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-rw-r--r--catalog/systemd.hu.catalog262
-rw-r--r--po/hu.po139
-rw-r--r--src/basic/conf-files.c22
-rw-r--r--src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-common-errors.c4
-rw-r--r--src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-common-errors.h1
-rw-r--r--src/resolve-host/resolve-host.c147
-rw-r--r--src/resolve/RFCs59
-rw-r--r--src/resolve/resolved-bus.c18
-rw-r--r--src/resolve/resolved-dns-answer.c24
-rw-r--r--src/resolve/resolved-dns-cache.c3
-rw-r--r--src/resolve/resolved-dns-dnssec.c260
-rw-r--r--src/resolve/resolved-dns-dnssec.h3
-rw-r--r--src/resolve/resolved-dns-packet.c42
-rw-r--r--src/resolve/resolved-dns-packet.h13
-rw-r--r--src/resolve/resolved-dns-rr.c48
-rw-r--r--src/resolve/resolved-dns-rr.h39
-rw-r--r--src/resolve/resolved-dns-server.c2
-rw-r--r--src/resolve/resolved-dns-transaction.c43
-rw-r--r--src/resolve/resolved-dns-trust-anchor.c324
-rw-r--r--src/resolve/resolved-dns-trust-anchor.h6
20 files changed, 1247 insertions, 212 deletions
diff --git a/catalog/systemd.hu.catalog b/catalog/systemd.hu.catalog
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..30d76916cc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/catalog/systemd.hu.catalog
@@ -0,0 +1,262 @@
+# This file is part of systemd.
+#
+# Copyright 2012 Lennart Poettering
+# Copyright 2016 Gabor Kelemen
+#
+# systemd is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+# under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License as published by
+# the Free Software Foundation; either version 2.1 of the License, or
+# (at your option) any later version.
+#
+# systemd is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+# WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
+# Lesser General Public License for more details.
+#
+# You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public License
+# along with systemd; If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+
+# Message catalog for systemd's own messages
+
+# The catalog format is documented on
+# http://www.freedesktop.org/wiki/Software/systemd/catalog
+
+# For an explanation why we do all this, see https://xkcd.com/1024/
+
+-- f77379a8490b408bbe5f6940505a777b
+Subject: A napló elindult
+Defined-By: systemd
+Support: http://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/systemd-devel
+
+A rendszernapló folyamat elindult, megnyitotta írásra a naplófájlokat,
+és most készen áll kérések feldolgozására.
+
+-- d93fb3c9c24d451a97cea615ce59c00b
+Subject: A napló leállt
+Defined-By: systemd
+Support: http://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/systemd-devel
+
+A rendszernapló folyamat leállt, és bezárt minden jelenleg aktív naplófájlt.
+
+-- a596d6fe7bfa4994828e72309e95d61e
+Subject: Egy szolgáltatás üzenetei elnémítva
+Defined-By: systemd
+Support: http://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/systemd-devel
+Documentation: man:journald.conf(5)
+
+Egy szolgáltatás túl sok üzenetet naplózott adott idő alatt. A
+szolgáltatástól származó üzenetek eldobásra kerültek.
+
+Ne feledje, hogy csak a kérdéses szolgáltatás üzenetei kerültek eldobásra,
+ más szolgáltatások üzeneteit ez nem befolyásolja.
+
+Az üzenetek eldobását vezérlő korlátok az /etc/systemd/journald.conf
+RateLimitInterval= és RateLimitBurst= beállításaival adhatók meg.
+Részletekért lásd a journald.conf(5) man oldalt.
+
+-- e9bf28e6e834481bb6f48f548ad13606
+Subject: Naplóüzenetek vesztek el
+Defined-By: systemd
+Support: http://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/systemd-devel
+
+Kernelüzenetek vesztek el, mert a naplózó rendszer nem tudta elég gyorsan
+feldolgozni azokat.
+
+-- fc2e22bc6ee647b6b90729ab34a250b1
+Subject: Egy folyamat összeomlott: @COREDUMP_PID@ (@COREDUMP_COMM@)
+Defined-By: systemd
+Support: http://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/systemd-devel
+Documentation: man:core(5)
+
+Ez a folyamat: @COREDUMP_PID@ (@COREDUMP_COMM@) összeomlott, és core fájlt
+ írt ki.
+
+Ez általában programozási hibát jelez az összeomló programban, és
+a szállítója felé kell bejelenteni.
+
+-- 8d45620c1a4348dbb17410da57c60c66
+Subject: Új munkamenet (@SESSION_ID@) létrehozva, felhasználója: @USER_ID@
+Defined-By: systemd
+Support: http://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/systemd-devel
+Documentation: http://www.freedesktop.org/wiki/Software/systemd/multiseat
+
+Létrejött egy új munkamenet @SESSION_ID@ azonosítóval ezen felhasználóhoz:
+@USER_ID@.
+
+A munkamenet vezető folyamata: @LEADER@.
+
+-- 3354939424b4456d9802ca8333ed424a
+Subject: Munkamenet (@SESSION_ID@) befejezve
+Defined-By: systemd
+Support: http://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/systemd-devel
+Documentation: http://www.freedesktop.org/wiki/Software/systemd/multiseat
+
+A következő azonosítójú munkamenet befejeződött: @SESSION_ID@.
+
+-- fcbefc5da23d428093f97c82a9290f7b
+Subject: Elérhető egy új munkaállomás: @SEAT_ID@
+Defined-By: systemd
+Support: http://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/systemd-devel
+Documentation: http://www.freedesktop.org/wiki/Software/systemd/multiseat
+
+Beállításra kerül és használható egy új munkaállomás: @SEAT_ID@.
+
+-- e7852bfe46784ed0accde04bc864c2d5
+Subject: A munkaállomás eltávolítva: @SEAT_ID@
+Defined-By: systemd
+Support: http://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/systemd-devel
+Documentation: http://www.freedesktop.org/wiki/Software/systemd/multiseat
+
+A munkaállomás el lett távolítva, és már nem érhető el: @SEAT_ID@
+
+-- c7a787079b354eaaa9e77b371893cd27
+Subject: Időmódosítás
+Defined-By: systemd
+Support: http://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/systemd-devel
+
+A rendszeróra beállítva @REALTIME@ ezredmásodpercre 1970. január 1. után.
+
+-- 45f82f4aef7a4bbf942ce861d1f20990
+Subject: Időzóna-módosítás erre: @TIMEZONE@
+Defined-By: systemd
+Support: http://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/systemd-devel
+
+A rendszer időzónája módosítva lett erre: @TIMEZONE@.
+
+-- b07a249cd024414a82dd00cd181378ff
+Subject: A rendszer indítása kész
+Defined-By: systemd
+Support: http://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/systemd-devel
+
+A rendszerindításkor szükséges indításhoz sorba állított összes
+rendszerszolgáltatás elindult. Ne feledje, hogy ez nem jelenti, hogy a
+gép üresjáratban van, mivel egyes szolgáltatások még az indítás
+befejezésével lehetnek elfoglalva.
+
+A kernel indítása @KERNEL_USEC@ ezredmásodpercet igényelt.
+
+A kiinduló RAM lemez indítása @INITRD_USEC@ ezredmásodpercet igényelt.
+
+A felhasználói programok indítása @USERSPACE_USEC@ ezredmásodpercet igényelt.
+
+-- 6bbd95ee977941e497c48be27c254128
+Subject: A rendszer „@SLEEP@” alvási állapotba lépett
+Defined-By: systemd
+Support: http://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/systemd-devel
+
+A rendszer belépett ebbe az alvási állapotba: @SLEEP@.
+
+-- 8811e6df2a8e40f58a94cea26f8ebf14
+Subject: A rendszer „@SLEEP@” alvási állapotból kilépett
+Defined-By: systemd
+Support: http://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/systemd-devel
+
+A rendszer kilépett ebből az alvási állapotból: @SLEEP@.
