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authorLennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net>2016-04-26 14:57:04 +0200
committerLennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net>2016-04-26 14:57:04 +0200
commitd7fe83bbc23d9976433fddaf6509cc6bebc0ecdd (patch)
treee5748844e740c3e7452040154fd3035b304eaee8
parent6e3930c40f3379b7123e505a71ba4cd6db6c372f (diff)
parent4aeb20f5aaec25ef969989b64d37377913b2a1ef (diff)
Merge pull request #3093 from poettering/nspawn-userns-magic
nspawn automatic user namespaces
-rw-r--r--.gitignore1
-rw-r--r--Makefile.am13
-rw-r--r--man/systemd-nspawn.xml101
-rw-r--r--man/systemd.nspawn.xml18
-rw-r--r--src/basic/copy.c2
-rw-r--r--src/basic/fd-util.c10
-rw-r--r--src/basic/fd-util.h2
-rw-r--r--src/basic/missing.h4
-rw-r--r--src/basic/user-util.h5
-rw-r--r--src/nspawn/nspawn-gperf.gperf4
-rw-r--r--src/nspawn/nspawn-patch-uid.c469
-rw-r--r--src/nspawn/nspawn-patch-uid.h23
-rw-r--r--src/nspawn/nspawn-settings.c86
-rw-r--r--src/nspawn/nspawn-settings.h15
-rw-r--r--src/nspawn/nspawn.c350
-rw-r--r--src/nspawn/test-patch-uid.c61
-rw-r--r--units/systemd-nspawn@.service.in2
17 files changed, 1091 insertions, 75 deletions
diff --git a/.gitignore b/.gitignore
index 02ba86ef6f..c7eb14452d 100644
--- a/.gitignore
+++ b/.gitignore
@@ -240,6 +240,7 @@
/test-ns
/test-nss
/test-parse-util
+/test-patch-uid
/test-path
/test-path-lookup
/test-path-util
diff --git a/Makefile.am b/Makefile.am
index 0f475c6d09..b323de55c6 100644
--- a/Makefile.am
+++ b/Makefile.am
@@ -3021,6 +3021,8 @@ systemd_nspawn_SOURCES = \
src/nspawn/nspawn-setuid.h \
src/nspawn/nspawn-stub-pid1.c \
src/nspawn/nspawn-stub-pid1.h \
+ src/nspawn/nspawn-patch-uid.c \
+ src/nspawn/nspawn-patch-uid.h \
src/core/mount-setup.c \
src/core/mount-setup.h \
src/core/loopback-setup.c \
@@ -3048,6 +3050,17 @@ systemd_nspawn_LDADD += \
libfirewall.la
endif
+test_patch_uid_SOURCES = \
+ src/nspawn/nspawn-patch-uid.c \
+ src/nspawn/nspawn-patch-uid.h \
+ src/nspawn/test-patch-uid.c
+
+test_patch_uid_LDADD = \
+ libshared.la
+
+manual_tests += \
+ test-patch-uid
+
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
systemd_run_SOURCES = \
src/run/run.c
diff --git a/man/systemd-nspawn.xml b/man/systemd-nspawn.xml
index a0376ed3e0..bd688a0ee1 100644
--- a/man/systemd-nspawn.xml
+++ b/man/systemd-nspawn.xml
@@ -387,38 +387,79 @@
<varlistentry>
<term><option>--private-users=</option></term>
- <listitem><para>Enables user namespacing. If enabled, the
- container will run with its own private set of Unix user and
- group ids (UIDs and GIDs). Takes none, one or two
- colon-separated parameters: the first parameter specifies the
- first host UID to assign to the container, the second
- parameter specifies the number of host UIDs to assign to the
- container. If the second parameter is omitted, 65536 UIDs are
- assigned. If the first parameter is also omitted (and hence
- no parameter passed at all), the first UID assigned to the
- container is read from the owner of the root directory of the
- container's directory tree. By default, no user namespacing is
- applied.</para>
-
- <para>Note that user namespacing currently requires OS trees
- that are prepared for the UID shift that is being applied:
- UIDs and GIDs used for file ownership or in file ACL entries
- must be shifted to the container UID base that is
- used during container runtime.</para>
-
- <para>It is recommended to assign at least 65536 UIDs to each
- container, so that the usable UID range in the container
- covers 16 bit. For best security, do not assign overlapping UID
- ranges to multiple containers. It is hence a good idea to use
- the upper 16 bit of the host 32-bit UIDs as container
- identifier, while the lower 16 bit encode the container UID
- used.</para>
-
- <para>When user namespaces are used, the GID range assigned to
- each container is always chosen identical to the UID
- range.</para></listitem>
+ <listitem><para>Controls user namespacing. If enabled, the container will run with its own private set of UNIX
+ user and group ids (UIDs and GIDs). This involves mapping the private UIDs/GIDs used in the container (starting
+ with the container's root user 0 and up) to a range of UIDs/GIDs on the host that are not used for other
+ purposes (usually in the range beyond the host's UID/GID 65536). The parameter may be specified as follows:</para>
+
+ <orderedlist>
+ <listitem><para>The value <literal>no</literal> turns off user namespacing. This is the default.</para></listitem>
+
+ <listitem><para>The value <literal>yes</literal> (or the omission of a parameter) turns on user
+ namespacing. The UID/GID range to use is determined automatically from the file ownership of the root
+ directory of the container's directory tree. To use this option, make sure to prepare the directory tree in
+ advance, and ensure that all files and directories in it are owned by UIDs/GIDs in the range you'd like to
+ use. Also, make sure that used file ACLs exclusively reference UIDs/GIDs in the appropriate range. If this
+ mode is used the number of UIDs/GIDs assigned to the container for use is 65536, and the UID/GID of the
+ root directory must be a multiple of 65536.</para></listitem>
+
+ <listitem><para>The value "pick" turns on user namespacing. In this case the UID/GID range is automatically
+ chosen. As first step, the file owner of the root directory of the container's directory tree is read, and it
+ is checked that it is currently not used by the system otherwise (in particular, that no other container is
+ using it). If this check is successful, the UID/GID range determined this way is used, similar to the
+ behaviour if "yes" is specified. If the check is not successful (and thus the UID/GID range indicated in the
+ root directory's file owner is already used elsewhere) a new – currently unused – UID/GID range of 65536
+ UIDs/GIDs is randomly chosen between the host UID/GIDs of 524288 and 1878982656, always starting at a
+ multiple of 65536. This setting implies <option>--private-users-chown</option> (see below), which has the
+ effect that the files and directories in the container's directory tree will be owned by the appropriate
+ users of the range picked. Using this option makes user namespace behaviour fully automatic. Note that the
+ first invocation of a previously unused container image might result in picking a new UID/GID range for it,
+ and thus in the (possibly expensive) file ownership adjustment operation. However, subsequent invocations of
+ the container will be cheap (unless of course the picked UID/GID range is assigned to a different use by
+ then).</para></listitem>
+
+ <listitem><para>Finally if one or two colon-separated numeric parameters are specified, user namespacing is
+ turned on, too. The first parameter specifies the first host UID/GID to assign to the container, the second
+ parameter specifies the number of host UIDs/GIDs to assign to the container. If the second parameter is
+ omitted, 65536 UIDs/GIDs are assigned.</para></listitem>
+ </orderedlist>
+
+ <para>It is recommended to assign at least 65536 UIDs/GIDs to each container, so that the usable UID/GID range in the
+ container covers 16 bit. For best security, do not assign overlapping UID/GID ranges to multiple containers. It is
+ hence a good idea to use the upper 16 bit of the host 32-bit UIDs/GIDs as container identifier, while the lower 16
+ bit encode the container UID/GID used. This is in fact the behaviour enforced by the
