summaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/ipc/kdbus/metadata.c
blob: 71ca475a80d5ebeb785ebe4728a51bbf12ea35c4 (plain)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229
230
231
232
233
234
235
236
237
238
239
240
241
242
243
244
245
246
247
248
249
250
251
252
253
254
255
256
257
258
259
260
261
262
263
264
265
266
267
268
269
270
271
272
273
274
275
276
277
278
279
280
281
282
283
284
285
286
287
288
289
290
291
292
293
294
295
296
297
298
299
300
301
302
303
304
305
306
307
308
309
310
311
312
313
314
315
316
317
318
319
320
321
322
323
324
325
326
327
328
329
330
331
332
333
334
335
336
337
338
339
340
341
342
343
344
345
346
347
348
349
350
351
352
353
354
355
356
357
358
359
360
361
362
363
364
365
366
367
368
369
370
371
372
373
374
375
376
377
378
379
380
381
382
383
384
385
386
387
388
389
390
391
392
393
394
395
396
397
398
399
400
401
402
403
404
405
406
407
408
409
410
411
412
413
414
415
416
417
418
419
420
421
422
423
424
425
426
427
428
429
430
431
432
433
434
435
436
437
438
439
440
441
442
443
444
445
446
447
448
449
450
451
452
453
454
455
456
457
458
459
460
461
462
463
464
465
466
467
468
469
470
471
472
473
474
475
476
477
478
479
480
481
482
483
484
485
486
487
488
489
490
491
492
493
494
495
496
497
498
499
500
501
502
503
504
505
506
507
508
509
510
511
512
513
514
515
516
517
518
519
520
521
522
523
524
525
526
527
528
529
530
531
532
533
534
535
536
537
538
539
540
541
542
543
544
545
546
547
548
549
550
551
552
553
554
555
556
557
558
559
560
561
562
563
564
565
566
567
568
569
570
571
572
573
574
575
576
577
578
579
580
581
582
583
584
585
586
587
588
589
590
591
592
593
594
595
596
597
598
599
600
601
602
603
604
605
606
607
608
609
610
611
612
613
614
615
616
617
618
619
620
621
622
623
624
625
626
627
628
629
630
631
632
633
634
635
636
637
638
639
640
641
642
643
644
645
646
647
648
649
650
651
652
653
654
655
656
657
658
659
660
661
662
663
664
665
666
667
668
669
670
671
672
673
674
675
676
677
678
679
680
681
682
683
684
685
686
687
688
689
690
691
692
693
694
695
696
697
698
699
700
701
702
703
704
705
706
707
708
709
710
711
712
713
714
715
716
717
718
719
720
721
722
723
724
725
726
727
728
729
730
731
732
733
734
735
736
737
738
739
740
741
742
743
744
745
746
747
748
749
750
751
752
753
754
755
756
757
758
759
760
761
762
763
764
765
766
767
768
769
770
771
772
773
774
775
776
777
778
779
780
781
782
783
784
785
786
787
788
789
790
791
792
793
794
795
796
797
798
799
800
801
802
803
804
805
806
807
808
809
810
811
812
813
814
815
816
817
818
819
820
821
822
823
824
825
826
827
828
829
830
831
832
833
834
835
836
837
838
839
840
841
842
843
844
845
846
847
848
849
850
851
852
853
854
855
856
857
858
859
860
861
862
863
864
865
866
867
868
869
870
871
872
873
874
875
876
877
878
879
880
881
882
883
884
885
886
887
888
889
890
891
892
893
894
895
896
897
898
899
900
901
902
903
904
905
906
907
908
909
910
911
912
913
914
915
916
917
918
919
920
921
922
923
924
925
926
927
928
929
930
931
932
933
934
935
936
937
938
939
940
941
942
943
944
945
946
947
948
949
950
951
952
953
954
955
956
957
958
959
960
961
962
963
964
965
966
967
968
969
970
971
972
973
974
975
976
977
978
979
980
981
982
983
984
985
986
987
988
989
990
991
992
993
994
995
996
997
998
999
1000
1001
1002
1003
1004
1005
1006
1007
1008
1009
1010
1011
1012
1013
1014
1015
1016
1017
1018
1019
1020
1021
1022
1023
1024
1025
1026
1027
1028
1029
1030
1031
1032
1033
1034
1035
1036
1037
1038
1039
1040
1041
1042
1043
1044
1045
1046
1047
1048
1049
1050
1051
1052
1053
1054
1055
1056
1057
1058
1059
1060
1061
1062
1063
1064
1065
1066
1067
1068
1069
1070
1071
1072
1073
1074
1075
1076
1077
1078
1079
1080
1081
1082
1083
1084
1085
1086
1087
1088
1089
1090
1091
1092
1093
1094
1095
1096
1097
1098
1099
1100
1101
1102
1103
1104
1105
1106
1107
1108
1109
1110
1111
1112
1113
1114
1115
1116
1117
1118
1119
1120
1121
1122
1123
1124
1125
1126
1127
1128
1129
1130
1131
1132
1133
1134
1135
1136
1137
1138
1139
1140
1141
1142
1143
1144
1145
1146
1147
1148
1149
1150
1151
1152
1153
1154
1155
1156
1157
1158
1159
1160
1161
1162
1163
1164
1165
1166
1167
1168
1169
1170
1171
1172
1173
1174
1175
1176
1177
1178
1179
1180
1181
1182
1183
1184
1185
1186
1187
1188
1189
1190
1191
1192
1193
1194
1195
1196
1197
1198
1199
1200
1201
1202
1203
1204
1205
1206
1207
1208
1209
1210
1211
1212
1213
1214
1215
1216
1217
1218
1219
1220
1221
1222
1223
1224
1225
1226
1227
1228
1229
1230
1231
1232
1233
1234
1235
1236
1237
1238
1239
1240
1241
1242
1243
1244
1245
1246
1247
1248
1249
1250
1251
1252
1253
1254
1255
1256
1257
1258
1259
1260
1261
1262
1263
1264
1265
1266
1267
1268
1269
1270
1271
1272
1273
1274
1275
1276
1277
1278
1279
1280
1281
1282
1283
1284
1285
1286
1287
1288
1289
1290
1291
1292
1293
1294
1295
1296
1297
1298
1299
1300
1301
1302
1303
1304
1305
1306
1307
1308
1309
1310
1311
1312
1313
1314
1315
1316
1317
1318
1319
1320
1321
1322
1323
1324
1325
1326
1327
1328
1329
1330
1331
1332
1333
1334
1335
1336
1337
1338
1339
1340
1341
1342
1343
1344
1345
1346
1347
/*
 * Copyright (C) 2013-2015 Kay Sievers
 * Copyright (C) 2013-2015 Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
 * Copyright (C) 2013-2015 Daniel Mack <daniel@zonque.org>
 * Copyright (C) 2013-2015 David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>
 * Copyright (C) 2013-2015 Linux Foundation
 * Copyright (C) 2014-2015 Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@opendz.org>
 *
 * kdbus is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it under
 * the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License as published by the
 * Free Software Foundation; either version 2.1 of the License, or (at
 * your option) any later version.
 */

