diff options
| author | Lennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net> | 2016-08-25 15:57:21 +0200 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@opendz.org> | 2016-09-25 10:42:18 +0200 |
| commit | 3f815163ff8fdcdbd329680580df36f94e15325d (patch) | |
| tree | 1436ba9f8a74ad8c6f4311764b7591a8283a5c00 /man/systemd.exec.xml | |
| parent | 160cfdbed3eb23b6bc3c17613685b756f23be4a1 (diff) | |
core: introduce ProtectSystem=strict
Let's tighten our sandbox a bit more: with this change ProtectSystem= gains a
new setting "strict". If set, the entire directory tree of the system is
mounted read-only, but the API file systems /proc, /dev, /sys are excluded
(they may be managed with PrivateDevices= and ProtectKernelTunables=). Also,
/home and /root are excluded as those are left for ProtectHome= to manage.
In this mode, all "real" file systems (i.e. non-API file systems) are mounted
read-only, and specific directories may only be excluded via
ReadWriteDirectories=, thus implementing an effective whitelist instead of
blacklist of writable directories.
While we are at, also add /efi to the list of paths always affected by
ProtectSystem=. This is a follow-up for
b52a109ad38cd37b660ccd5394ff5c171a5e5355 which added /efi as alternative for
/boot. Our namespacing logic should respect that too.
Diffstat (limited to 'man/systemd.exec.xml')
| -rw-r--r-- | man/systemd.exec.xml | 33 |
1 files changed, 17 insertions, 16 deletions
diff --git a/man/systemd.exec.xml b/man/systemd.exec.xml index 07128b489e..1b672fe0c9 100644 --- a/man/systemd.exec.xml +++ b/man/systemd.exec.xml @@ -1020,22 +1020,23 @@ <varlistentry> <term><varname>ProtectSystem=</varname></term> - <listitem><para>Takes a boolean argument or - <literal>full</literal>. If true, mounts the - <filename>/usr</filename> and <filename>/boot</filename> - directories read-only for processes invoked by this unit. If - set to <literal>full</literal>, the <filename>/etc</filename> - directory is mounted read-only, too. This setting ensures that - any modification of the vendor-supplied operating system (and - optionally its configuration) is prohibited for the service. - It is recommended to enable this setting for all long-running - services, unless they are involved with system updates or need - to modify the operating system in other ways. Note however - that processes retaining the CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability can undo - the effect of this setting. This setting is hence particularly - useful for daemons which have this capability removed, for - example with <varname>CapabilityBoundingSet=</varname>. - Defaults to off.</para></listitem> + <listitem><para>Takes a boolean argument or the special values <literal>full</literal> or + <literal>strict</literal>. If true, mounts the <filename>/usr</filename> and <filename>/boot</filename> + directories read-only for processes invoked by this unit. If set to <literal>full</literal>, the + <filename>/etc</filename> directory is mounted read-only, too. If set to <literal>strict</literal> the entire + file system hierarchy is mounted read-only, except for the API file system subtrees <filename>/dev</filename>, + <filename>/proc</filename> and <filename>/sys</filename> (protect these directories using + <varname>PrivateDevices=</varname>, <varname>ProtectKernelTunables=</varname>, + <varname>ProtectControlGroups=</varname>). This setting ensures that any modification of the vendor-supplied + operating system (and optionally its configuration, and local mounts) is prohibited for the service. It is + recommended to enable this setting for all long-running services, unless they are involved with system updates + or need to modify the operating system in other ways. If this option is used, + <varname>ReadWritePaths=</varname> may be used to exclude specific directories from being made read-only. Note + that processes retaining the <constant>CAP_SYS_ADMIN</constant> capability (and with no system call filter that + prohibits mount-related system calls applied) can undo the effect of this setting. This setting is hence + particularly useful for daemons which have this either the <literal>@mount</literal> set filtered using + <varname>SystemCallFilter=</varname>, or have the <constant>CAP_SYS_ADMIN</constant> capability removed, for + example with <varname>CapabilityBoundingSet=</varname>. Defaults to off.</para></listitem> </varlistentry> <varlistentry> |