+ <option>--private-users=pick</option> option.</para>
+
+ <para>When user namespaces are used, the GID range assigned to each container is always chosen identical to the
+ UID range.</para>
+
+ <para>In most cases, using <option>--private-users=pick</option> is the recommended option as it enhances
+ container security massively and operates fully automatically in most cases.</para>
+
+ <para>Note that the picked UID/GID range is not written to <filename>/etc/passwd</filename> or
+ <filename>/etc/group</filename>. In fact, the allocation of the range is not stored persistently anywhere,
+ except in the file ownership of the files and directories of the container.</para></listitem>
</varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term><option>-U</option></term>
+
+ <listitem><para>If the kernel supports the user namespaces feature, equivalent to
+ <option>--private-users=pick</option>, otherwise equivalent to
+ <option>--private-users=no</option>.</para></listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term><option>--private-users-chown</option></term>
+
+ <listitem><para>If specified, all files and directories in the container's directory tree will adjusted so that
+ they are owned to the appropriate UIDs/GIDs selected for the container (see above). This operation is
+ potentially expensive, as it involves descending and iterating through the full directory tree of the
+ container. Besides actual file ownership, file ACLs are adjusted as well.</para>
+
+ <para>This option is implied if <option>--private-users=pick</option> is used. This option has no effect if
+ user namespacing is not used.</para></listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
<varlistentry>
<term><option>--private-network</option></term>
diff --git a/man/systemd.nspawn.xml b/man/systemd.nspawn.xml
index ce900a5db1..15360078ef 100644
--- a/man/systemd.nspawn.xml
+++ b/man/systemd.nspawn.xml
@@ -251,6 +251,14 @@
<option>--uuid=</option> command line switch. This option is
privileged (see above). </para></listitem>
</varlistentry>
+
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term><varname>PrivateUsers=</varname></term>
+
+ <listitem><para>Configures support for usernamespacing. This is equivalent to the
+ <option>--private-users=</option> command line switch, and takes the same options. This option is privileged
+ (see above). </para></listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
</variablelist>
</refsect1>
@@ -314,6 +322,16 @@
for details about the specific options supported. This setting
is privileged (see above).</para></listitem>
</varlistentry>
+
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term><varname>PrivateUsersChown=</varname></term>
+
+ <listitem><para>Configures whether the ownership of the files and directories in the container tree shall be
+ adjusted to the UID/GID range used, if necessary and user namespacing is enabled. This is equivalent to the
+ <option>--private-users-chown</option> command line switch. This option is privileged (see
+ above). </para></listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
</variablelist>
</refsect1>
diff --git a/src/basic/copy.c b/src/basic/copy.c
index e2db4be9ff..03487a6878 100644
--- a/src/basic/copy.c
+++ b/src/basic/copy.c
@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ int copy_bytes(int fdf, int fdt, uint64_t max_bytes, bool try_reflink) {
if (try_cfr) {
n = try_copy_file_range(fdf, NULL, fdt, NULL, m, 0u);
if (n < 0) {
- if (!IN_SET(n, -EINVAL, -ENOSYS, -EXDEV))
+ if (!IN_SET(n, -EINVAL, -ENOSYS, -EXDEV, -EBADF))
return n;
try_cfr = false;
diff --git a/src/basic/fd-util.c b/src/basic/fd-util.c
index ec9560cd07..3d46d708c7 100644
--- a/src/basic/fd-util.c
+++ b/src/basic/fd-util.c
@@ -25,11 +25,13 @@
#include <unistd.h>
#include "fd-util.h"
+#include "fs-util.h"
#include "macro.h"
#include "missing.h"
#include "parse-util.h"
#include "path-util.h"
#include "socket-util.h"
+#include "stdio-util.h"
#include "util.h"
int close_nointr(int fd) {
@@ -356,3 +358,11 @@ bool fdname_is_valid(const char *s) {
return p - s < 256;
}
+
+int fd_get_path(int fd, char **ret) {
+ char procfs_path[strlen("/proc/self/fd/") + DECIMAL_STR_MAX(int)];
+
+ xsprintf(procfs_path, "/proc/self/fd/%i", fd);
+
+ return readlink_malloc(procfs_path, ret);
+}
diff --git a/src/basic/fd-util.h b/src/basic/fd-util.h
index 44528c6e35..b86e41698a 100644
--- a/src/basic/fd-util.h
+++ b/src/basic/fd-util.h
@@ -72,6 +72,8 @@ void cmsg_close_all(struct msghdr *mh);
bool fdname_is_valid(const char *s);
+int fd_get_path(int fd, char **ret);
+
/* Hint: ENETUNREACH happens if we try to connect to "non-existing" special IP addresses, such as ::5 */
#define ERRNO_IS_DISCONNECT(r) \
IN_SET(r, ENOTCONN, ECONNRESET, ECONNREFUSED, ECONNABORTED, EPIPE, ENETUNREACH)
diff --git a/src/basic/missing.h b/src/basic/missing.h
index 6616f0b720..b389e94cf7 100644
--- a/src/basic/missing.h
+++ b/src/basic/missing.h
@@ -445,6 +445,10 @@ struct btrfs_ioctl_quota_ctl_args {
#define TMPFS_MAGIC 0x01021994
#endif
+#ifndef MQUEUE_MAGIC
+#define MQUEUE_MAGIC 0x19800202
+#endif
+
#ifndef MS_MOVE
#define MS_MOVE 8192
#endif
diff --git a/src/basic/user-util.h b/src/basic/user-util.h
index c23f1d485d..8026eca3f4 100644
--- a/src/basic/user-util.h
+++ b/src/basic/user-util.h
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
#include <stdbool.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
bool uid_is_valid(uid_t uid);
@@ -63,3 +64,7 @@ int take_etc_passwd_lock(const char *root);
#define PTR_TO_GID(p) ((gid_t) (((uintptr_t) (p))-1))
#define GID_TO_PTR(u) ((void*) (((uintptr_t) (u))+1))
+
+static inline bool userns_supported(void) {
+ return access("/proc/self/uid_map", F_OK) >= 0;
+}
diff --git a/src/nspawn/nspawn-gperf.gperf b/src/nspawn/nspawn-gperf.gperf
index 116655cdd2..34e1310e29 100644
--- a/src/nspawn/nspawn-gperf.gperf
+++ b/src/nspawn/nspawn-gperf.gperf
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ struct ConfigPerfItem;
%includes
%%
Exec.Boot, config_parse_boot, 0, 0
-Exec.ProcessTwo, config_parse_pid2, 0, 0,
+Exec.ProcessTwo, config_parse_pid2, 0, 0
Exec.Parameters, config_parse_strv, 0, offsetof(Settings, parameters)
Exec.Environment, config_parse_strv, 0, offsetof(Settings, environment)
Exec.User, config_parse_string, 0, offsetof(Settings, user)
@@ -26,11 +26,13 @@ Exec.KillSignal, config_parse_signal, 0, offsetof(Settings,
Exec.Personality, config_parse_personality, 0, offsetof(Settings, personality)
Exec.MachineID, config_parse_id128, 0, offsetof(Settings, machine_id)
Exec.WorkingDirectory, config_parse_path, 0, offsetof(Settings, working_directory)
+Exec.PrivateUsers, config_parse_private_users, 0, 0
Files.ReadOnly, config_parse_tristate, 0, offsetof(Settings, read_only)
Files.Volatile, config_parse_volatile_mode, 0, offsetof(Settings, volatile_mode)
Files.Bind, config_parse_bind, 0, 0
Files.BindReadOnly, config_parse_bind, 1, 0
Files.TemporaryFileSystem, config_parse_tmpfs, 0, 0
+Files.PrivateUsersChown, config_parse_tristate, 0, offsetof(Settings, userns_chown)
Network.Private, config_parse_tristate, 0, offsetof(Settings, private_network)
Network.Interface, config_parse_strv, 0, offsetof(Settings, network_interfaces)
Network.MACVLAN, config_parse_strv, 0, offsetof(Settings, network_macvlan)
diff --git a/src/nspawn/nspawn-patch-uid.c b/src/nspawn/nspawn-patch-uid.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c7382d412d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/nspawn/nspawn-patch-uid.c
@@ -0,0 +1,469 @@
+/***
+ This file is part of systemd.