+
+-- 98268866d1d54a499c4e98921d93bc40
+Subject: Rendszer leállítása kezdeményezve
+Defined-By: systemd
+Support: http://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/systemd-devel
+
+A systemd leállítása kezdeményezve. A leállítás megkezdődött, minden
+rendszerszolgáltatás befejeződik, minden fájlrendszer leválasztásra kerül.
+
+-- 7d4958e842da4a758f6c1cdc7b36dcc5
+Subject: A(z) @UNIT@ egység indítása megkezdődött
+Defined-By: systemd
+Support: http://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/systemd-devel
+
+A(z) @UNIT@ egység megkezdte az indulást.
+
+-- 39f53479d3a045ac8e11786248231fbf
+Subject: A(z) @UNIT@ egység befejezte az indulást
+Defined-By: systemd
+Support: http://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/systemd-devel
+
+A(z) @UNIT@ egység befejezte az indulást
+
+Az indítás eredménye: @RESULT@.
+
+-- de5b426a63be47a7b6ac3eaac82e2f6f
+Subject: A(z) @UNIT@ egység megkezdte a leállást
+Defined-By: systemd
+Support: http://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/systemd-devel
+
+A(z) @UNIT@ egység megkezdte a leállást.
+
+-- 9d1aaa27d60140bd96365438aad20286
+Subject: A(z) @UNIT@ egység befejezte a leállást
+Defined-By: systemd
+Support: http://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/systemd-devel
+
+A(z) @UNIT@ egység befejezte a leállást.
+
+-- be02cf6855d2428ba40df7e9d022f03d
+Subject: A(z) @UNIT@ egység hibát jelzett
+Defined-By: systemd
+Support: http://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/systemd-devel
+
+A(z) @UNIT@ egység hibát jelzett.
+
+Az eredmény: @RESULT@.
+
+-- d34d037fff1847e6ae669a370e694725
+Subject: A(z) @UNIT@ egység megkezdte a beállításainak újratöltését
+Defined-By: systemd
+Support: http://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/systemd-devel
+
+A(z) @UNIT@ egység megkezdte a beállításainak újratöltését.
+
+-- 7b05ebc668384222baa8881179cfda54
+Subject: A(z) @UNIT@ egység befejezte a beállításainak újratöltését
+Defined-By: systemd
+Support: http://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/systemd-devel
+
+A(z) @UNIT@ egység befejezte a beállításainak újratöltését.
+
+Az eredmény: @RESULT@.
+
+-- 641257651c1b4ec9a8624d7a40a9e1e7
+Subject: A folyamat végrehajtása sikertelen: @EXECUTABLE@
+Defined-By: systemd
+Support: http://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/systemd-devel
+
+A folyamat végrehajtása sikertelen volt, és hibát jelzett: @EXECUTABLE@.
+
+A folyamat által visszaadott hibaszám: @ERRNO@.
+
+-- 0027229ca0644181a76c4e92458afa2e
+Subject: Legalább egy üzenet nem továbbítható a rendszernaplónak
+Defined-By: systemd
+Support: http://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/systemd-devel
+
+Legalább egy üzenet nem volt továbbítható a journald-vel párhuzamosan futó
+syslog szolgáltatásnak. Ez általában azt jelenti, hogy a syslog
+megvalósítás nem volt képes lépést tartani a sorba állított
+üzenetek sebességével.
+
+-- 1dee0369c7fc4736b7099b38ecb46ee7
+Subject: A csatolási pont nem üres
+Defined-By: systemd
+Support: http://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/systemd-devel
+
+A csatolási pontként megadott @WHERE@ könyvtár (második mező az /etc/fstab
+fájlban, vagy a Where= sor a systemd egységfájlban) nem üres. Ez nem
+akadályozza meg a csatolást, de a könyvtárban már meglévő fájlok
+elérhetetlenné válnak. A fájlok láthatóvá tételéhez csatolja
+az azokat tartalmazó fájlrendszert egy másodlagos helyre.
+
+-- 24d8d4452573402496068381a6312df2
+Subject: Egy virtuális gép vagy konténer elindult
+Defined-By: systemd
+Support: http://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/systemd-devel
+
+A(z) @NAME@ nevű virtuális gép (vezető PID: @LEADER@) elindult, és
+használatra kész.
+
+-- 58432bd3bace477cb514b56381b8a758
+Subject: Egy virtuális gép vagy konténer befejeződött
+Defined-By: systemd
+Support: http://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/systemd-devel
+
+A(z) @NAME@ nevű virtuális gép (vezető PID: @LEADER@) leállt.
diff --git a/po/hu.po b/po/hu.po
index 21050623c5..88fecbc506 100644
--- a/po/hu.po
+++ b/po/hu.po
@@ -1,14 +1,14 @@
# Hungarian translation of systemd
-# Copyright (C) 2015. Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+# Copyright (C) 2015, 2016. Free Software Foundation, Inc.
# This file is distributed under the same license as the systemd package.
#
-# Gabor Kelemen <kelemeng at gnome dot hu>, 2015.
+# Gabor Kelemen <kelemeng at gnome dot hu>, 2015, 2016.
msgid ""
msgstr ""
"Project-Id-Version: systemd master\n"
"Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: \n"
-"POT-Creation-Date: 2015-11-22 16:37+0100\n"
-"PO-Revision-Date: 2015-01-02 22:58+0100\n"
+"POT-Creation-Date: 2016-01-02 13:41+0100\n"
+"PO-Revision-Date: 2016-01-02 13:45+0100\n"
"Last-Translator: Gabor Kelemen <kelemeng at ubuntu dot com>\n"
"Language-Team: Hungarian <openscope at googlegroups dot com>\n"
"Language: hu\n"
@@ -29,15 +29,13 @@ msgstr ""
"Hitelesítés szükséges a bevitt jelmondat visszaküldéséhez a rendszernek."
#: ../src/core/org.freedesktop.systemd1.policy.in.in.h:3
-#, fuzzy
msgid "Manage system services or other units"
-msgstr "Rendszerszolgáltatások vagy -egységek kezelése"
+msgstr "Rendszerszolgáltatások vagy más egységek kezelése"
#: ../src/core/org.freedesktop.systemd1.policy.in.in.h:4
-#, fuzzy
msgid "Authentication is required to manage system services or other units."
msgstr ""
-"Hitelesítés szükséges a rendszerszolgáltatások vagy -egységek kezeléséhez."
+"Hitelesítés szükséges a rendszerszolgáltatások vagy más egységek kezeléséhez."
#: ../src/core/org.freedesktop.systemd1.policy.in.in.h:5
msgid "Manage system service or unit files"
@@ -51,14 +49,16 @@ msgstr ""
#: ../src/core/org.freedesktop.systemd1.policy.in.in.h:7
msgid "Set or unset system and service manager environment variables"
msgstr ""
+"Rendszer- és szolgáltatáskezelő környezeti változóinak beállítása vagy "
+"törlése"
#: ../src/core/org.freedesktop.systemd1.policy.in.in.h:8
-#, fuzzy
msgid ""
"Authentication is required to set or unset system and service manager "
"environment variables."
msgstr ""
-"Hitelesítés szükséges a rendszerszolgáltatás- vagy egységfájlok kezeléséhez."
+"Hitelesítés szükséges a rendszer- és szolgáltatáskezelő környezeti "
+"változóinak beállításához vagy törléséhez."
