Merge pull request #4243 from endocode/djalal/sandbox-first-protection-kernelmodules-v1

core:sandbox: Add ProtectKernelModules= and some fixes

17 files changed, 211 insertions, 32 deletions

diff --git a/Makefile.am b/Makefile.am
index e740512f98..a0c17db179 100644
--- a/Makefile.am
+++ b/Makefile.am
@@ -1639,6 +1639,9 @@ EXTRA_DIST += \
 	test/test-execute/exec-privatedevices-yes.service \
 	test/test-execute/exec-privatedevices-no-capability-mknod.service \
 	test/test-execute/exec-privatedevices-yes-capability-mknod.service \
+	test/test-execute/exec-protectkernelmodules-no-capabilities.service \
+	test/test-execute/exec-protectkernelmodules-yes-capabilities.service \
+	test/test-execute/exec-protectkernelmodules-yes-mount-propagation.service \
 	test/test-execute/exec-privatetmp-no.service \
 	test/test-execute/exec-privatetmp-yes.service \
 	test/test-execute/exec-readonlypaths.service \
diff --git a/man/systemd.exec.xml b/man/systemd.exec.xml
index c088042a51..71dc86ec2f 100644
--- a/man/systemd.exec.xml
+++ b/man/systemd.exec.xml
@@ -946,8 +946,8 @@
         <filename>/dev/port</filename> and others. This is useful to securely turn off physical device access by the
         executed process. Defaults to false. Enabling this option will install a system call filter to block low-level
         I/O system calls that are grouped in the <varname>@raw-io</varname> set, will also remove
-        <constant>CAP_MKNOD</constant> from the capability bounding set for the unit (see above), and set
-        <varname>DevicePolicy=closed</varname> (see
+        <constant>CAP_MKNOD</constant> and <constant>CAP_SYS_RAWIO</constant> from the capability bounding set for
+        the unit (see above), and set <varname>DevicePolicy=closed</varname> (see
         <citerefentry><refentrytitle>systemd.resource-control</refentrytitle><manvolnum>5</manvolnum></citerefentry>
         for details). Note that using this setting will disconnect propagation of mounts from the service to the host
         (propagation in the opposite direction continues to work).  This means that this setting may not be used for
@@ -1046,7 +1046,10 @@
         boot-time, with the <citerefentry><refentrytitle>sysctl.d</refentrytitle><manvolnum>5</manvolnum></citerefentry>
         mechanism. Almost no services need to write to these at runtime; it is hence recommended to turn this on for
         most services. For this setting the same restrictions regarding mount propagation and privileges apply as for
-        <varname>ReadOnlyPaths=</varname> and related calls, see above. Defaults to off.</para></listitem>
+        <varname>ReadOnlyPaths=</varname> and related calls, see above. Defaults to off.
+        Note that this option does not prevent kernel tuning through IPC interfaces and exeternal programs. However
+        <varname>InaccessiblePaths=</varname> can be used to make some IPC file system objects
+        inaccessible.</para></listitem>
       </varlistentry>
 
       <varlistentry>
@@ -1405,6 +1408,26 @@
       </varlistentry>
 
       <varlistentry>
+        <term><varname>ProtectKernelModules=</varname></term>
+
+        <listitem><para>Takes a boolean argument. If true, explicit module loading will
+        be denied. This allows to turn off module load and unload operations on modular
+        kernels. It is recomended to turn this on for most services that do not need special
+        file systems or extra kernel modules to work. Default to off. Enabling this option
+        removes <constant>CAP_SYS_MODULE</constant> from the capability bounding set for
+        the unit, and installs a system call filter to block module system calls,
+        also <filename>/usr/lib/modules</filename> is made inaccessible. For this
+        setting the same restrictions regarding mount propagation and privileges
+        apply as for <varname>ReadOnlyPaths=</varname> and related calls, see above.
+        Note that limited automatic module loading due to user configuration or kernel
+        mapping tables might still happen as side effect of requested user operations,
+        both privileged and unprivileged. To disable module auto-load feature please see
+        <citerefentry><refentrytitle>sysctl.d</refentrytitle><manvolnum>5</manvolnum></citerefentry>
+        <constant>kernel.modules_disabled</constant> mechanism and
+        <filename>/proc/sys/kernel/modules_disabled</filename> documentation.</para></listitem>
+      </varlistentry>
+
+      <varlistentry>
         <term><varname>Personality=</varname></term>
 
