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authorDavid Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>2015-07-01 18:31:18 +0200
committerKay Sievers <kay@vrfy.org>2015-07-01 18:32:51 +0200
commit3723263f4989ebeb087cf0a1259884de962bc85e (patch)
tree96d9135337434ad1caf6300a8b2b14be66952ebf /src/bus-proxyd/proxy.c
parent0204c4bd69f694b527643ace9d434befce80085c (diff)
bus-proxy: never apply policy when sending signals
Unlike dbus-daemon, the bus-proxy does not know the receiver of a broadcast (as the kernel has exclusive access on the bus connections). Hence, and "destination=" matches in dbus1 policies cannot be applied. But kdbus does not place any restrictions on *SENDING* broadcasts, anyway. The kernel never returns EPERM to KDBUS_CMD_SEND if KDBUS_MSG_SIGNAL is set. Instead, receiver policies are checked. Hence, stop checking sender policies for signals in bus-proxy and leave it up to the kernel. This fixes some network-manager bus-proxy issues where NM uses weird dst-based matches against interface-based matches. As we cannot perform dst-based matches, our bus-proxy cannot properly implement this policy.
Diffstat (limited to 'src/bus-proxyd/proxy.c')
-rw-r--r--src/bus-proxyd/proxy.c24
1 files changed, 11 insertions, 13 deletions
diff --git a/src/bus-proxyd/proxy.c b/src/bus-proxyd/proxy.c
index 28ab1c97fc..1dc55171e7 100644
--- a/src/bus-proxyd/proxy.c
+++ b/src/bus-proxyd/proxy.c
@@ -494,7 +494,16 @@ static int process_policy_unlocked(sd_bus *from, sd_bus *to, sd_bus_message *m,
}
/* First check if we (the sender) can send to this name */
- if (policy_check_send(policy, our_ucred->uid, our_ucred->gid, m->header->type, NULL, destination_names, m->path, m->interface, m->member, true, &n)) {
+ if (sd_bus_message_is_signal(m, NULL, NULL)) {
+ /* If we forward a signal from dbus-1 to kdbus, we have
+ * no idea who the recipient is. Therefore, we cannot
+ * apply any dbus-1 policies that match on receiver
+ * credentials. We know sd-bus always sets
+ * KDBUS_MSG_SIGNAL, so the kernel applies policies to
+ * the message. Therefore, skip policy checks in this
+ * case. */
+ return 0;
+ } else if (policy_check_send(policy, our_ucred->uid, our_ucred->gid, m->header->type, NULL, destination_names, m->path, m->interface, m->member, true, &n)) {
if (n) {
/* If we made a receiver decision, then remember which
* name's policy we used, and to which unique ID it
@@ -512,19 +521,8 @@ static int process_policy_unlocked(sd_bus *from, sd_bus *to, sd_bus_message *m,
return r;
}
- if (sd_bus_message_is_signal(m, NULL, NULL)) {
- /* If we forward a signal from dbus-1 to kdbus,
- * we have no idea who the recipient is.
- * Therefore, we cannot apply any dbus-1
- * receiver policies that match on receiver
- * credentials. We know sd-bus always sets
- * KDBUS_MSG_SIGNAL, so the kernel applies
- * receiver policies to the message. Therefore,
- * skip policy checks in this case. */
- return 0;
- } else if (policy_check_recv(policy, destination_uid, destination_gid, m->header->type, owned_names, NULL, m->path, m->interface, m->member, true)) {
+ if (policy_check_recv(policy, destination_uid, destination_gid, m->header->type, owned_names, NULL, m->path, m->interface, m->member, true))
return 0;
- }
}
/* Return an error back to the caller */