#: ../src/core/org.freedesktop.systemd1.policy.in.in.h:9
msgid "Reload the systemd state"
@@ -98,30 +98,27 @@ msgstr "Hitelesítés szükséges a helyi gép információinak beállításáho
#: ../src/import/org.freedesktop.import1.policy.in.h:1
msgid "Import a VM or container image"
-msgstr ""
+msgstr "VM vagy konténer lemezkép importálása"
#: ../src/import/org.freedesktop.import1.policy.in.h:2
-#, fuzzy
msgid "Authentication is required to import a VM or container image"
-msgstr "Hitelesítés szükséges a bejelentkezéshez egy helyi konténerbe."
+msgstr "Hitelesítés szükséges a VM vagy konténer lemezkép importálásához."
#: ../src/import/org.freedesktop.import1.policy.in.h:3
msgid "Export a VM or container image"
-msgstr ""
+msgstr "VM vagy konténer lemezkép exportálása"
#: ../src/import/org.freedesktop.import1.policy.in.h:4
-#, fuzzy
msgid "Authentication is required to export a VM or container image"
-msgstr "Hitelesítés szükséges a bejelentkezéshez egy helyi konténerbe."
+msgstr "Hitelesítés szükséges a VM vagy konténer lemezkép exportálásához."
#: ../src/import/org.freedesktop.import1.policy.in.h:5
msgid "Download a VM or container image"
-msgstr ""
+msgstr "VM vagy konténer lemezkép letöltése"
#: ../src/import/org.freedesktop.import1.policy.in.h:6
-#, fuzzy
msgid "Authentication is required to download a VM or container image"
-msgstr "Hitelesítés szükséges a bejelentkezéshez egy helyi konténerbe."
+msgstr "Hitelesítés szükséges a VM vagy konténer lemezkép letöltéséhez."
#: ../src/locale/org.freedesktop.locale1.policy.in.h:1
msgid "Set system locale"
@@ -409,123 +406,113 @@ msgstr ""
#: ../src/login/org.freedesktop.login1.policy.in.h:49
msgid "Manage active sessions, users and seats"
-msgstr ""
+msgstr "Aktív munkamenetek, felhasználók és munkaállomások kezelése"
#: ../src/login/org.freedesktop.login1.policy.in.h:50
-#, fuzzy
msgid ""
"Authentication is required for managing active sessions, users and seats."
msgstr ""
-"Hitelesítés szükséges eszköz csatolásának engedélyezéséhez egy "
-"munkaállomáshoz"
+"Hitelesítés szükséges az aktív munkamenetek, felhasználók és munkaállomások "
+"kezeléséhez."
#: ../src/login/org.freedesktop.login1.policy.in.h:51
msgid "Lock or unlock active sessions"
-msgstr ""
+msgstr "Aktív munkamenetek zárolása vagy feloldása"
#: ../src/login/org.freedesktop.login1.policy.in.h:52
-#, fuzzy
msgid "Authentication is required to lock or unlock active sessions."
-msgstr "Hitelesítés szükséges a bejelentkezéshez egy helyi konténerbe."
+msgstr ""
+"Hitelesítés szükséges az aktív munkamenetek zárolásához vagy feloldásához."
#: ../src/login/org.freedesktop.login1.policy.in.h:53
msgid "Allow indication to the firmware to boot to setup interface"
-msgstr ""
+msgstr "A firmware-nek jelezhető, hogy a beállítófelületet bootolja"
#: ../src/login/org.freedesktop.login1.policy.in.h:54
-#, fuzzy
msgid ""
"Authentication is required to indicate to the firmware to boot to setup "
"interface."
-msgstr "Hitelesítés szükséges a helyi gépnév beállításához."
+msgstr ""
+"Hitelesítés szükséges a firmware-nek jelzéshez, hogy a beállítófelületet "
+"bootolja"
#: ../src/login/org.freedesktop.login1.policy.in.h:55
msgid "Set a wall message"
-msgstr ""
+msgstr "Falüzenet beállítása"
#: ../src/login/org.freedesktop.login1.policy.in.h:56
-#, fuzzy
msgid "Authentication is required to set a wall message"
-msgstr "Hitelesítés szükséges a helyi gépnév beállításához."
+msgstr "Hitelesítés szükséges a falüzenet beállításához"
#: ../src/machine/org.freedesktop.machine1.policy.in.h:1
msgid "Log into a local container"
msgstr "Bejelentkezés helyi konténerbe"
#: ../src/machine/org.freedesktop.machine1.policy.in.h:2
-#, fuzzy
msgid "Authentication is required to log into a local container."
msgstr "Hitelesítés szükséges a bejelentkezéshez egy helyi konténerbe."
#: ../src/machine/org.freedesktop.machine1.policy.in.h:3
-#, fuzzy
msgid "Log into the local host"
-msgstr "Bejelentkezés helyi konténerbe"
+msgstr "Bejelentkezés a helyi gépre"
#: ../src/machine/org.freedesktop.machine1.policy.in.h:4
-#, fuzzy
msgid "Authentication is required to log into the local host."
-msgstr "Hitelesítés szükséges a bejelentkezéshez egy helyi konténerbe."
+msgstr "Hitelesítés szükséges a bejelentkezéshez a helyi gépre."
#: ../src/machine/org.freedesktop.machine1.policy.in.h:5
-#, fuzzy
msgid "Acquire a shell in a local container"
-msgstr "Bejelentkezés helyi konténerbe"
+msgstr "Parancsértelmező elérése helyi konténerben"
#: ../src/machine/org.freedesktop.machine1.policy.in.h:6
-#, fuzzy
msgid "Authentication is required to acquire a shell in a local container."
-msgstr "Hitelesítés szükséges a bejelentkezéshez egy helyi konténerbe."
+msgstr "Hitelesítés szükséges a parancsértelmező eléréséhez helyi konténerben."
#: ../src/machine/org.freedesktop.machine1.policy.in.h:7
msgid "Acquire a shell on the local host"
-msgstr ""
+msgstr "Parancsértelmező elérése a helyi gépen"
#: ../src/machine/org.freedesktop.machine1.policy.in.h:8
-#, fuzzy
msgid "Authentication is required to acquire a shell on the local host."
-msgstr "Hitelesítés szükséges a helyi gépnév beállításához."
+msgstr "Hitelesítés szükséges a parancsértelmező eléréséhez a helyi gépen."
#: ../src/machine/org.freedesktop.machine1.policy.in.h:9
-#, fuzzy
msgid "Acquire a pseudo TTY in a local container"
-msgstr "Bejelentkezés helyi konténerbe"
+msgstr "Pszeudoterminál elérése helyi konténerben"
#: ../src/machine/org.freedesktop.machine1.policy.in.h:10
-#, fuzzy
msgid ""
"Authentication is required to acquire a pseudo TTY in a local container."
-msgstr "Hitelesítés szükséges a bejelentkezéshez egy helyi konténerbe."
+msgstr "Hitelesítés szükséges a pszeudoterminál eléréséhez helyi konténerben."
#: ../src/machine/org.freedesktop.machine1.policy.in.h:11
msgid "Acquire a pseudo TTY on the local host"
-msgstr ""
+msgstr "Pszeudoterminál elérése helyi gépen"
#: ../src/machine/org.freedesktop.machine1.policy.in.h:12
-#, fuzzy
msgid "Authentication is required to acquire a pseudo TTY on the local host."
-msgstr "Hitelesítés szükséges a helyi gépnév beállításához."
+msgstr "Hitelesítés szükséges a pszeudoterminál eléréséhez a helyi gépen."
#: ../src/machine/org.freedesktop.machine1.policy.in.h:13
msgid "Manage local virtual machines and containers"
-msgstr ""
+msgstr "Virtuális gépek és konténerek kezelése"
#: ../src/machine/org.freedesktop.machine1.policy.in.h:14
-#, fuzzy
msgid ""
"Authentication is required to manage local virtual machines and containers."
-msgstr "Hitelesítés szükséges a helyi gép információinak beállításához."
+msgstr "Hitelesítés szükséges helyi virtuális gépek és konténerek kezeléséhez."
