diff options
| author | Luke Shumaker <lukeshu@sbcglobal.net> | 2016-06-07 00:05:00 -0400 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Luke Shumaker <lukeshu@sbcglobal.net> | 2016-06-07 00:05:00 -0400 |
| commit | 5c2a4ec88de774007b939796823adc4d7cb3c8dd (patch) | |
| tree | aa2724fd2bdeb2d1cb0501f05eddc463f3eec563 /src/libcore/execute.c | |
| parent | ce3326f10b8522ff1b1d2d55c76910a67897dbce (diff) | |
./move.sh
Diffstat (limited to 'src/libcore/execute.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/libcore/execute.c | 3165 |
1 files changed, 3165 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/libcore/execute.c b/src/libcore/execute.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6fd35c8350 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/libcore/execute.c @@ -0,0 +1,3165 @@ +/*** + This file is part of systemd. + + Copyright 2010 Lennart Poettering + + systemd is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it + under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License as published by + the Free Software Foundation; either version 2.1 of the License, or + (at your option) any later version. + + systemd is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but + WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU + Lesser General Public License for more details. + + You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public License + along with systemd; If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. +***/ + +#include <errno.h> +#include <fcntl.h> +#include <glob.h> +#include <grp.h> +#include <poll.h> +#include <signal.h> +#include <string.h> +#include <sys/personality.h> +#include <sys/prctl.h> +#include <sys/socket.h> +#include <sys/stat.h> +#include <sys/un.h> +#include <unistd.h> +#include <utmpx.h> + +#ifdef HAVE_PAM +#include <security/pam_appl.h> +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_SELINUX +#include <selinux/selinux.h> +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_SECCOMP +#include <seccomp.h> +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_APPARMOR +#include <sys/apparmor.h> +#endif + +#include <systemd/sd-messages.h> + +#include "af-list.h" +#include "alloc-util.h" +#ifdef HAVE_APPARMOR +#include "apparmor-util.h" +#endif +#include "async.h" +#include "barrier.h" +#include "bus-endpoint.h" +#include "cap-list.h" +#include "capability-util.h" +#include "def.h" +#include "env-util.h" +#include "errno-list.h" +#include "execute.h" +#include "exit-status.h" +#include "fd-util.h" +#include "fileio.h" +#include "formats-util.h" +#include "fs-util.h" +#include "glob-util.h" +#include "io-util.h" +#include "ioprio.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "macro.h" +#include "missing.h" +#include "mkdir.h" +#include "namespace.h" +#include "parse-util.h" +#include "path-util.h" +#include "process-util.h" +#include "rlimit-util.h" +#include "rm-rf.h" +#ifdef HAVE_SECCOMP +#include "seccomp-util.h" +#endif +#include "securebits.h" +#include "selinux-util.h" +#include "signal-util.h" +#include "smack-util.h" +#include "string-table.h" +#include "string-util.h" +#include "strv.h" +#include "syslog-util.h" +#include "terminal-util.h" +#include "unit.h" +#include "user-util.h" +#include "util.h" +#include "utmp-wtmp.h" + +#define IDLE_TIMEOUT_USEC (5*USEC_PER_SEC) +#define IDLE_TIMEOUT2_USEC (1*USEC_PER_SEC) + +/* This assumes there is a 'tty' group */ +#define TTY_MODE 0620 + +#define SNDBUF_SIZE (8*1024*1024) + +static int shift_fds(int fds[], unsigned n_fds) { + int start, restart_from; + + if (n_fds <= 0) + return 0; + + /* Modifies the fds array! (sorts it) */ + + assert(fds); + + start = 0; + for (;;) { + int i; + + restart_from = -1; + + for (i = start; i < (int) n_fds; i++) { + int nfd; + + /* Already at right index? */ + if (fds[i] == i+3) + continue; + + nfd = fcntl(fds[i], F_DUPFD, i + 3); + if (nfd < 0) + return -errno; + + safe_close(fds[i]); + fds[i] = nfd; + + /* Hmm, the fd we wanted isn't free? Then + * let's remember that and try again from here */ + if (nfd != i+3 && restart_from < 0) + restart_from = i; + } + + if (restart_from < 0) + break; + + start = restart_from; + } + + return 0; +} + +static int flags_fds(const int fds[], unsigned n_fds, bool nonblock) { + unsigned i; + int r; + + if (n_fds <= 0) + return 0; + + assert(fds); + + /* Drops/Sets O_NONBLOCK and FD_CLOEXEC from the file flags */ + + for (i = 0; i < n_fds; i++) { + + r = fd_nonblock(fds[i], nonblock); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + /* We unconditionally drop FD_CLOEXEC from the fds, + * since after all we want to pass these fds to our + * children */ + + r = fd_cloexec(fds[i], false); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + return 0; +} + +static const char *exec_context_tty_path(const ExecContext *context) { + assert(context); + + if (context->stdio_as_fds) + return NULL; + + if (context->tty_path) + return context->tty_path; + + return "/dev/console"; +} + +static void exec_context_tty_reset(const ExecContext *context, const ExecParameters *p) { + const char *path; + + assert(context); + + path = exec_context_tty_path(context); + + if (context->tty_vhangup) { + if (p && p->stdin_fd >= 0) + (void) terminal_vhangup_fd(p->stdin_fd); + else if (path) + (void) terminal_vhangup(path); + } + + if (context->tty_reset) { + if (p && p->stdin_fd >= 0) + (void) reset_terminal_fd(p->stdin_fd, true); + else if (path) + (void) reset_terminal(path); + } + + if (context->tty_vt_disallocate && path) + (void) vt_disallocate(path); +} + +static bool is_terminal_output(ExecOutput o) { + return + o == EXEC_OUTPUT_TTY || + o == EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG_AND_CONSOLE || + o == EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE || + o == EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL_AND_CONSOLE; +} + +static int open_null_as(int flags, int nfd) { + int fd, r; + + assert(nfd >= 0); + + fd = open("/dev/null", flags|O_NOCTTY); + if (fd < 0) + return -errno; + + if (fd != nfd) { + r = dup2(fd, nfd) < 0 ? -errno : nfd; + safe_close(fd); + } else + r = nfd; + + return r; +} + +static int connect_journal_socket(int fd, uid_t uid, gid_t gid) { + union sockaddr_union sa = { + .un.sun_family = AF_UNIX, + .un.sun_path = "/run/systemd/journal/stdout", + }; + uid_t olduid = UID_INVALID; + gid_t oldgid = GID_INVALID; + int r; + + if (gid != GID_INVALID) { + oldgid = getgid(); + + r = setegid(gid); + if (r < 0) + return -errno; + } + + if (uid != UID_INVALID) { + olduid = getuid(); + + r = seteuid(uid); + if (r < 0) { + r = -errno; + goto restore_gid; + } + } + + r = connect(fd, &sa.sa, offsetof(struct sockaddr_un, sun_path) + strlen(sa.un.sun_path)); + if (r < 0) + r = -errno; + + /* If we fail to restore the uid or gid, things will likely + fail later on. This should only happen if an LSM interferes. */ + + if (uid != UID_INVALID) + (void) seteuid(olduid); + + restore_gid: + if (gid != GID_INVALID) + (void) setegid(oldgid); + + return r; +} + +static int connect_logger_as(const ExecContext *context, ExecOutput output, const char *ident, const char *unit_id, int nfd, uid_t uid, gid_t gid) { + int fd, r; + + assert(context); + assert(output < _EXEC_OUTPUT_MAX); + assert(ident); + assert(nfd >= 0); + + fd = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0); + if (fd < 0) + return -errno; + + r = connect_journal_socket(fd, uid, gid); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + if (shutdown(fd, SHUT_RD) < 0) { + safe_close(fd); + return -errno; + } + + fd_inc_sndbuf(fd, SNDBUF_SIZE); + + dprintf(fd, + "%s\n" + "%s\n" + "%i\n" + "%i\n" + "%i\n" + "%i\n" + "%i\n", + context->syslog_identifier ? context->syslog_identifier : ident, + unit_id, + context->syslog_priority, + !!context->syslog_level_prefix, + output == EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG || output == EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG_AND_CONSOLE, + output == EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG || output == EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE, + is_terminal_output(output)); + + if (fd != nfd) { + r = dup2(fd, nfd) < 0 ? -errno : nfd; + safe_close(fd); + } else + r = nfd; + + return r; +} +static int open_terminal_as(const char *path, mode_t mode, int nfd) { + int fd, r; + + assert(path); + assert(nfd >= 0); + + fd = open_terminal(path, mode | O_NOCTTY); + if (fd < 0) + return fd; + + if (fd != nfd) { + r = dup2(fd, nfd) < 0 ? -errno : nfd; + safe_close(fd); + } else + r = nfd; + + return r; +} + +static bool is_terminal_input(ExecInput i) { + return + i == EXEC_INPUT_TTY || + i == EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FORCE || + i == EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FAIL; +} + +static int fixup_input(ExecInput std_input, int socket_fd, bool apply_tty_stdin) { + + if (is_terminal_input(std_input) && !apply_tty_stdin) + return EXEC_INPUT_NULL; + + if (std_input == EXEC_INPUT_SOCKET && socket_fd < 0) + return EXEC_INPUT_NULL; + + return std_input; +} + +static int fixup_output(ExecOutput std_output, int socket_fd) { + + if (std_output == EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET && socket_fd < 0) + return EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT; + + return std_output; +} + +static int setup_input( + const ExecContext *context, + const ExecParameters *params, + int socket_fd) { + + ExecInput i; + + assert(context); + assert(params); + + if (params->stdin_fd >= 0) { + if (dup2(params->stdin_fd, STDIN_FILENO) < 0) + return -errno; + + /* Try to make this the controlling