#include <linux/audit.h>
#include <linux/capability.h>
#include <linux/cgroup.h>
#include <linux/cred.h>
#include <linux/file.h>
#include <linux/fs_struct.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/kref.h>
#include <linux/mutex.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/sizes.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <linux/uidgid.h>
#include <linux/uio.h>
#include <linux/user_namespace.h>

#include "bus.h"
#include "connection.h"
#include "endpoint.h"
#include "item.h"
#include "message.h"
#include "metadata.h"
#include "names.h"

/**
 * struct kdbus_meta_proc - Process metadata
 * @kref:		Reference counting
 * @lock:		Object lock
 * @collected:		Bitmask of collected items
 * @valid:		Bitmask of collected and valid items
 * @cred:		Credentials
 * @pid:		PID of process
 * @tgid:		TGID of process
 * @ppid:		PPID of process
 * @tid_comm:		TID comm line
 * @pid_comm:		PID comm line
 * @exe_path:		Executable path
 * @root_path:		Root-FS path
 * @cmdline:		Command-line
 * @cgroup:		Full cgroup path
 * @seclabel:		Seclabel
 * @audit_loginuid:	Audit login-UID
 * @audit_sessionid:	Audit session-ID
 */
struct kdbus_meta_proc {
	struct kref kref;
	struct mutex lock;
	u64 collected;
	u64 valid;

	/* KDBUS_ITEM_CREDS */
	/* KDBUS_ITEM_AUXGROUPS */
	/* KDBUS_ITEM_CAPS */
	const struct cred *cred;

	/* KDBUS_ITEM_PIDS */
	struct pid *pid;
	struct pid *tgid;
	struct pid *ppid;

	/* KDBUS_ITEM_TID_COMM */
	char tid_comm[TASK_COMM_LEN];
	/* KDBUS_ITEM_PID_COMM */
	char pid_comm[TASK_COMM_LEN];

	/* KDBUS_ITEM_EXE */
	struct path exe_path;
	struct path root_path;

	/* KDBUS_ITEM_CMDLINE */
	char *cmdline;

	/* KDBUS_ITEM_CGROUP */
	char *cgroup;

	/* KDBUS_ITEM_SECLABEL */
	char *seclabel;

	/* KDBUS_ITEM_AUDIT */
	kuid_t audit_loginuid;
	unsigned int audit_sessionid;
};

/**
 * struct kdbus_meta_conn
 * @kref:		Reference counting
 * @lock:		Object lock
 * @collected:		Bitmask of collected items
 * @valid:		Bitmask of collected and valid items
 * @ts:			Timestamp values
 * @owned_names_items:	Serialized items for owned names
 * @owned_names_size:	Size of @owned_names_items
 * @conn_description:	Connection description
 */
struct kdbus_meta_conn {
	struct kref kref;
	struct mutex lock;
	u64 collected;
	u64 valid;

	/* KDBUS_ITEM_TIMESTAMP */
	struct kdbus_timestamp ts;

	/* KDBUS_ITEM_OWNED_NAME */
	struct kdbus_item *owned_names_items;
	size_t owned_names_size;

	/* KDBUS_ITEM_CONN_DESCRIPTION */
	char *conn_description;
};

/* fixed size equivalent of "kdbus_caps" */
struct kdbus_meta_caps {
	u32 last_cap;
	struct {
		u32 caps[_KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S];
	} set[4];
};

/**
 * kdbus_meta_proc_new() - Create process metadata object
 *
 * Return: Pointer to new object on success, ERR_PTR on failure.
 */
struct kdbus_meta_proc *kdbus_meta_proc_new(void)
{
	struct kdbus_meta_proc *mp;

	mp = kzalloc(sizeof(*mp), GFP_KERNEL);
	if (!mp)
		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);

	kref_init(&mp->kref);
	mutex_init(&mp->lock);

	return mp;
}

static void kdbus_meta_proc_free(struct kref *kref)
{
	struct kdbus_meta_proc *mp = container_of(kref, struct kdbus_meta_proc,
						  kref);

	path_put(&mp->exe_path);
	path_put(&mp->root_path);
	if (mp->cred)
		put_cred(mp->cred);
	put_pid(mp->ppid);
	put_pid(mp->tgid);
	put_pid(mp->pid);

	kfree(mp->seclabel);
	kfree(mp->cmdline);
	kfree(mp->cgroup);
	kfree(mp);
}

/**
 * kdbus_meta_proc_ref() - Gain reference
 * @mp:		Process metadata object
 *
 * Return: @mp is returned
 */
struct kdbus_meta_proc *kdbus_meta_proc_ref(struct kdbus_meta_proc *mp)
{
	if (mp)
		kref_get(&mp->kref);
	return mp;
}

/**
 * kdbus_meta_proc_unref() - Drop reference
 * @mp:		Process metadata object
 *
 * Return: NULL
 */
struct kdbus_meta_proc *kdbus_meta_proc_unref(struct kdbus_meta_proc *mp)
{
	if (mp)
		kref_put(&mp->kref, kdbus_meta_proc_free);
	return NULL;
}

static void kdbus_meta_proc_collect_pids(struct kdbus_meta_proc *mp)
{
	struct task_struct *parent;

	mp->pid = get_pid(task_pid(current));
	mp->tgid = get_pid(task_tgid(current));

	rcu_read_lock();
	parent = rcu_dereference(current->real_parent);
	mp->ppid = get_pid(task_tgid(parent));
	rcu_read_unlock();

	mp->valid |= KDBUS_ATTACH_PIDS;
}

static void kdbus_meta_proc_collect_tid_comm(struct kdbus_meta_proc *mp)
{
	get_task_comm(mp->tid_comm, current);
	mp->valid |= KDBUS_ATTACH_TID_COMM;
}

static void kdbus_meta_proc_collect_pid_comm(struct kdbus_meta_proc *mp)
{
	get_task_comm(mp->pid_comm, current->group_leader);
	mp->valid |= KDBUS_ATTACH_PID_COMM;
}

static void kdbus_meta_proc_collect_exe(struct kdbus_meta_proc *mp)
{
	struct file *exe_file;

	rcu_read_lock();
	exe_file = rcu_dereference(current->mm->exe_file);
	if (exe_file) {
		mp->exe_path = exe_file->f_path;
		path_get(&mp->exe_path);
		get_fs_root(current->fs, &mp->root_path);
		mp->valid |= KDBUS_ATTACH_EXE;
	}
	rcu_read_unlock();
}