#: ../src/machine/org.freedesktop.machine1.policy.in.h:15
msgid "Manage local virtual machine and container images"
-msgstr ""
+msgstr "Helyi virtuális gép és konténer lemezképek kezelése"
#: ../src/machine/org.freedesktop.machine1.policy.in.h:16
-#, fuzzy
msgid ""
"Authentication is required to manage local virtual machine and container "
"images."
-msgstr "Hitelesítés szükséges a helyi gép információinak beállításához."
+msgstr ""
+"Hitelesítés szükséges a helyi virtuális gép és konténer lemezképek "
+"kezeléséhez."
#: ../src/timedate/org.freedesktop.timedate1.policy.in.h:1
msgid "Set system time"
@@ -565,37 +552,33 @@ msgid ""
"shall be enabled."
msgstr "Hitelesítés szükséges a hálózati időszinkronizáció engedélyezéséhez."
-#: ../src/core/dbus-unit.c:428
-#, fuzzy
+#: ../src/core/dbus-unit.c:449
msgid "Authentication is required to start '$(unit)'."
-msgstr "Hitelesítés szükséges a rendszeridő beállításához."
+msgstr "Hitelesítés szükséges a következő elindításához: „$(unit)”."
-#: ../src/core/dbus-unit.c:429
-#, fuzzy
+#: ../src/core/dbus-unit.c:450
msgid "Authentication is required to stop '$(unit)'."
-msgstr "Hitelesítés szükséges a rendszeridő beállításához."
+msgstr "Hitelesítés szükséges a következő leállításához: „$(unit)”."
-#: ../src/core/dbus-unit.c:430
-#, fuzzy
+#: ../src/core/dbus-unit.c:451
msgid "Authentication is required to reload '$(unit)'."
-msgstr "Hitelesítés szükséges a systemd állapotának újratöltéséhez."
+msgstr "Hitelesítés szükséges a következő újratöltéséhez: „$(unit)”."
-#: ../src/core/dbus-unit.c:431 ../src/core/dbus-unit.c:432
-#, fuzzy
+#: ../src/core/dbus-unit.c:452 ../src/core/dbus-unit.c:453
msgid "Authentication is required to restart '$(unit)'."
-msgstr "Hitelesítés szükséges a rendszeridő beállításához."
+msgstr "Hitelesítés szükséges a következő újraindításához: „$(unit)”."
-#: ../src/core/dbus-unit.c:535
-#, fuzzy
+#: ../src/core/dbus-unit.c:556
msgid "Authentication is required to kill '$(unit)'."
-msgstr "Hitelesítés szükséges a bejelentkezéshez egy helyi konténerbe."
+msgstr "Hitelesítés szükséges a következő kilövéséhez: „$(unit)”."
-#: ../src/core/dbus-unit.c:565
-#, fuzzy
+#: ../src/core/dbus-unit.c:586
msgid "Authentication is required to reset the \"failed\" state of '$(unit)'."
-msgstr "Hitelesítés szükséges a helyi gépnév beállításához."
+msgstr ""
+"Hitelesítés szükséges a következő „sikertelen” állapotának törléséhez: "
+"„$(unit)”."
-#: ../src/core/dbus-unit.c:597
-#, fuzzy
+#: ../src/core/dbus-unit.c:618
msgid "Authentication is required to set properties on '$(unit)'."
-msgstr "Hitelesítés szükséges a rendszeridő beállításához."
+msgstr ""
+"Hitelesítés szükséges a következő tulajdonságainak beállításához: „$(unit)”."
diff --git a/src/basic/conf-files.c b/src/basic/conf-files.c
index 75dad228e3..5854caeb51 100644
--- a/src/basic/conf-files.c
+++ b/src/basic/conf-files.c
@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@
static int files_add(Hashmap *h, const char *root, const char *path, const char *suffix) {
_cleanup_closedir_ DIR *dir = NULL;
const char *dirpath;
+ struct dirent *de;
int r;
assert(path);
@@ -55,18 +56,9 @@ static int files_add(Hashmap *h, const char *root, const char *path, const char
return -errno;
}
- for (;;) {
- struct dirent *de;
+ FOREACH_DIRENT(de, dir, return -errno) {
char *p;
- errno = 0;
- de = readdir(dir);
- if (!de && errno != 0)
- return -errno;
-
- if (!de)
- break;
-
if (!dirent_is_file_with_suffix(de, suffix))
continue;
@@ -116,17 +108,15 @@ static int conf_files_list_strv_internal(char ***strv, const char *suffix, const
STRV_FOREACH(p, dirs) {
r = files_add(fh, root, *p, suffix);
- if (r == -ENOMEM) {
+ if (r == -ENOMEM)
return r;
- } else if (r < 0)
- log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to search for files in %s: %m",
- *p);
+ if (r < 0)
+ log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to search for files in %s, ignoring: %m", *p);
}
files = hashmap_get_strv(fh);
- if (files == NULL) {
+ if (!files)
return -ENOMEM;
- }
qsort_safe(files, hashmap_size(fh), sizeof(char *), base_cmp);
*strv = files;
diff --git a/src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-common-errors.c b/src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-common-errors.c
index 8d486fcbbd..6e2594d001 100644
--- a/src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-common-errors.c
+++ b/src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-common-errors.c
@@ -67,12 +67,14 @@ BUS_ERROR_MAP_ELF_REGISTER const sd_bus_error_map bus_common_errors[] = {
SD_BUS_ERROR_MAP(BUS_ERROR_NO_SUCH_PROCESS, ESRCH),
- SD_BUS_ERROR_MAP(BUS_ERROR_NO_NAME_SERVERS, EIO),
+ SD_BUS_ERROR_MAP(BUS_ERROR_NO_NAME_SERVERS, ESRCH),
SD_BUS_ERROR_MAP(BUS_ERROR_INVALID_REPLY, EINVAL),
SD_BUS_ERROR_MAP(BUS_ERROR_NO_SUCH_RR, ENOENT),
SD_BUS_ERROR_MAP(BUS_ERROR_NO_RESOURCES, ENOMEM),
SD_BUS_ERROR_MAP(BUS_ERROR_CNAME_LOOP, EDEADLK),
SD_BUS_ERROR_MAP(BUS_ERROR_ABORTED, ECANCELED),
+ SD_BUS_ERROR_MAP(BUS_ERROR_CONNECTION_FAILURE, ECONNREFUSED),
+ SD_BUS_ERROR_MAP(BUS_ERROR_NO_SUCH_SERVICE, EUNATCH),
SD_BUS_ERROR_MAP(BUS_ERROR_NO_SUCH_TRANSFER, ENXIO),
SD_BUS_ERROR_MAP(BUS_ERROR_TRANSFER_IN_PROGRESS, EBUSY),
diff --git a/src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-common-errors.h b/src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-common-errors.h
index d7d210b0c4..9076993f01 100644
--- a/src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-common-errors.h
+++ b/src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-common-errors.h
@@ -73,6 +73,7 @@
#define BUS_ERROR_CNAME_LOOP "org.freedesktop.resolve1.CNameLoop"
#define BUS_ERROR_ABORTED "org.freedesktop.resolve1.Aborted"
#define BUS_ERROR_CONNECTION_FAILURE "org.freedesktop.resolve1.ConnectionFailure"
+#define BUS_ERROR_NO_SUCH_SERVICE "org.freedesktop.resolve1.NoSuchService"
#define _BUS_ERROR_DNS "org.freedesktop.resolve1.DnsError."
