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From 6423ae83d38535687d52097b7854b3c81151fe34 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Lukas Fleischer <lfleischer@archlinux.org>
Date: Sat, 11 Apr 2015 12:57:46 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] Patch sshd for the AUR

* Apply the latest version of Damien Miller's patch to extend the
  parameters to the AuthorizedKeysCommand.

* Remove the secure path check for the AuthorizedKeysCommand. We are
  running the sshd under a non-privileged user who has as little
  permissions as possible. In particular, he does not own the directory
  that contains the scripts for the Git backend.

* Prevent from running the sshd as root.

Signed-off-by: Lukas Fleischer <lfleischer@archlinux.org>
---
 auth2-pubkey.c | 530 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------
 servconf.c     |  35 ++++
 servconf.h     |   8 +-
 ssh.c          |   5 +
 sshd.c         |   5 +
 sshd_config.5  |  54 +++++-
 sshkey.c       | 172 +++++++++++--------
 sshkey.h       |   1 +
 8 files changed, 606 insertions(+), 204 deletions(-)

diff --git a/auth2-pubkey.c b/auth2-pubkey.c
index d943efa..2ce0a4b 100644
--- a/auth2-pubkey.c
+++ b/auth2-pubkey.c
@@ -65,6 +65,9 @@
 #include "monitor_wrap.h"
 #include "authfile.h"
 #include "match.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "channels.h" /* XXX for session.h */
+#include "session.h" /* XXX for child_set_env(); refactor? */
 
 /* import */
 extern ServerOptions options;
@@ -248,6 +251,227 @@ pubkey_auth_info(Authctxt *authctxt, const Key *key, const char *fmt, ...)
 	free(extra);
 }
 