static int kdbus_meta_proc_collect_cmdline(struct kdbus_meta_proc *mp)
{
	struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
	char *cmdline;

	if (!mm->arg_end)
		return 0;

	cmdline = strndup_user((const char __user *)mm->arg_start,
			       mm->arg_end - mm->arg_start);
	if (IS_ERR(cmdline))
		return PTR_ERR(cmdline);

	mp->cmdline = cmdline;
	mp->valid |= KDBUS_ATTACH_CMDLINE;

	return 0;
}

static int kdbus_meta_proc_collect_cgroup(struct kdbus_meta_proc *mp)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_CGROUPS
	void *page;
	char *s;

	page = (void *)__get_free_page(GFP_TEMPORARY);
	if (!page)
		return -ENOMEM;

	s = task_cgroup_path(current, page, PAGE_SIZE);
	if (s) {
		mp->cgroup = kstrdup(s, GFP_KERNEL);
		if (!mp->cgroup) {
			free_page((unsigned long)page);
			return -ENOMEM;
		}
	}

	free_page((unsigned long)page);
	mp->valid |= KDBUS_ATTACH_CGROUP;
#endif

	return 0;
}

static int kdbus_meta_proc_collect_seclabel(struct kdbus_meta_proc *mp)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
	char *ctx = NULL;
	u32 sid, len;
	int ret;

	security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
	ret = security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len);
	if (ret < 0) {
		/*
		 * EOPNOTSUPP means no security module is active,
		 * lets skip adding the seclabel then. This effectively
		 * drops the SECLABEL item.
		 */
		return (ret == -EOPNOTSUPP) ? 0 : ret;
	}

	mp->seclabel = kstrdup(ctx, GFP_KERNEL);
	security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
	if (!mp->seclabel)
		return -ENOMEM;

	mp->valid |= KDBUS_ATTACH_SECLABEL;
#endif

	return 0;
}

static void kdbus_meta_proc_collect_audit(struct kdbus_meta_proc *mp)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
	mp->audit_loginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
	mp->audit_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
	mp->valid |= KDBUS_ATTACH_AUDIT;
#endif
}

/**
 * kdbus_meta_proc_collect() - Collect process metadata
 * @mp:		Process metadata object
 * @what:	Attach flags to collect
 *
 * This collects process metadata from current and saves it in @mp.
 *
 * Return: 0 on success, negative error code on failure.
 */
int kdbus_meta_proc_collect(struct kdbus_meta_proc *mp, u64 what)
{
	int ret;

	if (!mp || !(what & (KDBUS_ATTACH_CREDS |
			     KDBUS_ATTACH_PIDS |
			     KDBUS_ATTACH_AUXGROUPS |
			     KDBUS_ATTACH_TID_COMM |
			     KDBUS_ATTACH_PID_COMM |
			     KDBUS_ATTACH_EXE |
			     KDBUS_ATTACH_CMDLINE |
			     KDBUS_ATTACH_CGROUP |
			     KDBUS_ATTACH_CAPS |
			     KDBUS_ATTACH_SECLABEL |
			     KDBUS_ATTACH_AUDIT)))
		return 0;

	mutex_lock(&mp->lock);

	/* creds, auxgrps and caps share "struct cred" as context */
	{
		const u64 m_cred = KDBUS_ATTACH_CREDS |
				   KDBUS_ATTACH_AUXGROUPS |
				   KDBUS_ATTACH_CAPS;

		if ((what & m_cred) && !(mp->collected & m_cred)) {
			mp->cred = get_current_cred();
			mp->valid |= m_cred;
			mp->collected |= m_cred;
		}
	}

	if ((what & KDBUS_ATTACH_PIDS) &&
	    !(mp->collected & KDBUS_ATTACH_PIDS)) {
		kdbus_meta_proc_collect_pids(mp);
		mp->collected |= KDBUS_ATTACH_PIDS;
	}

	if ((what & KDBUS_ATTACH_TID_COMM) &&
	    !(mp->collected & KDBUS_ATTACH_TID_COMM)) {
		kdbus_meta_proc_collect_tid_comm(mp);
		mp->collected |= KDBUS_ATTACH_TID_COMM;
	}

	if ((what & KDBUS_ATTACH_PID_COMM) &&
	    !(mp->collected & KDBUS_ATTACH_PID_COMM)) {
		kdbus_meta_proc_collect_pid_comm(mp);
		mp->collected |= KDBUS_ATTACH_PID_COMM;
	}

	if ((what & KDBUS_ATTACH_EXE) &&
	    !(mp->collected & KDBUS_ATTACH_EXE)) {
		kdbus_meta_proc_collect_exe(mp);
		mp->collected |= KDBUS_ATTACH_EXE;
	}

	if ((what & KDBUS_ATTACH_CMDLINE) &&
	    !(mp->collected & KDBUS_ATTACH_CMDLINE)) {
		ret = kdbus_meta_proc_collect_cmdline(mp);
		if (ret < 0)
			goto exit_unlock;
		mp->collected |= KDBUS_ATTACH_CMDLINE;
	}

	if ((what & KDBUS_ATTACH_CGROUP) &&
	    !(mp->collected & KDBUS_ATTACH_CGROUP)) {
		ret = kdbus_meta_proc_collect_cgroup(mp);
		if (ret < 0)
			goto exit_unlock;
		mp->collected |= KDBUS_ATTACH_CGROUP;
	}

	if ((what & KDBUS_ATTACH_SECLABEL) &&
	    !(mp->collected & KDBUS_ATTACH_SECLABEL)) {
		ret = kdbus_meta_proc_collect_seclabel(mp);
		if (ret < 0)
			goto exit_unlock;
		mp->collected |= KDBUS_ATTACH_SECLABEL;
	}

	if ((what & KDBUS_ATTACH_AUDIT) &&
	    !(mp->collected & KDBUS_ATTACH_AUDIT)) {
		kdbus_meta_proc_collect_audit(mp);
		mp->collected |= KDBUS_ATTACH_AUDIT;
	}

	ret = 0;

exit_unlock:
	mutex_unlock(&mp->lock);
	return ret;
}

/**
 * kdbus_meta_fake_new() - Create fake metadata object
 *
 * Return: Pointer to new object on success, ERR_PTR on failure.
 */
struct kdbus_meta_fake *kdbus_meta_fake_new(void)
{
	struct kdbus_meta_fake *mf;

	mf = kzalloc(sizeof(*mf), GFP_KERNEL);
	if (!mf)
		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);

	return mf;
}

/**
 * kdbus_meta_fake_free() - Free fake metadata object
 * @mf:		Fake metadata object
 *
 * Return: NULL
 */
struct kdbus_meta_fake *kdbus_meta_fake_free(struct kdbus_meta_fake *mf)
{
	if (mf) {
		put_pid(mf->ppid);
		put_pid(mf->tgid);
		put_pid(mf->pid);
		kfree(mf->seclabel);
		kfree(mf);
	}