+
+ Copyright 2016 Lennart Poettering
+
+ systemd is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License as published by
+ the Free Software Foundation; either version 2.1 of the License, or
+ (at your option) any later version.
+
+ systemd is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
+ Lesser General Public License for more details.
+
+ You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public License
+ along with systemd; If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+***/
+
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <linux/magic.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_ACL
+#include <sys/acl.h>
+#endif
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/vfs.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "acl-util.h"
+#include "dirent-util.h"
+#include "fd-util.h"
+#include "missing.h"
+#include "nspawn-patch-uid.h"
+#include "stat-util.h"
+#include "stdio-util.h"
+#include "string-util.h"
+#include "strv.h"
+#include "user-util.h"
+
+#ifdef HAVE_ACL
+
+static int get_acl(int fd, const char *name, acl_type_t type, acl_t *ret) {
+ char procfs_path[strlen("/proc/self/fd/") + DECIMAL_STR_MAX(int) + 1];
+ acl_t acl;
+
+ assert(fd >= 0);
+ assert(ret);
+
+ if (name) {
+ _cleanup_close_ int child_fd = -1;
+
+ child_fd = openat(fd, name, O_PATH|O_CLOEXEC|O_NOFOLLOW);
+ if (child_fd < 0)
+ return -errno;
+
+ xsprintf(procfs_path, "/proc/self/fd/%i", child_fd);
+ acl = acl_get_file(procfs_path, type);
+ } else if (type == ACL_TYPE_ACCESS)
+ acl = acl_get_fd(fd);
+ else {
+ xsprintf(procfs_path, "/proc/self/fd/%i", fd);
+ acl = acl_get_file(procfs_path, type);
+ }
+ if (!acl)
+ return -errno;
+
+ *ret = acl;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int set_acl(int fd, const char *name, acl_type_t type, acl_t acl) {
+ char procfs_path[strlen("/proc/self/fd/") + DECIMAL_STR_MAX(int) + 1];
+ int r;
+
+ assert(fd >= 0);
+ assert(acl);
+
+ if (name) {
+ _cleanup_close_ int child_fd = -1;
+
+ child_fd = openat(fd, name, O_PATH|O_CLOEXEC|O_NOFOLLOW);
+ if (child_fd < 0)
+ return -errno;
+
+ xsprintf(procfs_path, "/proc/self/fd/%i", child_fd);
+ r = acl_set_file(procfs_path, type, acl);
+ } else if (type == ACL_TYPE_ACCESS)
+ r = acl_set_fd(fd, acl);
+ else {
+ xsprintf(procfs_path, "/proc/self/fd/%i", fd);
+ r = acl_set_file(procfs_path, type, acl);
+ }
+ if (r < 0)
+ return -errno;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int shift_acl(acl_t acl, uid_t shift, acl_t *ret) {
+ _cleanup_(acl_freep) acl_t copy = NULL;
+ acl_entry_t i;
+ int r;
+
+ assert(acl);
+ assert(ret);
+
+ r = acl_get_entry(acl, ACL_FIRST_ENTRY, &i);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return -errno;
+ while (r > 0) {
+ uid_t *old_uid, new_uid;
+ bool modify = false;
+ acl_tag_t tag;
+
+ if (acl_get_tag_type(i, &tag) < 0)
+ return -errno;
+
+ if (IN_SET(tag, ACL_USER, ACL_GROUP)) {
+
+ /* We don't distuingish here between uid_t and gid_t, let's make sure the compiler checks that
+ * this is actually OK */
+ assert_cc(sizeof(uid_t) == sizeof(gid_t));
+
+ old_uid = acl_get_qualifier(i);
+ if (!old_uid)
+ return -errno;
+
+ new_uid = shift | (*old_uid & UINT32_C(0xFFFF));
+ if (!uid_is_valid(new_uid))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ modify = new_uid != *old_uid;
+ if (modify && !copy) {
+ int n;
+
+ /* There's no copy of the ACL yet? if so, let's create one, and start the loop from the
+ * beginning, so that we copy all entries, starting from the first, this time. */
+
+ n = acl_entries(acl);
+ if (n < 0)
+ return -errno;
+
+ copy = acl_init(n);
+ if (!copy)
+ return -errno;
+
+ /* Seek back to the beginning */
+ r = acl_get_entry(acl, ACL_FIRST_ENTRY, &i);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return -errno;
+ continue;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (copy) {
+ acl_entry_t new_entry;
+
+ if (acl_create_entry(&copy, &new_entry) < 0)
+ return -errno;
+
+ if (acl_copy_entry(new_entry, i) < 0)
+ return -errno;
+
+ if (modify)
+ if (acl_set_qualifier(new_entry, &new_uid) < 0)
+ return -errno;
+ }
+
+ r = acl_get_entry(acl, ACL_NEXT_ENTRY, &i);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return -errno;
+ }
+
+ *ret = copy;
+ copy = NULL;
+
+ return !!*ret;
+}
+
+static int patch_acls(int fd, const char *name, const struct stat *st, uid_t shift) {
+ _cleanup_(acl_freep) acl_t acl = NULL, shifted = NULL;
+ bool changed = false;
+ int r;
+
+ assert(fd >= 0);
+ assert(st);
+
+ /* ACLs are not supported on symlinks, there's no point in trying */
+ if (S_ISLNK(st->st_mode))
+ return 0;
+
+ r = get_acl(fd, name, ACL_TYPE_ACCESS, &acl);
+ if (r == -EOPNOTSUPP)
+ return 0;
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ r = shift_acl(acl, shift, &shifted);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+ if (r > 0) {
+ r = set_acl(fd, name, ACL_TYPE_ACCESS, shifted);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ changed = true;
+ }
+
+ if (S_ISDIR(st->st_mode)) {
+ acl_free(acl);
+ acl_free(shifted);
+
+ acl = shifted = NULL;
+
+ r = get_acl(fd, name, ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT, &acl);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ r = shift_acl(acl, shift, &shifted);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+ if (r > 0) {
+ r = set_acl(fd, name, ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT, shifted);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ changed = true;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return changed;
+}
+
+#else
+
+static int patch_acls(int fd, const char *name, const struct stat *st, uid_t shift) {
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#endif
+
+static int patch_fd(int fd, const char *name, const struct stat *st, uid_t shift) {
+ uid_t new_uid;
+ gid_t new_gid;
+ bool changed = false;
+ int r;
+
+ assert(fd >= 0);
+ assert(st);
+
+ new_uid = shift | (st->st_uid & UINT32_C(0xFFFF));
+ new_gid = (gid_t) shift | (st->st_gid & UINT32_C(0xFFFF));
+
+ if (!uid_is_valid(new_uid) || !gid_is_valid(new_gid))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (st->st_uid != new_uid || st->st_gid != new_gid) {
+ if (name)
+ r = fchownat(fd, name, new_uid, new_gid, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW);
+ else