+/*
+ * Splits 's' into an argument vector. Handles quoted string and basic
+ * escape characters (\\, \", \'). Caller must free the argument vector
+ * and its members.
+ */
+static int
+split_argv(const char *s, int *argcp, char ***argvp)
+{
+	int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	int argc = 0, quote, i, j;
+	char *arg, **argv = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*argv));
+
+	*argvp = NULL;
+	*argcp = 0;
+
+	for (i = 0; s[i] != '\0'; i++) {
+		/* Skip leading whitespace */
+		if (s[i] == ' ' || s[i] == '\t')
+			continue;
+
+		/* Start of a token */
+		quote = 0;
+		if (s[i] == '\\' &&
+		    (s[i + 1] == '\'' || s[i + 1] == '\"' || s[i + 1] == '\\'))
+			i++;
+		else if (s[i] == '\'' || s[i] == '"')
+			quote = s[i++];
+
+		argv = xrealloc(argv, (argc + 2), sizeof(*argv));
+		arg = argv[argc++] = xcalloc(1, strlen(s + i) + 1);
+		argv[argc] = NULL;
+
+		/* Copy the token in, removing escapes */
+		for (j = 0; s[i] != '\0'; i++) {
+			if (s[i] == '\\') {
+				if (s[i + 1] == '\'' ||
+				    s[i + 1] == '\"' ||
+				    s[i + 1] == '\\') {
+					i++; /* Skip '\' */
+					arg[j++] = s[i];
+				} else {
+					/* Unrecognised escape */
+					arg[j++] = s[i];
+				}
+			} else if (quote == 0 && (s[i] == ' ' || s[i] == '\t'))
+				break; /* done */
+			else if (quote != 0 && s[i] == quote)
+				break; /* done */
+			else
+				arg[j++] = s[i];
+		}
+		if (s[i] == '\0') {
+			if (quote != 0) {
+				/* Ran out of string looking for close quote */
+				r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+				goto out;
+			}
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+	/* Success */
+	*argcp = argc;
+	*argvp = argv;
+	argc = 0;
+	argv = NULL;
+	r = 0;
+ out:
+	if (argc != 0 && argv != NULL) {
+		for (i = 0; i < argc; i++)
+			free(argv[i]);
+		free(argv);
+	}
+	return r;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Runs command in a subprocess. Returns pid on success and a FILE* to the
+ * subprocess' stdout or 0 on failure.
+ * NB. "command" is only used for logging.
+ */
+static pid_t
+subprocess(const char *tag, struct passwd *pw, const char *command,
+    int ac, char **av, FILE **child)
+{
+	FILE *f;
+	struct stat st;
+	int devnull, p[2], i;
+	pid_t pid;
+	char *cp, errmsg[512];
+	u_int envsize;
+	char **child_env;
+
+	*child = NULL;
+
+	debug3("%s: %s command \"%s\" running as %s", __func__,
+	    tag, command, pw->pw_name);
+
+	/* Verify the path exists and is safe-ish to execute */
+	if (*av[0] != '/') {
+		error("%s path is not absolute", tag);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	temporarily_use_uid(pw);
+	if (stat(av[0], &st) < 0) {
+		error("Could not stat %s \"%s\": %s", tag,
+		    av[0], strerror(errno));
+		restore_uid();
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Run the command; stderr is left in place, stdout is the
+	 * authorized_keys output.
+	 */
+	if (pipe(p) != 0) {
+		error("%s: pipe: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
+		restore_uid();
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Don't want to call this in the child, where it can fatal() and
+	 * run cleanup_exit() code.
+	 */
+	restore_uid();
+
+	switch ((pid = fork())) {
+	case -1: /* error */
+		error("%s: fork: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
+		close(p[0]);
+		close(p[1]);
+		return 0;
+	case 0: /* child */
+		/* Prepare a minimal environment for the child. */
+		envsize = 5;
+		child_env = xcalloc(sizeof(*child_env), envsize);
+		child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "PATH", _PATH_STDPATH);
+		child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "USER", pw->pw_name);
+		child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "LOGNAME", pw->pw_name);
+		child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "HOME", pw->pw_dir);
+		if ((cp = getenv("LANG")) != NULL)
+			child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "LANG", cp);
+
+		for (i = 0; i < NSIG; i++)
+			signal(i, SIG_DFL);
+
+		if ((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR)) == -1) {
+			error("%s: open %s: %s", tag, _PATH_DEVNULL,
+			    strerror(errno));
+			_exit(1);
+		}
+		/* Keep stderr around a while longer to catch errors */
+		if (dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO) == -1 ||
+		    dup2(p[1], STDOUT_FILENO) == -1) {
+			error("%s: dup2: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
+			_exit(1);
+		}
+		closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
+
+		/* Don't use permanently_set_uid() here to avoid fatal() */
+		if (setresgid(pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid) != 0) {
+			error("%s: setresgid %u: %s", tag, (u_int)pw->pw_gid,
+			    strerror(errno));
+			_exit(1);
+		}
+		if (setresuid(pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid) != 0) {
+			error("%s: setresuid %u: %s", tag, (u_int)pw->pw_uid,
+			    strerror(errno));
+			_exit(1);
+		}
+		/* stdin is pointed to /dev/null at this point */
+		if (dup2(STDIN_FILENO, STDERR_FILENO) == -1) {
+			error("%s: dup2: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
+			_exit(1);
+		}
+
+		execve(av[0], av, child_env);
+		error("%s exec \"%s\": %s", tag, command, strerror(errno));
+		_exit(127);
+	default: /* parent */
+		break;
+	}
+
+	close(p[1]);
+	if ((f = fdopen(p[0], "r")) == NULL) {
+		error("%s: fdopen: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
+		close(p[0]);
+		/* Don't leave zombie child */
+		kill(pid, SIGTERM);
+		while (waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) == -1 && errno == EINTR)
+			;
+		return 0;
+	}
+	/* Success */
+	debug3("%s: %s pid %ld", __func__, tag, (long)pid);
+	*child = f;
+	return pid;
+}
+
+/* Returns 0 if pid exited cleanly, non-zero otherwise */
+static int
+exited_cleanly(pid_t pid, const char *tag, const char *cmd)
+{
+	int status;
+
+	while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) {
+		if (errno != EINTR) {
+			error("%s: waitpid: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
+			return -1;
+		}
+	}
+	if (WIFSIGNALED(status)) {
+		error("%s %s exited on signal %d", tag, cmd, WTERMSIG(status));
+		return -1;
+	} else if (WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0) {
+		error("%s %s failed, status %d", tag, cmd, WEXITSTATUS(status));
+		return -1;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static int
 match_principals_option(const char *principal_list, struct sshkey_cert *cert)
 {
@@ -269,19 +493,13 @@ match_principals_option(const char *principal_list, struct sshkey_cert *cert)
 }
 
 static int
-match_principals_file(char *file, struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey_cert *cert)
+process_principals(FILE *f, char *file, struct passwd *pw,
+    struct sshkey_cert *cert)
 {
-	FILE *f;
 	char line[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES], *cp, *ep, *line_opts;
 	u_long linenum = 0;
 	u_int i;
 