         <listitem><para>Controls which kernel architecture <citerefentry
diff --git a/src/core/dbus-execute.c b/src/core/dbus-execute.c
index eec4500c8c..b8720d7d3d 100644
--- a/src/core/dbus-execute.c
+++ b/src/core/dbus-execute.c
@@ -708,6 +708,7 @@ const sd_bus_vtable bus_exec_vtable[] = {
         SD_BUS_PROPERTY("PrivateTmp", "b", bus_property_get_bool, offsetof(ExecContext, private_tmp), SD_BUS_VTABLE_PROPERTY_CONST),
         SD_BUS_PROPERTY("PrivateDevices", "b", bus_property_get_bool, offsetof(ExecContext, private_devices), SD_BUS_VTABLE_PROPERTY_CONST),
         SD_BUS_PROPERTY("ProtectKernelTunables", "b", bus_property_get_bool, offsetof(ExecContext, protect_kernel_tunables), SD_BUS_VTABLE_PROPERTY_CONST),
+        SD_BUS_PROPERTY("ProtectKernelModules", "b", bus_property_get_bool, offsetof(ExecContext, protect_kernel_modules), SD_BUS_VTABLE_PROPERTY_CONST),
         SD_BUS_PROPERTY("ProtectControlGroups", "b", bus_property_get_bool, offsetof(ExecContext, protect_control_groups), SD_BUS_VTABLE_PROPERTY_CONST),
         SD_BUS_PROPERTY("PrivateNetwork", "b", bus_property_get_bool, offsetof(ExecContext, private_network), SD_BUS_VTABLE_PROPERTY_CONST),
         SD_BUS_PROPERTY("PrivateUsers", "b", bus_property_get_bool, offsetof(ExecContext, private_users), SD_BUS_VTABLE_PROPERTY_CONST),
@@ -1075,7 +1076,7 @@ int bus_exec_context_set_transient_property(
                               "PrivateTmp", "PrivateDevices", "PrivateNetwork", "PrivateUsers",
                               "NoNewPrivileges", "SyslogLevelPrefix", "MemoryDenyWriteExecute",
                               "RestrictRealtime", "DynamicUser", "RemoveIPC", "ProtectKernelTunables",
-                              "ProtectControlGroups")) {
+                              "ProtectKernelModules", "ProtectControlGroups")) {
                 int b;
 
                 r = sd_bus_message_read(message, "b", &b);
@@ -1111,6 +1112,8 @@ int bus_exec_context_set_transient_property(
                                 c->remove_ipc = b;
                         else if (streq(name, "ProtectKernelTunables"))
                                 c->protect_kernel_tunables = b;
+                        else if (streq(name, "ProtectKernelModules"))
+                                c->protect_kernel_modules = b;
                         else if (streq(name, "ProtectControlGroups"))
                                 c->protect_control_groups = b;
 
diff --git a/src/core/execute.c b/src/core/execute.c
index 0c983f4953..869522704a 100644
--- a/src/core/execute.c
+++ b/src/core/execute.c
@@ -1436,6 +1436,50 @@ finish:
         return r;
 }
 