+ r = fchown(fd, new_uid, new_gid);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return -errno;
+
+ /* The Linux kernel alters the mode in some cases of chown(). Let's undo this. */
+ if (name && !S_ISLNK(st->st_mode))
+ r = fchmodat(fd, name, st->st_mode, 0);
+ else
+ r = fchmod(fd, st->st_mode);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return -errno;
+
+ changed = true;
+ }
+
+ r = patch_acls(fd, name, st, shift);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ return r > 0 || changed;
+}
+
+static int is_procfs_sysfs_or_suchlike(int fd) {
+ struct statfs sfs;
+
+ assert(fd >= 0);
+
+ if (fstatfs(fd, &sfs) < 0)
+ return -errno;
+
+ return F_TYPE_EQUAL(sfs.f_type, BINFMTFS_MAGIC) ||
+ F_TYPE_EQUAL(sfs.f_type, CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC) ||
+ F_TYPE_EQUAL(sfs.f_type, CGROUP2_SUPER_MAGIC) ||
+ F_TYPE_EQUAL(sfs.f_type, DEBUGFS_MAGIC) ||
+ F_TYPE_EQUAL(sfs.f_type, DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC) ||
+ F_TYPE_EQUAL(sfs.f_type, EFIVARFS_MAGIC) ||
+ F_TYPE_EQUAL(sfs.f_type, HUGETLBFS_MAGIC) ||
+ F_TYPE_EQUAL(sfs.f_type, MQUEUE_MAGIC) ||
+ F_TYPE_EQUAL(sfs.f_type, PROC_SUPER_MAGIC) ||
+ F_TYPE_EQUAL(sfs.f_type, PSTOREFS_MAGIC) ||
+ F_TYPE_EQUAL(sfs.f_type, SELINUX_MAGIC) ||
+ F_TYPE_EQUAL(sfs.f_type, SMACK_MAGIC) ||
+ F_TYPE_EQUAL(sfs.f_type, SYSFS_MAGIC);
+}
+
+static int recurse_fd(int fd, bool donate_fd, const struct stat *st, uid_t shift, bool is_toplevel) {
+ bool changed = false;
+ int r;
+
+ assert(fd >= 0);
+
+ /* We generally want to permit crossing of mount boundaries when patching the UIDs/GIDs. However, we
+ * probably shouldn't do this for /proc and /sys if that is already mounted into place. Hence, let's
+ * stop the recursion when we hit a procfs or sysfs file system. */
+ r = is_procfs_sysfs_or_suchlike(fd);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto finish;
+ if (r > 0) {
+ r = 0; /* don't recurse */
+ goto finish;
+ }
+
+ r = patch_fd(fd, NULL, st, shift);
+ if (r == -EROFS) {
+ _cleanup_free_ char *name = NULL;
+
+ if (!is_toplevel) {
+ /* When we hit a ready-only subtree we simply skip it, but log about it. */
+ (void) fd_get_path(fd, &name);
+ log_debug("Skippping read-only file or directory %s.", strna(name));
+ r = 0;
+ }
+
+ goto finish;
+ }
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto finish;
+
+ if (S_ISDIR(st->st_mode)) {
+ _cleanup_closedir_ DIR *d = NULL;
+ struct dirent *de;
+
+ if (!donate_fd) {
+ int copy;
+
+ copy = fcntl(fd, F_DUPFD_CLOEXEC, 3);
+ if (copy < 0) {
+ r = -errno;
+ goto finish;
+ }
+
+ fd = copy;
+ donate_fd = true;
+ }
+
+ d = fdopendir(fd);
+ if (!d) {
+ r = -errno;
+ goto finish;
+ }
+ fd = -1;
+
+ FOREACH_DIRENT_ALL(de, d, r = -errno; goto finish) {
+ struct stat fst;
+
+ if (STR_IN_SET(de->d_name, ".", ".."))
+ continue;
+
+ if (fstatat(dirfd(d), de->d_name, &fst, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) < 0) {
+ r = -errno;
+ goto finish;
+ }
+
+ if (S_ISDIR(fst.st_mode)) {
+ int subdir_fd;
+
+ subdir_fd = openat(dirfd(d), de->d_name, O_RDONLY|O_NONBLOCK|O_DIRECTORY|O_CLOEXEC|O_NOFOLLOW|O_NOATIME);
+ if (subdir_fd < 0) {
+ r = -errno;
+ goto finish;
+
+ }
+
+ r = recurse_fd(subdir_fd, true, &fst, shift, false);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto finish;
+ if (r > 0)
+ changed = true;
+
+ } else {
+ r = patch_fd(dirfd(d), de->d_name, &fst, shift);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto finish;
+ if (r > 0)
+ changed = true;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ r = changed;
+
+finish:
+ if (donate_fd)
+ safe_close(fd);
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int fd_patch_uid_internal(int fd, bool donate_fd, uid_t shift, uid_t range) {
+ struct stat st;
+ int r;
+
+ assert(fd >= 0);
+
+ /* Recursively adjusts the UID/GIDs of all files of a directory tree. This is used to automatically fix up an
+ * OS tree to the used user namespace UID range. Note that this automatic adjustment only works for UID ranges
+ * following the concept that the upper 16bit of a UID identify the container, and the lower 16bit are the actual
+ * UID within the container. */
+
+ if ((shift & 0xFFFF) != 0) {
+ /* We only support containers where the shift starts at a 2^16 boundary */
+ r = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ goto finish;
+ }
+
+ if (range != 0x10000) {
+ /* We only support containers with 16bit UID ranges for the patching logic */
+ r = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ goto finish;
+ }
+
+ if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0) {
+ r = -errno;
+ goto finish;
+ }
+
+ if ((uint32_t) st.st_uid >> 16 != (uint32_t) st.st_gid >> 16) {
+ /* We only support containers where the uid/gid container ID match */
+ r = -EBADE;
+ goto finish;
+ }
+
+ /* Try to detect if the range is already right. Of course, this a pretty drastic optimization, as we assume
+ * that if the top-level dir has the right upper 16bit assigned, then everything below will have too... */
+ if (((uint32_t) (st.st_uid ^ shift) >> 16) == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ return recurse_fd(fd, donate_fd, &st, shift, true);
+
+finish:
+ if (donate_fd)
+ safe_close(fd);
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+int fd_patch_uid(int fd, uid_t shift, uid_t range) {
+ return fd_patch_uid_internal(fd, false, shift, range);
+}
+
+int path_patch_uid(const char *path, uid_t shift, uid_t range) {
+ int fd;
+
+ fd = open(path, O_RDONLY|O_NONBLOCK|O_DIRECTORY|O_CLOEXEC|O_NOFOLLOW|O_NOATIME);
+ if (fd < 0)
+ return -errno;
+
+ return fd_patch_uid_internal(fd, true, shift, range);
+}
diff --git a/src/nspawn/nspawn-patch-uid.h b/src/nspawn/nspawn-patch-uid.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..55d0990016
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/nspawn/nspawn-patch-uid.h
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+/***
+ This file is part of systemd.
+
+ Copyright 2016 Lennart Poettering
+
+ systemd is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License as published by
+ the Free Software Foundation; either version 2.1 of the License, or
+ (at your option) any later version.
+
+ systemd is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
+ Lesser General Public License for more details.
