containing the profile info (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: length of @string on success else error on failure
+ *
+ * Requires: profile != NULL
+ *
+ * Creates a string containing the namespace_name://profile_name for
+ * @profile.
+ *
+ * Returns: size of string placed in @string else error code on failure
+ */
+int aa_getprocattr(struct aa_profile *profile, char **string)
+{
+ char *str;
+ int len = 0, mode_len = 0, ns_len = 0, name_len;
+ const char *mode_str = aa_profile_mode_names[profile->mode];
+ const char *ns_name = NULL;
+ struct aa_namespace *ns = profile->ns;
+ struct aa_namespace *current_ns = __aa_current_profile()->ns;
+ char *s;
+
+ if (!aa_ns_visible(current_ns, ns))
+ return -EACCES;
+
+ ns_name = aa_ns_name(current_ns, ns);
+ ns_len = strlen(ns_name);
+
+ /* if the visible ns_name is > 0 increase size for : :// seperator */
+ if (ns_len)
+ ns_len += 4;
+
+ /* unconfined profiles don't have a mode string appended */
+ if (!unconfined(profile))
+ mode_len = strlen(mode_str) + 3; /* + 3 for _() */
+
+ name_len = strlen(profile->base.hname);
+ len = mode_len + ns_len + name_len + 1; /* + 1 for \n */
+ s = str = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL); /* + 1 \0 */
+ if (!str)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ if (ns_len) {
+ /* skip over prefix current_ns->base.hname and separating // */
+ sprintf(s, ":%s://", ns_name);
+ s += ns_len;
+ }
+ if (unconfined(profile))
+ /* mode string not being appended */
+ sprintf(s, "%s\n", profile->base.hname);
+ else
+ sprintf(s, "%s (%s)\n", profile->base.hname, mode_str);
+ *string = str;
+
+ /* NOTE: len does not include \0 of string, not saved as part of file */
+ return len;
+}
+
+/**
+ * split_token_from_name - separate a string of form <token>^<name>
+ * @op: operation being checked
+ * @args: string to parse (NOT NULL)
+ * @token: stores returned parsed token value (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: start position of name after token else NULL on failure
+ */
+static char *split_token_from_name(int op, char *args, u64 * token)
+{
+ char *name;
+
+ *token = simple_strtoull(args, &name, 16);
+ if ((name == args) || *name != '^') {
+ AA_ERROR("%s: Invalid input '%s'", op_table[op], args);
+ return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+ }
+
+ name++; /* skip ^ */
+ if (!*name)
+ name = NULL;
+ return name;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_setprocattr_chagnehat - handle procattr interface to change_hat
+ * @args: args received from writing to /proc/<pid>/attr/current (NOT NULL)
+ * @size: size of the args
+ * @test: true if this is a test of change_hat permissions
+ *
+ * Returns: %0 or error code if change_hat fails
+ */
+int aa_setprocattr_changehat(char *args, size_t size, int test)
+{
+ char *hat;
+ u64 token;
+ const char *hats[16]; /* current hard limit on # of names */
+ int count = 0;
+
+ hat = split_token_from_name(OP_CHANGE_HAT, args, &token);
+ if (IS_ERR(hat))
+ return PTR_ERR(hat);
+
+ if (!hat && !token) {
+ AA_ERROR("change_hat: Invalid input, NULL hat and NULL magic");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (hat) {
+ /* set up hat name vector, args guaranteed null terminated
+ * at args[size] by setprocattr.
+ *
+ * If there are multiple hat names in the buffer each is
+ * separated by a \0. Ie. userspace writes them pre tokenized
+ */
+ char *end = args + size;
+ for (count = 0; (hat < end) && count < 16; ++count) {
+ char *next = hat + strlen(hat) + 1;
+ hats[count] = hat;
+ hat = next;
+ }
+ }
+
+ AA_DEBUG("%s: Magic 0x%llx Hat '%s'\n",
+ __func__, token, hat ? hat : NULL);
+
+ return aa_change_hat(hats, count, token, test);
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_setprocattr_changeprofile - handle procattr interface to changeprofile
+ * @fqname: args received from writting to /proc/<pid>/attr/current (NOT NULL)
+ * @onexec: true if change_profile should be delayed until exec
+ * @test: true if this is a test of change_profile permissions
+ *
+ * Returns: %0 or error code if change_profile fails
+ */
+int aa_setprocattr_changeprofile(char *fqname, bool onexec, int test)
+{
+ char *name, *ns_name;
+
+ name = aa_split_fqname(fqname, &ns_name);
+ return aa_change_profile(ns_name, name, onexec, test);
+}
diff --git a/security/apparmor/resource.c b/security/apparmor/resource.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..748bf0ca6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/resource.c
@@ -0,0 +1,154 @@
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor resource mediation and attachment
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/audit.h>
+
+#include "include/audit.h"
+#include "include/context.h"
+#include "include/resource.h"
+#include "include/policy.h"
+
+/*
+ * Table of rlimit names: we generate it from resource.h.
