diff options
author | Alessandro Puccetti <alessandro@kinvolk.io> | 2016-06-10 18:19:54 +0200 |
---|---|---|
committer | Lennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net> | 2016-06-10 18:19:54 +0200 |
commit | cf677fe6868f0565dd625cfbc2992a0f2cd3e053 (patch) | |
tree | 3e6d5cdbf44a06a1c48d3d6e98f3192b08ae723b | |
parent | a4e9499d8d205ab580b463882fdccce340c79434 (diff) |
core/execute: add the magic character '!' to allow privileged execution (#3493)
This patch implements the new magic character '!'. By putting '!' in front
of a command, systemd executes it with full privileges ignoring paramters
such as User, Group, SupplementaryGroups, CapabilityBoundingSet,
AmbientCapabilities, SecureBits, SystemCallFilter, SELinuxContext,
AppArmorProfile, SmackProcessLabel, and RestrictAddressFamilies.
Fixes partially https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/3414
Related to https://github.com/coreos/rkt/issues/2482
Testing:
1. Create a user 'bob'
2. Create the unit file /etc/systemd/system/exec-perm.service
(You can use the example below)
3. sudo systemctl start ext-perm.service
4. Verify that the commands starting with '!' were not executed as bob,
4.1 Looking to the output of ls -l /tmp/exec-perm
4.2 Each file contains the result of the id command.
`````````````````````````````````````````````````````````````````
[Unit]
Description=ext-perm
[Service]
Type=oneshot
TimeoutStartSec=0
User=bob
ExecStartPre=!/usr/bin/sh -c "/usr/bin/rm /tmp/exec-perm*" ;
/usr/bin/sh -c "/usr/bin/id > /tmp/exec-perm-start-pre"
ExecStart=/usr/bin/sh -c "/usr/bin/id > /tmp/exec-perm-start" ;
!/usr/bin/sh -c "/usr/bin/id > /tmp/exec-perm-star-2"
ExecStartPost=/usr/bin/sh -c "/usr/bin/id > /tmp/exec-perm-start-post"
ExecReload=/usr/bin/sh -c "/usr/bin/id > /tmp/exec-perm-reload"
ExecStop=!/usr/bin/sh -c "/usr/bin/id > /tmp/exec-perm-stop"
ExecStopPost=/usr/bin/sh -c "/usr/bin/id > /tmp/exec-perm-stop-post"
[Install]
WantedBy=multi-user.target]
`````````````````````````````````````````````````````````````````
-rw-r--r-- | man/systemd.exec.xml | 27 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | man/systemd.service.xml | 7 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | src/core/execute.c | 6 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | src/core/execute.h | 3 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | src/core/load-fragment.c | 15 |
5 files changed, 34 insertions, 24 deletions
diff --git a/man/systemd.exec.xml b/man/systemd.exec.xml index 4a3dd14c39..1c3256a662 100644 --- a/man/systemd.exec.xml +++ b/man/systemd.exec.xml @@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ <listitem><para>Sets the Unix user or group that the processes are executed as, respectively. Takes a single user or group name or ID as argument. If no group is set, the default group - of the user is chosen.</para></listitem> + of the user is chosen. These do not affect commands prefixed with <literal>!</literal>.</para></listitem> </varlistentry> <varlistentry> @@ -161,7 +161,7 @@ this one will have no effect. In any way, this option does not override, but extends the list of supplementary groups configured in the system group database for the - user.</para></listitem> + user. This does not affect commands prefixed with <literal>!</literal>.</para></listitem> </varlistentry> <varlistentry> @@ -795,7 +795,8 @@ process are enforced. This option may appear more than once, in which case the bounding sets are merged. If the empty string is assigned to this option, the bounding set is reset to the empty capability set, and all prior settings have no effect. If set to <literal>~</literal> (without any further argument), the bounding set is - reset to the full set of available capabilities, also undoing any previous settings.</para></listitem> + reset to the full set of available capabilities, also undoing any previous settings. This does not affect + commands prefixed with <literal>!</literal>.</para></listitem> </varlistentry> <varlistentry> @@ -824,7 +825,8 @@ as a non-privileged user but still want to give it some capabilities. Note that in this case option <constant>keep-caps</constant> is automatically added to <varname>SecureBits=</varname> to retain the - capabilities over the user change.</para></listitem> + capabilities over the user change. <varname>AmbientCapabilities=</varname> does not affect + commands prefixed with <literal>!</literal>.</para></listitem> </varlistentry> <varlistentry> @@ -840,8 +842,8 @@ <option>noroot-locked</option>. This option may appear more than once, in which case the secure bits are ORed. If the empty string is assigned to this option, - the bits are reset to 0. See - <citerefentry project='man-pages'><refentrytitle>capabilities</refentrytitle><manvolnum>7</manvolnum></citerefentry> + the bits are reset to 0. This does not affect commands prefixed with <literal>!</literal>. + See <citerefentry project='man-pages'><refentrytitle>capabilities</refentrytitle><manvolnum>7</manvolnum></citerefentry> for details.</para></listitem> </varlistentry> @@ -1097,8 +1099,8 @@ domain transition. However, the policy still needs to authorize the transition. This directive is ignored if SELinux is disabled. If prefixed by <literal>-</literal>, all errors - will be ignored. See - <citerefentry project='die-net'><refentrytitle>setexeccon</refentrytitle><manvolnum>3</manvolnum></citerefentry> + will be ignored. This does not affect commands prefixed with <literal>!