+
+ You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public License
+ along with systemd; If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+***/
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+int fd_patch_uid(int fd, uid_t shift, uid_t range);
+int path_patch_uid(const char *path, uid_t shift, uid_t range);
diff --git a/src/nspawn/nspawn-settings.c b/src/nspawn/nspawn-settings.c
index 4fb0054698..b98a79fd09 100644
--- a/src/nspawn/nspawn-settings.c
+++ b/src/nspawn/nspawn-settings.c
@@ -25,7 +25,9 @@
#include "parse-util.h"
#include "process-util.h"
#include "strv.h"
+#include "user-util.h"
#include "util.h"
+#include "string-util.h"
int settings_load(FILE *f, const char *path, Settings **ret) {
_cleanup_(settings_freep) Settings *s = NULL;
@@ -40,9 +42,13 @@ int settings_load(FILE *f, const char *path, Settings **ret) {
s->start_mode = _START_MODE_INVALID;
s->personality = PERSONALITY_INVALID;
+ s->userns_mode = _USER_NAMESPACE_MODE_INVALID;
+ s->uid_shift = UID_INVALID;
+ s->uid_range = UID_INVALID;
s->read_only = -1;
s->volatile_mode = _VOLATILE_MODE_INVALID;
+ s->userns_chown = -1;
s->private_network = -1;
s->network_veth = -1;
@@ -59,6 +65,16 @@ int settings_load(FILE *f, const char *path, Settings **ret) {
if (r < 0)
return r;
+ /* Make sure that if userns_mode is set, userns_chown is set to something appropriate, and vice versa. Either
+ * both fields shall be initialized or neither. */
+ if (s->userns_mode == USER_NAMESPACE_PICK)
+ s->userns_chown = true;
+ else if (s->userns_mode != _USER_NAMESPACE_MODE_INVALID && s->userns_chown < 0)
+ s->userns_chown = false;
+
+ if (s->userns_chown >= 0 && s->userns_mode == _USER_NAMESPACE_MODE_INVALID)
+ s->userns_mode = USER_NAMESPACE_NO;
+
*ret = s;
s = NULL;
@@ -392,3 +408,73 @@ conflict:
log_syntax(unit, LOG_ERR, filename, line, r, "Conflicting Boot= or ProcessTwo= setting found. Ignoring.");
return 0;
}
+
+int config_parse_private_users(
+ const char *unit,
+ const char *filename,
+ unsigned line,
+ const char *section,
+ unsigned section_line,
+ const char *lvalue,
+ int ltype,
+ const char *rvalue,
+ void *data,
+ void *userdata) {
+
+ Settings *settings = data;
+ int r;
+
+ assert(filename);
+ assert(lvalue);
+ assert(rvalue);
+
+ r = parse_boolean(rvalue);
+ if (r == 0) {
+ /* no: User namespacing off */
+ settings->userns_mode = USER_NAMESPACE_NO;
+ settings->uid_shift = UID_INVALID;
+ settings->uid_range = UINT32_C(0x10000);
+ } else if (r > 0) {
+ /* yes: User namespacing on, UID range is read from root dir */
+ settings->userns_mode = USER_NAMESPACE_FIXED;
+ settings->uid_shift = UID_INVALID;
+ settings->uid_range = UINT32_C(0x10000);
+ } else if (streq(rvalue, "pick")) {
+ /* pick: User namespacing on, UID range is picked randomly */
+ settings->userns_mode = USER_NAMESPACE_PICK;
+ settings->uid_shift = UID_INVALID;
+ settings->uid_range = UINT32_C(0x10000);
+ } else {
+ const char *range, *shift;
+ uid_t sh, rn;
+
+ /* anything else: User namespacing on, UID range is explicitly configured */
+
+ range = strchr(rvalue, ':');
+ if (range) {
+ shift = strndupa(rvalue, range - rvalue);
+ range++;
+
+ r = safe_atou32(range, &rn);
+ if (r < 0 || rn <= 0) {
+ log_syntax(unit, LOG_ERR, filename, line, r, "UID/GID range invalid, ignoring: %s", range);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ } else {
+ shift = rvalue;
+ rn = UINT32_C(0x10000);
+ }
+
+ r = parse_uid(shift, &sh);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ log_syntax(unit, LOG_ERR, filename, line, r, "UID/GID shift invalid, ignoring: %s", range);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ settings->userns_mode = USER_NAMESPACE_FIXED;
+ settings->uid_shift = sh;
+ settings->uid_range = rn;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/src/nspawn/nspawn-settings.h b/src/nspawn/nspawn-settings.h
index a017405cd9..e12e91b886 100644
--- a/src/nspawn/nspawn-settings.h
+++ b/src/nspawn/nspawn-settings.h
@@ -33,6 +33,14 @@ typedef enum StartMode {
_START_MODE_INVALID = -1
} StartMode;
+typedef enum UserNamespaceMode {
+ USER_NAMESPACE_NO,
+ USER_NAMESPACE_FIXED,
+ USER_NAMESPACE_PICK,
+ _USER_NAMESPACE_MODE_MAX,
+ _USER_NAMESPACE_MODE_INVALID = -1,
+} UserNamespaceMode;
+
typedef enum SettingsMask {
SETTING_START_MODE = 1 << 0,
SETTING_ENVIRONMENT = 1 << 1,
@@ -47,7 +55,8 @@ typedef enum SettingsMask {
SETTING_VOLATILE_MODE = 1 << 10,
SETTING_CUSTOM_MOUNTS = 1 << 11,
SETTING_WORKING_DIRECTORY = 1 << 12,
- _SETTINGS_MASK_ALL = (1 << 13) -1
+ SETTING_USERNS = 1 << 13,
+ _SETTINGS_MASK_ALL = (1 << 14) -1
} SettingsMask;
typedef struct Settings {
@@ -62,12 +71,15 @@ typedef struct Settings {
unsigned long personality;
sd_id128_t machine_id;
char *working_directory;
+ UserNamespaceMode userns_mode;
+ uid_t uid_shift, uid_range;
/* [Image] */
int read_only;
VolatileMode volatile_mode;
CustomMount *custom_mounts;
unsigned n_custom_mounts;
+ int userns_chown;
/* [Network] */
int private_network;
@@ -99,3 +111,4 @@ int config_parse_tmpfs(const char *unit, const char *filename, unsigned line, co
int config_parse_veth_extra(const char *unit, const char *filename, unsigned line, const char *section, unsigned section_line, const char *lvalue, int ltype, const char *rvalue, void *data, void *userdata);
int config_parse_boot(const char *unit, const char *filename, unsigned line, const char *section, unsigned section_line, const char *lvalue, int ltype, const char *rvalue, void *data, void *userdata);
int config_parse_pid2(const char *unit, const char *filename, unsigned line, const char *section, unsigned section_line, const char *lvalue, int ltype, const char *rvalue, void *data, void *userdata);
+int config_parse_private_users(const char *unit, const char *filename, unsigned line, const char *section, unsigned section_line, const char *lvalue, int ltype, const char *rvalue, void *data, void *userdata);
diff --git a/src/nspawn/nspawn.c b/src/nspawn/nspawn.c
index d687df8a09..5d39c9d7c3 100644
--- a/src/nspawn/nspawn.c
+++ b/src/nspawn/nspawn.c
@@ -22,7 +22,9 @@
#endif
#include <errno.h>
#include <getopt.h>
+#include <grp.h>
#include <linux/loop.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
#include <sched.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SECCOMP
#include <seccomp.h>
@@ -75,6 +77,7 @@
#include "nspawn-expose-ports.h"
#include "nspawn-mount.h"
#include "nspawn-network.h"
+#include "nspawn-patch-uid.h"
#include "nspawn-register.h"
#include "nspawn-settings.h"
#include "nspawn-setuid.h"
@@ -101,6 +104,11 @@
#include "user-util.h"
#include "util.h"
+/* Note that devpts's gid= parameter parses GIDs as signed values, hence we stay away from the upper half of the 32bit
+ * UID range here */
+#define UID_SHIFT_PICK_MIN ((uid_t) UINT32_C(0x00080000))
+#define UID_SHIFT_PICK_MAX ((uid_t) UINT32_C(0x6FFF0000))
+
typedef enum ContainerStatus {
CONTAINER_TERMINATED,
CONTAINER_REBOOTED
@@ -173,8 +181,9 @@ static char *arg_image = NULL;
static VolatileMode arg_volatile_mode = VOLATILE_NO;
static ExposePort *arg_expose_ports = NULL;