-	temporarily_use_uid(pw);
-	debug("trying authorized principals file %s", file);
-	if ((f = auth_openprincipals(file, pw, options.strict_modes)) == NULL) {
-		restore_uid();
-		return 0;
-	}
 	while (read_keyfile_line(f, file, line, sizeof(line), &linenum) != -1) {
 		/* Skip leading whitespace. */
 		for (cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
@@ -309,24 +527,119 @@ match_principals_file(char *file, struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey_cert *cert)
 		}
 		for (i = 0; i < cert->nprincipals; i++) {
 			if (strcmp(cp, cert->principals[i]) == 0) {
-				debug3("matched principal \"%.100s\" "
-				    "from file \"%s\" on line %lu",
-				    cert->principals[i], file, linenum);
+				debug3("%s:%lu: matched principal \"%.100s\"",
+				    file == NULL ? "(command)" : file,
+				    linenum, cert->principals[i]);
 				if (auth_parse_options(pw, line_opts,
 				    file, linenum) != 1)
 					continue;
-				fclose(f);
-				restore_uid();
 				return 1;
 			}
 		}
 	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+match_principals_file(char *file, struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey_cert *cert)
+{
+	FILE *f;
+	int success;
+
+	temporarily_use_uid(pw);
+	debug("trying authorized principals file %s", file);
+	if ((f = auth_openprincipals(file, pw, options.strict_modes)) == NULL) {
+		restore_uid();
+		return 0;
+	}
+	success = process_principals(f, file, pw, cert);
 	fclose(f);
 	restore_uid();
-	return 0;
+	return success;
 }
 
 /*
+ * Checks whether principal is allowed in output of command.
+ * returns 1 if the principal is allowed or 0 otherwise.
+ */
+static int
+match_principals_command(struct passwd *user_pw, struct sshkey *key)
+{
+	FILE *f = NULL;
+	int ok, found_principal = 0;
+	struct passwd *pw;
+	int i, ac = 0, uid_swapped = 0;
+	pid_t pid;
+	char *username = NULL, *command = NULL, **av = NULL;
+	void (*osigchld)(int);
+
+	if (options.authorized_principals_command == NULL)
+		return 0;
+	if (options.authorized_principals_command_user == NULL) {
+		error("No user for AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand specified, "
+		    "skipping");
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * NB. all returns later this function should go via "out" to
+	 * ensure the original SIGCHLD handler is restored properly.
+	 */
+	osigchld = signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
+
+	/* Prepare and verify the user for the command */
+	username = percent_expand(options.authorized_principals_command_user,
+	    "u", user_pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL);
+	pw = getpwnam(username);
+	if (pw == NULL) {
+		error("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser \"%s\" not found: %s",
+		    username, strerror(errno));
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	command = percent_expand(options.authorized_principals_command,
+	    "u", user_pw->pw_name, "h", user_pw->pw_dir, (char *)NULL);
+
+	/* Turn the command into an argument vector */
+	if (split_argv(command, &ac, &av) != 0) {
+		error("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand \"%s\" contains "
+		    "invalid quotes", command);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (ac == 0) {
+		error("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand \"%s\" yielded no arguments",
+		    command);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand", pw, command,
+	    ac, av, &f)) == 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	uid_swapped = 1;
+	temporarily_use_uid(pw);
+
+	ok = process_principals(f, NULL, pw, key->cert);
+
+	if (exited_cleanly(pid, "AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand", command))
+		goto out;
+
+	/* Read completed successfully */
+	found_principal = ok;
+ out:
+	if (f != NULL)
+		fclose(f);
+	signal(SIGCHLD, osigchld);
+	for (i = 0; i < ac; i++)
+		free(av[i]);
+	free(av);
+	if (uid_swapped)
+		restore_uid();
+	free(command);
+	free(username);
+	return found_principal;
+}
+/*
  * Checks whether key is allowed in authorized_keys-format file,
  * returns 1 if the key is allowed or 0 otherwise.
  */
@@ -448,7 +761,7 @@ user_cert_trusted_ca(struct passwd *pw, Key *key)
 {
 	char *ca_fp, *principals_file = NULL;
 	const char *reason;
-	int ret = 0;
+	int ret = 0, found_principal = 0;
 
