diff options
| author | Kees Cook <kees@outflux.net> | 2016-11-03 18:26:59 -0600 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Zbigniew Jędrzejewski-Szmek <zbyszek@in.waw.pl> | 2016-11-03 20:26:59 -0400 |
| commit | d974f949f10d6945e1abe9bc6525e676bc515928 (patch) | |
| tree | c6a6d7937efcfd885aff312015a61ee428e1109c /man/systemd.exec.xml | |
| parent | e2df6e90b239cbc1d14f5e63a9ba3abb08a2e787 (diff) | |
doc: clarify NoNewPrivileges (#4562)
Setting no_new_privs does not stop UID changes, but rather blocks
gaining privileges through execve(). Also fixes a small typo.
Diffstat (limited to 'man/systemd.exec.xml')
| -rw-r--r-- | man/systemd.exec.xml | 8 |
1 files changed, 4 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/man/systemd.exec.xml b/man/systemd.exec.xml index 3c350df11f..ea889c9cf3 100644 --- a/man/systemd.exec.xml +++ b/man/systemd.exec.xml @@ -1235,13 +1235,13 @@ <term><varname>NoNewPrivileges=</varname></term> <listitem><para>Takes a boolean argument. If true, ensures that the service - process and all its children can never gain new privileges. This option is more - powerful than the respective secure bits flags (see above), as it also prohibits - UID changes of any kind. This is the simplest and most effective way to ensure that + process and all its children can never gain new privileges through + <function>execve</function> (e.g. via setuid or setgid bits, or filesystem + capabilities). This is the simplest and most effective way to ensure that a process and its children can never elevate privileges again. Defaults to false, but in the user manager instance certain settings force <varname>NoNewPrivileges=yes</varname>, ignoring the value of this setting. - Those is the case when <varname>SystemCallFilter=</varname>, + This is the case when <varname>SystemCallFilter=</varname>, <varname>SystemCallArchitectures=</varname>, <varname>RestrictAddressFamilies=</varname>, <varname>PrivateDevices=</varname>, |