#define BUS_ERROR_NO_SUCH_TRANSFER "org.freedesktop.import1.NoSuchTransfer"
diff --git a/src/resolve-host/resolve-host.c b/src/resolve-host/resolve-host.c
index dc82769ac6..2cabfeaefa 100644
--- a/src/resolve-host/resolve-host.c
+++ b/src/resolve-host/resolve-host.c
@@ -328,8 +328,7 @@ static int parse_address(const char *s, int *family, union in_addr_union *addres
return 0;
}
-static int resolve_record(sd_bus *bus, const char *name) {
-
+static int resolve_record(sd_bus *bus, const char *name, uint16_t class, uint16_t type) {
_cleanup_(sd_bus_message_unrefp) sd_bus_message *req = NULL, *reply = NULL;
_cleanup_(sd_bus_error_free) sd_bus_error error = SD_BUS_ERROR_NULL;
char ifname[IF_NAMESIZE] = "";
@@ -343,7 +342,7 @@ static int resolve_record(sd_bus *bus, const char *name) {
if (arg_ifindex > 0 && !if_indextoname(arg_ifindex, ifname))
return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to resolve interface name for index %i: %m", arg_ifindex);
- log_debug("Resolving %s %s %s (interface %s).", name, dns_class_to_string(arg_class), dns_type_to_string(arg_type), isempty(ifname) ? "*" : ifname);
+ log_debug("Resolving %s %s %s (interface %s).", name, dns_class_to_string(class), dns_type_to_string(type), isempty(ifname) ? "*" : ifname);
r = sd_bus_message_new_method_call(
bus,
@@ -355,7 +354,7 @@ static int resolve_record(sd_bus *bus, const char *name) {
if (r < 0)
return bus_log_create_error(r);
- r = sd_bus_message_append(req, "isqqt", arg_ifindex, name, arg_class, arg_type, arg_flags);
+ r = sd_bus_message_append(req, "isqqt", arg_ifindex, name, class, type, arg_flags);
if (r < 0)
return bus_log_create_error(r);
@@ -442,6 +441,127 @@ static int resolve_record(sd_bus *bus, const char *name) {
return 0;
}
+static int resolve_rfc4501(sd_bus *bus, const char *name) {
+ uint16_t type = 0, class = 0;
+ const char *p, *q, *n;
+ int r;
+
+ assert(bus);
+ assert(name);
+ assert(startswith(name, "dns:"));
+
+ /* Parse RFC 4501 dns: URIs */
+
+ p = name + 4;
+
+ if (p[0] == '/') {
+ const char *e;
+
+ if (p[1] != '/')
+ goto invalid;
+
+ e = strchr(p + 2, '/');
+ if (!e)
+ goto invalid;
+
+ if (e != p + 2)
+ log_warning("DNS authority specification not supported; ignoring specified authority.");
+
+ p = e + 1;
+ }
+
+ q = strchr(p, '?');
+ if (q) {
+ n = strndupa(p, q - p);
+ q++;
+
+ for (;;) {
+ const char *f;
+
+ f = startswith_no_case(q, "class=");
+ if (f) {
+ _cleanup_free_ char *t = NULL;
+ const char *e;
+
+ if (class != 0) {
+ log_error("DNS class specified twice.");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ e = strchrnul(f, ';');
+ t = strndup(f, e - f);
+ if (!t)
+ return log_oom();
+
+ r = dns_class_from_string(t);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ log_error("Unknown DNS class %s.", t);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ class = r;
+
+ if (*e == ';') {
+ q = e + 1;
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ break;
+ }
+
+ f = startswith_no_case(q, "type=");
+ if (f) {
+ _cleanup_free_ char *t = NULL;
+ const char *e;
+
+ if (type != 0) {
+ log_error("DNS type specified twice.");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ e = strchrnul(f, ';');
+ t = strndup(f, e - f);
+ if (!t)
+ return log_oom();
+
+ r = dns_type_from_string(t);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ log_error("Unknown DNS type %s.", t);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ type = r;
+
+ if (*e == ';') {
+ q = e + 1;
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ break;
+ }
+
+ goto invalid;
+ }
+ } else
+ n = p;
+
+ if (type == 0)
+ type = arg_type;
+ if (type == 0)
+ type = DNS_TYPE_A;
+
+ if (class == 0)
+ class = arg_class;
+ if (class == 0)
+ class = DNS_CLASS_IN;
+
+ return resolve_record(bus, n, class, type);
+
+invalid:
+ log_error("Invalid DNS URI: %s", name);
+ return -EINVAL;
+}
+
static int resolve_service(sd_bus *bus, const char *name, const char *type, const char *domain) {
const char *canonical_name, *canonical_type, *canonical_domain;
_cleanup_(sd_bus_message_unrefp) sd_bus_message *req = NULL, *reply = NULL;
@@ -1009,6 +1129,9 @@ static int parse_argv(int argc, char *argv[]) {
if (arg_type != 0 && arg_class == 0)
arg_class = DNS_CLASS_IN;
+ if (arg_class != 0 && arg_type == 0)
+ arg_type = DNS_TYPE_A;
+
return 1 /* work to do */;
}
@@ -1042,11 +1165,15 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) {
int family, ifindex, k;
union in_addr_union a;
- k = parse_address(argv[optind], &family, &a, &ifindex);
- if (k >= 0)
- k = resolve_address(bus, family, &a, ifindex);
- else
- k = resolve_host(bus, argv[optind]);
+ if (startswith(argv[optind], "dns:"))
+ k = resolve_rfc4501(bus, argv[optind]);
+ else {
+ k = parse_address(argv[optind], &family, &a, &ifindex);
+ if (k >= 0)
+ k = resolve_address(bus, family, &a, ifindex);
+ else
+ k = resolve_host(bus, argv[optind]);
+ }
if (r == 0)
r = k;
@@ -1065,7 +1192,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) {
while (argv[optind]) {
int k;
- k = resolve_record(bus, argv[optind]);
+ k = resolve_record(bus, argv[optind], arg_class, arg_type);
if (r == 0)
r = k;
diff --git a/src/resolve/RFCs b/src/resolve/RFCs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ccc7f0d640
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/resolve/RFCs
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+Y = Comprehensively Implemented, to the point appropriate for resolved
+D = Comprehensively Implemented, by a dependency of resolved
+! = Missing and something we might want to implement
+~ = Needs no explicit support or doesn't apply
+? = Is this relevant today?