tty, if it is a tty, and reset it */ + (void) ioctl(STDIN_FILENO, TIOCSCTTY, context->std_input == EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FORCE); + (void) reset_terminal_fd(STDIN_FILENO, true); + + return STDIN_FILENO; + } + + i = fixup_input(context->std_input, socket_fd, params->apply_tty_stdin); + + switch (i) { + + case EXEC_INPUT_NULL: + return open_null_as(O_RDONLY, STDIN_FILENO); + + case EXEC_INPUT_TTY: + case EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FORCE: + case EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FAIL: { + int fd, r; + + fd = acquire_terminal(exec_context_tty_path(context), + i == EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FAIL, + i == EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FORCE, + false, + USEC_INFINITY); + if (fd < 0) + return fd; + + if (fd != STDIN_FILENO) { + r = dup2(fd, STDIN_FILENO) < 0 ? -errno : STDIN_FILENO; + safe_close(fd); + } else + r = STDIN_FILENO; + + return r; + } + + case EXEC_INPUT_SOCKET: + return dup2(socket_fd, STDIN_FILENO) < 0 ? -errno : STDIN_FILENO; + + default: + assert_not_reached("Unknown input type"); + } +} + +static int setup_output( + Unit *unit, + const ExecContext *context, + const ExecParameters *params, + int fileno, + int socket_fd, + const char *ident, + uid_t uid, gid_t gid) { + + ExecOutput o; + ExecInput i; + int r; + + assert(unit); + assert(context); + assert(params); + assert(ident); + + if (fileno == STDOUT_FILENO && params->stdout_fd >= 0) { + + if (dup2(params->stdout_fd, STDOUT_FILENO) < 0) + return -errno; + + return STDOUT_FILENO; + } + + if (fileno == STDERR_FILENO && params->stderr_fd >= 0) { + if (dup2(params->stderr_fd, STDERR_FILENO) < 0) + return -errno; + + return STDERR_FILENO; + } + + i = fixup_input(context->std_input, socket_fd, params->apply_tty_stdin); + o = fixup_output(context->std_output, socket_fd); + + if (fileno == STDERR_FILENO) { + ExecOutput e; + e = fixup_output(context->std_error, socket_fd); + + /* This expects the input and output are already set up */ + + /* Don't change the stderr file descriptor if we inherit all + * the way and are not on a tty */ + if (e == EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT && + o == EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT && + i == EXEC_INPUT_NULL && + !is_terminal_input(context->std_input) && + getppid () != 1) + return fileno; + + /* Duplicate from stdout if possible */ + if (e == o || e == EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT) + return dup2(STDOUT_FILENO, fileno) < 0 ? -errno : fileno; + + o = e; + + } else if (o == EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT) { + /* If input got downgraded, inherit the original value */ + if (i == EXEC_INPUT_NULL && is_terminal_input(context->std_input)) + return open_terminal_as(exec_context_tty_path(context), O_WRONLY, fileno); + + /* If the input is connected to anything that's not a /dev/null, inherit that... */ + if (i != EXEC_INPUT_NULL) + return dup2(STDIN_FILENO, fileno) < 0 ? -errno : fileno; + + /* If we are not started from PID 1 we just inherit STDOUT from our parent process. */ + if (getppid() != 1) + return fileno; + + /* We need to open /dev/null here anew, to get the right access mode. */ + return open_null_as(O_WRONLY, fileno); + } + + switch (o) { + + case EXEC_OUTPUT_NULL: + return open_null_as(O_WRONLY, fileno); + + case EXEC_OUTPUT_TTY: + if (is_terminal_input(i)) + return dup2(STDIN_FILENO, fileno) < 0 ? -errno : fileno; + + /* We don't reset the terminal if this is just about output */ + return open_terminal_as(exec_context_tty_path(context), O_WRONLY, fileno); + + case EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG: + case EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG_AND_CONSOLE: + case EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG: + case EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE: + case EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL: + case EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL_AND_CONSOLE: + r = connect_logger_as(context, o, ident, unit->id, fileno, uid, gid); + if (r < 0) { + log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to connect %s to the journal socket, ignoring: %m", fileno == STDOUT_FILENO ? "stdout" : "stderr"); + r = open_null_as(O_WRONLY, fileno); + } + return r; + + case EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET: + assert(socket_fd >= 0); + return dup2(socket_fd, fileno) < 0 ? -errno : fileno; + + default: + assert_not_reached("Unknown error type"); + } +} + +static int chown_terminal(int fd, uid_t uid) { + struct stat st; + + assert(fd >= 0); + + /* This might fail. What matters are the results. */ + (void) fchown(fd, uid, -1); + (void) fchmod(fd, TTY_MODE); + + if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0) + return -errno; + + if (st.st_uid != uid || (st.st_mode & 0777) != TTY_MODE) + return -EPERM; + + return 0; +} + +static int setup_confirm_stdio(int *_saved_stdin, int *_saved_stdout) { + _cleanup_close_ int fd = -1, saved_stdin = -1, saved_stdout = -1; + int r; + + assert(_saved_stdin); + assert(_saved_stdout); + + saved_stdin = fcntl(STDIN_FILENO, F_DUPFD, 3); + if (saved_stdin < 0) + return -errno; + + saved_stdout = fcntl(STDOUT_FILENO, F_DUPFD, 3); + if (saved_stdout < 0) + return -errno; + + fd = acquire_terminal( + "/dev/console", + false, + false, + false, + DEFAULT_CONFIRM_USEC); + if (fd < 0) + return fd; + + r = chown_terminal(fd, getuid()); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = reset_terminal_fd(fd, true); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + if (dup2(fd, STDIN_FILENO) < 0) + return -errno; + + if (dup2(fd, STDOUT_FILENO) < 0) + return -errno; + + if (fd >= 2) + safe_close(fd); + fd = -1; + + *_saved_stdin = saved_stdin; + *_saved_stdout = saved_stdout; + + saved_stdin = saved_stdout = -1; + + return 0; +} + +_printf_(1, 2) static int write_confirm_message(const char *format, ...) { + _cleanup_close_ int fd = -1; + va_list ap; + + assert(format); + + fd = open_terminal("/dev/console", O_WRONLY|O_NOCTTY|O_CLOEXEC); + if (fd < 0) + return fd; + + va_start(ap, format); + vdprintf(fd, format, ap); + va_end(ap); + + return 0; +} + +static int restore_confirm_stdio(int *saved_stdin, int *saved_stdout) { + int r = 0; + + assert(saved_stdin); + assert(saved_stdout); + + release_terminal(); + + if (*saved_stdin >= 0) + if (dup2(*saved_stdin, STDIN_FILENO) < 0) + r = -errno; + + if (*saved_stdout >= 0) + if (dup2(*saved_stdout, STDOUT_FILENO) < 0) + r = -errno; + + *saved_stdin = safe_close(*saved_stdin); + *saved_stdout = safe_close(*saved_stdout); + + return r; +} + +static int ask_for_confirmation(char *response, char **argv) { + int saved_stdout = -1, saved_stdin = -1, r; + _cleanup_free_ char *line = NULL; + + r = setup_confirm_stdio(&saved_stdin, &saved_stdout); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + line = exec_command_line(argv); + if (!line) + return -ENOMEM; + + r = ask_char(response, "yns", "Execute %s? [Yes, No, Skip] ", line); + + restore_confirm_stdio(&saved_stdin, &saved_stdout); + + return r; +} + +static int enforce_groups(const ExecContext *context, const char *username, gid_t gid) { + bool keep_groups = false; + int r; + + assert(context); + + /* Lookup and set GID and supplementary group list. Here too + * we avoid NSS lookups for gid=0. */ + + if (context->group || username) { + /* First step, initialize groups from /etc/groups */ + if (username && gid != 0) { + if (initgroups(username, gid) < 0) + return -errno; + + keep_groups = true; + } + + /* Second step, set our gids */ + if (setresgid(gid, gid, gid) < 0) + return -errno; + } + + if (context->supplementary_groups) { + int ngroups_max, k; + gid_t *gids; + char **i; + + /* Final step, initialize any manually set supplementary groups */ + assert_se((ngroups_max = (int) sysconf(_SC_NGROUPS_MAX)) > 0); + + if (!(gids = new(gid_t, ngroups_max))) + return -ENOMEM; + + if (keep_groups) { + k = getgroups(ngroups_max, gids); + if (k < 0) { + free(gids); + return -errno; + } + } else + k = 0; + + STRV_FOREACH(i, context->supplementary_groups) { + const char *g; + + if (k >= ngroups_max) { + free(gids); + return -E2BIG; + } + + g = *i; + r = get_group_creds(&g, gids+k); + if (r < 0) { + free(gids); + return r; + } + + k++; + } + + if (setgroups(k, gids) < 0) { + free(gids); + return -errno; + } + + free(gids); + } + + return 0; +} + +static int enforce_user(const ExecContext *context, uid_t uid) { + assert(context); + + /* Sets (but doesn't lookup) the uid and make sure we keep the + * capabilities while doing so. */ + + if (context->capabilities || context->capability_ambient_set != 0) { + + /* First step: If we need to keep capabilities but + * drop privileges we need to make sure we keep our + * caps, while we drop privileges. */ + if (uid != 0) { + int sb = context->secure_bits | 1<<SECURE_KEEP_CAPS; + + if (prctl(PR_GET_SECUREBITS) != sb) + if (prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS, sb) < 0) + return -errno; + } + + /* Second step: set the capabilities. This will reduce + * the capabilities to the minimum we need. */ + + if (context->capabilities) { + _cleanup_cap_free_ cap_t d = NULL; + static const cap_value_t bits[] = { + CAP_SETUID, /* Necessary so that we can run setresuid() below */ + CAP_SETPCAP /* Necessary so that we can set PR_SET_SECUREBITS later on */ + }; + + d = cap_dup(context->capabilities); + if (!d) + return -errno; + + if (cap_set_flag(d, CAP_EFFECTIVE, ELEMENTSOF(bits), bits, CAP_SET) < 0 || + cap_set_flag(d, CAP_PERMITTED, ELEMENTSOF(bits), bits, CAP_SET) < 0) + return -errno; + + if (cap_set_proc(d) < 0) + return -errno; + } + } + + /* Third step: actually set the uids */ + if (setresuid(uid, uid, uid) < 0) + return -errno; + + /* At this point we should have all necessary capabilities but + are otherwise a normal user. However, the caps might got + corrupted due to the setresuid() so we need clean them up + later. This is done outside of this call. */ + + return 0; +} + +#ifdef HAVE_PAM + +static int null_conv( + int num_msg, + const struct pam_message **msg, + struct pam_response **resp, + void *appdata_ptr) { + + /* We don't support conversations */ + + return PAM_CONV_ERR; +} + +static int setup_pam( + const char *name, + const char *user, + uid_t uid, + const char *tty, + char ***pam_env, + int fds[], unsigned n_fds) { + + static const struct pam_conv conv = { + .conv = null_conv, + .appdata_ptr = NULL + }; + + _cleanup_(barrier_destroy) Barrier barrier = BARRIER_NULL; + pam_handle_t *handle = NULL; + sigset_t old_ss; + int pam_code = PAM_SUCCESS, r; + char **e = NULL; + bool close_session = false; + pid_t pam_pid = 0, parent_pid; + int flags = 0; + + assert(name); + assert(user); + assert(pam_env); + + /* We set up PAM in the parent process, then fork. The child + * will then stay around until killed via PR_GET_PDEATHSIG or + * systemd via the cgroup logic. It will then remove the PAM + * session again. The parent process will exec() the actual + * daemon. We do things this way to ensure that the main PID + * of the daemon is the one we initially fork()ed. */ + + r = barrier_create(&barrier); + if (r < 0) + goto fail; + + if (log_get_max_level() < LOG_DEBUG) + flags |= PAM_SILENT; + + pam_code = pam_start(name, user, &conv, &handle); + if (pam_code != PAM_SUCCESS) { + handle = NULL; + goto fail; + } + + if (tty) { + pam_code = pam_set_item(handle, PAM_TTY, tty); + if (pam_code != PAM_SUCCESS) + goto fail; + } + + pam_code = pam_acct_mgmt(handle, flags); + if (pam_code != PAM_SUCCESS) + goto fail; + + pam_code = pam_open_session(handle, flags); + if (pam_code != PAM_SUCCESS) + goto fail; + + close_session = true; + + e = pam_getenvlist(handle); + if (!e) { + pam_code = PAM_BUF_ERR; + goto fail; + } + + /* Block SIGTERM, so that we know that it won't get lost in + * the child */ + + assert_se(sigprocmask_many(SIG_BLOCK, &old_ss, SIGTERM, -1) >= 0); + + parent_pid = getpid(); + + pam_pid = fork(); + if (pam_pid < 0) { + r = -errno; + goto fail; + } + + if (pam_pid == 0) { + int sig, ret = EXIT_PAM; + + /* The child's job is to reset the PAM session on + * termination */ + barrier_set_role(&barrier, BARRIER_CHILD); + + /* This string must fit in 10 chars (i.e. the length + * of "/sbin/init"), to look pretty in /bin/ps */ + rename_process("(sd-pam)"); + + /* Make sure we don't keep open the passed fds in this + child. We assume that otherwise only those fds are + open here that have been opened by PAM. */ + close_many(fds, n_fds); + + /* Drop privileges - we don't need any to pam_close_session + * and this will make PR_SET_PDEATHSIG work in most cases. + * If this fails, ignore the error - but expect sd-pam threads + * to fail to exit normally */ + if (setresuid(uid, uid, uid) < 0) + log_error_errno(r, "Error: Failed to setresuid() in sd-pam: %m"); + + (void) ignore_signals(SIGPIPE, -1); + + /* Wait until our parent died. This will only work if + * the above setresuid() succeeds, otherwise the kernel + * will not allow unprivileged parents kill their privileged + * children this way. We rely on the control groups kill logic + * to do the rest for us. */ + if (prctl(PR_SET_PDEATHSIG, SIGTERM) < 0) + goto child_finish; + + /* Tell the parent that our setup is done. This is especially + * important regarding dropping privileges. Otherwise, unit + * setup might race against our setresuid(2) call. */ + barrier_place(&barrier); + + /* Check if our parent process might already have + * died? */ + if (getppid() == parent_pid) { + sigset_t ss; + + assert_se(sigemptyset(&ss) >= 0); + assert_se(sigaddset(&ss, SIGTERM) >= 0); + + for (;;) { + if (sigwait(&ss, &sig) < 0) { + if (errno == EINTR) + continue; + + goto child_finish; + } + + assert(sig == SIGTERM); + break; + } + } + + /* If our parent died we'll end the session */ + if (getppid() != parent_pid) { + pam_code = pam_close_session(handle, flags); + if (pam_code != PAM_SUCCESS) + goto child_finish; + } + + ret = 0; + + child_finish: + pam_end(handle, pam_code | flags); + _exit(ret); + } + + barrier_set_role(&barrier, BARRIER_PARENT); + + /* If the child was forked off successfully it will do all the + * cleanups, so forget about the handle here. */ + handle = NULL; + + /* Unblock SIGTERM again in the parent */ + assert_se(sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &old_ss, NULL) >= 0); + + /* We close the log explicitly here, since the PAM modules + * might have opened it, but we don't want this fd around. */ + closelog(); + + /* Synchronously wait for the child to initialize. We don't care for + * errors as we cannot recover. However, warn loudly if it happens. */ + if (!barrier_place_and_sync(&barrier)) + log_error("PAM initialization failed"); + + *pam_env = e; + e = NULL; + + return 0; + +fail: + if (pam_code != PAM_SUCCESS) { + log_error("PAM failed: %s", pam_strerror(handle, pam_code)); + r = -EPERM; /* PAM errors do not map to errno */ + } else + log_error_errno(r, "PAM failed: %m"); + + if (handle) { + if (close_session) + pam_code = pam_close_session(handle, flags); + + pam_end(handle, pam_code | flags); + } + + strv_free(e); + closelog(); + + return r; +} +#endif + +static void rename_process_from_path(const char *path) { + char process_name[11]; + const char *p; + size_t l; + + /* This resulting string must fit in 10 chars (i.e. the length + * of "/sbin/init") to look pretty in /bin/ps */ + + p = basename(path); + if (isempty(p)) { + rename_process("(...)"); + return; + } + + l = strlen(p); + if (l > 8) { + /* The end of the process name is usually more + * interesting, since the first bit might just be + * "systemd-" */ + p = p + l - 8; + l = 8; + } + + process_name[0] = '('; + memcpy(process_name+1, p, l); + process_name[1+l] = ')'; + process_name[1+l+1] = 0; + + rename_process(process_name); +} + +#ifdef HAVE_SECCOMP + +static int apply_seccomp(const ExecContext *c) { + uint32_t negative_action, action; + scmp_filter_ctx *seccomp; + Iterator i; + void *id; + int r; + + assert(c); + + negative_action = c->syscall_errno == 0 ? SCMP_ACT_KILL : SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(c->syscall_errno); + + seccomp = seccomp_init(c->syscall_whitelist ? negative_action : SCMP_ACT_ALLOW); + if (!seccomp) + return -ENOMEM; + + if (c->syscall_archs) { + + SET_FOREACH(id, c->syscall_archs, i) { + r = seccomp_arch_add(seccomp, PTR_TO_UINT32(id) - 1); + if (r == -EEXIST) + continue; + if (r < 0) + goto finish; + } + + } else { + r = seccomp_add_secondary_archs(seccomp); + if (r < 0) + goto finish; + } + + action = c->syscall_whitelist ? SCMP_ACT_ALLOW : negative_action; + SET_FOREACH(id, c->syscall_filter, i) { + r = seccomp_rule_add(seccomp, action, PTR_TO_INT(id) - 1, 0); + if (r < 0) + goto finish; + } + + r = seccomp_attr_set(seccomp, SCMP_FLTATR_CTL_NNP, 0); + if (r < 0) + goto finish; + + r = seccomp_load(seccomp); + +finish: + seccomp_release(seccomp); + return r; +} + +static int apply_address_families(const ExecContext *c) { + scmp_filter_ctx *seccomp; + Iterator i; + int r; + + assert(c); + + seccomp = seccomp_init(SCMP_ACT_ALLOW); + if (!seccomp) + return -ENOMEM; + + r = seccomp_add_secondary_archs(seccomp); + if (r < 0) + goto finish; + + if (c->address_families_whitelist) { + int af, first = 0, last = 0; + void *afp; + + /* If this is a whitelist, we first block the address + * families that are out of range and then everything + * that is not in the set. First, we find the lowest + * and highest address family in the set. */ + + SET_FOREACH(afp, c->address_families, i) { + af = PTR_TO_INT(afp); + + if (af <= 0 || af >= af_max()) + continue; + + if (first == 0 || af < first) + first = af; + + if (last == 0 || af > last) + last = af; + } + + assert((first == 0) == (last == 0)); + + if (first == 0) { + + /* No entries in the valid range, block everything */ + r = seccomp_rule_add( + seccomp, + SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPROTONOSUPPORT), + SCMP_SYS(socket), + 0); + if (r < 0) + goto finish; + + } else { + + /* Block everything below the first entry */ + r = seccomp_rule_add( + seccomp, + SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPROTONOSUPPORT), + SCMP_SYS(socket), + 1, + SCMP_A0(SCMP_CMP_LT, first)); + if (r < 0) + goto finish; + + /* Block everything above the last entry */ + r = seccomp_rule_add( + seccomp, + SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPROTONOSUPPORT), + SCMP_SYS(socket), + 1, + SCMP_A0(SCMP_CMP_GT, last)); + if (r < 0) + goto finish; + + /* Block everything between the first and last + * entry */ + for (af = 1; af < af_max(); af++) { + + if (set_contains(c->address_families, INT_TO_PTR(af))) + continue; + + r = seccomp_rule_add( + seccomp, + SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPROTONOSUPPORT), + SCMP_SYS(socket), + 1, + SCMP_A0(SCMP_CMP_EQ, af)); + if (r < 0) + goto finish; + } + } + + } else { + void *af; + + /* If this is a blacklist, then generate one rule for + * each address family that are then combined in OR + * checks. */ + + SET_FOREACH(af, c->address_families, i) { + + r = seccomp_rule_add( + seccomp, + SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPROTONOSUPPORT), + SCMP_SYS(socket), + 