+static int apply_protect_kernel_modules(Unit *u, const ExecContext *c) {
+        static const int module_syscalls[] = {
+                SCMP_SYS(delete_module),
+                SCMP_SYS(finit_module),
+                SCMP_SYS(init_module),
+        };
+
+        scmp_filter_ctx *seccomp;
+        unsigned i;
+        int r;
+
+        assert(c);
+
+        /* Turn of module syscalls on ProtectKernelModules=yes */
+
+        if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u, "ProtectKernelModules="))
+                return 0;
+
+        seccomp = seccomp_init(SCMP_ACT_ALLOW);
+        if (!seccomp)
+                return -ENOMEM;
+
+        r = seccomp_add_secondary_archs(seccomp);
+        if (r < 0)
+                goto finish;
+
+        for (i = 0; i < ELEMENTSOF(module_syscalls); i++) {
+                r = seccomp_rule_add(seccomp, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM),
+                                     module_syscalls[i], 0);
+                if (r < 0)
+                        goto finish;
+        }
+
+        r = seccomp_attr_set(seccomp, SCMP_FLTATR_CTL_NNP, 0);
+        if (r < 0)
+                goto finish;
+
+        r = seccomp_load(seccomp);
+
+finish:
+        seccomp_release(seccomp);
+        return r;
+}
+
 static int apply_private_devices(Unit *u, const ExecContext *c) {
         const SystemCallFilterSet *set;
         scmp_filter_ctx *seccomp;
@@ -1722,6 +1766,7 @@ static bool exec_needs_mount_namespace(
             context->protect_system != PROTECT_SYSTEM_NO ||
             context->protect_home != PROTECT_HOME_NO ||
             context->protect_kernel_tunables ||
+            context->protect_kernel_modules ||
             context->protect_control_groups)
                 return true;
 
@@ -2070,6 +2115,8 @@ static bool context_has_no_new_privileges(const ExecContext *c) {
                 c->memory_deny_write_execute ||
                 c->restrict_realtime ||
                 c->protect_kernel_tunables ||
+                c->protect_kernel_modules ||
+                c->private_devices ||
                 context_has_syscall_filters(c);
 }
 
@@ -2449,6 +2496,12 @@ static int exec_child(
         if (needs_mount_namespace) {
                 _cleanup_free_ char **rw = NULL;
                 char *tmp = NULL, *var = NULL;
+                NameSpaceInfo ns_info = {
+                        .private_dev = context->private_devices,
+                        .protect_control_groups = context->protect_control_groups,
+                        .protect_kernel_tunables = context->protect_kernel_tunables,
+                        .protect_kernel_modules = context->protect_kernel_modules,
+                };
 
                 /* The runtime struct only contains the parent
                  * of the private /tmp, which is
@@ -2471,14 +2524,12 @@ static int exec_child(
 
                 r = setup_namespace(
                                 (params->flags & EXEC_APPLY_CHROOT) ? context->root_directory : NULL,
+                                &ns_info,
                                 rw,
                                 context->read_only_paths,
                                 context->inaccessible_paths,
                                 tmp,
                                 var,
-                                context->private_devices,
-                                context->protect_kernel_tunables,
-                                context->protect_control_groups,
                                 context->protect_home,
                                 context->protect_system,
                                 context->mount_flags);
@@ -2690,6 +2741,14 @@ static int exec_child(
                         }
                 }
 
+                if (context->protect_kernel_modules) {
+                        r = apply_protect_kernel_modules(unit, context);
+                        if (r < 0) {
+                                *exit_status = EXIT_SECCOMP;
+                                return r;
+                        }
+                }
+
                 if (context->private_devices) {
                         r = apply_private_devices(unit, context);
                         if (r < 0) {
@@ -3131,6 +3190,7 @@ void exec_context_dump(ExecContext *c, FILE* f, const char *prefix) {
                 "%sPrivateTmp: %s\n"
                 "%sPrivateDevices: %s\n"
                 "%sProtectKernelTunables: %s\n"
+                "%sProtectKernelModules: %s\n"
                 "%sProtectControlGroups: %s\n"
                 "%sPrivateNetwork: %s\n"
                 "%sPrivateUsers: %s\n"
@@ -3146,6 +3206,7 @@ void exec_context_dump(ExecContext *c, FILE* f, const char *prefix) {
                 prefix, yes_no(c->private_tmp),
                 prefix, yes_no(c->private_devices),
                 prefix, yes_no(c->protect_kernel_tunables),
+                prefix, yes_no(c->protect_kernel_modules),
                 prefix, yes_no(c->protect_control_groups),
                 prefix, yes_no(c->private_network),
                 prefix, yes_no(c->private_users),
diff --git a/src/core/execute.h b/src/core/execute.h
index 449180c903..1de439c3ad 100644
--- a/src/core/execute.h
+++ b/src/core/execute.h
@@ -175,6 +175,7 @@ struct ExecContext {
         ProtectSystem protect_system;
         ProtectHome protect_home;
         bool protect_kernel_tunables;
+        bool protect_kernel_modules;
         bool protect_control_groups;
 