+ = We are working on this
+
+Y https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc1034 → DOMAIN NAMES - CONCEPTS AND FACILITIES
+Y https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc1035 → DOMAIN NAMES - IMPLEMENTATION AND SPECIFICATION
+? https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc1101 → DNS Encoding of Network Names and Other Types
+Y https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc1123 → Requirements for Internet Hosts -- Application and Support
+ https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc1464 → Using the Domain Name System To Store Arbitrary String Attributes
+Y https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc1536 → Common DNS Implementation Errors and Suggested Fixes
+Y https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc1876 → A Means for Expressing Location Information in the Domain Name System
+Y https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2181 → Clarifications to the DNS Specification
+ https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2308 → Negative Caching of DNS Queries (DNS NCACHE)
+Y https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2782 → A DNS RR for specifying the location of services (DNS SRV)
+D https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3492 → Punycode: A Bootstring encoding of Unicode for Internationalized Domain Names in Applications (IDNA)
+Y https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3596 → DNS Extensions to Support IP Version 6
+Y https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3597 → Handling of Unknown DNS Resource Record (RR) Types
+ https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4033 → DNS Security Introduction and Requirements
+ https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4034 → Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions
+ https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4035 → Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security Extensions
+! https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4183 → A Suggested Scheme for DNS Resolution of Networks and Gateways
+Y https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4255 → Using DNS to Securely Publish Secure Shell (SSH) Key Fingerprints
+Y https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4343 → Domain Name System (DNS) Case Insensitivity Clarification
+~ https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4470 → Minimally Covering NSEC Records and DNSSEC On-line Signing
+Y https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4501 → Domain Name System Uniform Resource Identifiers
+Y https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4509 → Use of SHA-256 in DNSSEC Delegation Signer (DS) Resource Records (RRs)
+~ https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4592 → The Role of Wildcards in the Domain Name System
+~ https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4697 → Observed DNS Resolution Misbehavior
+Y https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4795 → Link-Local Multicast Name Resolution (LLMNR)
+! https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5011 → Automated Updates of DNS Security (DNSSEC) Trust Anchors
+ https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5155 → DNS Security (DNSSEC) Hashed Authenticated Denial of Existence
+ https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5452 → Measures for Making DNS More Resilient against Forged Answers
+Y https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5702 → Use of SHA-2 Algorithms with RSA in DNSKEY and RRSIG Resource Records for DNSSEC
+Y https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5890 → Internationalized Domain Names for Applications (IDNA): Definitions and Document Framework
+Y https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5891 → Internationalized Domain Names in Applications (IDNA): Protocol
+Y https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5966 → DNS Transport over TCP - Implementation Requirements
+Y https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6303 → Locally Served DNS Zones
+ https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6604 → xNAME RCODE and Status Bits Clarification
+Y https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6605 → Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) for DNSSEC
+ https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6672 → DNAME Redirection in the DNS
+ https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6731 → Improved Recursive DNS Server Selection for Multi-Interfaced Nodes
+Y https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6761 → Special-Use Domain Names
+ https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6762 → Multicast DNS
+ https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6763 → DNS-Based Service Discovery
+ https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6781 → DNSSEC Operational Practices, Version 2
+ https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6840 → Clarifications and Implementation Notes for DNS Security (DNSSEC)
+Y https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6891 → Extension Mechanisms for DNS (EDNS(0))
+Y https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6944 → Applicability Statement: DNS Security (DNSSEC) DNSKEY Algorithm Implementation Status
+Y https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6975 → Signaling Cryptographic Algorithm Understanding in DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC)
+ https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7129 → Authenticated Denial of Existence in the DNS
+! https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7646 → Definition and Use of DNSSEC Negative Trust Anchors
+~ https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7719 → DNS Terminology
+
+Also relevant:
+
+ https://www.iab.org/documents/correspondence-reports-documents/2013-2/iab-statement-dotless-domains-considered-harmful/
diff --git a/src/resolve/resolved-bus.c b/src/resolve/resolved-bus.c
index 5c7893d01c..4d4c1ca014 100644
--- a/src/resolve/resolved-bus.c
+++ b/src/resolve/resolved-bus.c
@@ -976,6 +976,7 @@ static void bus_method_resolve_service_complete(DnsQuery *q) {
return;
if (q->answer) {
+ bool has_root_domain = false;
DnsResourceRecord *rr;
int ifindex;
@@ -989,6 +990,11 @@ static void bus_method_resolve_service_complete(DnsQuery *q) {
if (rr->key->type != DNS_TYPE_SRV)
continue;
+ if (dns_name_is_root(rr->srv.name)) {
+ has_root_domain = true;
+ continue;
+ }
+
if ((q->flags & SD_RESOLVED_NO_ADDRESS) == 0) {
q->block_all_complete ++;
r = resolve_service_hostname(q, rr, ifindex);
@@ -1000,6 +1006,18 @@ static void bus_method_resolve_service_complete(DnsQuery *q) {
found++;
}
+
+ if (has_root_domain && found == 0) {
+ /* If there's exactly one SRV RR and it uses
+ * the root domain as host name, then the
+ * service is explicitly not offered on the
+ * domain. Report this as a recognizable
+ * error. See RFC 2782, Section "Usage
+ * Rules". */
+ r = sd_bus_reply_method_errorf(q->request, BUS_ERROR_NO_SUCH_SERVICE, "'%s' does not provide the requested service", dns_question_first_name(q->question));
+ goto finish;
+ }
+
}
if (found <= 0) {
diff --git a/src/resolve/resolved-dns-answer.c b/src/resolve/resolved-dns-answer.c
index 399b518644..445999f545 100644
--- a/src/resolve/resolved-dns-answer.c
+++ b/src/resolve/resolved-dns-answer.c
@@ -125,10 +125,13 @@ int dns_answer_add(DnsAnswer *a, DnsResourceRecord *rr, int ifindex, DnsAnswerFl
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (r > 0) {
- /* Entry already exists, keep the entry with
- * the higher RR, or the one with TTL 0 */
+ /* Don't mix contradicting TTLs (see below) */
+ if ((rr->ttl == 0) != (a->items[i].rr->ttl == 0))
+ return -EINVAL;
- if (rr->ttl == 0 || (rr->ttl > a->items[i].rr->ttl && a->items[i].rr->ttl != 0)) {
+ /* Entry already exists, keep the entry with
+ * the higher RR. */
+ if (rr->ttl > a->items[i].rr->ttl) {
dns_resource_record_ref(rr);
dns_resource_record_unref(a->items[i].rr);
a->items[i].rr = rr;
@@ -137,6 +140,21 @@ int dns_answer_add(DnsAnswer *a, DnsResourceRecord *rr, int ifindex, DnsAnswerFl
a->items[i].flags |= flags;
return 0;
}
+
+ r = dns_resource_key_equal(a->items[i].rr->key, rr->key);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+ if (r > 0) {
+ /* There's already an RR of the same RRset in
+ * place! Let's see if the TTLs more or less
+ * match. We don't really care if they match
+ * precisely, but we do care whether one is 0
+ * and the other is not. See RFC 2181, Section
+ * 5.2.*/
+
+ if ((rr->ttl == 0) != (a->items[i].rr->ttl == 0))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
}
return dns_answer_add_raw(a, rr, ifindex, flags);
diff --git a/src/resolve/resolved-dns-cache.c b/src/resolve/resolved-dns-cache.c
index 3193985542..1c7dd56b3b 100644
--- a/src/resolve/resolved-dns-cache.c
+++ b/src/resolve/resolved-dns-cache.c
@@ -26,7 +26,8 @@
#include "resolved-dns-packet.h"
#include "string-util.h"
-/* Never cache more than 4K entries */
+/* Never cache more than 4K entries. RFC 1536, Section 5 suggests to
+ * leave DNS caches unbounded, but that's crazy. */
#define CACHE_MAX 4096
/* We never keep any item longer than 2h in our cache */
diff --git a/src/resolve/resolved-dns-dnssec.c b/src/resolve/resolved-dns-dnssec.c
index a3aa90e98d..1182201b7d 100644
--- a/src/resolve/resolved-dns-dnssec.c
+++ b/src/resolve/resolved-dns-dnssec.c
@@ -35,14 +35,14 @@
*
* TODO:
*
- * - Make trust anchor store read additional DS+DNSKEY data from disk
* - wildcard zones compatibility (NSEC/NSEC3 wildcard check is missing)
* - multi-label zone compatibility
* - cname/dname compatibility
* - per-interface DNSSEC setting
* - nxdomain on qname
* - retry on failed validation?
- * - DSA support?
+ * - DNSSEC key revocation support? https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5011
+ * - when doing negative caching, use NSEC/NSEC3 RR instead of SOA for TTL
*
* */
@@ -52,6 +52,9 @@
/* Permit a maximum clock skew of 1h 10min. This should be enough to deal with DST confusion */
#define SKEW_MAX (1*USEC_PER_HOUR + 10*USEC_PER_MINUTE)
+/* Maximum number of NSEC3 iterations we'll do. */
+#define NSEC3_ITERATIONS_MAX 2048
+
/*
* The DNSSEC Chain of trust:
*
@@ -237,8 +240,8 @@ static int dnssec_rsa_verify(
exponent = (uint8_t*) dnskey->dnskey.key + 3;
exponent_size =
- ((size_t) (((uint8_t*) dnskey->dnskey.key)[0]) << 8) |
- ((size_t) ((uint8_t*) dnskey->dnskey.key)[1]);
+ ((size_t) (((uint8_t*) dnskey->dnskey.key)[1]) << 8) |
+ ((size_t) ((uint8_t*) dnskey->dnskey.key)[2]);
if (exponent_size < 256)
return -EINVAL;
@@ -458,7 +461,15 @@ static int dnssec_rrsig_expired(DnsResourceRecord *rrsig, usec_t realtime) {
static int algorithm_to_gcrypt_md(uint8_t algorithm) {
- /* Translates a DNSSEC signature algorithm into a gcrypt digest identifier */
+ /* Translates a DNSSEC signature algorithm into a gcrypt
+ * digest identifier.