</literal>. + See <citerefentry project='die-net'><refentrytitle>setexeccon</refentrytitle><manvolnum>3</manvolnum></citerefentry> for details.</para></listitem> </varlistentry> @@ -1110,7 +1112,7 @@ Profiles must already be loaded in the kernel, or the unit will fail. This result in a non operation if AppArmor is not enabled. If prefixed by <literal>-</literal>, all errors will - be ignored. </para></listitem> + be ignored. This does not affect commands prefixed with <literal>!</literal>.</para></listitem> </varlistentry> <varlistentry> @@ -1129,7 +1131,8 @@ <para>The value may be prefixed by <literal>-</literal>, in which case all errors will be ignored. An empty value may be - specified to unset previous assignments.</para> + specified to unset previous assignments. This does not affect + commands prefixed with <literal>!</literal>.</para> </listitem> </varlistentry> @@ -1180,7 +1183,7 @@ listed explicitly. This option may be specified more than once, in which case the filter masks are merged. If the empty string is assigned, the filter is reset, all prior assignments will - have no effect.</para> + have no effect. This does not affect commands prefixed with <literal>!</literal>.</para> <para>If you specify both types of this option (i.e. whitelisting and blacklisting), the first encountered will @@ -1343,7 +1346,7 @@ family should be included in the configured whitelist as it is frequently used for local communication, including for <citerefentry><refentrytitle>syslog</refentrytitle><manvolnum>2</manvolnum></citerefentry> - logging.</para></listitem> + logging. This does not affect commands prefixed with <literal>!</literal>.</para></listitem> </varlistentry> <varlistentry> diff --git a/man/systemd.service.xml b/man/systemd.service.xml index 6641dfed4f..6e969abc25 100644 --- a/man/systemd.service.xml +++ b/man/systemd.service.xml @@ -295,9 +295,10 @@ If the absolute filename is prefixed with <literal>-</literal>, an exit code of the command normally considered a failure (i.e. non-zero exit status or abnormal - exit due to signal) is ignored and considered success. If both - <literal>-</literal> and <literal>@</literal> are used, they - can appear in either order.</para> + exit due to signal) is ignored and considered success. + If the absolute path is prefixed with <literal>!</literal> then + it is executed with full privileges. <literal>-</literal>, <literal>@</literal>, and <literal>!</literal> + may be used together and they can appear in any order.</para> <para>If more than one command is specified, the commands are invoked sequentially in the order they appear in the unit diff --git a/src/core/execute.c b/src/core/execute.c index e718c43df9..802f14d575 100644 --- a/src/core/execute.c +++ b/src/core/execute.c @@ -1717,7 +1717,7 @@ static int exec_child( umask(context->umask); - if (params->apply_permissions) { + if (params->apply_permissions && !command->privileged) { r = enforce_groups(context, username, gid); if (r < 0) { *exit_status = EXIT_GROUP; @@ -1842,7 +1842,7 @@ static int exec_child( } #ifdef HAVE_SELINUX - if (params->apply_permissions && mac_selinux_use() && params->selinux_context_net && socket_fd >= 0) { + if (params->apply_permissions && mac_selinux_use() && params->selinux_context_net && socket_fd >= 0 && !command->privileged) { r = mac_selinux_get_child_mls_label(socket_fd, command->path, context->selinux_context, &mac_selinux_context_net); if (r < 0) { *exit_status = EXIT_SELINUX_CONTEXT; @@ -1867,7 +1867,7 @@ static int exec_child( return r; } - if (params->apply_permissions) { + if (params->apply_permissions && !command->privileged) { bool use_address_families = context->address_families_whitelist || !set_isempty(context->address_families); diff --git a/src/core/execute.h b/src/core/execute.h index 464869d226..cd1f7b36f6 100644 --- a/src/core/execute.h +++ b/src/core/execute.h @@ -81,7 +81,8 @@ struct ExecCommand { char **argv; ExecStatus exec_status; LIST_FIELDS(ExecCommand, command); /* useful for chaining commands */ - bool ignore; + bool ignore:1; + bool privileged:1; }; struct ExecRuntime { diff --git a/src/core/load-fragment.c b/src/core/load-fragment.c index 2d8f6296c8..17c72aed88 100644 --- a/src/core/load-fragment.c +++ b/src/core/load-fragment.c @@ -596,7 +596,7 @@ int config_parse_exec( p = rvalue; do { _cleanup_free_ char *path = NULL, *firstword = NULL; - bool separate_argv0 = false, ignore = false; + bool separate_argv0 = false, ignore = false, privileged = false; _cleanup_free_ ExecCommand *nce = NULL; _cleanup_strv_free_ char **n = NULL; size_t nlen = 0, nbufsize = 0; @@ -610,14 +610,18 @@ int config_parse_exec( return 0; f = firstword; - for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) { - /* We accept an absolute path as first argument, or - * alternatively an absolute prefixed with @ to allow - * overriding of argv[0]. */ + for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) { + /* We accept an absolute path as first argument. + * If it's prefixed with - and the path doesn't exist, + * we ignore it instead of erroring out; + * if it's prefixed with @, we allow overriding of argv[0]; + * and if it's prefixed with !, it will be run with full privileges */ if (*f == '-' && !ignore) ignore = true; else if (*f == '@' && !separate_argv0) separate_argv0 = true; + else if (*f == '!' && !privileged) + privileged = true; else break; f++; @@ -715,6 +719,7 @@ int config_parse_exec( nce->argv = n; nce->path = path; nce->ignore = ignore; + nce->privileged = privileged; exec_command_append_list(e, nce); |