 	if (!key_is_cert(key) || options.trusted_user_ca_keys == NULL)
 		return 0;
@@ -470,14 +783,20 @@ user_cert_trusted_ca(struct passwd *pw, Key *key)
 	 * against the username.
 	 */
 	if ((principals_file = authorized_principals_file(pw)) != NULL) {
-		if (!match_principals_file(principals_file, pw, key->cert)) {
-			reason = "Certificate does not contain an "
-			    "authorized principal";
+		if (match_principals_file(principals_file, pw, key->cert))
+			found_principal = 1;
+	}
+	/* Try querying command if specified */
+	if (!found_principal && match_principals_command(pw, key))
+		found_principal = 1;
+	/* If principals file or command specify, then require a match here */
+	if (!found_principal && (principals_file != NULL ||
+	    options.authorized_principals_command != NULL)) {
+		reason = "Certificate does not contain an authorized principal";
  fail_reason:
-			error("%s", reason);
-			auth_debug_add("%s", reason);
-			goto out;
-		}
+		error("%s", reason);
+		auth_debug_add("%s", reason);
+		goto out;
 	}
 	if (key_cert_check_authority(key, 0, 1,
 	    principals_file == NULL ? pw->pw_name : NULL, &reason) != 0)
@@ -526,144 +845,105 @@ user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, char *file)
 static int
 user_key_command_allowed2(struct passwd *user_pw, Key *key)
 {
-	FILE *f;
-	int ok, found_key = 0;
+	FILE *f = NULL;
+	int r, ok, found_key = 0;
 	struct passwd *pw;
-	struct stat st;
-	int status, devnull, p[2], i;
+	int i, uid_swapped = 0, ac = 0;
 	pid_t pid;
-	char *username, errmsg[512];
+	char *username = NULL, *key_fp = NULL, *keytext = NULL;
+	char *command = NULL, **av = NULL;
+	void (*osigchld)(int);
 
-	if (options.authorized_keys_command == NULL ||
-	    options.authorized_keys_command[0] != '/')
+	if (options.authorized_keys_command == NULL)
 		return 0;
-
 	if (options.authorized_keys_command_user == NULL) {
 		error("No user for AuthorizedKeysCommand specified, skipping");
 		return 0;
 	}
 
+	/*
+	 * NB. all returns later this function should go via "out" to
+	 * ensure the original SIGCHLD handler is restored properly.
+	 */
+	osigchld = signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
+
+	/* Prepare and verify the user for the command */
 	username = percent_expand(options.authorized_keys_command_user,
 	    "u", user_pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL);
 	pw = getpwnam(username);
 	if (pw == NULL) {
 		error("AuthorizedKeysCommandUser \"%s\" not found: %s",
 		    username, strerror(errno));
-		free(username);
-		return 0;
+		goto out;
 	}
-	free(username);
-
-	temporarily_use_uid(pw);
 
-	if (stat(options.authorized_keys_command, &st) < 0) {
-		error("Could not stat AuthorizedKeysCommand \"%s\": %s",
-		    options.authorized_keys_command, strerror(errno));
+	/* Prepare AuthorizedKeysCommand */
+	if ((key_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash,
+	    SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) {
+		error("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __func__);
 		goto out;
 	}
-	if (auth_secure_path(options.authorized_keys_command, &st, NULL, 0,
-	    errmsg, sizeof(errmsg)) != 0) {
-		error("Unsafe AuthorizedKeysCommand: %s", errmsg);
+	if ((r = sshkey_to_base64(key, &keytext)) != 0) {
+		error("%s: sshkey_to_base64 failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
 		goto out;
 	}
-
-	if (pipe(p) != 0) {
-		error("%s: pipe: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+	command = percent_expand(options.authorized_keys_command,
+	    "u", user_pw->pw_name, "h", user_pw->pw_dir,
+	    "t", sshkey_ssh_name(key), "f", key_fp, "k", keytext, (char *)NULL);
+
+	/* Turn the command into an argument vector */
+	if (split_argv(command, &ac, &av) != 0) {
+		error("AuthorizedKeysCommand \"%s\" contains invalid quotes",
+		    command);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (ac == 0) {
+		error("AuthorizedKeysCommand \"%s\" yielded no arguments",
+		    command);
 		goto out;
 	}
-
-	debug3("Running AuthorizedKeysCommand: \"%s %s\" as \"%s\"",
-	    options.authorized_keys_command, user_pw->pw_name, pw->pw_name);
 