	return NULL;
}

/**
 * kdbus_meta_fake_collect() - Fill fake metadata from faked credentials
 * @mf:		Fake metadata object
 * @creds:	Creds to set, may be %NULL
 * @pids:	PIDs to set, may be %NULL
 * @seclabel:	Seclabel to set, may be %NULL
 *
 * This function takes information stored in @creds, @pids and @seclabel and
 * resolves them to kernel-representations, if possible. This call uses the
 * current task's namespaces to resolve the given information.
 *
 * Return: 0 on success, negative error code on failure.
 */
int kdbus_meta_fake_collect(struct kdbus_meta_fake *mf,
			    const struct kdbus_creds *creds,
			    const struct kdbus_pids *pids,
			    const char *seclabel)
{
	if (mf->valid)
		return -EALREADY;

	if (creds) {
		struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns();

		mf->uid		= make_kuid(ns, creds->uid);
		mf->euid	= make_kuid(ns, creds->euid);
		mf->suid	= make_kuid(ns, creds->suid);
		mf->fsuid	= make_kuid(ns, creds->fsuid);

		mf->gid		= make_kgid(ns, creds->gid);
		mf->egid	= make_kgid(ns, creds->egid);
		mf->sgid	= make_kgid(ns, creds->sgid);
		mf->fsgid	= make_kgid(ns, creds->fsgid);

		if ((creds->uid   != (uid_t)-1 && !uid_valid(mf->uid))   ||
		    (creds->euid  != (uid_t)-1 && !uid_valid(mf->euid))  ||
		    (creds->suid  != (uid_t)-1 && !uid_valid(mf->suid))  ||
		    (creds->fsuid != (uid_t)-1 && !uid_valid(mf->fsuid)) ||
		    (creds->gid   != (gid_t)-1 && !gid_valid(mf->gid))   ||
		    (creds->egid  != (gid_t)-1 && !gid_valid(mf->egid))  ||
		    (creds->sgid  != (gid_t)-1 && !gid_valid(mf->sgid))  ||
		    (creds->fsgid != (gid_t)-1 && !gid_valid(mf->fsgid)))
			return -EINVAL;

		mf->valid |= KDBUS_ATTACH_CREDS;
	}

	if (pids) {
		mf->pid = get_pid(find_vpid(pids->tid));
		mf->tgid = get_pid(find_vpid(pids->pid));
		mf->ppid = get_pid(find_vpid(pids->ppid));

		if ((pids->tid != 0 && !mf->pid) ||
		    (pids->pid != 0 && !mf->tgid) ||
		    (pids->ppid != 0 && !mf->ppid)) {
			put_pid(mf->pid);
			put_pid(mf->tgid);
			put_pid(mf->ppid);
			mf->pid = NULL;
			mf->tgid = NULL;
			mf->ppid = NULL;
			return -EINVAL;
		}

		mf->valid |= KDBUS_ATTACH_PIDS;
	}

	if (seclabel) {
		mf->seclabel = kstrdup(seclabel, GFP_KERNEL);
		if (!mf->seclabel)
			return -ENOMEM;

		mf->valid |= KDBUS_ATTACH_SECLABEL;
	}

	return 0;
}

/**
 * kdbus_meta_conn_new() - Create connection metadata object
 *
 * Return: Pointer to new object on success, ERR_PTR on failure.
 */
struct kdbus_meta_conn *kdbus_meta_conn_new(void)
{
	struct kdbus_meta_conn *mc;

	mc = kzalloc(sizeof(*mc), GFP_KERNEL);
	if (!mc)
		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);

	kref_init(&mc->kref);
	mutex_init(&mc->lock);

	return mc;
}

static void kdbus_meta_conn_free(struct kref *kref)
{
	struct kdbus_meta_conn *mc =
		container_of(kref, struct kdbus_meta_conn, kref);

	kfree(mc->conn_description);
	kfree(mc->owned_names_items);
	kfree(mc);
}

/**
 * kdbus_meta_conn_ref() - Gain reference
 * @mc:		Connection metadata object
 */
struct kdbus_meta_conn *kdbus_meta_conn_ref(struct kdbus_meta_conn *mc)
{
	if (mc)
		kref_get(&mc->kref);
	return mc;
}

/**
 * kdbus_meta_conn_unref() - Drop reference
 * @mc:		Connection metadata object
 */
struct kdbus_meta_conn *kdbus_meta_conn_unref(struct kdbus_meta_conn *mc)
{
	if (mc)
		kref_put(&mc->kref, kdbus_meta_conn_free);
	return NULL;
}

static void kdbus_meta_conn_collect_timestamp(struct kdbus_meta_conn *mc,
					      u64 msg_seqnum)
{
	mc->ts.monotonic_ns = ktime_get_ns();
	mc->ts.realtime_ns = ktime_get_real_ns();

	if (msg_seqnum)
		mc->ts.seqnum = msg_seqnum;

	mc->valid |= KDBUS_ATTACH_TIMESTAMP;
}

static int kdbus_meta_conn_collect_names(struct kdbus_meta_conn *mc,
					 struct kdbus_conn *conn)
{
	const struct kdbus_name_owner *owner;
	struct kdbus_item *item;
	size_t slen, size;

	lockdep_assert_held(&conn->ep->bus->name_registry->rwlock);

	size = 0;
	/* open-code length calculation to avoid final padding */
	list_for_each_entry(owner, &conn->names_list, conn_entry)
		if (!(owner->flags & KDBUS_NAME_IN_QUEUE))
			size = KDBUS_ALIGN8(size) + KDBUS_ITEM_HEADER_SIZE +
				sizeof(struct kdbus_name) +
				strlen(owner->name->name) + 1;

	if (!size)
		return 0;

	/* make sure we include zeroed padding for convenience helpers */
	item = kmalloc(KDBUS_ALIGN8(size), GFP_KERNEL);
	if (!item)
		return -ENOMEM;

	mc->owned_names_items = item;
	mc->owned_names_size = size;

	list_for_each_entry(owner, &conn->names_list, conn_entry) {
		if (owner->flags & KDBUS_NAME_IN_QUEUE)
			continue;

		slen = strlen(owner->name->name) + 1;
		kdbus_item_set(item, KDBUS_ITEM_OWNED_NAME, NULL,
			       sizeof(struct kdbus_name) + slen);
		item->name.flags = owner->flags;
		memcpy(item->name.name, owner->name->name, slen);
		item = KDBUS_ITEM_NEXT(item);
	}