         bool no_new_privileges;
diff --git a/src/core/load-fragment-gperf.gperf.m4 b/src/core/load-fragment-gperf.gperf.m4
index c49c1d6732..a700d853cc 100644
--- a/src/core/load-fragment-gperf.gperf.m4
+++ b/src/core/load-fragment-gperf.gperf.m4
@@ -90,6 +90,7 @@ $1.InaccessiblePaths,            config_parse_namespace_path_strv,   0,
 $1.PrivateTmp,                   config_parse_bool,                  0,                             offsetof($1, exec_context.private_tmp)
 $1.PrivateDevices,               config_parse_bool,                  0,                             offsetof($1, exec_context.private_devices)
 $1.ProtectKernelTunables,        config_parse_bool,                  0,                             offsetof($1, exec_context.protect_kernel_tunables)
+$1.ProtectKernelModules,         config_parse_bool,                  0,                             offsetof($1, exec_context.protect_kernel_modules)
 $1.ProtectControlGroups,         config_parse_bool,                  0,                             offsetof($1, exec_context.protect_control_groups)
 $1.PrivateNetwork,               config_parse_bool,                  0,                             offsetof($1, exec_context.private_network)
 $1.PrivateUsers,                 config_parse_bool,                  0,                             offsetof($1, exec_context.private_users)
diff --git a/src/core/namespace.c b/src/core/namespace.c
index 43a2f4ba6e..1195e9a854 100644
--- a/src/core/namespace.c
+++ b/src/core/namespace.c
@@ -97,6 +97,14 @@ static const TargetMount protect_kernel_tunables_table[] = {
         { "/sys/fs/cgroup",             READWRITE,      false }, /* READONLY is set by ProtectControlGroups= option */
 };
 
+/* ProtectKernelModules= option */
+static const TargetMount protect_kernel_modules_table[] = {
+#ifdef HAVE_SPLIT_USR
+        { "/lib/modules",               INACCESSIBLE,   true  },
+#endif
+        { "/usr/lib/modules",           INACCESSIBLE,   true  },
+};
+
 /*
  * ProtectHome=read-only table, protect $HOME and $XDG_RUNTIME_DIR and rest of
  * system should be protected by ProtectSystem=
@@ -207,6 +215,13 @@ static int append_protect_kernel_tunables(BindMount **p, const char *root_direct
                                     ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_tunables_table));
 }
 
+static int append_protect_kernel_modules(BindMount **p, const char *root_directory) {
+        assert(p);
+
+        return append_target_mounts(p, root_directory, protect_kernel_modules_table,
+                                    ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_modules_table));
+}
+
 static int append_protect_home(BindMount **p, const char *root_directory, ProtectHome protect_home) {
         int r = 0;
 
@@ -660,14 +675,12 @@ static int chase_all_symlinks(const char *root_directory, BindMount *m, unsigned
 }
 
 static unsigned namespace_calculate_mounts(
+                const NameSpaceInfo *ns_info,
                 char** read_write_paths,
                 char** read_only_paths,
                 char** inaccessible_paths,
                 const char* tmp_dir,
                 const char* var_tmp_dir,
-                bool private_dev,
-                bool protect_sysctl,
-                bool protect_cgroups,
                 ProtectHome protect_home,
                 ProtectSystem protect_system) {
 
