diff options
author | Lennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net> | 2016-01-03 14:18:05 +0100 |
---|---|---|
committer | Lennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net> | 2016-01-03 14:18:05 +0100 |
commit | 092500ec395015c295c9efc44f5c2390c2d6b445 (patch) | |
tree | ac130e9dc549ee7afd663083a36a6eb15ccaa1ea /src/resolve | |
parent | 113325b8641207a99447d8a439e7ffac1e69f196 (diff) | |
parent | 35ad41d361a2d9e766f2d7689b92cfbc4304ddbd (diff) |
Merge pull request #2255 from teg/resolved-fixes-2
Fixes to NSEC3 proof v2
Diffstat (limited to 'src/resolve')
-rw-r--r-- | src/resolve/resolved-dns-dnssec.c | 217 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | src/resolve/resolved-dns-dnssec.h | 3 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | src/resolve/resolved-dns-transaction.c | 1 |
3 files changed, 169 insertions, 52 deletions
diff --git a/src/resolve/resolved-dns-dnssec.c b/src/resolve/resolved-dns-dnssec.c index b7c0b5b824..1182201b7d 100644 --- a/src/resolve/resolved-dns-dnssec.c +++ b/src/resolve/resolved-dns-dnssec.c @@ -240,8 +240,8 @@ static int dnssec_rsa_verify( exponent = (uint8_t*) dnskey->dnskey.key + 3; exponent_size = - ((size_t) (((uint8_t*) dnskey->dnskey.key)[0]) << 8) | - ((size_t) ((uint8_t*) dnskey->dnskey.key)[1]); + ((size_t) (((uint8_t*) dnskey->dnskey.key)[1]) << 8) | + ((size_t) ((uint8_t*) dnskey->dnskey.key)[2]); if (exponent_size < 256) return -EINVAL; @@ -527,9 +527,6 @@ int dnssec_verify_rrset( if (md_algorithm < 0) return md_algorithm; - if (a->n_rrs > VERIFY_RRS_MAX) - return -E2BIG; - r = dnssec_rrsig_expired(rrsig, realtime); if (r < 0) return r; @@ -554,6 +551,9 @@ int dnssec_verify_rrset( return r; list[n++] = rr; + + if (n > VERIFY_RRS_MAX) + return -E2BIG; } if (n <= 0) @@ -1073,7 +1073,7 @@ static int nsec3_hash_to_gcrypt_md(uint8_t algorithm) { } } -int dnssec_nsec3_hash(DnsResourceRecord *nsec3, const char *name, void *ret) { +int dnssec_nsec3_hash(const DnsResourceRecord *nsec3, const char *name, void *ret) { uint8_t wire_format[DNS_WIRE_FOMAT_HOSTNAME_MAX]; gcry_md_hd_t md = NULL; size_t hash_size; @@ -1200,21 +1200,62 @@ static int nsec3_is_good(DnsResourceRecord *rr, DnsAnswerFlags flags, DnsResourc return dns_name_equal(a, b); } -static int dnssec_test_nsec3(DnsAnswer *answer, DnsResourceKey *key, DnssecNsecResult *result, bool *authenticated) { - _cleanup_free_ char *next_closer_domain = NULL, *l = NULL; +static int nsec3_hashed_domain(const DnsResourceRecord *nsec3, const char *domain, const char *zone, char **ret) { + _cleanup_free_ char *l = NULL, *hashed_domain = NULL; uint8_t hashed[DNSSEC_HASH_SIZE_MAX]; - const char *suffix, *p, *pp = NULL; - DnsResourceRecord *rr, *suffix_rr; + int hashed_size; + + assert(nsec3); + assert(domain); + assert(zone); + assert(ret); + + hashed_size = dnssec_nsec3_hash(nsec3, domain, hashed); + if (hashed_size < 0) + return hashed_size; + + l = base32hexmem(hashed, hashed_size, false); + if (!l) + return -ENOMEM; + + hashed_domain = strjoin(l, ".", zone, NULL); + if (!hashed_domain) + return -ENOMEM; + + *ret = hashed_domain; + hashed_domain = NULL; + + return hashed_size; +} + +/* See RFC 5155, Section 8 + * First try to find a NSEC3 record that matches our query precisely, if that fails, find the closest + * enclosure. Secondly, find a proof that there is no closer enclosure and either a proof that there + * is no wildcard domain as a direct descendant of the closest enclosure, or find an NSEC3 record that + * matches the wildcard domain. + * + * Based