	/* sanity check: the buffer should be completely written now */
	WARN_ON((u8 *)item !=
			(u8 *)mc->owned_names_items + KDBUS_ALIGN8(size));

	mc->valid |= KDBUS_ATTACH_NAMES;
	return 0;
}

static int kdbus_meta_conn_collect_description(struct kdbus_meta_conn *mc,
					       struct kdbus_conn *conn)
{
	if (!conn->description)
		return 0;

	mc->conn_description = kstrdup(conn->description, GFP_KERNEL);
	if (!mc->conn_description)
		return -ENOMEM;

	mc->valid |= KDBUS_ATTACH_CONN_DESCRIPTION;
	return 0;
}

/**
 * kdbus_meta_conn_collect() - Collect connection metadata
 * @mc:		Message metadata object
 * @conn:	Connection to collect data from
 * @msg_seqnum:	Sequence number of the message to send
 * @what:	Attach flags to collect
 *
 * This collects connection metadata from @msg_seqnum and @conn and saves it
 * in @mc.
 *
 * If KDBUS_ATTACH_NAMES is set in @what and @conn is non-NULL, the caller must
 * hold the name-registry read-lock of conn->ep->bus->registry.
 *
 * Return: 0 on success, negative error code on failure.
 */
int kdbus_meta_conn_collect(struct kdbus_meta_conn *mc,
			    struct kdbus_conn *conn,
			    u64 msg_seqnum, u64 what)
{
	int ret;

	if (!mc || !(what & (KDBUS_ATTACH_TIMESTAMP |
			     KDBUS_ATTACH_NAMES |
			     KDBUS_ATTACH_CONN_DESCRIPTION)))
		return 0;

	mutex_lock(&mc->lock);

	if (msg_seqnum && (what & KDBUS_ATTACH_TIMESTAMP) &&
	    !(mc->collected & KDBUS_ATTACH_TIMESTAMP)) {
		kdbus_meta_conn_collect_timestamp(mc, msg_seqnum);
		mc->collected |= KDBUS_ATTACH_TIMESTAMP;
	}

	if (conn && (what & KDBUS_ATTACH_NAMES) &&
	    !(mc->collected & KDBUS_ATTACH_NAMES)) {
		ret = kdbus_meta_conn_collect_names(mc, conn);
		if (ret < 0)
			goto exit_unlock;
		mc->collected |= KDBUS_ATTACH_NAMES;
	}

	if (conn && (what & KDBUS_ATTACH_CONN_DESCRIPTION) &&
	    !(mc->collected & KDBUS_ATTACH_CONN_DESCRIPTION)) {
		ret = kdbus_meta_conn_collect_description(mc, conn);
		if (ret < 0)
			goto exit_unlock;
		mc->collected |= KDBUS_ATTACH_CONN_DESCRIPTION;
	}

	ret = 0;

exit_unlock:
	mutex_unlock(&mc->lock);
	return ret;
}

static void kdbus_meta_export_caps(struct kdbus_meta_caps *out,
				   const struct kdbus_meta_proc *mp,
				   struct user_namespace *user_ns)
{
	struct user_namespace *iter;
	const struct cred *cred = mp->cred;
	bool parent = false, owner = false;
	int i;

	/*
	 * This translates the effective capabilities of 'cred' into the given
	 * user-namespace. If the given user-namespace is a child-namespace of
	 * the user-namespace of 'cred', the mask can be copied verbatim. If
	 * not, the mask is cleared.
	 * There's one exception: If 'cred' is the owner of any user-namespace
	 * in the path between the given user-namespace and the user-namespace
	 * of 'cred', then it has all effective capabilities set. This means,
	 * the user who created a user-namespace always has all effective
	 * capabilities in any child namespaces. Note that this is based on the
	 * uid of the namespace creator, not the task hierarchy.
	 */
	for (iter = user_ns; iter; iter = iter->parent) {
		if (iter == cred->user_ns) {
			parent = true;
			break;
		}

		if (iter == &init_user_ns)
			break;

		if ((iter->parent == cred->user_ns) &&
		    uid_eq(iter->owner, cred->euid)) {
			owner = true;
			break;
		}
	}

	out->last_cap = CAP_LAST_CAP;

	CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(i) {
		if (parent) {
			out->set[0].caps[i] = cred->cap_inheritable.cap[i];
			out->set[1].caps[i] = cred->cap_permitted.cap[i];
			out->set[2].caps[i] = cred->cap_effective.cap[i];
			out->set[3].caps[i] = cred->cap_bset.cap[i];
		} else if (owner) {
			out->set[0].caps[i] = 0U;
			out->set[1].caps[i] = ~0U;
			out->set[2].caps[i] = ~0U;
			out->set[3].caps[i] = ~0U;
		} else {
			out->set[0].caps[i] = 0U;
			out->set[1].caps[i] = 0U;
			out->set[2].caps[i] = 0U;
			out->set[3].caps[i] = 0U;
		}
	}

	/* clear unused bits */
	for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
		out->set[i].caps[CAP_TO_INDEX(CAP_LAST_CAP)] &=
					CAP_LAST_U32_VALID_MASK;
}

/* This is equivalent to from_kuid_munged(), but maps INVALID_UID to itself */
static uid_t kdbus_from_kuid_keep(struct user_namespace *ns, kuid_t uid)
{
	return uid_valid(uid) ? from_kuid_munged(ns, uid) : ((uid_t)-1);
}

/* This is equivalent to from_kgid_munged(), but maps INVALID_GID to itself */
static gid_t kdbus_from_kgid_keep(struct user_namespace *ns, kgid_t gid)
{
	return gid_valid(gid) ? from_kgid_munged(ns, gid) : ((gid_t)-1);
}

struct kdbus_meta_staging {
	const struct kdbus_meta_proc *mp;
	const struct kdbus_meta_fake *mf;
	const struct kdbus_meta_conn *mc;
	const struct kdbus_conn *conn;
	u64 mask;

	void *exe;
	const char *exe_path;
};

static size_t kdbus_meta_measure(struct kdbus_meta_staging *staging)
{
	const struct kdbus_meta_proc *mp = staging->mp;
	const struct kdbus_meta_fake *mf = staging->mf;
	const struct kdbus_meta_conn *mc = staging->mc;
	const u64 mask = staging->mask;
	size_t size = 0;