@@ -690,22 +703,21 @@ static unsigned namespace_calculate_mounts(
                 strv_length(read_write_paths) +
                 strv_length(read_only_paths) +
                 strv_length(inaccessible_paths) +
-                private_dev +
-                (protect_sysctl ? ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_tunables_table) : 0) +
-                (protect_cgroups ? 1 : 0) +
+                ns_info->private_dev +
+                (ns_info->protect_kernel_tunables ? ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_tunables_table) : 0) +
+                (ns_info->protect_control_groups ? 1 : 0) +
+                (ns_info->protect_kernel_modules ? ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_modules_table) : 0) +
                 protect_home_cnt + protect_system_cnt;
 }
 
 int setup_namespace(
                 const char* root_directory,
+                const NameSpaceInfo *ns_info,
                 char** read_write_paths,
                 char** read_only_paths,
                 char** inaccessible_paths,
                 const char* tmp_dir,
                 const char* var_tmp_dir,
-                bool private_dev,
-                bool protect_sysctl,
-                bool protect_cgroups,
                 ProtectHome protect_home,
                 ProtectSystem protect_system,
                 unsigned long mount_flags) {
@@ -718,13 +730,12 @@ int setup_namespace(
         if (mount_flags == 0)
                 mount_flags = MS_SHARED;
 
-        n = namespace_calculate_mounts(read_write_paths,
+        n = namespace_calculate_mounts(ns_info,
+                                       read_write_paths,
                                        read_only_paths,
                                        inaccessible_paths,
                                        tmp_dir, var_tmp_dir,
-                                       private_dev, protect_sysctl,
-                                       protect_cgroups, protect_home,
-                                       protect_system);
+                                       protect_home, protect_system);
 
         /* Set mount slave mode */
         if (root_directory || n > 0)
@@ -756,16 +767,25 @@ int setup_namespace(
                         m++;
                 }
 
-                if (private_dev) {
+                if (ns_info->private_dev) {
                         m->path = prefix_roota(root_directory, "/dev");
                         m->mode = PRIVATE_DEV;
                         m++;
                 }
 
-                if (protect_sysctl)
-                        append_protect_kernel_tunables(&m, root_directory);
+                if (ns_info->protect_kernel_tunables) {
+                        r = append_protect_kernel_tunables(&m, root_directory);
+                        if (r < 0)
+                                return r;
+                }
+
+                if (ns_info->protect_kernel_modules) {
+                        r = append_protect_kernel_modules(&m, root_directory);
+                        if (r < 0)
+                                return r;
+                }
 
-                if (protect_cgroups) {
+                if (ns_info->protect_control_groups) {
                         m->path = prefix_roota(root_directory, "/sys/fs/cgroup");
                         m->mode = READONLY;
                         m++;
diff --git a/src/core/namespace.h b/src/core/namespace.h
index 6505bcc499..6310638e9a 100644
--- a/src/core/namespace.h
+++ b/src/core/namespace.h
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
   This file is part of systemd.
 
   Copyright 2010 Lennart Poettering
+  Copyright 2016 Djalal Harouni
 
   systemd is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
   under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License as published by
@@ -19,6 +20,8 @@
   along with systemd; If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
 ***/
 
+typedef struct NameSpaceInfo NameSpaceInfo;
+
 #include <stdbool.h>
 
 #include "macro.h"
@@ -40,15 +43,20 @@ typedef enum ProtectSystem {
         _PROTECT_SYSTEM_INVALID = -1
 } ProtectSystem;
 