static char **arg_property = NULL;
+static UserNamespaceMode arg_userns_mode = USER_NAMESPACE_NO;
static uid_t arg_uid_shift = UID_INVALID, arg_uid_range = 0x10000U;
-static bool arg_userns = false;
+static bool arg_userns_chown = false;
static int arg_kill_signal = 0;
static bool arg_unified_cgroup_hierarchy = false;
static SettingsMask arg_settings_mask = 0;
@@ -202,8 +211,10 @@ static void help(void) {
" --uuid=UUID Set a specific machine UUID for the container\n"
" -S --slice=SLICE Place the container in the specified slice\n"
" --property=NAME=VALUE Set scope unit property\n"
+ " -U --private-users=pick Run within user namespace, pick UID/GID range automatically\n"
" --private-users[=UIDBASE[:NUIDS]]\n"
- " Run within user namespace\n"
+ " Run within user namespace, user configured UID/GID range\n"
+ " --private-user-chown Adjust OS tree file ownership for private UID/GID range\n"
" --private-network Disable network in container\n"
" --network-interface=INTERFACE\n"
" Assign an existing network interface to the\n"
@@ -272,9 +283,15 @@ static int custom_mounts_prepare(void) {
for (i = 0; i < arg_n_custom_mounts; i++) {
CustomMount *m = &arg_custom_mounts[i];
- if (arg_userns && arg_uid_shift == UID_INVALID && path_equal(m->destination, "/")) {
- log_error("--private-users with automatic UID shift may not be combined with custom root mounts.");
- return -EINVAL;
+ if (path_equal(m->destination, "/") && arg_userns_mode != USER_NAMESPACE_NO) {
+
+ if (arg_userns_chown) {
+ log_error("--private-users-chown may not be combined with custom root mounts.");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ } else if (arg_uid_shift == UID_INVALID) {
+ log_error("--private-users with automatic UID shift may not be combined with custom root mounts.");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
}
if (m->type != CUSTOM_MOUNT_OVERLAY)
@@ -349,6 +366,7 @@ static int parse_argv(int argc, char *argv[]) {
ARG_KILL_SIGNAL,
ARG_SETTINGS,
ARG_CHDIR,
+ ARG_PRIVATE_USERS_CHOWN,
};
static const struct option options[] = {
@@ -392,6 +410,7 @@ static int parse_argv(int argc, char *argv[]) {
{ "port", required_argument, NULL, 'p' },
{ "property", required_argument, NULL, ARG_PROPERTY },
{ "private-users", optional_argument, NULL, ARG_PRIVATE_USERS },
+ { "private-users-chown", optional_argument, NULL, ARG_PRIVATE_USERS_CHOWN},
{ "kill-signal", required_argument, NULL, ARG_KILL_SIGNAL },
{ "settings", required_argument, NULL, ARG_SETTINGS },
{ "chdir", required_argument, NULL, ARG_CHDIR },
@@ -406,7 +425,7 @@ static int parse_argv(int argc, char *argv[]) {
assert(argc >= 0);
assert(argv);
- while ((c = getopt_long(argc, argv, "+hD:u:abL:M:jS:Z:qi:xp:n", options, NULL)) >= 0)
+ while ((c = getopt_long(argc, argv, "+hD:u:abL:M:jS:Z:qi:xp:nU", options, NULL)) >= 0)
switch (c) {
@@ -797,10 +816,29 @@ static int parse_argv(int argc, char *argv[]) {
break;
case ARG_PRIVATE_USERS:
- if (optarg) {
+
+ r = optarg ? parse_boolean(optarg) : 1;
+ if (r == 0) {
+ /* no: User namespacing off */
+ arg_userns_mode = USER_NAMESPACE_NO;
+ arg_uid_shift = UID_INVALID;
+ arg_uid_range = UINT32_C(0x10000);
+ } else if (r > 0) {
+ /* yes: User namespacing on, UID range is read from root dir */
+ arg_userns_mode = USER_NAMESPACE_FIXED;
+ arg_uid_shift = UID_INVALID;
+ arg_uid_range = UINT32_C(0x10000);
+ } else if (streq(optarg, "pick")) {
+ /* pick: User namespacing on, UID range is picked randomly */
+ arg_userns_mode = USER_NAMESPACE_PICK;
+ arg_uid_shift = UID_INVALID;
+ arg_uid_range = UINT32_C(0x10000);
+ } else {
_cleanup_free_ char *buffer = NULL;
const char *range, *shift;
+ /* anything else: User namespacing on, UID range is explicitly configured */
+
range = strchr(optarg, ':');
if (range) {
buffer = strndup(optarg, range - optarg);
@@ -820,9 +858,28 @@ static int parse_argv(int argc, char *argv[]) {
log_error("Failed to parse UID: %s", optarg);
return -EINVAL;
}
+
+ arg_userns_mode = USER_NAMESPACE_FIXED;
+ }
+
+ arg_settings_mask |= SETTING_USERNS;
+ break;
+
+ case 'U':
+ if (userns_supported()) {
+ arg_userns_mode = USER_NAMESPACE_PICK;
+ arg_uid_shift = UID_INVALID;
+ arg_uid_range = UINT32_C(0x10000);
+
+ arg_settings_mask |= SETTING_USERNS;
}
- arg_userns = true;
+ break;
+
+ case ARG_PRIVATE_USERS_CHOWN:
+ arg_userns_chown = true;
+
+ arg_settings_mask |= SETTING_USERNS;
break;
case ARG_KILL_SIGNAL:
@@ -893,6 +950,9 @@ static int parse_argv(int argc, char *argv[]) {
if (arg_share_system)
arg_register = false;
+ if (arg_userns_mode == USER_NAMESPACE_PICK)
+ arg_userns_chown = true;
+
if (arg_start_mode != START_PID1 && arg_share_system) {
log_error("--boot and --share-system may not be combined.");
return -EINVAL;
@@ -933,8 +993,15 @@ static int parse_argv(int argc, char *argv[]) {
return -EINVAL;
}
- if (arg_userns && access("/proc/self/uid_map", F_OK) < 0)
- return log_error_errno(EOPNOTSUPP, "--private-users= is not supported, kernel compiled without user namespace support.");
+ if (arg_userns_mode != USER_NAMESPACE_NO && !userns_supported()) {
+ log_error("--private-users= is not supported, kernel compiled without user namespace support.");
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ }
+
+ if (arg_userns_chown && arg_read_only) {
+ log_error("--read-only and --private-users-chown may not be combined.");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
if (argc > optind) {
arg_parameters = strv_copy(argv + optind);
@@ -993,7 +1060,7 @@ static int verify_arguments(void) {
static int userns_lchown(const char *p, uid_t uid, gid_t gid) {
assert(p);
- if (!arg_userns)
+ if (arg_userns_mode == USER_NAMESPACE_NO)
return 0;
if (uid == UID_INVALID && gid == GID_INVALID)
@@ -2218,6 +2285,29 @@ static int setup_machine_id(const char *directory) {
return 0;
}
+static int recursive_chown(const char *directory, uid_t shift, uid_t range) {
+ int r;
+
+ assert(directory);
+
+ if (arg_userns_mode == USER_NAMESPACE_NO || !arg_userns_chown)
+ return 0;
+
+ r = path_patch_uid(directory, arg_uid_shift, arg_uid_range);
+ if (r == -EOPNOTSUPP)
+ return log_error_errno(r, "Automatic UID/GID adjusting is only supported for UID/GID ranges starting at multiples of 2^16 with a range of 2^16.");
+ if (r == -EBADE)
+ return log_error_errno(r, "Upper 16 bits of root directory UID and GID do not match.");
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to adjust UID/GID shift of OS tree: %m");
+ if (r == 0)
+ log_debug("Root directory of image is already owned by the right UID/GID range, skipping recursive chown operation.");
+ else
+ log_debug("Patched directory tree to match UID/GID range.");
+
+ return r;
+}
+
static int mount_devices(
const char *where,
const char *root_device, bool root_device_rw,
@@ -2435,7 +2525,7 @@ static int determine_names(void) {
static int determine_uid_shift(const char *directory) {
int r;
- if (!arg_userns) {
+ if (arg_userns_mode == USER_NAMESPACE_NO) {
arg_uid_shift = 0;
return 0;
}
@@ -2462,7 +2552,6 @@ static int determine_uid_shift(const char *directory) {