1, + SCMP_A0(SCMP_CMP_EQ, PTR_TO_INT(af))); + if (r < 0) + goto finish; + } + } + + r = seccomp_attr_set(seccomp, SCMP_FLTATR_CTL_NNP, 0); + if (r < 0) + goto finish; + + r = seccomp_load(seccomp); + +finish: + seccomp_release(seccomp); + return r; +} + +#endif + +static void do_idle_pipe_dance(int idle_pipe[4]) { + assert(idle_pipe); + + + idle_pipe[1] = safe_close(idle_pipe[1]); + idle_pipe[2] = safe_close(idle_pipe[2]); + + if (idle_pipe[0] >= 0) { + int r; + + r = fd_wait_for_event(idle_pipe[0], POLLHUP, IDLE_TIMEOUT_USEC); + + if (idle_pipe[3] >= 0 && r == 0 /* timeout */) { + ssize_t n; + + /* Signal systemd that we are bored and want to continue. */ + n = write(idle_pipe[3], "x", 1); + if (n > 0) + /* Wait for systemd to react to the signal above. */ + fd_wait_for_event(idle_pipe[0], POLLHUP, IDLE_TIMEOUT2_USEC); + } + + idle_pipe[0] = safe_close(idle_pipe[0]); + + } + + idle_pipe[3] = safe_close(idle_pipe[3]); +} + +static int build_environment( + const ExecContext *c, + const ExecParameters *p, + unsigned n_fds, + const char *home, + const char *username, + const char *shell, + char ***ret) { + + _cleanup_strv_free_ char **our_env = NULL; + unsigned n_env = 0; + char *x; + + assert(c); + assert(ret); + + our_env = new0(char*, 11); + if (!our_env) + return -ENOMEM; + + if (n_fds > 0) { + _cleanup_free_ char *joined = NULL; + + if (asprintf(&x, "LISTEN_PID="PID_FMT, getpid()) < 0) + return -ENOMEM; + our_env[n_env++] = x; + + if (asprintf(&x, "LISTEN_FDS=%u", n_fds) < 0) + return -ENOMEM; + our_env[n_env++] = x; + + joined = strv_join(p->fd_names, ":"); + if (!joined) + return -ENOMEM; + + x = strjoin("LISTEN_FDNAMES=", joined, NULL); + if (!x) + return -ENOMEM; + our_env[n_env++] = x; + } + + if (p->watchdog_usec > 0) { + if (asprintf(&x, "WATCHDOG_PID="PID_FMT, getpid()) < 0) + return -ENOMEM; + our_env[n_env++] = x; + + if (asprintf(&x, "WATCHDOG_USEC="USEC_FMT, p->watchdog_usec) < 0) + return -ENOMEM; + our_env[n_env++] = x; + } + + if (home) { + x = strappend("HOME=", home); + if (!x) + return -ENOMEM; + our_env[n_env++] = x; + } + + if (username) { + x = strappend("LOGNAME=", username); + if (!x) + return -ENOMEM; + our_env[n_env++] = x; + + x = strappend("USER=", username); + if (!x) + return -ENOMEM; + our_env[n_env++] = x; + } + + if (shell) { + x = strappend("SHELL=", shell); + if (!x) + return -ENOMEM; + our_env[n_env++] = x; + } + + if (is_terminal_input(c->std_input) || + c->std_output == EXEC_OUTPUT_TTY || + c->std_error == EXEC_OUTPUT_TTY || + c->tty_path) { + + x = strdup(default_term_for_tty(exec_context_tty_path(c))); + if (!x) + return -ENOMEM; + our_env[n_env++] = x; + } + + our_env[n_env++] = NULL; + assert(n_env <= 11); + + *ret = our_env; + our_env = NULL; + + return 0; +} + +static int build_pass_environment(const ExecContext *c, char ***ret) { + _cleanup_strv_free_ char **pass_env = NULL; + size_t n_env = 0, n_bufsize = 0; + char **i; + + STRV_FOREACH(i, c->pass_environment) { + _cleanup_free_ char *x = NULL; + char *v; + + v = getenv(*i); + if (!v) + continue; + x = strjoin(*i, "=", v, NULL); + if (!x) + return -ENOMEM; + if (!GREEDY_REALLOC(pass_env, n_bufsize, n_env + 2)) + return -ENOMEM; + pass_env[n_env++] = x; + pass_env[n_env] = NULL; + x = NULL; + } + + *ret = pass_env; + pass_env = NULL; + + return 0; +} + +static bool exec_needs_mount_namespace( + const ExecContext *context, + const ExecParameters *params, + ExecRuntime *runtime) { + + assert(context); + assert(params); + + if (!strv_isempty(context->read_write_dirs) || + !strv_isempty(context->read_only_dirs) || + !strv_isempty(context->inaccessible_dirs)) + return true; + + if (context->mount_flags != 0) + return true; + + if (context->private_tmp && runtime && (runtime->tmp_dir || runtime->var_tmp_dir)) + return true; + + if (params->bus_endpoint_path) + return true; + + if (context->private_devices || + context->protect_system != PROTECT_SYSTEM_NO || + context->protect_home != PROTECT_HOME_NO) + return true; + + return false; +} + +static int close_remaining_fds( + const ExecParameters *params, + ExecRuntime *runtime, + int socket_fd, + int *fds, unsigned n_fds) { + + unsigned n_dont_close = 0; + int dont_close[n_fds + 7]; + + assert(params); + + if (params->stdin_fd >= 0) + dont_close[n_dont_close++] = params->stdin_fd; + if (params->stdout_fd >= 0) + dont_close[n_dont_close++] = params->stdout_fd; + if (params->stderr_fd >= 0) + dont_close[n_dont_close++] = params->stderr_fd; + + if (socket_fd >= 0) + dont_close[n_dont_close++] = socket_fd; + if (n_fds > 0) { + memcpy(dont_close + n_dont_close, fds, sizeof(int) * n_fds); + n_dont_close += n_fds; + } + + if (params->bus_endpoint_fd >= 0) + dont_close[n_dont_close++] = params->bus_endpoint_fd; + + if (runtime) { + if (runtime->netns_storage_socket[0] >= 0) + dont_close[n_dont_close++] = runtime->netns_storage_socket[0]; + if (runtime->netns_storage_socket[1] >= 0) + dont_close[n_dont_close++] = runtime->netns_storage_socket[1]; + } + + return close_all_fds(dont_close, n_dont_close); +} + +static int exec_child( + Unit *unit, + ExecCommand *command, + const ExecContext *context, + const ExecParameters *params, + ExecRuntime *runtime, + char **argv, + int socket_fd, + int *fds, unsigned n_fds, + char **files_env, + int *exit_status) { + + _cleanup_strv_free_ char **our_env = NULL, **pass_env = NULL, **pam_env = NULL, **final_env = NULL, **final_argv = NULL; + _cleanup_free_ char *mac_selinux_context_net = NULL; + const char *username = NULL, *home = NULL, *shell = NULL, *wd; + uid_t uid = UID_INVALID; + gid_t gid = GID_INVALID; + int i, r; + bool needs_mount_namespace; + + assert(unit); + assert(command); + assert(context); + assert(params); + assert(exit_status); + + rename_process_from_path(command->path); + + /* We reset exactly these signals, since they are the + * only ones we set to SIG_IGN in the main daemon. All + * others we leave untouched because we set them to + * SIG_DFL or a valid handler initially, both of which + * will be demoted to SIG_DFL. */ + (void) default_signals(SIGNALS_CRASH_HANDLER, + SIGNALS_IGNORE, -1); + + if (context->ignore_sigpipe) + (void) ignore_signals(SIGPIPE, -1); + + r = reset_signal_mask(); + if (r < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_SIGNAL_MASK; + return r; + } + + if (params->idle_pipe) + do_idle_pipe_dance(params->idle_pipe); + + /* Close sockets very early to make sure we don't + * block init reexecution because it cannot bind its + * sockets */ + + log_forget_fds(); + + r = close_remaining_fds(params, runtime, socket_fd, fds, n_fds); + if (r < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_FDS; + return r; + } + + if (!context->same_pgrp) + if (setsid() < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_SETSID; + return -errno; + } + + exec_context_tty_reset(context, params); + + if (params->confirm_spawn) { + char response; + + r = ask_for_confirmation(&response, argv); + if (r == -ETIMEDOUT) + write_confirm_message("Confirmation question timed out, assuming positive response.\n"); + else if (r < 0) + write_confirm_message("Couldn't ask confirmation question, assuming positive response: %s\n", strerror(-r)); + else if (response == 's') { + write_confirm_message("Skipping execution.\n"); + *exit_status = EXIT_CONFIRM; + return -ECANCELED; + } else if (response == 'n') { + write_confirm_message("Failing execution.\n"); + *exit_status = 0; + return 0; + } + } + + if (context->user) { + username = context->user; + r = get_user_creds(&username, &uid, &gid, &home, &shell); + if (r < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_USER; + return r; + } + } + + if (context->group) { + const char *g = context->group; + + r = get_group_creds(&g, &gid); + if (r < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_GROUP; + return r; + } + } + + + /* If a socket is connected to STDIN/STDOUT/STDERR, we + * must sure to drop O_NONBLOCK */ + if (socket_fd >= 0) + (void) fd_nonblock(socket_fd, false); + + r = setup_input(context, params, socket_fd); + if (r < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_STDIN; + return r; + } + + r = setup_output(unit, context, params, STDOUT_FILENO, socket_fd, basename(command->path), uid, gid); + if (r < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_STDOUT; + return r; + } + + r = setup_output(unit, context, params, STDERR_FILENO, socket_fd, basename(command->path), uid, gid); + if (r < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_STDERR; + return r; + } + + if (params->cgroup_path) { + r = cg_attach_everywhere(params->cgroup_supported, params->cgroup_path, 0, NULL, NULL); + if (r < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_CGROUP; + return r; + } + } + + if (context->oom_score_adjust_set) { + char t[DECIMAL_STR_MAX(context->oom_score_adjust)]; + + /* When we can't make this change due to EPERM, then + * let's silently skip over it. User namespaces + * prohibit write access to this file, and we + * shouldn't trip up over that. */ + + sprintf(t, "%i", context->oom_score_adjust); + r = write_string_file("/proc/self/oom_score_adj", t, 0); + if (r == -EPERM || r == -EACCES) { + log_open(); + log_unit_debug_errno(unit, r, "Failed to adjust OOM setting, assuming containerized execution, ignoring: %m"); + log_close(); + } else if (r < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_OOM_ADJUST; + return -errno; + } + } + + if (context->nice_set) + if (setpriority(PRIO_PROCESS, 0, context->nice) < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_NICE; + return -errno; + } + + if (context->cpu_sched_set) { + struct sched_param param = { + .sched_priority = context->cpu_sched_priority, + }; + + r = sched_setscheduler(0, + context->cpu_sched_policy | + (context->cpu_sched_reset_on_fork ? + SCHED_RESET_ON_FORK : 0), + ¶m); + if (r < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_SETSCHEDULER; + return -errno; + } + } + + if (context->cpuset) + if (sched_setaffinity(0, CPU_ALLOC_SIZE(context->cpuset_ncpus), context->cpuset) < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_CPUAFFINITY; + return -errno; + } + + if (context->ioprio_set) + if (ioprio_set(IOPRIO_WHO_PROCESS, 0, context->ioprio) < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_IOPRIO; + return -errno; + } + + if (context->timer_slack_nsec != NSEC_INFINITY) + if (prctl(PR_SET_TIMERSLACK, context->timer_slack_nsec) < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_TIMERSLACK; + return -errno; + } + + if (context->personality != PERSONALITY_INVALID) + if (personality(context->personality) < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_PERSONALITY; + return -errno; + } + + if (context->utmp_id) + utmp_put_init_process(context->utmp_id, getpid(), getsid(0), context->tty_path, + context->utmp_mode == EXEC_UTMP_INIT ? INIT_PROCESS : + context->utmp_mode == EXEC_UTMP_LOGIN ? LOGIN_PROCESS : + USER_PROCESS, + username ? "root" : context->user); + + if (context->user && is_terminal_input(context->std_input)) { + r = chown_terminal(STDIN_FILENO, uid); + if (r < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_STDIN; + return r; + } + } + + if (params->bus_endpoint_fd >= 0 && context->bus_endpoint) { + uid_t ep_uid = (uid == UID_INVALID) ? 0 : uid; + + r = bus_kernel_set_endpoint_policy(params->bus_endpoint_fd, ep_uid, context->bus_endpoint); + if (r < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_BUS_ENDPOINT; + return r; + } + } + + /* If delegation is enabled we'll pass ownership of the cgroup + * (but only in systemd's own controller hierarchy!) to the + * user of the new process. */ + if (params->cgroup_path && context->user && params->cgroup_delegate) { + r = cg_set_task_access(SYSTEMD_CGROUP_CONTROLLER, params->cgroup_path, 0644, uid, gid); + if (r < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_CGROUP; + return r; + } + + + r = cg_set_group_access(SYSTEMD_CGROUP_CONTROLLER, params->cgroup_path, 0755, uid, gid); + if (r < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_CGROUP; + return r; + } + } + + if (!strv_isempty(context->runtime_directory) && params->runtime_prefix) { + char **rt; + + STRV_FOREACH(rt, context->runtime_directory) { + _cleanup_free_ char *p; + + p = strjoin(params->runtime_prefix, "/", *rt, NULL); + if (!p) { + *exit_status = EXIT_RUNTIME_DIRECTORY; + return -ENOMEM; + } + + r = mkdir_p_label(p, context->runtime_directory_mode); + if (r < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_RUNTIME_DIRECTORY; + return r; + } + + r = chmod_and_chown(p, context->runtime_directory_mode, uid, gid); + if (r < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_RUNTIME_DIRECTORY; + return r; + } + } + } + + umask(context->umask); + + if (params->apply_permissions) { + r = enforce_groups(context, username, gid); + if (r < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_GROUP; + return r; + } +#ifdef HAVE_SMACK + if (context->smack_process_label) { + r = mac_smack_apply_pid(0, context->smack_process_label); + if (r < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_SMACK_PROCESS_LABEL; + return r; + } + } +#ifdef SMACK_DEFAULT_PROCESS_LABEL + else { + _cleanup_free_ char *exec_label = NULL; + + r = mac_smack_read(command->path, SMACK_ATTR_EXEC, &exec_label); + if (r < 0 && r != -ENODATA && r != -EOPNOTSUPP) { + *exit_status = EXIT_SMACK_PROCESS_LABEL; + return r; + } + + r = mac_smack_apply_pid(0, exec_label ? : SMACK_DEFAULT_PROCESS_LABEL); + if (r < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_SMACK_PROCESS_LABEL; + return r; + } + } +#endif +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_PAM + if (context->pam_name && username) { + r = setup_pam(context->pam_name, username, uid, context->tty_path, &pam_env, fds, n_fds); + if (r < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_PAM; + return r; + } + } +#endif + } + + if (context->private_network && runtime && runtime->netns_storage_socket[0] >= 0) { + r = setup_netns(runtime->netns_storage_socket); + if (r < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_NETWORK; + return r; + } + } + + needs_mount_namespace = exec_needs_mount_namespace(context, params, runtime); + + if (needs_mount_namespace) { + char *tmp = NULL, *var = NULL; + + /* The runtime struct only contains the parent + * of the private /tmp, which is + * non-accessible to world users. Inside of it + * there's a /tmp that is sticky, and that's + * the one we want to use here. */ + + if (context->private_tmp && runtime) { + if (runtime->tmp_dir) + tmp = strjoina(runtime->tmp_dir, "/tmp"); + if (runtime->var_tmp_dir) + var = strjoina(runtime->var_tmp_dir, "/tmp"); + } + + r = setup_namespace( + params->apply_chroot ? context->root_directory : NULL, + context->read_write_dirs, + context->read_only_dirs, + context->inaccessible_dirs, + tmp, + var, + params->bus_endpoint_path, + context->private_devices, + context->protect_home, + context->protect_system, + context->mount_flags); + + /* If we couldn't set up the namespace this is + * probably due to a missing capability. In this case, + * silently proceeed. */ + if (r == -EPERM || r == -EACCES) { + log_open(); + log_unit_debug_errno(unit, r, "Failed to set up namespace, assuming containerized execution, ignoring: %m"); + log_close(); + } else if (r < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_NAMESPACE; + return r; + } + } + + if (context->working_directory_home) + wd = home; + else if (context->working_directory) + wd = context->working_directory; + else + wd = "/"; + + if (params->apply_chroot) { + if (!needs_mount_namespace && context->root_directory) + if (chroot(context->root_directory) < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_CHROOT; + return -errno; + } + + if (chdir(wd) < 0 && + !context->working_directory_missing_ok) { + *exit_status = EXIT_CHDIR; + return -errno; + } + } else { + const char *d; + + d = strjoina(strempty(context->root_directory), "/", strempty(wd)); + if (chdir(d) < 0 && + !context->working_directory_missing_ok) { + *exit_status = EXIT_CHDIR; + return -errno; + } + } + +#ifdef HAVE_SELINUX + if (params->apply_permissions && mac_selinux_use() && params->selinux_context_net && socket_fd >= 0) { + r = mac_selinux_get_child_mls_label(socket_fd, command->path, context->selinux_context, &mac_selinux_context_net); + if (r < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_SELINUX_CONTEXT; + return r; + } + } +#endif + + /* We repeat the fd closing here, to make sure that + * nothing is leaked from the PAM modules. Note that + * we are more aggressive this time since socket_fd + * and the netns fds we don't need anymore. The custom + * endpoint fd was needed to upload the policy and can + * now be closed as well. */ + r = close_all_fds(fds, n_fds); + if (r >= 0) + r = shift_fds(fds, n_fds); + if (r >= 0) + r = flags_fds(fds, n_fds, context->non_blocking); + if (r < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_FDS; + return r; + } + + if (params->apply_permissions) { + + int secure_bits = context->secure_bits; + + for (i = 0; i < _RLIMIT_MAX; i++) { + if (!context->rlimit[i]) + continue; + + if (setrlimit_closest(i, context->rlimit[i]) < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_LIMITS; + return -errno; + } + } + + if (!cap_test_all(context->capability_bounding_set)) { + r = capability_bounding_set_drop(context->capability_bounding_set, false); + if (r < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_CAPABILITIES; + return r; + } + } + + /* This is done before enforce_user, but ambient set + * does not survive over setresuid() if keep_caps is not set. */ + if (context->capability_ambient_set != 0) { + r = capability_ambient_set_apply(context->capability_ambient_set, true); + if (r < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_CAPABILITIES; + return r; + } + + if (context->capabilities) { + + /* The capabilities in ambient set need to be also in the inherited + * set. If they aren't, trying to get them will fail. Add the ambient + * set inherited capabilities to the capability set in the context. + * This is needed because if capabilities are set (using "Capabilities=" + * keyword), they will override whatever we set now. */ + + r = capability_update_inherited_set(context->capabilities, context->capability_ambient_set); + if (r < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_CAPABILITIES; + return r; + } + } + } + + if (context->user) { + r = enforce_user(context, uid); + if (r < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_USER; + return r; + } + if (context->capability_ambient_set != 0) { + + /* Fix the ambient capabilities after user change. */ + r = capability_ambient_set_apply(context->capability_ambient_set, false); + if (r < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_CAPABILITIES; + return r; + } + + /* If we were asked to change user and ambient capabilities + * were requested, we had to add keep-caps to the securebits + * so that we would maintain the inherited capability set + * through the setresuid(). Make sure that the bit is added + * also to the context secure_bits so that we don't try to + * drop the bit away next. */ + + secure_bits |= 1<<SECURE_KEEP_CAPS; + } + } + + /* PR_GET_SECUREBITS