	/* process metadata */

	if (mf && (mask & KDBUS_ATTACH_CREDS))
		size += KDBUS_ITEM_SIZE(sizeof(struct kdbus_creds));
	else if (mp && (mask & KDBUS_ATTACH_CREDS))
		size += KDBUS_ITEM_SIZE(sizeof(struct kdbus_creds));

	if (mf && (mask & KDBUS_ATTACH_PIDS))
		size += KDBUS_ITEM_SIZE(sizeof(struct kdbus_pids));
	else if (mp && (mask & KDBUS_ATTACH_PIDS))
		size += KDBUS_ITEM_SIZE(sizeof(struct kdbus_pids));

	if (mp && (mask & KDBUS_ATTACH_AUXGROUPS))
		size += KDBUS_ITEM_SIZE(mp->cred->group_info->ngroups *
					sizeof(u64));

	if (mp && (mask & KDBUS_ATTACH_TID_COMM))
		size += KDBUS_ITEM_SIZE(strlen(mp->tid_comm) + 1);

	if (mp && (mask & KDBUS_ATTACH_PID_COMM))
		size += KDBUS_ITEM_SIZE(strlen(mp->pid_comm) + 1);

	if (staging->exe_path && (mask & KDBUS_ATTACH_EXE))
		size += KDBUS_ITEM_SIZE(strlen(staging->exe_path) + 1);

	if (mp && (mask & KDBUS_ATTACH_CMDLINE))
		size += KDBUS_ITEM_SIZE(strlen(mp->cmdline) + 1);

	if (mp && (mask & KDBUS_ATTACH_CGROUP))
		size += KDBUS_ITEM_SIZE(strlen(mp->cgroup) + 1);

	if (mp && (mask & KDBUS_ATTACH_CAPS))
		size += KDBUS_ITEM_SIZE(sizeof(struct kdbus_meta_caps));

	if (mf && (mask & KDBUS_ATTACH_SECLABEL))
		size += KDBUS_ITEM_SIZE(strlen(mf->seclabel) + 1);
	else if (mp && (mask & KDBUS_ATTACH_SECLABEL))
		size += KDBUS_ITEM_SIZE(strlen(mp->seclabel) + 1);

	if (mp && (mask & KDBUS_ATTACH_AUDIT))
		size += KDBUS_ITEM_SIZE(sizeof(struct kdbus_audit));

	/* connection metadata */

	if (mc && (mask & KDBUS_ATTACH_NAMES))
		size += KDBUS_ALIGN8(mc->owned_names_size);

	if (mc && (mask & KDBUS_ATTACH_CONN_DESCRIPTION))
		size += KDBUS_ITEM_SIZE(strlen(mc->conn_description) + 1);

	if (mc && (mask & KDBUS_ATTACH_TIMESTAMP))
		size += KDBUS_ITEM_SIZE(sizeof(struct kdbus_timestamp));

	return size;
}

static struct kdbus_item *kdbus_write_head(struct kdbus_item **iter,
					   u64 type, u64 size)
{
	struct kdbus_item *item = *iter;
	size_t padding;

	item->type = type;
	item->size = KDBUS_ITEM_HEADER_SIZE + size;

	/* clear padding */
	padding = KDBUS_ALIGN8(item->size) - item->size;
	if (padding)
		memset(item->data + size, 0, padding);

	*iter = KDBUS_ITEM_NEXT(item);
	return item;
}

static struct kdbus_item *kdbus_write_full(struct kdbus_item **iter,
					   u64 type, u64 size, const void *data)
{
	struct kdbus_item *item;

	item = kdbus_write_head(iter, type, size);
	memcpy(item->data, data, size);
	return item;
}

static size_t kdbus_meta_write(struct kdbus_meta_staging *staging, void *mem,
			       size_t size)
{
	struct user_namespace *user_ns = staging->conn->cred->user_ns;
	struct pid_namespace *pid_ns = ns_of_pid(staging->conn->pid);
	struct kdbus_item *item = NULL, *items = mem;
	u8 *end, *owned_names_end = NULL;

	/* process metadata */

	if (staging->mf && (staging->mask & KDBUS_ATTACH_CREDS)) {
		const struct kdbus_meta_fake *mf = staging->mf;

		item = kdbus_write_head(&items, KDBUS_ITEM_CREDS,
					sizeof(struct kdbus_creds));
		item->creds = (struct kdbus_creds){
			.uid	= kdbus_from_kuid_keep(user_ns, mf->uid),
			.euid	= kdbus_from_kuid_keep(user_ns, mf->euid),
			.suid	= kdbus_from_kuid_keep(user_ns, mf->suid),
			.fsuid	= kdbus_from_kuid_keep(user_ns, mf->fsuid),
			.gid	= kdbus_from_kgid_keep(user_ns, mf->gid),
			.egid	= kdbus_from_kgid_keep(user_ns, mf->egid),
			.sgid	= kdbus_from_kgid_keep(user_ns, mf->sgid),
			.fsgid	= kdbus_from_kgid_keep(user_ns, mf->fsgid),
		};
	} else if (staging->mp && (staging->mask & KDBUS_ATTACH_CREDS)) {
		const struct cred *c = staging->mp->cred;

		item = kdbus_write_head(&items, KDBUS_ITEM_CREDS,
					sizeof(struct kdbus_creds));
		item->creds = (struct kdbus_creds){
			.uid	= kdbus_from_kuid_keep(user_ns, c->uid),
			.euid	= kdbus_from_kuid_keep(user_ns, c->euid),
			.suid	= kdbus_from_kuid_keep(user_ns, c->suid),
			.fsuid	= kdbus_from_kuid_keep(user_ns, c->fsuid),
			.gid	= kdbus_from_kgid_keep(user_ns, c->gid),
			.egid	= kdbus_from_kgid_keep(user_ns, c->egid),
			.sgid	= kdbus_from_kgid_keep(user_ns, c->sgid),
			.fsgid	= kdbus_from_kgid_keep(user_ns, c->fsgid),
		};
	}

	if (staging->mf && (staging->mask & KDBUS_ATTACH_PIDS)) {
		item = kdbus_write_head(&items, KDBUS_ITEM_PIDS,
					sizeof(struct kdbus_pids));
		item->pids = (struct kdbus_pids){
			.pid = pid_nr_ns(staging->mf->tgid, pid_ns),
			.tid = pid_nr_ns(staging->mf->pid, pid_ns),
			.ppid = pid_nr_ns(staging->mf->ppid, pid_ns),
		};
	} else if (staging->mp && (staging->mask & KDBUS_ATTACH_PIDS)) {
		item = kdbus_write_head(&items, KDBUS_ITEM_PIDS,
					sizeof(struct kdbus_pids));
		item->pids = (struct kdbus_pids){
			.pid = pid_nr_ns(staging->mp->tgid, pid_ns),
			.tid = pid_nr_ns(staging->mp->pid, pid_ns),
			.ppid = pid_nr_ns(staging->mp->ppid, pid_ns),
		};
	}

	if (staging->mp && (staging->mask & KDBUS_ATTACH_AUXGROUPS)) {
		const struct group_info *info = staging->mp->cred->group_info;
		size_t i;

		item = kdbus_write_head(&items, KDBUS_ITEM_AUXGROUPS,
					info->ngroups * sizeof(u64));
		for (i = 0; i < info->ngroups; ++i)
			item->data64[i] = from_kgid_munged(user_ns,
							   GROUP_AT(info, i));
	}

	if (staging->mp && (staging->mask & KDBUS_ATTACH_TID_COMM))
		item = kdbus_write_full(&items, KDBUS_ITEM_TID_COMM,
					strlen(staging->mp->tid_comm) + 1,
					staging->mp->tid_comm);