on this we can prove either the existence of the record in @key, or NXDOMAIN or NODATA, or + * that there is no proof either way. The latter is the case if a the proof of non-existence of a given + * name uses an NSEC3 record with the opt-out bit set. Lastly, if we are given insufficient NSEC3 records + * to conclude anything we indicate this by returning NO_RR. */ +static int dnssec_test_nsec3(DnsAnswer *answer, DnsResourceKey *key, DnssecNsecResult *result, bool *authenticated) { + _cleanup_free_ char *next_closer_domain = NULL, *wildcard = NULL, *wildcard_domain = NULL; + const char *zone, *p, *pp = NULL; + DnsResourceRecord *rr, *enclosure_rr, *suffix_rr, *wildcard_rr = NULL; DnsAnswerFlags flags; int hashed_size, r; - bool a; + bool a, no_closer = false, no_wildcard = false, optout = false; assert(key); assert(result); assert(authenticated); - /* First step, look for the longest common suffix we find with any NSEC3 RR in the response. */ - suffix = DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(key); + /* First step, find the zone name and the NSEC3 parameters of the zone. + * it is sufficient to look for the longest common suffix we find with + * any NSEC3 RR in the response. Any NSEC3 record will do as all NSEC3 + * records from a given zone in a response must use the same + * parameters. */ + zone = DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(key); for (;;) { DNS_ANSWER_FOREACH_FLAGS(suffix_rr, flags, answer) { r = nsec3_is_good(suffix_rr, flags, NULL); @@ -1223,15 +1264,15 @@ static int dnssec_test_nsec3(DnsAnswer *answer, DnsResourceKey *key, DnssecNsecR if (r == 0) continue; - r = dns_name_equal_skip(DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(suffix_rr->key), 1, suffix); + r = dns_name_equal_skip(DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(suffix_rr->key), 1, zone); if (r < 0) return r; if (r > 0) - goto found_suffix; + goto found_zone; } /* Strip one label from the front */ - r = dns_name_parent(&suffix); + r = dns_name_parent(&zone); if (r < 0) return r; if (r == 0) @@ -1241,13 +1282,13 @@ static int dnssec_test_nsec3(DnsAnswer *answer, DnsResourceKey *key, DnssecNsecR *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_NO_RR; return 0; -found_suffix: +found_zone: /* Second step, find the closest encloser NSEC3 RR in 'answer' that matches 'key' */ p = DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(key); for (;;) { - _cleanup_free_ char *hashed_domain = NULL, *label = NULL; + _cleanup_free_ char *hashed_domain = NULL; - hashed_size = dnssec_nsec3_hash(suffix_rr, p, hashed); + hashed_size = nsec3_hashed_domain(suffix_rr, p, zone, &hashed_domain); if (hashed_size == -EOPNOTSUPP) { *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM; return 0; @@ -1255,26 +1296,18 @@ found_suffix: if (hashed_size < 0) return hashed_size; - label = base32hexmem(hashed, hashed_size, false); - if (!label) - return -ENOMEM; - - hashed_domain = strjoin(label, ".", suffix, NULL); - if (!hashed_domain) - return -ENOMEM; + DNS_ANSWER_FOREACH_FLAGS(enclosure_rr, flags, answer) { - DNS_ANSWER_FOREACH_FLAGS(rr, flags, answer) { - - r = nsec3_is_good(rr, flags, suffix_rr); + r = nsec3_is_good(enclosure_rr, flags, suffix_rr); if (r < 0) return r; if (r == 0) continue; - if (rr->nsec3.next_hashed_name_size != (size_t) hashed_size) + if (enclosure_rr->nsec3.next_hashed_name_size != (size_t) hashed_size) continue; - r = dns_name_equal(DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(rr->key), hashed_domain); + r = dns_name_equal(DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(enclosure_rr->key), hashed_domain); if (r < 0) return r; if (r > 0) { @@ -1304,37 +1337,48 @@ found_closest_encloser: /* We found a closest encloser in 'p'; next closer is 'pp' */ /* Ensure this is not a DNAME domain, see RFC5155, section 8.3. */ - if (bitmap_isset(rr->nsec3.types, DNS_TYPE_DNAME)) + if (bitmap_isset(enclosure_rr->nsec3.types, DNS_TYPE_DNAME)) return -EBADMSG; /* Ensure that this data is from the delegated domain * (i.e. originates from the "lower" DNS server), and isn't * just glue records (i.e. doesn't originate from the "upper" * DNS server). */ - if (bitmap_isset(rr->nsec3.types, DNS_TYPE_NS) && - !bitmap_isset(rr->nsec3.types, DNS_TYPE_SOA)) + if (bitmap_isset(enclosure_rr->nsec3.types, DNS_TYPE_NS) && + !bitmap_isset(enclosure_rr->nsec3.types, DNS_TYPE_SOA)) return -EBADMSG; if (!pp) { /* No next closer NSEC3 RR. That means there's a direct NSEC3 RR for our key. */ - *result = bitmap_isset(rr->nsec3.types, key->type) ? DNSSEC_NSEC_FOUND : DNSSEC_NSEC_NODATA; + if (bitmap_isset(enclosure_rr->nsec3.types, key->type)) + *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_FOUND; + else if (bitmap_isset(enclosure_rr->nsec3.types, DNS_TYPE_CNAME)) + *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_CNAME; + else + *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_NODATA; + *authenticated = a; + return 0; } - r = dnssec_nsec3_hash(rr, pp, hashed); + /* Prove that there is no next closer and whether or not there is a wildcard domain. */ + + wildcard = strappend("*.", p); + if (!wildcard) + return -ENOMEM; + + r = nsec3_hashed_domain(enclosure_rr, wildcard, zone, &wildcard_domain); if (r < 0) return r; if (r != hashed_size) return -EBADMSG; - l = base32hexmem(hashed, hashed_size, false); - if (!l) - return -ENOMEM; - - next_closer_domain = strjoin(l, ".", p, NULL); - if (!next_closer_domain) - return -ENOMEM; + r = nsec3_hashed_domain(enclosure_rr, pp, zone, &next_closer_domain); + if (r < 0) + return r; + if (r != hashed_size) + return -EBADMSG; DNS_ANSWER_FOREACH_FLAGS(rr, flags, answer) { _cleanup_free_ char *label = NULL, *next_hashed_domain = NULL; @@ -1349,7 +1393,7 @@ found_closest_encloser: if (!label) return -ENOMEM; - next_hashed_domain = strjoin(label, ".", p, NULL); + next_hashed_domain = strjoin(label, ".", zone, NULL); if (!next_hashed_domain) return -ENOMEM; @@ -1358,16 +1402,82 @@ found_closest_encloser: return r; if (r > 0) { if (rr->nsec3.flags & 1) - *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_OPTOUT; - else - *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_NXDOMAIN; + optout = true; - *authenticated = a && (flags & DNS_ANSWER_AUTHENTICATED); - return 1; + a = a && (flags & DNS_ANSWER_AUTHENTICATED); + + no_closer = true; + } + + r = dns_name_equal(DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(rr->key), wildcard_domain); + if (r < 0) + return r; + if (r > 0) { + a = a && (flags & DNS_ANSWER_AUTHENTICATED); + + wildcard_rr = rr; + } + + r = dns_name_between(DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(rr->key), wildcard_domain, next_hashed_domain); + if (r < 0) + return r; + if (r > 0) { + if (rr->nsec3.flags & 1) + /* This only makes sense if we have a wildcard delegation, which is + * very unlikely, see RFC 4592, Section 4.2, but we cannot rely on + * this not happening, so hence cannot simply conclude NXDOMAIN as + * we would wish */ + optout = true; + + a = a && (flags & DNS_ANSWER_AUTHENTICATED); + + no_wildcard = true; } } - *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_NO_RR; + if (wildcard_rr && no_wildcard) + return -EBADMSG; + + if (!no_closer) { + *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_NO_RR; + + return 0; + } + + if (wildcard_rr) { + /* A wildcard exists that matches our query. */ + if (optout) + /* This is not specified in any RFC to the best of my knowledge, but + * if the next closer enclosure is covered by an opt-out NSEC3 RR + * it means that we cannot prove that the source of synthesis is + * correct, as there may be a closer match. */ + *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_OPTOUT; + else if (bitmap_isset(wildcard_rr->nsec3.types, key->type)) + *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_FOUND; + else if (bitmap_isset(wildcard_rr->nsec3.types, DNS_TYPE_CNAME)) + *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_CNAME; + else + *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_NODATA; + } else { + if (optout) + /* The RFC only specifies that we have to care for optout for NODATA for + * DS records. However, children of an insecure opt-out delegation should + * also be considered opt-out, rather than verified NXDOMAIN. + * Note that we do not require a proof of wildcard non-existence if the + * next closer domain is covered by an opt-out, as that would not provide + * any additional information. */ + *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_OPTOUT; + else if (no_wildcard) + *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_NXDOMAIN; + else { + *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_NO_RR; + + return 0; + } + } + + *authenticated = a; + return 0; } @@ -1396,7 +1506,12 @@ int dnssec_test_nsec(DnsAnswer *answer, DnsResourceKey *key, DnssecNsecResult *r if (r < 0) return r; if (r > 0) { - *result = bitmap_isset(rr->nsec.types, key->type) ? DNSSEC_NSEC_FOUND : DNSSEC_NSEC_NODATA; + if (bitmap_isset(rr->nsec.types, key->type)) + *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_FOUND; + else if (bitmap_isset(rr->nsec.types, DNS_TYPE_CNAME)) + *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_CNAME; + else + *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_NODATA; *authenticated = flags & DNS_ANSWER_AUTHENTICATED; return 0; } diff --git a/src/resolve/resolved-dns-dnssec.h b/src/resolve/resolved-dns-dnssec.h index d7aecbce13..f106875027 100644 --- a/src/resolve/resolved-dns-dnssec.h +++ b/src/resolve/resolved-dns-dnssec.h @@ -87,10 +87,11 @@ uint16_t dnssec_keytag(DnsResourceRecord *dnskey); int dnssec_canonicalize(const char *n, char *buffer, size_t buffer_max); -int dnssec_nsec3_hash(DnsResourceRecord *nsec3, const char *name, void *ret); +int dnssec_nsec3_hash(const DnsResourceRecord *nsec3, const char *name, void *ret); typedef enum DnssecNsecResult { DNSSEC_NSEC_NO_RR, /* No suitable NSEC/NSEC3 RR found */ + DNSSEC_NSEC_CNAME, /* Would be NODATA, but for the existence of a CNAME RR */ DNSSEC_NSEC_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM, DNSSEC_NSEC_NXDOMAIN, DNSSEC_NSEC_NODATA, diff --git a/src/resolve/resolved-dns-transaction.c b/src/resolve/resolved-dns-transaction.c index 9a03baa9ec..f7671e070f 100644 --- a/src/resolve/resolved-dns-transaction.c +++ b/src/resolve/resolved-dns-transaction.c @@ -2338,6 +2338,7 @@ int dns_transaction_validate_dnssec(DnsTransaction *t) { break; case DNSSEC_NSEC_FOUND: + case DNSSEC_NSEC_CNAME: /* NSEC says it needs to be there, but we couldn't find it? Bummer! */ t->answer_dnssec_result = DNSSEC_NSEC_MISMATCH; break; |