+struct NameSpaceInfo {
+        bool private_dev:1;
+        bool protect_control_groups:1;
+        bool protect_kernel_tunables:1;
+        bool protect_kernel_modules:1;
+};
+
 int setup_namespace(const char *chroot,
+                    const NameSpaceInfo *ns_info,
                     char **read_write_paths,
                     char **read_only_paths,
                     char **inaccessible_paths,
                     const char *tmp_dir,
                     const char *var_tmp_dir,
-                    bool private_dev,
-                    bool protect_sysctl,
-                    bool protect_cgroups,
                     ProtectHome protect_home,
                     ProtectSystem protect_system,
                     unsigned long mount_flags);
diff --git a/src/core/unit.c b/src/core/unit.c
index 690f7f7dd9..67668bdc48 100644
--- a/src/core/unit.c
+++ b/src/core/unit.c
@@ -3399,7 +3399,10 @@ int unit_patch_contexts(Unit *u) {
                         ec->no_new_privileges = true;
 
                 if (ec->private_devices)
-                        ec->capability_bounding_set &= ~(UINT64_C(1) << CAP_MKNOD);
+                        ec->capability_bounding_set &= ~((UINT64_C(1) << CAP_MKNOD) | (UINT64_C(1) << CAP_SYS_RAWIO));
+
+                if (ec->protect_kernel_modules)
+                        ec->capability_bounding_set &= ~(UINT64_C(1) << CAP_SYS_MODULE);
 
                 if (ec->dynamic_user) {
                         if (!ec->user) {
diff --git a/src/shared/bus-unit-util.c b/src/shared/bus-unit-util.c
index a550a370b5..f639e0e832 100644
--- a/src/shared/bus-unit-util.c
+++ b/src/shared/bus-unit-util.c
@@ -204,7 +204,8 @@ int bus_append_unit_property_assignment(sd_bus_message *m, const char *assignmen
                               "IgnoreSIGPIPE", "TTYVHangup", "TTYReset", "RemainAfterExit",
                               "PrivateTmp", "PrivateDevices", "PrivateNetwork", "PrivateUsers", "NoNewPrivileges",
                               "SyslogLevelPrefix", "Delegate", "RemainAfterElapse", "MemoryDenyWriteExecute",
-                              "RestrictRealtime", "DynamicUser", "RemoveIPC", "ProtectKernelTunables", "ProtectControlGroups")) {
+                              "RestrictRealtime", "DynamicUser", "RemoveIPC", "ProtectKernelTunables",
+                              "ProtectKernelModules", "ProtectControlGroups")) {
 
                 r = parse_boolean(eq);
                 if (r < 0)
diff --git a/src/test/test-execute.c b/src/test/test-execute.c
index 8b4ff22495..e8ff02adaf 100644
--- a/src/test/test-execute.c
+++ b/src/test/test-execute.c
@@ -140,6 +140,19 @@ static void test_exec_privatedevices_capabilities(Manager *m) {
         }
         test(m, "exec-privatedevices-yes-capability-mknod.service", 0, CLD_EXITED);
         test(m, "exec-privatedevices-no-capability-mknod.service", 0, CLD_EXITED);
+        test(m, "exec-privatedevices-yes-capability-sys-rawio.service", 0, CLD_EXITED);
+        test(m, "exec-privatedevices-no-capability-sys-rawio.service", 0, CLD_EXITED);
+}
+
+static void test_exec_protectkernelmodules(Manager *m) {
+        if (detect_container() > 0) {
+                log_notice("testing in container, skipping protectkernelmodules tests");
+                return;
+        }
+
+        test(m, "exec-protectkernelmodules-no-capabilities.service", 0, CLD_EXITED);
+        test(m, "exec-protectkernelmodules-yes-capabilities.service", 0, CLD_EXITED);
+        test(m, "exec-protectkernelmodules-yes-mount-propagation.service", 0, CLD_EXITED);
 }
 
