1 files changed, 361 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..eeee00dce
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -0,0 +1,361 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2005,2006,2007,2008 IBM Corporation
+ *
+ * Authors:
+ * Reiner Sailer <sailer@watson.ibm.com>
+ * Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
+ * Kylene Hall <kylene@us.ibm.com>
+ * Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ *
+ * File: ima_main.c
+ *	implements the IMA hooks: ima_bprm_check, ima_file_mmap,
+ *	and ima_file_check.
+ */
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/file.h>
+#include <linux/binfmts.h>
+#include <linux/mount.h>
+#include <linux/mman.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/xattr.h>
+#include <linux/ima.h>
+#include <crypto/hash_info.h>
+
+#include "ima.h"
+
+int ima_initialized;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE
+int ima_appraise = IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE;
+#else
+int ima_appraise;
+#endif
+
+int ima_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
+static int hash_setup_done;
+
+static int __init hash_setup(char *str)
+{
+	struct ima_template_desc *template_desc = ima_template_desc_current();
+	int i;
+
+	if (hash_setup_done)
+		return 1;
+
+	if (strcmp(template_desc->name, IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME) == 0) {
+		if (strncmp(str, "sha1", 4) == 0)
+			ima_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
+		else if (strncmp(str, "md5", 3) == 0)
+			ima_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_MD5;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; i < HASH_ALGO__LAST; i++) {
+		if (strcmp(str, hash_algo_name[i]) == 0) {
+			ima_hash_algo = i;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+out:
+	hash_setup_done = 1;
+	return 1;
+}
+__setup("ima_hash=", hash_setup);
+
+/*
+ * ima_rdwr_violation_check
+ *
+ * Only invalidate the PCR for measured files:
+ *	- Opening a file for write when already open for read,
+ *	  results in a time of measure, time of use (ToMToU) error.
+ *	- Opening a file for read when already open for write,
+ *	  could result in a file measurement error.
+ *
+ */
+static void ima_rdwr_violation_check(struct file *file,
+				     struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+				     int must_measure,
+				     char **pathbuf,
+				     const char **pathname)
+{
+	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
+	fmode_t mode = file->f_mode;
+	bool send_tomtou = false, send_writers = false;
+
+	if (mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
+		if (atomic_read(&inode->i_readcount) && IS_IMA(inode)) {
+			if (!iint)
+				iint = integrity_iint_find(inode);
+			/* IMA_MEASURE is set from reader side */
+			if (iint && (iint->flags & IMA_MEASURE))
+				send_tomtou = true;
+		}
+	} else {
+		if ((atomic_read(&inode->i_writecount) > 0) && must_measure)
+			send_writers = true;
+	}
+
+	if (!send_tomtou && !send_writers)
+		return;
+
+	*pathname = ima_d_path(&file->f_path, pathbuf);
+
+	if (send_tomtou)
+		ima_add_violation(file, *pathname, "invalid_pcr", "ToMToU");
+	if (send_writers)
+		ima_add_violation(file, *pathname,
+				  "invalid_pcr", "open_writers");
+}
+
+static void ima_check_last_writer(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+				  struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+	fmode_t mode = file->f_mode;
+
+	if (!(mode & FMODE_WRITE))
+		return;
+
+	mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
+	if (atomic_read(&inode->i_writecount) == 1) {
+		if ((iint->version != inode->i_version) ||
+		    (iint->flags & IMA_NEW_FILE)) {
+			iint->flags &= ~(IMA_DONE_MASK | IMA_NEW_FILE);
+			if (iint->flags & IMA_APPRAISE)
+				ima_update_xattr(iint, file);
+		}
+	}
+	mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
+}
+
+/**
+ * ima_file_free - called on __fput()
+ * @file: pointer to file structure being freed
+ *
+ * Flag files that changed, based on i_version
+ */
+void ima_file_free(struct file *file)
+{
+	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
+	struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
+
+	if (!ima_policy_flag || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
+		return;
+
+	iint = integrity_iint_find(inode);
+	if (!iint)
+		return;
+
+	ima_check_last_writer(iint, inode, file);
+}
+
+static int process_measurement(struct file *file, int mask, int function,
+			       int opened)
+{
+	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
+	struct integrity_iint_cache *iint = NULL;
+	struct ima_template_desc *template_desc;
+	char *pathbuf = NULL;
+	const char *pathname = NULL;
+	int rc = -ENOMEM, action, must_appraise;
+	struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value = NULL, **xattr_ptr = NULL;
+	int xattr_len = 0;
+	bool violation_check;
+
+	if (!ima_policy_flag || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
+		return 0;
+
+	/* Return an IMA_MEASURE, IMA_APPRAISE, IMA_AUDIT action
+	 * bitmask based on the appraise/audit/measurement policy.
+	 * Included is the appraise submask.