+ *
+ * Note that we implement all algorithms listed as "Must
+ * implement" and "Recommended to Implement" in RFC6944. We
+ * don't implement any algorithms that are listed as
+ * "Optional" or "Must Not Implement". Specifically, we do not
+ * implement RSAMD5, DSASHA1, DH, DSA-NSEC3-SHA1, and
+ * GOST-ECC. */
switch (algorithm) {
@@ -516,9 +527,6 @@ int dnssec_verify_rrset(
if (md_algorithm < 0)
return md_algorithm;
- if (a->n_rrs > VERIFY_RRS_MAX)
- return -E2BIG;
-
r = dnssec_rrsig_expired(rrsig, realtime);
if (r < 0)
return r;
@@ -543,6 +551,9 @@ int dnssec_verify_rrset(
return r;
list[n++] = rr;
+
+ if (n > VERIFY_RRS_MAX)
+ return -E2BIG;
}
if (n <= 0)
@@ -1048,7 +1059,21 @@ int dnssec_verify_dnskey_search(DnsResourceRecord *dnskey, DnsAnswer *validated_
return 0;
}
-int dnssec_nsec3_hash(DnsResourceRecord *nsec3, const char *name, void *ret) {
+static int nsec3_hash_to_gcrypt_md(uint8_t algorithm) {
+
+ /* Translates a DNSSEC NSEC3 hash algorithm into a gcrypt digest identifier */
+
+ switch (algorithm) {
+
+ case NSEC3_ALGORITHM_SHA1:
+ return GCRY_MD_SHA1;
+
+ default:
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ }
+}
+
+int dnssec_nsec3_hash(const DnsResourceRecord *nsec3, const char *name, void *ret) {
uint8_t wire_format[DNS_WIRE_FOMAT_HOSTNAME_MAX];
gcry_md_hd_t md = NULL;
size_t hash_size;
@@ -1064,7 +1089,10 @@ int dnssec_nsec3_hash(DnsResourceRecord *nsec3, const char *name, void *ret) {
if (nsec3->key->type != DNS_TYPE_NSEC3)
return -EINVAL;
- algorithm = digest_to_gcrypt_md(nsec3->nsec3.algorithm);
+ if (nsec3->nsec3.iterations > NSEC3_ITERATIONS_MAX)
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+ algorithm = nsec3_hash_to_gcrypt_md(nsec3->nsec3.algorithm);
if (algorithm < 0)
return algorithm;
@@ -1129,6 +1157,13 @@ static int nsec3_is_good(DnsResourceRecord *rr, DnsAnswerFlags flags, DnsResourc
if (!IN_SET(rr->nsec3.flags, 0, 1))
return 0;
+ /* Ignore NSEC3 RRs whose algorithm we don't know */
+ if (nsec3_hash_to_gcrypt_md(rr->nsec3.algorithm) < 0)
+ return 0;
+ /* Ignore NSEC3 RRs with an excessive number of required iterations */
+ if (rr->nsec3.iterations > NSEC3_ITERATIONS_MAX)
+ return 0;
+
if (!nsec3)
return 1;
@@ -1165,21 +1200,62 @@ static int nsec3_is_good(DnsResourceRecord *rr, DnsAnswerFlags flags, DnsResourc
return dns_name_equal(a, b);
}
-static int dnssec_test_nsec3(DnsAnswer *answer, DnsResourceKey *key, DnssecNsecResult *result, bool *authenticated) {
- _cleanup_free_ char *next_closer_domain = NULL, *l = NULL;
+static int nsec3_hashed_domain(const DnsResourceRecord *nsec3, const char *domain, const char *zone, char **ret) {
+ _cleanup_free_ char *l = NULL, *hashed_domain = NULL;
uint8_t hashed[DNSSEC_HASH_SIZE_MAX];
- const char *suffix, *p, *pp = NULL;
- DnsResourceRecord *rr, *suffix_rr;
+ int hashed_size;
+
+ assert(nsec3);
+ assert(domain);
+ assert(zone);
+ assert(ret);
+
+ hashed_size = dnssec_nsec3_hash(nsec3, domain, hashed);
+ if (hashed_size < 0)
+ return hashed_size;
+
+ l = base32hexmem(hashed, hashed_size, false);
+ if (!l)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ hashed_domain = strjoin(l, ".", zone, NULL);
+ if (!hashed_domain)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ *ret = hashed_domain;
+ hashed_domain = NULL;
+
+ return hashed_size;
+}
+
+/* See RFC 5155, Section 8
+ * First try to find a NSEC3 record that matches our query precisely, if that fails, find the closest
+ * enclosure. Secondly, find a proof that there is no closer enclosure and either a proof that there
+ * is no wildcard domain as a direct descendant of the closest enclosure, or find an NSEC3 record that
+ * matches the wildcard domain.
+ *
+ * Based on this we can prove either the existence of the record in @key, or NXDOMAIN or NODATA, or
+ * that there is no proof either way. The latter is the case if a the proof of non-existence of a given
+ * name uses an NSEC3 record with the opt-out bit set. Lastly, if we are given insufficient NSEC3 records
+ * to conclude anything we indicate this by returning NO_RR. */
+static int dnssec_test_nsec3(DnsAnswer *answer, DnsResourceKey *key, DnssecNsecResult *result, bool *authenticated) {
+ _cleanup_free_ char *next_closer_domain = NULL, *wildcard = NULL, *wildcard_domain = NULL;
+ const char *zone, *p, *pp = NULL;
+ DnsResourceRecord *rr, *enclosure_rr, *suffix_rr, *wildcard_rr = NULL;
DnsAnswerFlags flags;
int hashed_size, r;
- bool a;
+ bool a, no_closer = false, no_wildcard = false, optout = false;
assert(key);
assert(result);
assert(authenticated);
- /* First step, look for the longest common suffix we find with any NSEC3 RR in the response. */
- suffix = DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(key);
+ /* First step, find the zone name and the NSEC3 parameters of the zone.