 	/*
-	 * Don't want to call this in the child, where it can fatal() and
-	 * run cleanup_exit() code.
+	 * If AuthorizedKeysCommand was run without arguments
+	 * then fall back to the old behaviour of passing the
+	 * target username as a single argument.
 	 */
-	restore_uid();
-
-	switch ((pid = fork())) {
-	case -1: /* error */
-		error("%s: fork: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
-		close(p[0]);
-		close(p[1]);
-		return 0;
-	case 0: /* child */
-		for (i = 0; i < NSIG; i++)
-			signal(i, SIG_DFL);
-
-		if ((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR)) == -1) {
-			error("%s: open %s: %s", __func__, _PATH_DEVNULL,
-			    strerror(errno));
-			_exit(1);
-		}
-		/* Keep stderr around a while longer to catch errors */
-		if (dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO) == -1 ||
-		    dup2(p[1], STDOUT_FILENO) == -1) {
-			error("%s: dup2: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
-			_exit(1);
-		}
-		closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
-
-		/* Don't use permanently_set_uid() here to avoid fatal() */
-		if (setresgid(pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid) != 0) {
-			error("setresgid %u: %s", (u_int)pw->pw_gid,
-			    strerror(errno));
-			_exit(1);
-		}
-		if (setresuid(pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid) != 0) {
-			error("setresuid %u: %s", (u_int)pw->pw_uid,
-			    strerror(errno));
-			_exit(1);
-		}
-		/* stdin is pointed to /dev/null at this point */
-		if (dup2(STDIN_FILENO, STDERR_FILENO) == -1) {
-			error("%s: dup2: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
-			_exit(1);
-		}
-
-		execl(options.authorized_keys_command,
-		    options.authorized_keys_command, user_pw->pw_name, NULL);
-
-		error("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s exec failed: %s",
-		    options.authorized_keys_command, strerror(errno));
-		_exit(127);
-	default: /* parent */
-		break;
+	if (ac == 1) {
+		av = xrealloc(av, ac + 2, sizeof(*av));
+		av[1] = xstrdup(user_pw->pw_name);
+		av[2] = NULL;
+		/* Fix up command too, since it is used in log messages */
+		free(command);
+		xasprintf(&command, "%s %s", av[0], av[1]);
 	}
 
+	if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedKeysCommand", pw, command,
+	    ac, av, &f)) == 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	uid_swapped = 1;
 	temporarily_use_uid(pw);
 
-	close(p[1]);
-	if ((f = fdopen(p[0], "r")) == NULL) {
-		error("%s: fdopen: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
-		close(p[0]);
-		/* Don't leave zombie child */
-		kill(pid, SIGTERM);
-		while (waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) == -1 && errno == EINTR)
-			;
-		goto out;
-	}
 	ok = check_authkeys_file(f, options.authorized_keys_command, key, pw);
-	fclose(f);
 
-	while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) {
-		if (errno != EINTR) {
-			error("%s: waitpid: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
-			goto out;
-		}
-	}
-	if (WIFSIGNALED(status)) {
-		error("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s exited on signal %d",
-		    options.authorized_keys_command, WTERMSIG(status));
+	if (exited_cleanly(pid, "AuthorizedKeysCommand", command))
 		goto out;
-	} else if (WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0) {
-		error("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s returned status %d",
-		    options.authorized_keys_command, WEXITSTATUS(status));
-		goto out;
-	}
+
+	/* Read completed successfully */
 	found_key = ok;
  out:
-	restore_uid();
+	if (f != NULL)
+		fclose(f);
+	signal(SIGCHLD, osigchld);
+	for (i = 0; i < ac; i++)
+		free(av[i]);
+	free(av);
+	if (uid_swapped)
+		restore_uid();
+	free(command);
+	free(username);
+	free(key_fp);
+	free(keytext);
 	return found_key;
 }
 
diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
index 3185462..510cdde 100644
--- a/servconf.c
+++ b/servconf.c
@@ -159,6 +159,8 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
 	options->revoked_keys_file = NULL;
 	options->trusted_user_ca_keys = NULL;
 	options->authorized_principals_file = NULL;
+	options->authorized_principals_command = NULL;
+	options->authorized_principals_command_user = NULL;
 	options->ip_qos_interactive = -1;
 	options->ip_qos_bulk = -1;
 	options->version_addendum = NULL;
@@ -396,6 +398,7 @@ typedef enum {
 	sUsePrivilegeSeparation, sAllowAgentForwarding,
 	sHostCertificate,
 	sRevokedKeys, sTrustedUserCAKeys, sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile,
+	sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommand, sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser,
 	sKexAlgorithms, sIPQoS, sVersionAddendum,
 	sAuthorizedKeysCommand, sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser,
 	sAuthenticationMethods, sHostKeyAgent, sPermitUserRC,
@@ -528,6 +531,8 @@ static struct {
 	{ "ipqos", sIPQoS, SSHCFG_ALL },
 	{ "authorizedkeyscommand", sAuthorizedKeysCommand, SSHCFG_ALL },
 	{ "authorizedkeyscommanduser", sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser, SSHCFG_ALL },
+	{ "authorizedprincipalscommand", sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommand, SSHCFG_ALL },
+	{ "authorizedprincipalscommanduser", sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser, SSHCFG_ALL },
 	{ "versionaddendum", sVersionAddendum, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
 	{ "authenticationmethods", sAuthenticationMethods, SSHCFG_ALL },
 	{ "streamlocalbindmask", sStreamLocalBindMask, SSHCFG_ALL },
@@ -1697,6 +1702,34 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
 			*charptr = xstrdup(arg);
 		break;
 