is not privileged, while + * PR_SET_SECUREBITS is. So to suppress + * potential EPERMs we'll try not to call + * PR_SET_SECUREBITS unless necessary. */ + if (prctl(PR_GET_SECUREBITS) != secure_bits) + if (prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS, secure_bits) < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_SECUREBITS; + return -errno; + } + + if (context->capabilities) + if (cap_set_proc(context->capabilities) < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_CAPABILITIES; + return -errno; + } + + if (context->no_new_privileges) + if (prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0) < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_NO_NEW_PRIVILEGES; + return -errno; + } + +#ifdef HAVE_SECCOMP + if (context->address_families_whitelist || + !set_isempty(context->address_families)) { + r = apply_address_families(context); + if (r < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_ADDRESS_FAMILIES; + return r; + } + } + + if (context->syscall_whitelist || + !set_isempty(context->syscall_filter) || + !set_isempty(context->syscall_archs)) { + r = apply_seccomp(context); + if (r < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_SECCOMP; + return r; + } + } +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_SELINUX + if (mac_selinux_use()) { + char *exec_context = mac_selinux_context_net ?: context->selinux_context; + + if (exec_context) { + r = setexeccon(exec_context); + if (r < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_SELINUX_CONTEXT; + return r; + } + } + } +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_APPARMOR + if (context->apparmor_profile && mac_apparmor_use()) { + r = aa_change_onexec(context->apparmor_profile); + if (r < 0 && !context->apparmor_profile_ignore) { + *exit_status = EXIT_APPARMOR_PROFILE; + return -errno; + } + } +#endif + } + + r = build_environment(context, params, n_fds, home, username, shell, &our_env); + if (r < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_MEMORY; + return r; + } + + r = build_pass_environment(context, &pass_env); + if (r < 0) { + *exit_status = EXIT_MEMORY; + return r; + } + + final_env = strv_env_merge(6, + params->environment, + our_env, + pass_env, + context->environment, + files_env, + pam_env, + NULL); + if (!final_env) { + *exit_status = EXIT_MEMORY; + return -ENOMEM; + } + + final_argv = replace_env_argv(argv, final_env); + if (!final_argv) { + *exit_status = EXIT_MEMORY; + return -ENOMEM; + } + + final_env = strv_env_clean(final_env); + + if (_unlikely_(log_get_max_level() >= LOG_DEBUG)) { + _cleanup_free_ char *line; + + line = exec_command_line(final_argv); + if (line) { + log_open(); + log_struct(LOG_DEBUG, + LOG_UNIT_ID(unit), + "EXECUTABLE=%s", command->path, + LOG_UNIT_MESSAGE(unit, "Executing: %s", line), + NULL); + log_close(); + } + } + + execve(command->path, final_argv, final_env); + *exit_status = EXIT_EXEC; + return -errno; +} + +int exec_spawn(Unit *unit, + ExecCommand *command, + const ExecContext *context, + const ExecParameters *params, + ExecRuntime *runtime, + pid_t *ret) { + + _cleanup_strv_free_ char **files_env = NULL; + int *fds = NULL; unsigned n_fds = 0; + _cleanup_free_ char *line = NULL; + int socket_fd, r; + char **argv; + pid_t pid; + + assert(unit); + assert(command); + assert(context); + assert(ret); + assert(params); + assert(params->fds || params->n_fds <= 0); + + if (context->std_input == EXEC_INPUT_SOCKET || + context->std_output == EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET || + context->std_error == EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET) { + + if (params->n_fds != 1) { + log_unit_error(unit, "Got more than one socket."); + return -EINVAL; + } + + socket_fd = params->fds[0]; + } else { + socket_fd = -1; + fds = params->fds; + n_fds = params->n_fds; + } + + r = exec_context_load_environment(unit, context, &files_env); + if (r < 0) + return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to load environment files: %m"); + + argv = params->argv ?: command->argv; + line = exec_command_line(argv); + if (!line) + return log_oom(); + + log_struct(LOG_DEBUG, + LOG_UNIT_ID(unit), + LOG_UNIT_MESSAGE(unit, "About to execute: %s", line), + "EXECUTABLE=%s", command->path, + NULL); + pid = fork(); + if (pid < 0) + return log_unit_error_errno(unit, errno, "Failed to fork: %m"); + + if (pid == 0) { + int exit_status; + + r = exec_child(unit, + command, + context, + params, + runtime, + argv, + socket_fd, + fds, n_fds, + files_env, + &exit_status); + if (r < 0) { + log_open(); + log_struct_errno(LOG_ERR, r, + LOG_MESSAGE_ID(SD_MESSAGE_SPAWN_FAILED), + LOG_UNIT_ID(unit), + LOG_UNIT_MESSAGE(unit, "Failed at step %s spawning %s: %m", + exit_status_to_string(exit_status, EXIT_STATUS_SYSTEMD), + command->path), + "EXECUTABLE=%s", command->path, + NULL); + } + + _exit(exit_status); + } + + log_unit_debug(unit, "Forked %s as "PID_FMT, command->path, pid); + + /* We add the new process to the cgroup both in the child (so + * that we can be sure that no user code is ever executed + * outside of the cgroup) and in the parent (so that we can be + * sure that when we kill the cgroup the process will be + * killed too). */ + if (params->cgroup_path) + (void) cg_attach(SYSTEMD_CGROUP_CONTROLLER, params->cgroup_path, pid); + + exec_status_start(&command->exec_status, pid); + + *ret = pid; + return 0; +} + +void exec_context_init(ExecContext *c) { + assert(c); + + c->umask = 0022; + c->ioprio = IOPRIO_PRIO_VALUE(IOPRIO_CLASS_BE, 0); + c->cpu_sched_policy = SCHED_OTHER; + c->syslog_priority = LOG_DAEMON|LOG_INFO; + c->syslog_level_prefix = true; + c->ignore_sigpipe = true; + c->timer_slack_nsec = NSEC_INFINITY; + c->personality = PERSONALITY_INVALID; + c->runtime_directory_mode = 0755; + c->capability_bounding_set = CAP_ALL; +} + +void exec_context_done(ExecContext *c) { + unsigned l; + + assert(c); + + c->environment = strv_free(c->environment); + c->environment_files = strv_free(c->environment_files); + c->pass_environment = strv_free(c->pass_environment); + + for (l = 0; l < ELEMENTSOF(c->rlimit); l++) + c->rlimit[l] = mfree(c->rlimit[l]); + + c->working_directory = mfree(c->working_directory); + c->root_directory = mfree(c->root_directory); + c->tty_path = mfree(c->tty_path); + c->syslog_identifier = mfree(c->syslog_identifier); + c->user = mfree(c->user); + c->group = mfree(c->group); + + c->supplementary_groups = strv_free(c->supplementary_groups); + + c->pam_name = mfree(c->pam_name); + + if (c->capabilities) { + cap_free(c->capabilities); + c->capabilities = NULL; + } + + c->read_only_dirs = strv_free(c->read_only_dirs); + c->read_write_dirs = strv_free(c->read_write_dirs); + c->inaccessible_dirs = strv_free(c->inaccessible_dirs); + + if (c->cpuset) + CPU_FREE(c->cpuset); + + c->utmp_id = mfree(c->utmp_id); + c->selinux_context = mfree(c->selinux_context); + c->apparmor_profile = mfree(c->apparmor_profile); + + c->syscall_filter = set_free(c->syscall_filter); + c->syscall_archs = set_free(c->syscall_archs); + c->address_families = set_free(c->address_families); + + c->runtime_directory = strv_free(c->runtime_directory); + + bus_endpoint_free(c->bus_endpoint); + c->bus_endpoint = NULL; +} + +int exec_context_destroy_runtime_directory(ExecContext *c, const char *runtime_prefix) { + char **i; + + assert(c); + + if (!runtime_prefix) + return 0; + + STRV_FOREACH(i, c->runtime_directory) { + _cleanup_free_ char *p; + + p = strjoin(runtime_prefix, "/", *i, NULL); + if (!p) + return -ENOMEM; + + /* We execute this synchronously, since we need to be + * sure this is gone when we start the service + * next. */ + (void) rm_rf(p, REMOVE_ROOT); + } + + return 0; +} + +void exec_command_done(ExecCommand *c) { + assert(c); + + c->path = mfree(c->path); + + c->argv = strv_free(c->argv); +} + +void exec_command_done_array(ExecCommand *c, unsigned n) { + unsigned i; + + for (i = 0; i < n; i++) + exec_command_done(c+i); +} + +ExecCommand* exec_command_free_list(ExecCommand *c) { + ExecCommand *i; + + while ((i = c)) { + LIST_REMOVE(command, c, i); + exec_command_done(i); + free(i); + } + + return NULL; +} + +void exec_command_free_array(ExecCommand **c, unsigned n) { + unsigned i; + + for (i = 0; i < n; i++) + c[i] = exec_command_free_list(c[i]); +} + +typedef struct InvalidEnvInfo { + Unit *unit; + const char *path; +} InvalidEnvInfo; + +static void invalid_env(const char *p, void *userdata) { + InvalidEnvInfo *info = userdata; + + log_unit_error(info->unit, "Ignoring invalid environment assignment '%s': %s", p, info->path); +} + +int exec_context_load_environment(Unit *unit, const ExecContext *c, char ***l) { + char **i, **r = NULL; + + assert(c); + assert(l); + + STRV_FOREACH(i, c->environment_files) { + char *fn; + int k; + bool ignore = false; + char **p; + _cleanup_globfree_ glob_t pglob = {}; + int count, n; + + fn = *i; + + if (fn[0] == '-') { + ignore = true; + fn ++; + } + + if (!path_is_absolute(fn)) { + if (ignore) + continue; + + strv_free(r); + return -EINVAL; + } + + /* Filename supports globbing, take all matching files */ + errno = 0; + if (glob(fn, 0, NULL, &pglob) != 0) { + if (ignore) + continue; + + strv_free(r); + return errno > 0 ? -errno : -EINVAL; + } + count = pglob.gl_pathc; + if (count == 0) { + if (ignore) + continue; + + strv_free(r); + return -EINVAL; + } + for (n = 0; n < count; n++) { + k = load_env_file(NULL, pglob.gl_pathv[n], NULL, &p); + if (k < 0) { + if (ignore) + continue; + + strv_free(r); + return k; + } + /* Log invalid environment variables with filename */ + if (p) { + InvalidEnvInfo info = { + .unit = unit, + .path = pglob.gl_pathv[n] + }; + + p = strv_env_clean_with_callback(p, invalid_env, &info); + } + + if (r == NULL) + r = p; + else { + char **m; + + m = strv_env_merge(2, r, p); + strv_free(r); + strv_free(p); + if (!m) + return -ENOMEM; + + r = m; + } + } + } + + *l = r; + + return 0; +} + +static bool tty_may_match_dev_console(const char *tty) { + _cleanup_free_ char *active = NULL; + char *console; + + if (!tty) + return true; + + if (startswith(tty, "/dev/")) + tty += 5; + + /* trivial identity? */ + if (streq(tty, "console")) + return true; + + console = resolve_dev_console(&active); + /* if we could not resolve, assume it may */ + if (!console) + return true; + + /* "tty0" means the active VC, so it may be the same sometimes */ + return streq(console, tty) || (streq(console, "tty0") && tty_is_vc(tty)); +} + +bool exec_context_may_touch_console(ExecContext *ec) { + + return (ec->tty_reset || + ec->tty_vhangup || + ec->tty_vt_disallocate || + is_terminal_input(ec->std_input) || + is_terminal_output(ec->std_output) || + is_terminal_output(ec->std_error)) && + tty_may_match_dev_console(exec_context_tty_path(ec)); +} + +static void strv_fprintf(FILE *f, char **l) { + char **g; + + assert(f); + + STRV_FOREACH(g, l) + fprintf(f, " %s", *g); +} + +void exec_context_dump(ExecContext *c, FILE* f, const char *prefix) { + char **e, **d; + unsigned i; + + assert(c); + assert(f); + + prefix = strempty(prefix); + + fprintf(f, + "%sUMask: %04o\n" + "%sWorkingDirectory: %s\n" + "%sRootDirectory: %s\n" + "%sNonBlocking: %s\n" + "%sPrivateTmp: %s\n" + "%sPrivateNetwork: %s\n" + "%sPrivateDevices: %s\n" + "%sProtectHome: %s\n" + "%sProtectSystem: %s\n" + "%sIgnoreSIGPIPE: %s\n", + prefix, c->umask, + prefix, c->working_directory ? c->working_directory : "/", + prefix, c->root_directory ? c->root_directory : "/", + prefix, yes_no(c->non_blocking), + prefix, yes_no(c->private_tmp), + prefix, yes_no(c->private_network), + prefix, yes_no(c->private_devices), + prefix, protect_home_to_string(c->protect_home), + prefix, protect_system_to_string(c->protect_system), + prefix, yes_no(c->ignore_sigpipe)); + + STRV_FOREACH(e, c->environment) + fprintf(f, "%sEnvironment: %s\n", prefix, *e); + + STRV_FOREACH(e, c->environment_files) + fprintf(f, "%sEnvironmentFile: %s\n", prefix, *e); + + STRV_FOREACH(e, c->pass_environment) + fprintf(f, "%sPassEnvironment: %s\n", prefix, *e); + + fprintf(f, "%sRuntimeDirectoryMode: %04o\n", prefix, c->runtime_directory_mode); + + STRV_FOREACH(d, c->runtime_directory) + fprintf(f, "%sRuntimeDirectory: %s\n", prefix, *d); + + if (c->nice_set) + fprintf(f, + "%sNice: %i\n", + prefix, c->nice); + + if (c->oom_score_adjust_set) + fprintf(f, + "%sOOMScoreAdjust: %i\n", + prefix, c->oom_score_adjust); + + for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) + if (c->rlimit[i]) { + fprintf(f, "%s%s: " RLIM_FMT "\n", + prefix, rlimit_to_string(i), c->rlimit[i]->rlim_max); + fprintf(f, "%s%sSoft: " RLIM_FMT "\n", + prefix, rlimit_to_string(i), c->rlimit[i]->rlim_cur); + } + + if (c->ioprio_set) { + _cleanup_free_ char *class_str = NULL; + + ioprio_class_to_string_alloc(IOPRIO_PRIO_CLASS(c->ioprio), &class_str); + fprintf(f, + "%sIOSchedulingClass: %s\n" + "%sIOPriority: %i\n", + prefix, strna(class_str), + prefix, (int) IOPRIO_PRIO_DATA(c->ioprio)); + } + + if (c->cpu_sched_set) { + _cleanup_free_ char *policy_str = NULL; + + sched_policy_to_string_alloc(c->cpu_sched_policy, &policy_str); + fprintf(f, + "%sCPUSchedulingPolicy: %s\n" + "%sCPUSchedulingPriority: %i\n" + "%sCPUSchedulingResetOnFork: %s\n", + prefix, strna(policy_str), + prefix, c->cpu_sched_priority, + prefix, yes_no(c->cpu_sched_reset_on_fork)); + } + + if (c->cpuset) { + fprintf(f, "%sCPUAffinity:", prefix); + for (i = 0; i < c->cpuset_ncpus; i++) + if (CPU_ISSET_S(i, CPU_ALLOC_SIZE(c->cpuset_ncpus), c->cpuset)) + fprintf(f, " %u", i); + fputs("\n", f); + } + + if (c->timer_slack_nsec != NSEC_INFINITY) + fprintf(f, "%sTimerSlackNSec: "NSEC_FMT "\n", prefix, c->timer_slack_nsec); + + fprintf(f, + "%sStandardInput: %s\n" + "%sStandardOutput: %s\n" + "%sStandardError: %s\n", + prefix, exec_input_to_string(c->std_input), + prefix, exec_output_to_string(c->std_output), + prefix, exec_output_to_string(c->std_error)); + + if (c->tty_path) + fprintf(f, + "%sTTYPath: %s\n" + "%sTTYReset: %s\n" + "%sTTYVHangup: %s\n" + "%sTTYVTDisallocate: %s\n", + prefix, c->tty_path, + prefix, yes_no(c->tty_reset), + prefix, yes_no(c->tty_vhangup), + prefix, yes_no(c->tty_vt_disallocate)); + + if (c->std_output == EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG || + c->std_output == EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG || + c->std_output == EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL || + c->std_output == EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG_AND_CONSOLE || + c->std_output == EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE || + c->std_output == EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL_AND_CONSOLE || + c->std_error == EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG || + c->std_error == EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG || + c->std_error == EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL || + c->std_error == EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG_AND_CONSOLE || + c->std_error == EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE || + c->std_error == EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL_AND_CONSOLE) { + + _cleanup_free_ char *fac_str = NULL, *lvl_str = NULL; + + log_facility_unshifted_to_string_alloc(c->syslog_priority >> 3, &fac_str); + log_level_to_string_alloc(LOG_PRI(c->syslog_priority), &lvl_str); + + fprintf(f, + "%sSyslogFacility: %s\n" + "%sSyslogLevel: %s\n", + prefix, strna(fac_str), + prefix, strna(lvl_str)); + } + + if (c->capabilities) { + _cleanup_cap_free_charp_ char *t; + + t = cap_to_text(c->capabilities, NULL); + if (t) + fprintf(f, "%sCapabilities: %s\n", prefix, t); + } + + if (c->secure_bits) + fprintf(f, "%sSecure Bits:%s%s%s%s%s%s\n", + prefix, + (c->secure_bits & 1<<SECURE_KEEP_CAPS) ? " keep-caps" : "", + (c->secure_bits & 1<<SECURE_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED) ? " keep-caps-locked" : "", + (c->secure_bits & 1<<SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP) ? " no-setuid-fixup" : "", + (c->secure_bits & 1<<SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP_LOCKED) ? " no-setuid-fixup-locked" : "", + (c->secure_bits & 1<<SECURE_NOROOT) ? " noroot" : "", + (c->secure_bits & 1<<SECURE_NOROOT_LOCKED) ? "noroot-locked" : ""); + + if (c->capability_bounding_set != CAP_ALL) { + unsigned long l; + fprintf(f, "%sCapabilityBoundingSet:", prefix); + + for (l = 0; l <= cap_last_cap(); l++) + if (c->capability_bounding_set & (UINT64_C(1) << l)) + fprintf(f, " %s", strna(capability_to_name(l))); + + fputs("\n", f); + } + + if (c->capability_ambient_set != 0) { + unsigned long l; + fprintf(f, "%sAmbientCapabilities:", prefix); + + for (l = 0; l <= cap_last_cap(); l++) + if (c->capability_ambient_set & (UINT64_C(1) << l)) + fprintf(f, " %s", strna(capability_to_name(l))); + + fputs("\n", f); + } + + if (c->user) + fprintf(f, "%sUser: %s\n", prefix, c->user); + if (c->group) + fprintf(f, "%sGroup: %s\n", prefix, c->group); + + if (strv_length(c->supplementary_groups) > 0) { + fprintf(f, "%sSupplementaryGroups:", prefix); + strv_fprintf(f, c->supplementary_groups); + fputs("\n", f); + } + + if (c->pam_name) + fprintf(f, "%sPAMName: %s\n", prefix, c->pam_name); + + if (strv_length(c->read_write_dirs) > 0) { + fprintf(f, "%sReadWriteDirs:", prefix); + strv_fprintf(f, c->read_write_dirs); + fputs("\n", f); + } + + if (strv_length(c->read_only_dirs) > 0) { + fprintf(f, "%sReadOnlyDirs:", prefix); + strv_fprintf(f, c->read_only_dirs); + fputs("\n", f); + } + + if (strv_length(c->inaccessible_dirs) > 0) { + fprintf(f, "%sInaccessibleDirs:", prefix); + strv_fprintf(f, c->inaccessible_dirs); + fputs("\n", f); + } + + if (c->utmp_id) + fprintf(f, + "%sUtmpIdentifier: %s\n", + prefix, c->utmp_id); + + if (c->selinux_context) + fprintf(f, + "%sSELinuxContext: %s%s\n", + prefix, c->selinux_context_ignore ? "-" : "", c->selinux_context); + + if (c->personality != PERSONALITY_INVALID) + fprintf(f, + "%sPersonality: %s\n", + prefix, strna(personality_to_string(c->personality))); + + if (c->syscall_filter) { +#ifdef HAVE_SECCOMP + Iterator j; + void *id; + bool first = true; +#endif + + fprintf(f, + "%sSystemCallFilter: ", + prefix); + + if (!c->syscall_whitelist) + fputc('~', f); + +#ifdef HAVE_SECCOMP + SET_FOREACH(id, c->syscall_filter, j) { + _cleanup_free_ char *name = NULL; + + if (first) + first = false; + else + fputc(' ', f); + + name = seccomp_syscall_resolve_num_arch(SCMP_ARCH_NATIVE, PTR_TO_INT(id) - 1); + fputs(strna(name), f); + } +#endif + + fputc('\n', f); + } + + if (c->syscall_archs) { +#ifdef HAVE_SECCOMP + Iterator j; + void *id; +#endif + + fprintf(f, + "%sSystemCallArchitectures:", + prefix); + +#ifdef HAVE_SECCOMP + SET_FOREACH(id, c->syscall_archs, j) + fprintf(f, " %s", strna(seccomp_arch_to_string(PTR_TO_UINT32(id) - 1))); +#endif + fputc('\n', f); + } + + if (c->syscall_errno > 0) + fprintf(f, + "%sSystemCallErrorNumber: %s\n", + prefix, strna(errno_to_name(c->syscall_errno))); + + if (c->apparmor_profile) + fprintf(f, + "%sAppArmorProfile: %s%s\n", + prefix, c->apparmor_profile_ignore ? "-" : "", c->apparmor_profile); +} + +bool exec_context_maintains_privileges(ExecContext *c) { + assert(c); + + /* Returns true if the process forked off would run run