bus-proxy: cloning smack label

When dbus client connects to systemd-bus-proxyd through
Unix domain socket proxy takes client's smack label and sets for itself.

It is done before and independent of dropping privileges.

The reason of such soluton is fact that tests of access rights
performed by lsm may take place inside kernel, not only
in userspace of recipient of message.

The bus-proxyd needs CAP_MAC_ADMIN to manipulate its label.

In case of systemd running in system mode, CAP_MAC_ADMIN
should be added to CapabilityBoundingSet in service file of bus-proxyd.

In case of systemd running in user mode ('systemd --user')
it can be achieved by addition
Capabilities=cap_mac_admin=i and SecureBits=keep-caps
to user@.service file
and setting cap_mac_admin+ei on bus-proxyd binary.

3 files changed, 42 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/src/bus-proxyd/bus-proxyd.c b/src/bus-proxyd/bus-proxyd.c
index 42fb0da0ef..5d304538fd 100644
--- a/src/bus-proxyd/bus-proxyd.c
+++ b/src/bus-proxyd/bus-proxyd.c
@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@
 #include "capability.h"
 #include "bus-policy.h"
 #include "bus-control.h"
+#include "smack-util.h"
 
 static char *arg_address = NULL;
 static char *arg_command_line_buffer = NULL;
@@ -1235,6 +1236,23 @@ static int patch_sender(sd_bus *a, sd_bus_message *m) {
         return 0;
 }
 
+static int mac_smack_apply_label_and_drop_cap_mac_admin(pid_t its_pid, const char *new_label) {
+#ifdef HAVE_SMACK
+        int r = 0, k;
+
+        if (!mac_smack_use())
+                return 0;
+
+        if (new_label && its_pid > 0)
+                r = mac_smack_apply_pid(its_pid, new_label);
+
+        k = drop_capability(CAP_MAC_ADMIN);
+        return r < 0 ? r : k;
+#else
+        return 0;
+#endif
+}
+
 int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
 
         _cleanup_bus_close_unref_ sd_bus *a = NULL, *b = NULL;
@@ -1274,6 +1292,10 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
         if (is_unix) {
                 (void) getpeercred(in_fd, &ucred);
                 (void) getpeersec(in_fd, &peersec);
+
+                r = mac_smack_apply_label_and_drop_cap_mac_admin(getpid(), peersec);
+                if (r < 0)
+                        log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to set SMACK label (%s) and drop CAP_MAC_ADMIN: %m", peersec);
         }
 
         if (arg_drop_privileges) {
diff --git a/src/shared/capability.c b/src/shared/capability.c
index 5d156ab3cd..65d7e038a7 100644
--- a/src/shared/capability.c
+++ b/src/shared/capability.c
@@ -271,3 +271,21 @@ int drop_privileges(uid_t uid, gid_t gid, uint64_t keep_capabilities) {
 
         return 0;
 }
+
+int drop_capability(cap_value_t cv) {
+        _cleanup_cap_free_ cap_t tmp_cap = NULL;
+
+        tmp_cap = cap_get_proc();
+        if (!tmp_cap)
+                return -errno;
+
+        if ((cap_set_flag(tmp_cap, CAP_INHERITABLE, 1, &cv, CAP_CLEAR) < 0) ||
+            (cap_set_flag(tmp_cap, CAP_PERMITTED, 1, &cv, CAP_CLEAR) < 0) ||
+            (cap_set_flag(tmp_cap, CAP_EFFECTIVE, 1, &cv, CAP_CLEAR) < 0))
+                return -errno;
+
+        if (cap_set_proc(tmp_cap) < 0)
+                return -errno;
+
+        return 0;
+}
diff --git a/src/shared/capability.h b/src/shared/capability.h
index 3e6d9995f5..6f2f6f997d 100644
--- a/src/shared/capability.h
+++ b/src/shared/capability.h
@@ -34,6 +34,8 @@ int capability_bounding_set_drop_usermode(uint64_t drop);
 
 int drop_privileges(uid_t uid, gid_t gid, uint64_t keep_capabilites);
 
+int drop_capability(cap_value_t cv);
+
 DEFINE_TRIVIAL_CLEANUP_FUNC(cap_t, cap_free);
 #define _cleanup_cap_free_ _cleanup_(cap_freep)