+	case sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommand:
+		if (cp == NULL)
+			fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename,
+			    linenum);
+		len = strspn(cp, WHITESPACE);
+		if (*activep &&
+		    options->authorized_principals_command == NULL) {
+			if (cp[len] != '/' && strcasecmp(cp + len, "none") != 0)
+				fatal("%.200s line %d: "
+				    "AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand must be "
+				    "an absolute path", filename, linenum);
+			options->authorized_principals_command =
+			    xstrdup(cp + len);
+		}
+		return 0;
+
+	case sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser:
+		charptr = &options->authorized_principals_command_user;
+
+		arg = strdelim(&cp);
+		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+			fatal("%s line %d: missing "
+			    "AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser argument.",
+			    filename, linenum);
+		if (*activep && *charptr == NULL)
+			*charptr = xstrdup(arg);
+		break;
+
 	case sAuthenticationMethods:
 		if (*activep && options->num_auth_methods == 0) {
 			while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') {
@@ -2166,6 +2199,8 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
 	dump_cfg_string(sVersionAddendum, o->version_addendum);
 	dump_cfg_string(sAuthorizedKeysCommand, o->authorized_keys_command);
 	dump_cfg_string(sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser, o->authorized_keys_command_user);
+	dump_cfg_string(sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommand, o->authorized_principals_command);
+	dump_cfg_string(sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser, o->authorized_principals_command_user);
 	dump_cfg_string(sHostKeyAgent, o->host_key_agent);
 	dump_cfg_string(sKexAlgorithms,
 	    o->kex_algorithms ? o->kex_algorithms : KEX_SERVER_KEX);
diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h
index 9922f0c..35d6673 100644
--- a/servconf.h
+++ b/servconf.h
@@ -176,9 +176,11 @@ typedef struct {
 	char   *chroot_directory;
 	char   *revoked_keys_file;
 	char   *trusted_user_ca_keys;
-	char   *authorized_principals_file;
 	char   *authorized_keys_command;
 	char   *authorized_keys_command_user;
+	char   *authorized_principals_file;
+	char   *authorized_principals_command;
+	char   *authorized_principals_command_user;
 
 	int64_t rekey_limit;
 	int	rekey_interval;
@@ -214,9 +216,11 @@ struct connection_info {
 		M_CP_STROPT(banner); \
 		M_CP_STROPT(trusted_user_ca_keys); \
 		M_CP_STROPT(revoked_keys_file); \
-		M_CP_STROPT(authorized_principals_file); \
 		M_CP_STROPT(authorized_keys_command); \
 		M_CP_STROPT(authorized_keys_command_user); \
+		M_CP_STROPT(authorized_principals_file); \
+		M_CP_STROPT(authorized_principals_command); \
+		M_CP_STROPT(authorized_principals_command_user); \
 		M_CP_STROPT(hostbased_key_types); \
 		M_CP_STROPT(pubkey_key_types); \
 		M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(authorized_keys_files, num_authkeys_files); \
diff --git a/ssh.c b/ssh.c
index 0ad82f0..abf4e54 100644
--- a/ssh.c
+++ b/ssh.c
@@ -548,6 +548,11 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 	original_real_uid = getuid();
 	original_effective_uid = geteuid();
 
+	if (original_effective_uid == 0) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "this is a patched version of the sshd that must not be run as root.\n");
+		exit(1);
+	}
+
 	/*
 	 * Use uid-swapping to give up root privileges for the duration of
 	 * option processing.  We will re-instantiate the rights when we are
diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
index 6aa17fa..672c486 100644
--- a/sshd.c
+++ b/sshd.c
@@ -1694,6 +1694,11 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 	    strcasecmp(options.authorized_keys_command, "none") != 0))
 		fatal("AuthorizedKeysCommand set without "
 		    "AuthorizedKeysCommandUser");
+	if (options.authorized_principals_command_user == NULL &&
+	    (options.authorized_principals_command != NULL &&
+	    strcasecmp(options.authorized_principals_command, "none") != 0))
+		fatal("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand set without "
+		    "AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser");
 