return -EINVAL;
}
- log_info("Using user namespaces with base " UID_FMT " and range " UID_FMT ".", arg_uid_shift, arg_uid_range);
return 0;
}
@@ -2499,7 +2588,7 @@ static int inner_child(
cg_unified_flush();
- if (arg_userns) {
+ if (arg_userns_mode != USER_NAMESPACE_NO) {
/* Tell the parent, that it now can write the UID map. */
(void) barrier_place(barrier); /* #1 */
@@ -2510,7 +2599,14 @@ static int inner_child(
}
}
- r = mount_all(NULL, arg_userns, true, arg_uid_shift, arg_private_network, arg_uid_range, arg_selinux_apifs_context);
+ r = mount_all(NULL,
+ arg_userns_mode != USER_NAMESPACE_NO,
+ true,
+ arg_private_network,
+ arg_uid_shift,
+ arg_uid_range,
+ arg_selinux_apifs_context);
+
if (r < 0)
return r;
@@ -2749,7 +2845,8 @@ static int outer_child(
if (r < 0)
return r;
- if (arg_userns) {
+ if (arg_userns_mode != USER_NAMESPACE_NO) {
+ /* Let the parent know which UID shift we read from the image */
l = send(uid_shift_socket, &arg_uid_shift, sizeof(arg_uid_shift), MSG_NOSIGNAL);
if (l < 0)
return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to send UID shift: %m");
@@ -2757,17 +2854,49 @@ static int outer_child(
log_error("Short write while sending UID shift.");
return -EIO;
}
+
+ if (arg_userns_mode == USER_NAMESPACE_PICK) {
+ /* When we are supposed to pick the UID shift, the parent will check now whether the UID shift
+ * we just read from the image is available. If yes, it will send the UID shift back to us, if
+ * not it will pick a different one, and send it back to us. */
+
+ l = recv(uid_shift_socket, &arg_uid_shift, sizeof(arg_uid_shift), 0);
+ if (l < 0)
+ return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to recv UID shift: %m");
+ if (l != sizeof(arg_uid_shift)) {
+ log_error("Short read while recieving UID shift.");
+ return -EIO;
+ }
+ }
+
+ log_info("Selected user namespace base " UID_FMT " and range " UID_FMT ".", arg_uid_shift, arg_uid_range);
}
/* Turn directory into bind mount */
if (mount(directory, directory, NULL, MS_BIND|MS_REC, NULL) < 0)
return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to make bind mount: %m");
- r = setup_volatile(directory, arg_volatile_mode, arg_userns, arg_uid_shift, arg_uid_range, arg_selinux_context);
+ r = recursive_chown(directory, arg_uid_shift, arg_uid_range);
if (r < 0)
return r;
- r = setup_volatile_state(directory, arg_volatile_mode, arg_userns, arg_uid_shift, arg_uid_range, arg_selinux_context);
+ r = setup_volatile(
+ directory,
+ arg_volatile_mode,
+ arg_userns_mode != USER_NAMESPACE_NO,
+ arg_uid_shift,
+ arg_uid_range,
+ arg_selinux_context);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ r = setup_volatile_state(
+ directory,
+ arg_volatile_mode,
+ arg_userns_mode != USER_NAMESPACE_NO,
+ arg_uid_shift,
+ arg_uid_range,
+ arg_selinux_context);
if (r < 0)
return r;
@@ -2781,7 +2910,13 @@ static int outer_child(
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to make tree read-only: %m");
}
- r = mount_all(directory, arg_userns, false, arg_private_network, arg_uid_shift, arg_uid_range, arg_selinux_apifs_context);
+ r = mount_all(directory,
+ arg_userns_mode != USER_NAMESPACE_NO,
+ false,
+ arg_private_network,
+ arg_uid_shift,
+ arg_uid_range,
+ arg_selinux_apifs_context);
if (r < 0)
return r;
@@ -2823,11 +2958,24 @@ static int outer_child(
if (r < 0)
return r;
- r = mount_custom(directory, arg_custom_mounts, arg_n_custom_mounts, arg_userns, arg_uid_shift, arg_uid_range, arg_selinux_apifs_context);
+ r = mount_custom(
+ directory,
+ arg_custom_mounts,
+ arg_n_custom_mounts,
+ arg_userns_mode != USER_NAMESPACE_NO,
+ arg_uid_shift,
+ arg_uid_range,
+ arg_selinux_apifs_context);
if (r < 0)
return r;
- r = mount_cgroups(directory, arg_unified_cgroup_hierarchy, arg_userns, arg_uid_shift, arg_uid_range, arg_selinux_apifs_context);
+ r = mount_cgroups(
+ directory,
+ arg_unified_cgroup_hierarchy,
+ arg_userns_mode != USER_NAMESPACE_NO,
+ arg_uid_shift,
+ arg_uid_range,
+ arg_selinux_apifs_context);
if (r < 0)
return r;
@@ -2838,7 +2986,7 @@ static int outer_child(
pid = raw_clone(SIGCHLD|CLONE_NEWNS|
(arg_share_system ? 0 : CLONE_NEWIPC|CLONE_NEWPID|CLONE_NEWUTS) |
(arg_private_network ? CLONE_NEWNET : 0) |
- (arg_userns ? CLONE_NEWUSER : 0),
+ (arg_userns_mode != USER_NAMESPACE_NO ? CLONE_NEWUSER : 0),
NULL);
if (pid < 0)
return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to fork inner child: %m");
@@ -2882,6 +3030,61 @@ static int outer_child(
return 0;
}
+static int uid_shift_pick(uid_t *shift, LockFile *ret_lock_file) {
+ unsigned n_tries = 100;
+ uid_t candidate;
+ int r;
+
+ assert(shift);
+ assert(ret_lock_file);
+ assert(arg_userns_mode == USER_NAMESPACE_PICK);
+ assert(arg_uid_range == 0x10000U);
+
+ candidate = *shift;
+
+ (void) mkdir("/run/systemd/nspawn-uid", 0755);
+
+ for (;;) {
+ char lock_path[strlen("/run/systemd/nspawn-uid/") + DECIMAL_STR_MAX(uid_t) + 1];
+ _cleanup_release_lock_file_ LockFile lf = LOCK_FILE_INIT;
+
+ if (--n_tries <= 0)
+ return -EBUSY;
+
+ if (candidate < UID_SHIFT_PICK_MIN || candidate > UID_SHIFT_PICK_MAX)
+ goto next;
+ if ((candidate & UINT32_C(0xFFFF)) != 0)
+ goto next;
+
+ xsprintf(lock_path, "/run/systemd/nspawn-uid/" UID_FMT, candidate);
+ r = make_lock_file(lock_path, LOCK_EX|LOCK_NB, &lf);
+ if (r == -EBUSY) /* Range already taken by another nspawn instance */
+ goto next;
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ /* Make some superficial checks whether the range is currently known in the user database */
+ if (getpwuid(candidate))
+ goto next;
+ if (getpwuid(candidate + UINT32_C(0xFFFE)))
+ goto next;
+ if (getgrgid(candidate))
+ goto next;
+ if (getgrgid(candidate + UINT32_C(0xFFFE)))
+ goto next;
+
+ *ret_lock_file = lf;
+ lf = (struct LockFile) LOCK_FILE_INIT;
+ *shift = candidate;
+ return 0;
+
+ next:
+ random_bytes(&candidate, sizeof(candidate));
+ candidate = (candidate % (UID_SHIFT_PICK_MAX - UID_SHIFT_PICK_MIN)) + UID_SHIFT_PICK_MIN;
+ candidate &= (uid_t) UINT32_C(0xFFFF0000);
+ }
+}
+
static int setup_uid_map(pid_t pid) {
char uid_map[strlen("/proc//uid_map") + DECIMAL_STR_MAX(uid_t) + 1], line[DECIMAL_STR_MAX(uid_t)*3+3+1];
int r;
@@ -3113,6 +3316,19 @@ static int load_settings(void) {
}
}
+ if ((arg_settings_mask & SETTING_USERNS) == 0 &&
+ settings->userns_mode != _USER_NAMESPACE_MODE_INVALID) {
+
+ if (!arg_settings_trusted)
+ log_warning("Ignoring PrivateUsers= and PrivateUsersChown= settings, file %s is not trusted.", p);
+ else {
+ arg_userns_mode = settings->userns_mode;
+ arg_uid_shift = settings->uid_shift;
+ arg_uid_range = settings->uid_range;
+ arg_userns_chown = settings->userns_chown;
+ }
+ }
+
return 0;
}
@@ -3351,20 +3567,42 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
}
for (;;) {
- _cleanup_close_pair_ int kmsg_socket_pair[2] = { -1, -1 }, rtnl_socket_pair[2] = { -1, -1 },
- pid_socket_pair[2] = { -1, -1 }, uuid_socket_pair[2] = { -1, -1 }, uid_shift_socket_pair[2] = { -1, -1 };
- ContainerStatus container_status;
- _cleanup_(barrier_destroy) Barrier barrier = BARRIER_NULL;
