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authorLennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net>2016-10-21 21:50:05 +0200
committerLennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net>2016-10-24 17:32:50 +0200
commit8130926d32d76193e98ba783ba932816f276bfad (patch)
tree1c2d5281da29c9cc10480e95b186d88941b1acf8 /src/shared
parente0f3720e399573134657458f4c8bd20c68fc092a (diff)
core: rework syscall filter set handling
A variety of fixes: - rename the SystemCallFilterSet structure to SyscallFilterSet. So far the main instance of it (the syscall_filter_sets[] array) used to abbreviate "SystemCall" as "Syscall". Let's stick to one of the two syntaxes, and not mix and match too wildly. Let's pick the shorter name in this case, as it is sufficiently well established to not confuse hackers reading this. - Export explicit indexes into the syscall_filter_sets[] array via an enum. This way, code that wants to make use of a specific filter set, can index it directly via the enum, instead of having to search for it. This makes apply_private_devices() in particular a lot simpler. - Provide two new helper calls in seccomp-util.c: syscall_filter_set_find() to find a set by its name, seccomp_add_syscall_filter_set() to add a set to a seccomp object. - Update SystemCallFilter= parser to use extract_first_word(). Let's work on deprecating FOREACH_WORD_QUOTED(). - Simplify apply_private_devices() using this functionality
Diffstat (limited to 'src/shared')
-rw-r--r--src/shared/seccomp-util.c128
-rw-r--r--src/shared/seccomp-util.h32
2 files changed, 122 insertions, 38 deletions
diff --git a/src/shared/seccomp-util.c b/src/shared/seccomp-util.c
index 8116c7671f..1d51f3fd1f 100644
--- a/src/shared/seccomp-util.c
+++ b/src/shared/seccomp-util.c
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
#include "macro.h"
#include "seccomp-util.h"
#include "string-util.h"
+#include "util.h"
const char* seccomp_arch_to_string(uint32_t c) {
@@ -132,28 +133,30 @@ bool is_seccomp_available(void) {
return cached_enabled;
}
-const SystemCallFilterSet syscall_filter_sets[] = {
- {
+const SyscallFilterSet syscall_filter_sets[_SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_MAX] = {
+ [SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_CLOCK] = {
/* Clock */
- .set_name = "@clock",
+ .name = "@clock",
.value =
"adjtimex\0"
"clock_adjtime\0"
"clock_settime\0"
"settimeofday\0"
"stime\0"
- }, {
+ },
+ [SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_CPU_EMULATION] = {
/* CPU emulation calls */
- .set_name = "@cpu-emulation",
+ .name = "@cpu-emulation",
.value =
"modify_ldt\0"
"subpage_prot\0"
"switch_endian\0"
"vm86\0"
"vm86old\0"
- }, {
+ },
+ [SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_DEBUG] = {
/* Debugging/Performance Monitoring/Tracing */
- .set_name = "@debug",
+ .name = "@debug",
.value =
"lookup_dcookie\0"
"perf_event_open\0"
@@ -161,11 +164,14 @@ const SystemCallFilterSet syscall_filter_sets[] = {
"process_vm_writev\0"
"ptrace\0"
"rtas\0"
+#ifdef __NR_s390_runtime_instr
"s390_runtime_instr\0"
+#endif
"sys_debug_setcontext\0"
- }, {
+ },
+ [SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_DEFAULT] = {
/* Default list */
- .set_name = "@default",
+ .name = "@default",
.value =
"execve\0"
"exit\0"
@@ -173,9 +179,10 @@ const SystemCallFilterSet syscall_filter_sets[] = {
"getrlimit\0" /* make sure processes can query stack size and such */
"rt_sigreturn\0"
"sigreturn\0"
- }, {
+ },
+ [SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_IO_EVENT] = {
/* Event loop use */
- .set_name = "@io-event",
+ .name = "@io-event",
.value =
"_newselect\0"
"epoll_create1\0"
@@ -191,9 +198,10 @@ const SystemCallFilterSet syscall_filter_sets[] = {
"ppoll\0"
"pselect6\0"
"select\0"
- }, {
+ },
+ [SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_IPC] = {
/* Message queues, SYSV IPC or other IPC: unusual */
- .set_name = "@ipc",
+ .name = "@ipc",
.value = "ipc\0"
"mq_getsetattr\0"
"mq_notify\0"
@@ -215,23 +223,26 @@ const SystemCallFilterSet syscall_filter_sets[] = {
"shmctl\0"
"shmdt\0"
"shmget\0"
- }, {
+ },
+ [SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_KEYRING] = {
/* Keyring */
- .set_name = "@keyring",
+ .name = "@keyring",
.value =
"add_key\0"
"keyctl\0"
"request_key\0"
- }, {
+ },
+ [SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_MODULE] = {
/* Kernel module control */
- .set_name = "@module",
+ .name = "@module",
.value =
"delete_module\0"
"finit_module\0"
"init_module\0"
- }, {
+ },
+ [SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_MOUNT] = {
/* Mounting */
- .set_name = "@mount",
+ .name = "@mount",
.value =
"chroot\0"
"mount\0"
@@ -239,9 +250,10 @@ const SystemCallFilterSet syscall_filter_sets[] = {
