diff options
| author | canyonknight <canyonknight@gmail.com> | 2012-06-23 14:40:11 -0400 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Lukas Fleischer <archlinux@cryptocrack.de> | 2012-06-24 10:59:23 +0200 |
| commit | 2c93f0a98f0f6380fd07ea17fd16afa2c6e4925b (patch) | |
| tree | dc5fd78a8cb46cd1475b45eeaa6544fbdeb23280 /web/lib/aur.inc.php | |
| parent | bfb25807c49d3f35cdce91947a442455e1940392 (diff) | |
Implement token system to fix CSRF vulnerabilities
Specially crafted pages can force authenticated users to unknowingly perform
actions on the AUR website despite being on an attacker's website. This
cross-site request forgery (CSRF) vulnerability applies to all POST data on
the AUR.
Implement a token system using a double submit cookie. Have a hidden form
value on every page containing POST forms. Use the newly added check_token() to
verify the token sent via POST matches the "AURSID" cookie value. Random
nature of the token limits potential for CSRF.
Signed-off-by: canyonknight <canyonknight@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Lukas Fleischer <archlinux@cryptocrack.de>
Diffstat (limited to 'web/lib/aur.inc.php')
| -rw-r--r-- | web/lib/aur.inc.php | 10 |
1 files changed, 10 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/web/lib/aur.inc.php b/web/lib/aur.inc.php index 6bc36ac..8b9f31e 100644 --- a/web/lib/aur.inc.php +++ b/web/lib/aur.inc.php @@ -77,6 +77,16 @@ function check_sid($dbh=NULL) { return; } +# Verify the supplied token matches the expected token for POST forms +# +function check_token() { + if (isset($_POST['token'])) { + return ($_POST['token'] == $_COOKIE['AURSID']); + } else { + return false; + } +} + # verify that an email address looks like it is legitimate # function valid_email($addy) { |