 	/*
 	 * Check whether there is any path through configured auth methods.
diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
index 6dce0c7..a267af9 100644
--- a/sshd_config.5
+++ b/sshd_config.5
@@ -230,9 +230,21 @@ The default is not to require multiple authentication; successful completion
 of a single authentication method is sufficient.
 .It Cm AuthorizedKeysCommand
 Specifies a program to be used to look up the user's public keys.
-The program must be owned by root and not writable by group or others.
-It will be invoked with a single argument of the username
-being authenticated, and should produce on standard output zero or
+The program must be owned by root, not writable by group or others and
+specified by an absolute path.
+.Pp
+Arguments to
+.Cm AuthorizedKeysCommand
+may be provided using the following tokens, which will be expanded
+at runtime: %% is replaced by a literal '%', %u is replaced by the
+username being authenticated, %h is replaced by the home directory
+of the user being authenticated, %t is replaced with the key type
+offered for authentication, %f is replaced with the fingerprint of
+the key, and %k is replaced with the key being offered for authentication.
+If no arguments are specified then the username of the target user
+will be supplied.
+.Pp
+The program should produce on standard output zero or
 more lines of authorized_keys output (see AUTHORIZED_KEYS in
 .Xr sshd 8 ) .
 If a key supplied by AuthorizedKeysCommand does not successfully authenticate
@@ -271,6 +283,42 @@ directory.
 Multiple files may be listed, separated by whitespace.
 The default is
 .Dq .ssh/authorized_keys .ssh/authorized_keys2 .
+.It Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand
+Specifies a program to be used to generate the list of allowed
+certificate principals as per
+.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile .
+The program must be owned by root, not writable by group or others and
+specified by an absolute path.
+.Pp
+Arguments to
+.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand
+may be provided using the following tokens, which will be expanded
+at runtime: %% is replaced by a literal '%', %u is replaced by the
+username being authenticated and %h is replaced by the home directory
+of the user being authenticated.
+.Pp
+The program should produce on standard output zero or
+more lines of
+.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile
+output.
+If either
+.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand
+or
+.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile
+is specified, then certificates offered by the client for authentication
+must contain a principal that is listed.
+By default, no AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand is run.
+.It Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser
+Specifies the user under whose account the AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand is run.
+It is recommended to use a dedicated user that has no other role on the host
+than running authorized principals commands.
+If
+.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand
+is specified but
+.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser
+is not, then
+.Xr sshd 8
+will refuse to start.
 .It Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile
 Specifies a file that lists principal names that are accepted for
 certificate authentication.
diff --git a/sshkey.c b/sshkey.c
index 3cc3f44..ecb61fd 100644
--- a/sshkey.c
+++ b/sshkey.c
@@ -761,6 +761,12 @@ to_blob_buf(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b, int force_plain)
 	if (key == NULL)
 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
 
+	if (sshkey_is_cert(key)) {
+		if (key->cert == NULL)
+			return SSH_ERR_EXPECTED_CERT;
+		if (sshbuf_len(key->cert->certblob) == 0)
+			return SSH_ERR_KEY_LACKS_CERTBLOB;
+	}
 	type = force_plain ? sshkey_type_plain(key->type) : key->type;
 	typename = sshkey_ssh_name_from_type_nid(type, key->ecdsa_nid);
 
@@ -1409,98 +1415,116 @@ sshkey_read(struct sshkey *ret, char **cpp)
 }
 
 int
-sshkey_write(const struct sshkey *key, FILE *f)
+sshkey_to_base64(const struct sshkey *key, char **b64p)
 {
-	int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-	struct sshbuf *b = NULL, *bb = NULL;
+	int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
 	char *uu = NULL;
+
+	if (b64p != NULL)
+		*b64p = NULL;
+	if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+	if ((r = sshkey_putb(key, b)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	if ((uu = sshbuf_dtob64(b)) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	/* Success */
+	if (b64p != NULL) {
+		*b64p = uu;
+		uu = NULL;
+	}
+	r = 0;
+ out:
+	sshbuf_free(b);
+	free(uu);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int
+sshkey_format_rsa1(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b)
+{
+	int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
 #ifdef WITH_SSH1
 	u_int bits = 0;
 	char *dec_e = NULL, *dec_n = NULL;
-#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */
 