+ */
+#include "rlim_names.h"
+
+struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_rlimit[] = {
+ AA_FS_FILE_STRING("mask", AA_FS_RLIMIT_MASK),
+ { }
+};
+
+/* audit callback for resource specific fields */
+static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
+{
+ struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
+
+ audit_log_format(ab, " rlimit=%s value=%lu",
+ rlim_names[sa->aad->rlim.rlim], sa->aad->rlim.max);
+}
+
+/**
+ * audit_resource - audit setting resource limit
+ * @profile: profile being enforced (NOT NULL)
+ * @resoure: rlimit being auditing
+ * @value: value being set
+ * @error: error value
+ *
+ * Returns: 0 or sa->error else other error code on failure
+ */
+static int audit_resource(struct aa_profile *profile, unsigned int resource,
+ unsigned long value, int error)
+{
+ struct common_audit_data sa;
+ struct apparmor_audit_data aad = {0,};
+
+ sa.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE;
+ sa.aad = &aad;
+ aad.op = OP_SETRLIMIT,
+ aad.rlim.rlim = resource;
+ aad.rlim.max = value;
+ aad.error = error;
+ return aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO, profile, GFP_KERNEL, &sa,
+ audit_cb);
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_map_resouce - map compiled policy resource to internal #
+ * @resource: flattened policy resource number
+ *
+ * Returns: resource # for the current architecture.
+ *
+ * rlimit resource can vary based on architecture, map the compiled policy
+ * resource # to the internal representation for the architecture.
+ */
+int aa_map_resource(int resource)
+{
+ return rlim_map[resource];
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_task_setrlimit - test permission to set an rlimit
+ * @profile - profile confining the task (NOT NULL)
+ * @task - task the resource is being set on
+ * @resource - the resource being set
+ * @new_rlim - the new resource limit (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Control raising the processes hard limit.
+ *
+ * Returns: 0 or error code if setting resource failed
+ */
+int aa_task_setrlimit(struct aa_profile *profile, struct task_struct *task,
+ unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim)
+{
+ struct aa_profile *task_profile;
+ int error = 0;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ task_profile = aa_get_profile(aa_cred_profile(__task_cred(task)));
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+
+ /* TODO: extend resource control to handle other (non current)
+ * profiles. AppArmor rules currently have the implicit assumption
+ * that the task is setting the resource of a task confined with
+ * the same profile.
+ */
+ if (profile != task_profile ||
+ (profile->rlimits.mask & (1 << resource) &&
+ new_rlim->rlim_max > profile->rlimits.limits[resource].rlim_max))
+ error = -EACCES;
+
+ aa_put_profile(task_profile);
+
+ return audit_resource(profile, resource, new_rlim->rlim_max, error);
+}
+
+/**
+ * __aa_transition_rlimits - apply new profile rlimits
+ * @old: old profile on task (NOT NULL)
+ * @new: new profile with rlimits to apply (NOT NULL)
+ */
+void __aa_transition_rlimits(struct aa_profile *old, struct aa_profile *new)
+{
+ unsigned int mask = 0;
+ struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
+ int i;
+
+ /* for any rlimits the profile controlled reset the soft limit
+ * to the less of the tasks hard limit and the init tasks soft limit
+ */
+ if (old->rlimits.mask) {
+ for (i = 0, mask = 1; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++, mask <<= 1) {
+ if (old->rlimits.mask & mask) {
+ rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
+ initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim + i;
+ rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max,
+ initrlim->rlim_cur);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* set any new hard limits as dictated by the new profile */
+ if (!new->rlimits.mask)
+ return;
+ for (i = 0, mask = 1; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++, mask <<= 1) {
+ if (!(new->rlimits.mask & mask))
+ continue;
+
+ rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
+ rlim->rlim_max = min(rlim->rlim_max,
+ new->rlimits.limits[i].rlim_max);
+ /* soft limit should not exceed hard limit */
+ rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_cur, rlim->rlim_max);
+ }
+}
diff --git a/security/apparmor/sid.c b/security/apparmor/sid.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f0b34f76e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/sid.c
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor security identifier (sid) manipulation fns
+ *
+ * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ *
+ *
+ * AppArmor allocates a unique sid for every profile loaded. If a profile
+ * is replaced it receives the sid of the profile it is replacing.
+ *
+ * The sid value of 0 is invalid.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+
+#include "include/sid.h"
+
+/* global counter from which sids are allocated */
+static u32 global_sid;
+static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sid_lock);
+
+/* TODO FIXME: add sid to profile mapping, and sid recycling */
+
+/**
+ * aa_alloc_sid - allocate a new sid for a profile
+ */
+u32 aa_alloc_sid(void)
+{
+ u32 sid;
+
+ /*
+ * TODO FIXME: sid recycling - part of profile mapping table
+ */
+ spin_lock(&sid_lock);
+ sid = (++global_sid);
+ spin_unlock(&sid_lock);
+ return sid;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_free_sid - free a sid
+ * @sid: sid to free
+ */
+void aa_free_sid(u32 sid)
+{
+ ; /* NOP ATM */
+}