 static void test_exec_readonlypaths(Manager *m) {
@@ -368,6 +381,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
                 test_exec_privatetmp,
                 test_exec_privatedevices,
                 test_exec_privatedevices_capabilities,
+                test_exec_protectkernelmodules,
                 test_exec_readonlypaths,
                 test_exec_readwritepaths,
                 test_exec_inaccessiblepaths,
diff --git a/src/test/test-ns.c b/src/test/test-ns.c
index c4d4da6d05..da7a8b0565 100644
--- a/src/test/test-ns.c
+++ b/src/test/test-ns.c
@@ -45,6 +45,14 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
                 "/home/lennart/projects",
                 NULL
         };
+
+        static const NameSpaceInfo ns_info = {
+                .private_dev = true,
+                .protect_control_groups = true,
+                .protect_kernel_tunables = true,
+                .protect_kernel_modules = true,
+        };
+
         char *root_directory;
         char *projects_directory;
         int r;
@@ -69,14 +77,12 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
                 log_info("Not chrooted");
 
         r = setup_namespace(root_directory,
+                            &ns_info,
                             (char **) writable,
                             (char **) readonly,
                             (char **) inaccessible,
                             tmp_dir,
                             var_tmp_dir,
-                            true,
-                            true,
-                            true,
                             PROTECT_HOME_NO,
                             PROTECT_SYSTEM_NO,
                             0);
diff --git a/test/test-execute/exec-privatedevices-no-capability-sys-rawio.service b/test/test-execute/exec-privatedevices-no-capability-sys-rawio.service
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e7f529c44c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/test-execute/exec-privatedevices-no-capability-sys-rawio.service
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+[Unit]
+Description=Test CAP_SYS_RAWIO capability for PrivateDevices=no
+
+[Service]
+PrivateDevices=no
+ExecStart=/bin/sh -x -c 'capsh --print | grep cap_sys_rawio'
+Type=oneshot
diff --git a/test/test-execute/exec-privatedevices-yes-capability-sys-rawio.service b/test/test-execute/exec-privatedevices-yes-capability-sys-rawio.service
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..cebc493a7a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/test-execute/exec-privatedevices-yes-capability-sys-rawio.service
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+[Unit]
+Description=Test CAP_SYS_RAWIO capability for PrivateDevices=yes
+
+[Service]
+PrivateDevices=yes
+ExecStart=/bin/sh -x -c '! capsh --print | grep cap_sys_rawio'
+Type=oneshot
diff --git a/test/test-execute/exec-protectkernelmodules-no-capabilities.service b/test/test-execute/exec-protectkernelmodules-no-capabilities.service
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b2f2cd6b8a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/test-execute/exec-protectkernelmodules-no-capabilities.service
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+[Unit]
+Description=Test CAP_SYS_MODULE ProtectKernelModules=no
+
+[Service]
+ProtectKernelModules=no
+ExecStart=/bin/sh -x -c 'capsh --print | grep cap_sys_module'
+Type=oneshot
diff --git a/test/test-execute/exec-protectkernelmodules-yes-capabilities.service b/test/test-execute/exec-protectkernelmodules-yes-capabilities.service
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..84bf39be56
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/test-execute/exec-protectkernelmodules-yes-capabilities.service
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+[Unit]
+Description=Test CAP_SYS_MODULE for ProtectKernelModules=yes
+
+[Service]
+ProtectKernelModules=yes
+ExecStart=/bin/sh -x -c '! capsh --print | grep cap_sys_module'
+Type=oneshot
diff --git a/test/test-execute/exec-protectkernelmodules-yes-mount-propagation.service b/test/test-execute/exec-protectkernelmodules-yes-mount-propagation.service
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e438783df3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/test-execute/exec-protectkernelmodules-yes-mount-propagation.service
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+[Unit]
+Description=Test to make sure that passing ProtectKernelModules=yes disconnect mount propagation
+
+[Service]
+ProtectKernelModules=yes
+ExecStart=/bin/sh -x -c 'mkdir -p /TEST; mount -t tmpfs tmpfs /TEST; grep TEST /proc/self/mountinfo && ! grep TEST /proc/$${PPID}/mountinfo && ! grep TEST /proc/1/mountinfo'
+Type=oneshot