	if (staging->mp && (staging->mask & KDBUS_ATTACH_PID_COMM))
		item = kdbus_write_full(&items, KDBUS_ITEM_PID_COMM,
					strlen(staging->mp->pid_comm) + 1,
					staging->mp->pid_comm);

	if (staging->exe_path && (staging->mask & KDBUS_ATTACH_EXE))
		item = kdbus_write_full(&items, KDBUS_ITEM_EXE,
					strlen(staging->exe_path) + 1,
					staging->exe_path);

	if (staging->mp && (staging->mask & KDBUS_ATTACH_CMDLINE))
		item = kdbus_write_full(&items, KDBUS_ITEM_CMDLINE,
					strlen(staging->mp->cmdline) + 1,
					staging->mp->cmdline);

	if (staging->mp && (staging->mask & KDBUS_ATTACH_CGROUP))
		item = kdbus_write_full(&items, KDBUS_ITEM_CGROUP,
					strlen(staging->mp->cgroup) + 1,
					staging->mp->cgroup);

	if (staging->mp && (staging->mask & KDBUS_ATTACH_CAPS)) {
		item = kdbus_write_head(&items, KDBUS_ITEM_CAPS,
					sizeof(struct kdbus_meta_caps));
		kdbus_meta_export_caps((void*)&item->caps, staging->mp,
				       user_ns);
	}

	if (staging->mf && (staging->mask & KDBUS_ATTACH_SECLABEL))
		item = kdbus_write_full(&items, KDBUS_ITEM_SECLABEL,
					strlen(staging->mf->seclabel) + 1,
					staging->mf->seclabel);
	else if (staging->mp && (staging->mask & KDBUS_ATTACH_SECLABEL))
		item = kdbus_write_full(&items, KDBUS_ITEM_SECLABEL,
					strlen(staging->mp->seclabel) + 1,
					staging->mp->seclabel);

	if (staging->mp && (staging->mask & KDBUS_ATTACH_AUDIT)) {
		item = kdbus_write_head(&items, KDBUS_ITEM_AUDIT,
					sizeof(struct kdbus_audit));
		item->audit = (struct kdbus_audit){
			.loginuid = from_kuid(user_ns,
					      staging->mp->audit_loginuid),
			.sessionid = staging->mp->audit_sessionid,
		};
	}

	/* connection metadata */

	if (staging->mc && (staging->mask & KDBUS_ATTACH_NAMES)) {
		memcpy(items, staging->mc->owned_names_items,
		       KDBUS_ALIGN8(staging->mc->owned_names_size));
		owned_names_end = (u8 *)items + staging->mc->owned_names_size;
		items = (void *)KDBUS_ALIGN8((unsigned long)owned_names_end);
	}

	if (staging->mc && (staging->mask & KDBUS_ATTACH_CONN_DESCRIPTION))
		item = kdbus_write_full(&items, KDBUS_ITEM_CONN_DESCRIPTION,
				strlen(staging->mc->conn_description) + 1,
				staging->mc->conn_description);

	if (staging->mc && (staging->mask & KDBUS_ATTACH_TIMESTAMP))
		item = kdbus_write_full(&items, KDBUS_ITEM_TIMESTAMP,
					sizeof(staging->mc->ts),
					&staging->mc->ts);

	/*
	 * Return real size (minus trailing padding). In case of 'owned_names'
	 * we cannot deduce it from item->size, so treat it special.
	 */

	if (items == (void *)KDBUS_ALIGN8((unsigned long)owned_names_end))
		end = owned_names_end;
	else if (item)
		end = (u8 *)item + item->size;
	else
		end = mem;

	WARN_ON((u8 *)items - (u8 *)mem != size);
	WARN_ON((void *)KDBUS_ALIGN8((unsigned long)end) != (void *)items);

	return end - (u8 *)mem;
}

int kdbus_meta_emit(struct kdbus_meta_proc *mp,
		    struct kdbus_meta_fake *mf,
		    struct kdbus_meta_conn *mc,
		    struct kdbus_conn *conn,
		    u64 mask,
		    struct kdbus_item **out_items,
		    size_t *out_size)
{
	struct kdbus_meta_staging staging = {};
	struct kdbus_item *items = NULL;
	size_t size = 0;
	int ret;

	if (WARN_ON(mf && mp))
		mp = NULL;

	staging.mp = mp;
	staging.mf = mf;
	staging.mc = mc;
	staging.conn = conn;

	/* get mask of valid items */
	if (mf)
		staging.mask |= mf->valid;
	if (mp) {
		mutex_lock(&mp->lock);
		staging.mask |= mp->valid;
		mutex_unlock(&mp->lock);
	}
	if (mc) {
		mutex_lock(&mc->lock);
		staging.mask |= mc->valid;
		mutex_unlock(&mc->lock);
	}

	staging.mask &= mask;

	if (!staging.mask) { /* bail out if nothing to do */
		ret = 0;
		goto exit;
	}

	/* EXE is special as it needs a temporary page to assemble */
	if (mp && (staging.mask & KDBUS_ATTACH_EXE)) {
		struct path p;

		/*
		 * XXX: We need access to __d_path() so we can write the path
		 * relative to conn->root_path. Once upstream, we need
		 * EXPORT_SYMBOL(__d_path) or an equivalent of d_path() that
		 * takes the root path directly. Until then, we drop this item
		 * if the root-paths differ.
		 */

		get_fs_root(current->fs, &p);
		if (path_equal(&p, &conn->root_path)) {
			staging.exe = (void *)__get_free_page(GFP_TEMPORARY);
			if (!staging.exe) {
				path_put(&p);
				ret = -ENOMEM;
				goto exit;
			}

			staging.exe_path = d_path(&mp->exe_path, staging.exe,
						  PAGE_SIZE);
			if (IS_ERR(staging.exe_path)) {
				path_put(&p);
				ret = PTR_ERR(staging.exe_path);
				goto exit;
			}
		}
		path_put(&p);
	}

	size = kdbus_meta_measure(&staging);
	if (!size) { /* bail out if nothing to do */
		ret = 0;
		goto exit;
	}

	items = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
	if (!items) {
		ret = -ENOMEM;
		goto exit;
	}

	size = kdbus_meta_write(&staging, items, size);
	if (!size) {
		kfree(items);
		items = NULL;
	}

	ret = 0;

exit:
	if (staging.exe)
		free_page((unsigned long)staging.exe);
	if (ret >= 0) {
		*out_items = items;
		*out_size = size;
	}
	return ret;
}

enum {
	KDBUS_META_PROC_NONE,
	KDBUS_META_PROC_NORMAL,
};