under + * an unchanged UID or as root. */ + + if (!c->user) + return true; + + if (streq(c->user, "root") || streq(c->user, "0")) + return true; + + return false; +} + +void exec_status_start(ExecStatus *s, pid_t pid) { + assert(s); + + zero(*s); + s->pid = pid; + dual_timestamp_get(&s->start_timestamp); +} + +void exec_status_exit(ExecStatus *s, ExecContext *context, pid_t pid, int code, int status) { + assert(s); + + if (s->pid && s->pid != pid) + zero(*s); + + s->pid = pid; + dual_timestamp_get(&s->exit_timestamp); + + s->code = code; + s->status = status; + + if (context) { + if (context->utmp_id) + utmp_put_dead_process(context->utmp_id, pid, code, status); + + exec_context_tty_reset(context, NULL); + } +} + +void exec_status_dump(ExecStatus *s, FILE *f, const char *prefix) { + char buf[FORMAT_TIMESTAMP_MAX]; + + assert(s); + assert(f); + + if (s->pid <= 0) + return; + + prefix = strempty(prefix); + + fprintf(f, + "%sPID: "PID_FMT"\n", + prefix, s->pid); + + if (s->start_timestamp.realtime > 0) + fprintf(f, + "%sStart Timestamp: %s\n", + prefix, format_timestamp(buf, sizeof(buf), s->start_timestamp.realtime)); + + if (s->exit_timestamp.realtime > 0) + fprintf(f, + "%sExit Timestamp: %s\n" + "%sExit Code: %s\n" + "%sExit Status: %i\n", + prefix, format_timestamp(buf, sizeof(buf), s->exit_timestamp.realtime), + prefix, sigchld_code_to_string(s->code), + prefix, s->status); +} + +char *exec_command_line(char **argv) { + size_t k; + char *n, *p, **a; + bool first = true; + + assert(argv); + + k = 1; + STRV_FOREACH(a, argv) + k += strlen(*a)+3; + + if (!(n = new(char, k))) + return NULL; + + p = n; + STRV_FOREACH(a, argv) { + + if (!first) + *(p++) = ' '; + else + first = false; + + if (strpbrk(*a, WHITESPACE)) { + *(p++) = '\''; + p = stpcpy(p, *a); + *(p++) = '\''; + } else + p = stpcpy(p, *a); + + } + + *p = 0; + + /* FIXME: this doesn't really handle arguments that have + * spaces and ticks in them */ + + return n; +} + +void exec_command_dump(ExecCommand *c, FILE *f, const char *prefix) { + _cleanup_free_ char *cmd = NULL; + const char *prefix2; + + assert(c); + assert(f); + + prefix = strempty(prefix); + prefix2 = strjoina(prefix, "\t"); + + cmd = exec_command_line(c->argv); + fprintf(f, + "%sCommand Line: %s\n", + prefix, cmd ? cmd : strerror(ENOMEM)); + + exec_status_dump(&c->exec_status, f, prefix2); +} + +void exec_command_dump_list(ExecCommand *c, FILE *f, const char *prefix) { + assert(f); + + prefix = strempty(prefix); + + LIST_FOREACH(command, c, c) + exec_command_dump(c, f, prefix); +} + +void exec_command_append_list(ExecCommand **l, ExecCommand *e) { + ExecCommand *end; + + assert(l); + assert(e); + + if (*l) { + /* It's kind of important, that we keep the order here */ + LIST_FIND_TAIL(command, *l, end); + LIST_INSERT_AFTER(command, *l, end, e); + } else + *l = e; +} + +int exec_command_set(ExecCommand *c, const char *path, ...) { + va_list ap; + char **l, *p; + + assert(c); + assert(path); + + va_start(ap, path); + l = strv_new_ap(path, ap); + va_end(ap); + + if (!l) + return -ENOMEM; + + p = strdup(path); + if (!p) { + strv_free(l); + return -ENOMEM; + } + + free(c->path); + c->path = p; + + strv_free(c->argv); + c->argv = l; + + return 0; +} + +int exec_command_append(ExecCommand *c, const char *path, ...) { + _cleanup_strv_free_ char **l = NULL; + va_list ap; + int r; + + assert(c); + assert(path); + + va_start(ap, path); + l = strv_new_ap(path, ap); + va_end(ap); + + if (!l) + return -ENOMEM; + + r = strv_extend_strv(&c->argv, l, false); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + return 0; +} + + +static int exec_runtime_allocate(ExecRuntime **rt) { + + if (*rt) + return 0; + + *rt = new0(ExecRuntime, 1); + if (!*rt) + return -ENOMEM; + + (*rt)->n_ref = 1; + (*rt)->netns_storage_socket[0] = (*rt)->netns_storage_socket[1] = -1; + + return 0; +} + +int exec_runtime_make(ExecRuntime **rt, ExecContext *c, const char *id) { + int r; + + assert(rt); + assert(c); + assert(id); + + if (*rt) + return 1; + + if (!c->private_network && !c->private_tmp) + return 0; + + r = exec_runtime_allocate(rt); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + if (c->private_network && (*rt)->netns_storage_socket[0] < 0) { + if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_DGRAM, 0, (*rt)->netns_storage_socket) < 0) + return -errno; + } + + if (c->private_tmp && !(*rt)->tmp_dir) { + r = setup_tmp_dirs(id, &(*rt)->tmp_dir, &(*rt)->var_tmp_dir); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + return 1; +} + +ExecRuntime *exec_runtime_ref(ExecRuntime *r) { + assert(r); + assert(r->n_ref > 0); + + r->n_ref++; + return r; +} + +ExecRuntime *exec_runtime_unref(ExecRuntime *r) { + + if (!r) + return NULL; + + assert(r->n_ref > 0); + + r->n_ref--; + if (r->n_ref > 0) + return NULL; + + free(r->tmp_dir); + free(r->var_tmp_dir); + safe_close_pair(r->netns_storage_socket); + free(r); + + return NULL; +} + +int exec_runtime_serialize(Unit *u, ExecRuntime *rt, FILE *f, FDSet *fds) { + assert(u); + assert(f); + assert(fds); + + if (!rt) + return 0; + + if (rt->tmp_dir) + unit_serialize_item(u, f, "tmp-dir", rt->tmp_dir); + + if (rt->var_tmp_dir) + unit_serialize_item(u, f, "var-tmp-dir", rt->var_tmp_dir); + + if (rt->netns_storage_socket[0] >= 0) { + int copy; + + copy = fdset_put_dup(fds, rt->netns_storage_socket[0]); + if (copy < 0) + return copy; + + unit_serialize_item_format(u, f, "netns-socket-0", "%i", copy); + } + + if (rt->netns_storage_socket[1] >= 0) { + int copy; + + copy = fdset_put_dup(fds, rt->netns_storage_socket[1]); + if (copy < 0) + return copy; + + unit_serialize_item_format(u, f, "netns-socket-1", "%i", copy); + } + + return 0; +} + +int exec_runtime_deserialize_item(Unit *u, ExecRuntime **rt, const char *key, const char *value, FDSet *fds) { + int r; + + assert(rt); + assert(key); + assert(value); + + if (streq(key, "tmp-dir")) { + char *copy; + + r = exec_runtime_allocate(rt); + if (r < 0) + return log_oom(); + + copy = strdup(value); + if (!copy) + return log_oom(); + + free((*rt)->tmp_dir); + (*rt)->tmp_dir = copy; + + } else if (streq(key, "var-tmp-dir")) { + char *copy; + + r = exec_runtime_allocate(rt); + if (r < 0) + return log_oom(); + + copy = strdup(value); + if (!copy) + return log_oom(); + + free((*rt)->var_tmp_dir); + (*rt)->var_tmp_dir = copy; + + } else if (streq(key, "netns-socket-0")) { + int fd; + + r = exec_runtime_allocate(rt); + if (r < 0) + return log_oom(); + + if (safe_atoi(value, &fd) < 0 || !fdset_contains(fds, fd)) + log_unit_debug(u, "Failed to parse netns socket value: %s", value); + else { + safe_close((*rt)->netns_storage_socket[0]); + (*rt)->netns_storage_socket[0] = fdset_remove(fds, fd); + } + } else if (streq(key, "netns-socket-1")) { + int fd; + + r = exec_runtime_allocate(rt); + if (r < 0) + return log_oom(); + + if (safe_atoi(value, &fd) < 0 || !fdset_contains(fds, fd)) + log_unit_debug(u, "Failed to parse netns socket value: %s", value); + else { + safe_close((*rt)->netns_storage_socket[1]); + (*rt)->netns_storage_socket[1] = fdset_remove(fds, fd); + } + } else + return 0; + + return 1; +} + +static void *remove_tmpdir_thread(void *p) { + _cleanup_free_ char *path = p; + + (void) rm_rf(path, REMOVE_ROOT|REMOVE_PHYSICAL); + return NULL; +} + +void exec_runtime_destroy(ExecRuntime *rt) { + int r; + + if (!rt) + return; + + /* If there are multiple users of this, let's leave the stuff around */ + if (rt->n_ref > 1) + return; + + if (rt->tmp_dir) { + log_debug("Spawning thread to nuke %s", rt->tmp_dir); + + r = asynchronous_job(remove_tmpdir_thread, rt->tmp_dir); + if (r < 0) { + log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to nuke %s: %m", rt->tmp_dir); + free(rt->tmp_dir); + } + + rt->tmp_dir = NULL; + } + + if (rt->var_tmp_dir) { + log_debug("Spawning thread to nuke %s", rt->var_tmp_dir); + + r = asynchronous_job(remove_tmpdir_thread, rt->var_tmp_dir); + if (r < 0) { + log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to nuke %s: %m", rt->var_tmp_dir); + free(rt->var_tmp_dir); + } + + rt->var_tmp_dir = NULL; + } + + safe_close_pair(rt->netns_storage_socket); +} + +static const char* const exec_input_table[_EXEC_INPUT_MAX] = { + [EXEC_INPUT_NULL] = "null", + [EXEC_INPUT_TTY] = "tty", + [EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FORCE] = "tty-force", + [EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FAIL] = "tty-fail", + [EXEC_INPUT_SOCKET] = "socket" +}; + +DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(exec_input, ExecInput); + +static const char* const exec_output_table[_EXEC_OUTPUT_MAX] = { + [EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT] = "inherit", + [EXEC_OUTPUT_NULL] = "null", + [EXEC_OUTPUT_TTY] = "tty", + [EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG] = "syslog", + [EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG_AND_CONSOLE] = "syslog+console", + [EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG] = "kmsg", + [EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE] = "kmsg+console", + [EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL] = "journal", + [EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL_AND_CONSOLE] = "journal+console", + [EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET] = "socket" +}; + +DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(exec_output, ExecOutput); + +static const char* const exec_utmp_mode_table[_EXEC_UTMP_MODE_MAX] = { + [EXEC_UTMP_INIT] = "init", + [EXEC_UTMP_LOGIN] = "login", + [EXEC_UTMP_USER] = "user", +}; + +DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(exec_utmp_mode, ExecUtmpMode); |