+	 */
+	action = ima_get_action(inode, mask, function);
+	violation_check = ((function == FILE_CHECK || function == MMAP_CHECK) &&
+			   (ima_policy_flag & IMA_MEASURE));
+	if (!action && !violation_check)
+		return 0;
+
+	must_appraise = action & IMA_APPRAISE;
+
+	/*  Is the appraise rule hook specific?  */
+	if (action & IMA_FILE_APPRAISE)
+		function = FILE_CHECK;
+
+	mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
+
+	if (action) {
+		iint = integrity_inode_get(inode);
+		if (!iint)
+			goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (violation_check) {
+		ima_rdwr_violation_check(file, iint, action & IMA_MEASURE,
+					 &pathbuf, &pathname);
+		if (!action) {
+			rc = 0;
+			goto out_free;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* Determine if already appraised/measured based on bitmask
+	 * (IMA_MEASURE, IMA_MEASURED, IMA_XXXX_APPRAISE, IMA_XXXX_APPRAISED,
+	 *  IMA_AUDIT, IMA_AUDITED)
+	 */
+	iint->flags |= action;
+	action &= IMA_DO_MASK;
+	action &= ~((iint->flags & IMA_DONE_MASK) >> 1);
+
+	/* Nothing to do, just return existing appraised status */
+	if (!action) {
+		if (must_appraise)
+			rc = ima_get_cache_status(iint, function);
+		goto out_digsig;
+	}
+
+	template_desc = ima_template_desc_current();
+	if ((action & IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK) ||
+		    strcmp(template_desc->name, IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME) != 0)
+		xattr_ptr = &xattr_value;
+
+	rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file, xattr_ptr, &xattr_len);
+	if (rc != 0) {
+		if (file->f_flags & O_DIRECT)
+			rc = (iint->flags & IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO) ? 0 : -EACCES;
+		goto out_digsig;
+	}
+
+	if (!pathname)	/* ima_rdwr_violation possibly pre-fetched */
+		pathname = ima_d_path(&file->f_path, &pathbuf);
+
+	if (action & IMA_MEASURE)
+		ima_store_measurement(iint, file, pathname,
+				      xattr_value, xattr_len);
+	if (action & IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)
+		rc = ima_appraise_measurement(function, iint, file, pathname,
+					      xattr_value, xattr_len, opened);
+	if (action & IMA_AUDIT)
+		ima_audit_measurement(iint, pathname);
+
+out_digsig:
+	if ((mask & MAY_WRITE) && (iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG))
+		rc = -EACCES;
+	kfree(xattr_value);
+out_free:
+	if (pathbuf)
+		__putname(pathbuf);
+out:
+	mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
+	if ((rc && must_appraise) && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE))
+		return -EACCES;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * ima_file_mmap - based on policy, collect/store measurement.
+ * @file: pointer to the file to be measured (May be NULL)
+ * @prot: contains the protection that will be applied by the kernel.
+ *
+ * Measure files being mmapped executable based on the ima_must_measure()
+ * policy decision.
+ *
+ * On success return 0.  On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
+ * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
+ */
+int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
+{
+	if (file && (prot & PROT_EXEC))
+		return process_measurement(file, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK, 0);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * ima_bprm_check - based on policy, collect/store measurement.
+ * @bprm: contains the linux_binprm structure
+ *
+ * The OS protects against an executable file, already open for write,
+ * from being executed in deny_write_access() and an executable file,
+ * already open for execute, from being modified in get_write_access().
+ * So we can be certain that what we verify and measure here is actually
+ * what is being executed.
+ *
+ * On success return 0.  On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
+ * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
+ */
+int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+	return process_measurement(bprm->file, MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK, 0);
+}
+
+/**
+ * ima_path_check - based on policy, collect/store measurement.
+ * @file: pointer to the file to be measured
+ * @mask: contains MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE or MAY_EXECUTE
+ *
+ * Measure files based on the ima_must_measure() policy decision.
+ *
+ * On success return 0.  On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
+ * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
+ */
+int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask, int opened)
+{
+	return process_measurement(file,
+				   mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC),
+				   FILE_CHECK, opened);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_file_check);
+
+/**
+ * ima_module_check - based on policy, collect/store/appraise measurement.
+ * @file: pointer to the file to be measured/appraised
+ *
+ * Measure/appraise kernel modules based on policy.
+ *
+ * On success return 0.  On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
+ * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
+ */
+int ima_module_check(struct file *file)
+{
+	if (!file) {
+#ifndef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE
+		if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES) &&
+		    (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE))
+			return -EACCES;	/* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */
+#endif
+		return 0;	/* We rely on module signature checking */
+	}
+	return process_measurement(file, MAY_EXEC, MODULE_CHECK, 0);
+}
+
+int ima_fw_from_file(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
+{
+	if (!file) {
+		if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE) &&
+		    (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE))
+			return -EACCES;	/* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */
+		return 0;
+	}
+	return process_measurement(file, MAY_EXEC, FIRMWARE_CHECK, 0);
+}
+
+static int __init init_ima(void)
+{
+	int error;
+
+	hash_setup(CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_HASH);
+	error = ima_init();
+	if (!error) {
+		ima_initialized = 1;
+		ima_update_policy_flag();
+	}
+	return error;
+}
+
+late_initcall(init_ima);	/* Start IMA after the TPM is available */
+
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Integrity Measurement Architecture");
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");