static const struct sigaction sa = {
.sa_handler = nop_signal_handler,
.sa_flags = SA_NOCLDSTOP,
};
- int ifi = 0;
- ssize_t l;
+
+ _cleanup_release_lock_file_ LockFile uid_shift_lock = LOCK_FILE_INIT;
+ _cleanup_close_ int etc_passwd_lock = -1;
+ _cleanup_close_pair_ int
+ kmsg_socket_pair[2] = { -1, -1 },
+ rtnl_socket_pair[2] = { -1, -1 },
+ pid_socket_pair[2] = { -1, -1 },
+ uuid_socket_pair[2] = { -1, -1 },
+ uid_shift_socket_pair[2] = { -1, -1 };
+ _cleanup_(barrier_destroy) Barrier barrier = BARRIER_NULL;
_cleanup_(sd_event_unrefp) sd_event *event = NULL;
_cleanup_(pty_forward_freep) PTYForward *forward = NULL;
_cleanup_(sd_netlink_unrefp) sd_netlink *rtnl = NULL;
+ ContainerStatus container_status;
char last_char = 0;
+ int ifi = 0;
+ ssize_t l;
+
+ if (arg_userns_mode == USER_NAMESPACE_PICK) {
+ /* When we shall pick the UID/GID range, let's first lock /etc/passwd, so that we can safely
+ * check with getpwuid() if the specific user already exists. Note that /etc might be
+ * read-only, in which case this will fail with EROFS. But that's really OK, as in that case we
+ * can be reasonably sure that no users are going to be added. Note that getpwuid() checks are
+ * really just an extra safety net. We kinda assume that the UID range we allocate from is
+ * really ours. */
+
+ etc_passwd_lock = take_etc_passwd_lock(NULL);
+ if (etc_passwd_lock < 0 && etc_passwd_lock != -EROFS) {
+ log_error_errno(r, "Failed to take /etc/passwd lock: %m");
+ goto finish;
+ }
+ }
r = barrier_create(&barrier);
if (r < 0) {
@@ -3392,7 +3630,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
goto finish;
}
- if (arg_userns)
+ if (arg_userns_mode != USER_NAMESPACE_NO)
if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_SEQPACKET|SOCK_CLOEXEC, 0, uid_shift_socket_pair) < 0) {
r = log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to create uid shift socket pair: %m");
goto finish;
@@ -3468,6 +3706,43 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
uuid_socket_pair[1] = safe_close(uuid_socket_pair[1]);
uid_shift_socket_pair[1] = safe_close(uid_shift_socket_pair[1]);
+ if (arg_userns_mode != USER_NAMESPACE_NO) {
+ /* The child just let us know the UID shift it might have read from the image. */
+ l = recv(uid_shift_socket_pair[0], &arg_uid_shift, sizeof(arg_uid_shift), 0);
+ if (l < 0) {
+ r = log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to read UID shift: %m");
+ goto finish;
+ }
+ if (l != sizeof(arg_uid_shift)) {
+ log_error("Short read while reading UID shift.");
+ r = EIO;
+ goto finish;
+ }
+
+ if (arg_userns_mode == USER_NAMESPACE_PICK) {
+ /* If we are supposed to pick the UID shift, let's try to use the shift read from the
+ * image, but if that's already in use, pick a new one, and report back to the child,
+ * which one we now picked. */
+
+ r = uid_shift_pick(&arg_uid_shift, &uid_shift_lock);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ log_error_errno(r, "Failed to pick suitable UID/GID range: %m");
+ goto finish;
+ }
+
+ l = send(uid_shift_socket_pair[0], &arg_uid_shift, sizeof(arg_uid_shift), MSG_NOSIGNAL);
+ if (l < 0) {
+ r = log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to send UID shift: %m");
+ goto finish;
+ }
+ if (l != sizeof(arg_uid_shift)) {
+ log_error("Short write while writing UID shift.");
+ r = -EIO;
+ goto finish;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
/* Wait for the outer child. */
r = wait_for_terminate_and_warn("namespace helper", pid, NULL);
if (r < 0)
@@ -3504,24 +3779,13 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
log_debug("Init process invoked as PID " PID_FMT, pid);
- if (arg_userns) {
+ if (arg_userns_mode != USER_NAMESPACE_NO) {
if (!barrier_place_and_sync(&barrier)) { /* #1 */
log_error("Child died too early.");
r = -ESRCH;
goto finish;
}
- l = recv(uid_shift_socket_pair[0], &arg_uid_shift, sizeof(arg_uid_shift), 0);
- if (l < 0) {
- r = log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to read UID shift: %m");
- goto finish;
- }
- if (l != sizeof(arg_uid_shift)) {
- log_error("Short read while reading UID shift.");
- r = EIO;
- goto finish;
- }
-
r = setup_uid_map(pid);
if (r < 0)
goto finish;
@@ -3619,6 +3883,10 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
goto finish;
}
+ /* At this point we have made use of the UID we picked, and thus nss-mymachines will make them appear
+ * in getpwuid(), thus we can release the /etc/passwd lock. */
+ etc_passwd_lock = safe_close(etc_passwd_lock);
+
sd_notifyf(false,
"READY=1\n"
"STATUS=Container running.\n"
diff --git a/src/nspawn/test-patch-uid.c b/src/nspawn/test-patch-uid.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..11c5321788
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/nspawn/test-patch-uid.c
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+/***
+ This file is part of systemd.
+
+ Copyright 2016 Lennart Poettering
+
+ systemd is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License as published by
+ the Free Software Foundation; either version 2.1 of the License, or
+ (at your option) any later version.
+
+ systemd is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
+ Lesser General Public License for more details.
+
+ You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public License
+ along with systemd; If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+***/
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+#include "log.h"
+#include "nspawn-patch-uid.h"
+#include "user-util.h"
+#include "util.h"
+
+int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
+ uid_t shift, range;
+ int r;
+
+ log_set_max_level(LOG_DEBUG);
+ log_parse_environment();
+ log_open();
+
+ if (argc != 4) {
+ log_error("Expected PATH SHIFT RANGE parameters.");
+ return EXIT_FAILURE;
+ }
+
+ r = parse_uid(argv[2], &shift);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ log_error_errno(r, "Failed to parse UID shift %s.", argv[2]);
+ return EXIT_FAILURE;
+ }
+
+ r = parse_gid(argv[3], &range);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ log_error_errno(r, "Failed to parse UID range %s.", argv[3]);
+ return EXIT_FAILURE;
+ }
+
+ r = path_patch_uid(argv[1], shift, range);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ log_error_errno(r, "Failed to patch directory tree: %m");
+ return EXIT_FAILURE;
+ }
+
+ log_info("Changed: %s", yes_no(r));
+
+ return EXIT_SUCCESS;
+}
diff --git a/units/systemd-nspawn@.service.in b/units/systemd-nspawn@.service.in
index 1927c4d485..ea28941507 100644
--- a/units/systemd-nspawn@.service.in
+++ b/units/systemd-nspawn@.service.in
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ Before=machines.target
After=network.target
[Service]
-ExecStart=@bindir@/systemd-nspawn --quiet --keep-unit --boot --link-journal=try-guest --network-veth --settings=override --machine=%i
+ExecStart=@bindir@/systemd-nspawn --quiet --keep-unit --boot --link-journal=try-guest --network-veth -U --settings=override --machine=%i
KillMode=mixed
Type=notify
RestartForceExitStatus=133