"pivot_root\0"
"umount2\0"
"umount\0"
- }, {
+ },
+ [SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_NETWORK_IO] = {
/* Network or Unix socket IO, should not be needed if not network facing */
- .set_name = "@network-io",
+ .name = "@network-io",
.value =
"accept4\0"
"accept\0"
@@ -264,9 +276,10 @@ const SystemCallFilterSet syscall_filter_sets[] = {
"socket\0"
"socketcall\0"
"socketpair\0"
- }, {
+ },
+ [SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_OBSOLETE] = {
/* Unusual, obsolete or unimplemented, some unknown even to libseccomp */
- .set_name = "@obsolete",
+ .name = "@obsolete",
.value =
"_sysctl\0"
"afs_syscall\0"
@@ -292,9 +305,10 @@ const SystemCallFilterSet syscall_filter_sets[] = {
"uselib\0"
"ustat\0"
"vserver\0"
- }, {
+ },
+ [SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_PRIVILEGED] = {
/* Nice grab-bag of all system calls which need superuser capabilities */
- .set_name = "@privileged",
+ .name = "@privileged",
.value =
"@clock\0"
"@module\0"
@@ -333,9 +347,10 @@ const SystemCallFilterSet syscall_filter_sets[] = {
"swapon\0"
"sysctl\0"
"vhangup\0"
- }, {
+ },
+ [SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_PROCESS] = {
/* Process control, execution, namespaces */
- .set_name = "@process",
+ .name = "@process",
.value =
"arch_prctl\0"
"clone\0"
@@ -349,19 +364,66 @@ const SystemCallFilterSet syscall_filter_sets[] = {
"tkill\0"
"unshare\0"
"vfork\0"
- }, {
+ },
+ [SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_RAW_IO] = {
/* Raw I/O ports */
- .set_name = "@raw-io",
+ .name = "@raw-io",
.value =
"ioperm\0"
"iopl\0"
"pciconfig_iobase\0"
"pciconfig_read\0"
"pciconfig_write\0"
+#ifdef __NR_s390_pci_mmio_read
"s390_pci_mmio_read\0"
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_s390_pci_mmio_write
"s390_pci_mmio_write\0"
- }, {
- .set_name = NULL,
- .value = NULL
- }
+#endif
+ },
};
+
+const SyscallFilterSet *syscall_filter_set_find(const char *name) {
+ unsigned i;
+
+ if (isempty(name) || name[0] != '@')
+ return NULL;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < _SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_MAX; i++)
+ if (streq(syscall_filter_sets[i].name, name))
+ return syscall_filter_sets + i;
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+int seccomp_add_syscall_filter_set(scmp_filter_ctx seccomp, const SyscallFilterSet *set, uint32_t action) {
+ const char *sys;
+ int r;
+
+ assert(seccomp);
+ assert(set);
+
+ NULSTR_FOREACH(sys, set->value) {
+ int id;
+
+ if (sys[0] == '@') {
+ const SyscallFilterSet *other;
+
+ other = syscall_filter_set_find(sys);
+ if (!other)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ r = seccomp_add_syscall_filter_set(seccomp, other, action);
+ } else {
+ id = seccomp_syscall_resolve_name(sys);
+ if (id == __NR_SCMP_ERROR)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ r = seccomp_rule_add(seccomp, action, id, 0);
+ }
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/src/shared/seccomp-util.h b/src/shared/seccomp-util.h
index cca7c17912..34fd49c122 100644
--- a/src/shared/seccomp-util.h
+++ b/src/shared/seccomp-util.h
@@ -29,9 +29,31 @@ int seccomp_add_secondary_archs(scmp_filter_ctx *c);
bool is_seccomp_available(void);
-typedef struct SystemCallFilterSet {
- const char *set_name;
+typedef struct SyscallFilterSet {
+ const char *name;
const char *value;
-} SystemCallFilterSet;
-
-extern const SystemCallFilterSet syscall_filter_sets[];
+} SyscallFilterSet;
+
+enum {
+ SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_CLOCK,
+ SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_CPU_EMULATION,
+ SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_DEBUG,
+ SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_DEFAULT,
+ SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_IO_EVENT,
+ SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_IPC,
+ SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_KEYRING,
+ SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_MODULE,
+ SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_MOUNT,
+ SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_NETWORK_IO,
+ SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_OBSOLETE,
+ SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_PRIVILEGED,
+ SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_PROCESS,
+ SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_RAW_IO,
+ _SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_MAX
+};
+
+extern const SyscallFilterSet syscall_filter_sets[];
+
+const SyscallFilterSet *syscall_filter_set_find(const char *name);
+
+int seccomp_add_syscall_filter_set(scmp_filter_ctx seccomp, const SyscallFilterSet *set, uint32_t action);