/**
 * kdbus_proc_permission() - check /proc permissions on target pid
 * @pid_ns:		namespace we operate in
 * @cred:		credentials of requestor
 * @target:		target process
 *
 * This checks whether a process with credentials @cred can access information
 * of @target in the namespace @pid_ns. This tries to follow /proc permissions,
 * but is slightly more restrictive.
 *
 * Return: The /proc access level (KDBUS_META_PROC_*) is returned.
 */
static unsigned int kdbus_proc_permission(const struct pid_namespace *pid_ns,
					  const struct cred *cred,
					  struct pid *target)
{
	if (pid_ns->hide_pid < 1)
		return KDBUS_META_PROC_NORMAL;

	/* XXX: we need groups_search() exported for aux-groups */
	if (gid_eq(cred->egid, pid_ns->pid_gid))
		return KDBUS_META_PROC_NORMAL;

	/*
	 * XXX: If ptrace_may_access(PTRACE_MODE_READ) is granted, you can
	 * overwrite hide_pid. However, ptrace_may_access() only supports
	 * checking 'current', hence, we cannot use this here. But we
	 * simply decide to not support this override, so no need to worry.
	 */

	return KDBUS_META_PROC_NONE;
}

/**
 * kdbus_meta_proc_mask() - calculate which metadata would be visible to
 *			    a connection via /proc
 * @prv_pid:		pid of metadata provider
 * @req_pid:		pid of metadata requestor
 * @req_cred:		credentials of metadata reqeuestor
 * @wanted:		metadata that is requested
 *
 * This checks which metadata items of @prv_pid can be read via /proc by the
 * requestor @req_pid.
 *
 * Return: Set of metadata flags the requestor can see (limited by @wanted).
 */
static u64 kdbus_meta_proc_mask(struct pid *prv_pid,
				struct pid *req_pid,
				const struct cred *req_cred,
				u64 wanted)
{
	struct pid_namespace *prv_ns, *req_ns;
	unsigned int proc;

	prv_ns = ns_of_pid(prv_pid);
	req_ns = ns_of_pid(req_pid);

	/*
	 * If the sender is not visible in the receiver namespace, then the
	 * receiver cannot access the sender via its own procfs. Hence, we do
	 * not attach any additional metadata.
	 */
	if (!pid_nr_ns(prv_pid, req_ns))
		return 0;

	/*
	 * If the pid-namespace of the receiver has hide_pid set, it cannot see
	 * any process but its own. We shortcut this /proc permission check if
	 * provider and requestor are the same. If not, we perform rather
	 * expensive /proc permission checks.
	 */
	if (prv_pid == req_pid)
		proc = KDBUS_META_PROC_NORMAL;
	else
		proc = kdbus_proc_permission(req_ns, req_cred, prv_pid);

	/* you need /proc access to read standard process attributes */
	if (proc < KDBUS_META_PROC_NORMAL)
		wanted &= ~(KDBUS_ATTACH_TID_COMM |
			    KDBUS_ATTACH_PID_COMM |
			    KDBUS_ATTACH_SECLABEL |
			    KDBUS_ATTACH_CMDLINE |
			    KDBUS_ATTACH_CGROUP |
			    KDBUS_ATTACH_AUDIT |
			    KDBUS_ATTACH_CAPS |
			    KDBUS_ATTACH_EXE);

	/* clear all non-/proc flags */
	return wanted & (KDBUS_ATTACH_TID_COMM |
			 KDBUS_ATTACH_PID_COMM |
			 KDBUS_ATTACH_SECLABEL |
			 KDBUS_ATTACH_CMDLINE |
			 KDBUS_ATTACH_CGROUP |
			 KDBUS_ATTACH_AUDIT |
			 KDBUS_ATTACH_CAPS |
			 KDBUS_ATTACH_EXE);
}

/**
 * kdbus_meta_get_mask() - calculate attach flags mask for metadata request
 * @prv_pid:		pid of metadata provider
 * @prv_mask:		mask of metadata the provide grants unchecked
 * @req_pid:		pid of metadata requestor
 * @req_cred:		credentials of metadata requestor
 * @req_mask:		mask of metadata that is requested
 *
 * This calculates the metadata items that the requestor @req_pid can access
 * from the metadata provider @prv_pid. This permission check consists of
 * several different parts:
 *  - Providers can grant metadata items unchecked. Regardless of their type,
 *    they're always granted to the requestor. This mask is passed as @prv_mask.
 *  - Basic items (credentials and connection metadata) are granted implicitly
 *    to everyone. They're publicly available to any bus-user that can see the
 *    provider.
 *  - Process credentials that are not granted implicitly follow the same
 *    permission checks as /proc. This means, we always assume a requestor
 *    process has access to their *own* /proc mount, if they have access to
 *    kdbusfs.
 *
 * Return: Mask of metadata that is granted.
 */
static u64 kdbus_meta_get_mask(struct pid *prv_pid, u64 prv_mask,
			       struct pid *req_pid,
			       const struct cred *req_cred, u64 req_mask)
{
	u64 missing, impl_mask, proc_mask = 0;

	/*
	 * Connection metadata and basic unix process credentials are
	 * transmitted implicitly, and cannot be suppressed. Both are required
	 * to perform user-space policies on the receiver-side. Furthermore,
	 * connection metadata is public state, anyway, and unix credentials
	 * are needed for UDS-compatibility. We extend them slightly by
	 * auxiliary groups and additional uids/gids/pids.
	 */
	impl_mask = /* connection metadata */
		    KDBUS_ATTACH_CONN_DESCRIPTION |
		    KDBUS_ATTACH_TIMESTAMP |
		    KDBUS_ATTACH_NAMES |
		    /* credentials and pids */
		    KDBUS_ATTACH_AUXGROUPS |
		    KDBUS_ATTACH_CREDS |
		    KDBUS_ATTACH_PIDS;

	/*
	 * Calculate the set of metadata that is not granted implicitly nor by
	 * the sender, but still requested by the receiver. If any are left,
	 * perform rather expensive /proc access checks for them.
	 */
	missing = req_mask & ~((prv_mask | impl_mask) & req_mask);
	if (missing)
		proc_mask = kdbus_meta_proc_mask(prv_pid, req_pid, req_cred,
						 missing);

	return (prv_mask | impl_mask | proc_mask) & req_mask;
}

/**
 */
u64 kdbus_meta_info_mask(const struct kdbus_conn *conn, u64 mask)
{
	return kdbus_meta_get_mask(conn->pid,
				   atomic64_read(&conn->attach_flags_send),
				   task_pid(current),
				   current_cred(),
				   mask);
}

/**
 */
u64 kdbus_meta_msg_mask(const struct kdbus_conn *snd,
			const struct kdbus_conn *rcv)
{
	return kdbus_meta_get_mask(task_pid(current),
				   atomic64_read(&snd->attach_flags_send),
				   rcv->pid,
				   rcv->cred,
				   atomic64_read(&rcv->attach_flags_recv));
}