-	if (sshkey_is_cert(key)) {
-		if (key->cert == NULL)
-			return SSH_ERR_EXPECTED_CERT;
-		if (sshbuf_len(key->cert->certblob) == 0)
-			return SSH_ERR_KEY_LACKS_CERTBLOB;
+	if (key->rsa == NULL || key->rsa->e == NULL ||
+	    key->rsa->n == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+		goto out;
 	}
-	if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
-		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-	switch (key->type) {
-#ifdef WITH_SSH1
-	case KEY_RSA1:
-		if (key->rsa == NULL || key->rsa->e == NULL ||
-		    key->rsa->n == NULL) {
-			ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-			goto out;
-		}
-		if ((dec_e = BN_bn2dec(key->rsa->e)) == NULL ||
-		    (dec_n = BN_bn2dec(key->rsa->n)) == NULL) {
-			ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-			goto out;
-		}
-		/* size of modulus 'n' */
-		if ((bits = BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n)) <= 0) {
-			ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-			goto out;
-		}
-		if ((ret = sshbuf_putf(b, "%u %s %s", bits, dec_e, dec_n)) != 0)
-			goto out;
+	if ((dec_e = BN_bn2dec(key->rsa->e)) == NULL ||
+	    (dec_n = BN_bn2dec(key->rsa->n)) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	/* size of modulus 'n' */
+	if ((bits = BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n)) <= 0) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((r = sshbuf_putf(b, "%u %s %s", bits, dec_e, dec_n)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* Success */
+	r = 0;
+ out:
+	if (dec_e != NULL)
+		OPENSSL_free(dec_e);
+	if (dec_n != NULL)
+		OPENSSL_free(dec_n);
 #endif /* WITH_SSH1 */
-		break;
-#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
-	case KEY_DSA:
-	case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00:
-	case KEY_DSA_CERT:
-	case KEY_ECDSA:
-	case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
-	case KEY_RSA:
-	case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00:
-	case KEY_RSA_CERT:
-#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
-	case KEY_ED25519:
-	case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
-		if ((bb = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
-			ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-			goto out;
-		}
-		if ((ret = sshkey_putb(key, bb)) != 0)
-			goto out;
-		if ((uu = sshbuf_dtob64(bb)) == NULL) {
-			ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int
+sshkey_format_text(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b)
+{
+	int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	char *uu = NULL;
+
+	if (key->type == KEY_RSA1) {
+		if ((r = sshkey_format_rsa1(key, b)) != 0)
 			goto out;
-		}
-		if ((ret = sshbuf_putf(b, "%s ", sshkey_ssh_name(key))) != 0)
+	} else {
+		/* Unsupported key types handled in sshkey_to_base64() */
+		if ((r = sshkey_to_base64(key, &uu)) != 0)
 			goto out;
-		if ((ret = sshbuf_put(b, uu, strlen(uu))) != 0)
+		if ((r = sshbuf_putf(b, "%s %s",
+		    sshkey_ssh_name(key), uu)) != 0)
 			goto out;
-		break;
-	default:
-		ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
-		goto out;
 	}
+	r = 0;
+ out:
+	free(uu);
+	return r;
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_write(const struct sshkey *key, FILE *f)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
+	int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+	if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+	if ((r = sshkey_format_text(key, b)) != 0)
+		goto out;
 	if (fwrite(sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), 1, f) != 1) {
 		if (feof(f))
 			errno = EPIPE;
-		ret = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+		r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
 		goto out;
 	}
-	ret = 0;
+	/* Success */
+	r = 0;
  out:
-	if (b != NULL)
-		sshbuf_free(b);
-	if (bb != NULL)
-		sshbuf_free(bb);
-	if (uu != NULL)
-		free(uu);
-#ifdef WITH_SSH1
-	if (dec_e != NULL)
-		OPENSSL_free(dec_e);
-	if (dec_n != NULL)
-		OPENSSL_free(dec_n);
-#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */
-	return ret;
+	sshbuf_free(b);
+	return r;
 }
 
 const char *
diff --git a/sshkey.h b/sshkey.h
index 62c1c3e..98f1ca9 100644
--- a/sshkey.h
+++ b/sshkey.h
@@ -163,6 +163,7 @@ int	 sshkey_from_blob(const u_char *, size_t, struct sshkey **);
 int	 sshkey_fromb(struct sshbuf *, struct sshkey **);
 int	 sshkey_froms(struct sshbuf *, struct sshkey **);
 int	 sshkey_to_blob(const struct sshkey *, u_char **, size_t *);
+int	 sshkey_to_base64(const struct sshkey *, char **);
 int	 sshkey_putb(const struct sshkey *, struct sshbuf *);
 int	 sshkey_puts(const struct sshkey *, struct sshbuf *);
 int	 sshkey_plain_to_blob(const struct sshkey *, u_char **, size_t *);
-- 
2.3.5