+ * it is sufficient to look for the longest common suffix we find with
+ * any NSEC3 RR in the response. Any NSEC3 record will do as all NSEC3
+ * records from a given zone in a response must use the same
+ * parameters. */
+ zone = DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(key);
for (;;) {
DNS_ANSWER_FOREACH_FLAGS(suffix_rr, flags, answer) {
r = nsec3_is_good(suffix_rr, flags, NULL);
@@ -1188,15 +1264,15 @@ static int dnssec_test_nsec3(DnsAnswer *answer, DnsResourceKey *key, DnssecNsecR
if (r == 0)
continue;
- r = dns_name_equal_skip(DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(suffix_rr->key), 1, suffix);
+ r = dns_name_equal_skip(DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(suffix_rr->key), 1, zone);
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (r > 0)
- goto found_suffix;
+ goto found_zone;
}
/* Strip one label from the front */
- r = dns_name_parent(&suffix);
+ r = dns_name_parent(&zone);
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (r == 0)
@@ -1206,13 +1282,13 @@ static int dnssec_test_nsec3(DnsAnswer *answer, DnsResourceKey *key, DnssecNsecR
*result = DNSSEC_NSEC_NO_RR;
return 0;
-found_suffix:
+found_zone:
/* Second step, find the closest encloser NSEC3 RR in 'answer' that matches 'key' */
p = DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(key);
for (;;) {
- _cleanup_free_ char *hashed_domain = NULL, *label = NULL;
+ _cleanup_free_ char *hashed_domain = NULL;
- hashed_size = dnssec_nsec3_hash(suffix_rr, p, hashed);
+ hashed_size = nsec3_hashed_domain(suffix_rr, p, zone, &hashed_domain);
if (hashed_size == -EOPNOTSUPP) {
*result = DNSSEC_NSEC_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM;
return 0;
@@ -1220,26 +1296,18 @@ found_suffix:
if (hashed_size < 0)
return hashed_size;
- label = base32hexmem(hashed, hashed_size, false);
- if (!label)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
- hashed_domain = strjoin(label, ".", suffix, NULL);
- if (!hashed_domain)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
- DNS_ANSWER_FOREACH_FLAGS(rr, flags, answer) {
+ DNS_ANSWER_FOREACH_FLAGS(enclosure_rr, flags, answer) {
- r = nsec3_is_good(rr, flags, suffix_rr);
+ r = nsec3_is_good(enclosure_rr, flags, suffix_rr);
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (r == 0)
continue;
- if (rr->nsec3.next_hashed_name_size != (size_t) hashed_size)
+ if (enclosure_rr->nsec3.next_hashed_name_size != (size_t) hashed_size)
continue;
- r = dns_name_equal(DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(rr->key), hashed_domain);
+ r = dns_name_equal(DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(enclosure_rr->key), hashed_domain);
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (r > 0) {
@@ -1269,37 +1337,48 @@ found_closest_encloser:
/* We found a closest encloser in 'p'; next closer is 'pp' */
/* Ensure this is not a DNAME domain, see RFC5155, section 8.3. */
- if (bitmap_isset(rr->nsec3.types, DNS_TYPE_DNAME))
+ if (bitmap_isset(enclosure_rr->nsec3.types, DNS_TYPE_DNAME))
return -EBADMSG;
/* Ensure that this data is from the delegated domain
* (i.e. originates from the "lower" DNS server), and isn't
* just glue records (i.e. doesn't originate from the "upper"
* DNS server). */
- if (bitmap_isset(rr->nsec3.types, DNS_TYPE_NS) &&
- !bitmap_isset(rr->nsec3.types, DNS_TYPE_SOA))
+ if (bitmap_isset(enclosure_rr->nsec3.types, DNS_TYPE_NS) &&
+ !bitmap_isset(enclosure_rr->nsec3.types, DNS_TYPE_SOA))
return -EBADMSG;
if (!pp) {
/* No next closer NSEC3 RR. That means there's a direct NSEC3 RR for our key. */
- *result = bitmap_isset(rr->nsec3.types, key->type) ? DNSSEC_NSEC_FOUND : DNSSEC_NSEC_NODATA;
+ if (bitmap_isset(enclosure_rr->nsec3.types, key->type))
+ *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_FOUND;
+ else if (bitmap_isset(enclosure_rr->nsec3.types, DNS_TYPE_CNAME))
+ *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_CNAME;
+ else
+ *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_NODATA;
+
*authenticated = a;
+
return 0;
}
- r = dnssec_nsec3_hash(rr, pp, hashed);
+ /* Prove that there is no next closer and whether or not there is a wildcard domain. */
+
+ wildcard = strappend("*.", p);
+ if (!wildcard)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ r = nsec3_hashed_domain(enclosure_rr, wildcard, zone, &wildcard_domain);
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (r != hashed_size)
return -EBADMSG;
- l = base32hexmem(hashed, hashed_size, false);
- if (!l)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
- next_closer_domain = strjoin(l, ".", p, NULL);
- if (!next_closer_domain)
- return -ENOMEM;
+ r = nsec3_hashed_domain(enclosure_rr, pp, zone, &next_closer_domain);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+ if (r != hashed_size)
+ return -EBADMSG;
DNS_ANSWER_FOREACH_FLAGS(rr, flags, answer) {
_cleanup_free_ char *label = NULL, *next_hashed_domain = NULL;
@@ -1314,7 +1393,7 @@ found_closest_encloser:
if (!label)
return -ENOMEM;
- next_hashed_domain = strjoin(label, ".", p, NULL);
+ next_hashed_domain = strjoin(label, ".", zone, NULL);
if (!next_hashed_domain)
return -ENOMEM;
@@ -1323,16 +1402,82 @@ found_closest_encloser:
return r;
if (r > 0) {
if (rr->nsec3.flags & 1)
- *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_OPTOUT;
- else
- *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_NXDOMAIN;
+ optout = true;
- *authenticated = a && (flags & DNS_ANSWER_AUTHENTICATED);
- return 1;
+ a = a && (flags & DNS_ANSWER_AUTHENTICATED);
+
+ no_closer = true;
+ }
+
+ r = dns_name_equal(DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(rr->key), wildcard_domain);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+ if (r > 0) {
+ a = a && (flags & DNS_ANSWER_AUTHENTICATED);
+
+ wildcard_rr = rr;
+ }
+
+ r = dns_name_between(DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(rr->key), wildcard_domain, next_hashed_domain);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+ if (r > 0) {
+ if (rr->nsec3.flags & 1)
+ /* This only makes sense if we have a wildcard delegation, which is
+ * very unlikely, see RFC 4592, Section 4.2, but we cannot rely on
+ * this not happening, so hence cannot simply conclude NXDOMAIN as
+ * we would wish */
+ optout = true;
+
+ a = a && (flags & DNS_ANSWER_AUTHENTICATED);
+
+ no_wildcard = true;
}
}
- *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_NO_RR;
+ if (wildcard_rr && no_wildcard)
+ return -EBADMSG;
+
+ if (!no_closer) {
+ *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_NO_RR;
+
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (wildcard_rr) {
+ /* A wildcard exists that matches our query. */
+ if (optout)
+ /* This is not specified in any RFC to the best of my knowledge, but
+ * if the next closer enclosure is covered by an opt-out NSEC3 RR
+ * it means that we cannot prove that the source of synthesis is
+ * correct, as there may be a closer match. */
+ *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_OPTOUT;
+ else if (bitmap_isset(wildcard_rr->nsec3.types, key->type))
+ *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_FOUND;
+ else if (bitmap_isset(wildcard_rr->nsec3.types, DNS_TYPE_CNAME))
+ *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_CNAME;
+ else
+ *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_NODATA;
+ } else {
+ if (optout)
+ /* The RFC only specifies that we have to care for optout for NODATA for
+ * DS records. However, children of an insecure opt-out delegation should
+ * also be considered opt-out, rather than verified NXDOMAIN.
+ * Note that we do not require a proof of wildcard non-existence if the
+ * next closer domain is covered by an opt-out, as that would not provide
+ * any additional information. */
+ *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_OPTOUT;
+ else if (no_wildcard)
+ *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_NXDOMAIN;
+ else {
+ *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_NO_RR;
+
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ *authenticated = a;
+
return 0;
}
@@ -1361,7 +1506,12 @@ int dnssec_test_nsec(DnsAnswer *answer, DnsResourceKey *key, DnssecNsecResult *r
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (r > 0) {
- *result = bitmap_isset(rr->nsec.types, key->type) ? DNSSEC_NSEC_FOUND : DNSSEC_NSEC_NODATA;
+ if (bitmap_isset(rr->nsec.types, key->type))
+ *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_FOUND;
+ else if (bitmap_isset(rr->nsec.types, DNS_TYPE_CNAME))
+ *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_CNAME;
+ else
+ *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_NODATA;
*authenticated = flags & DNS_ANSWER_AUTHENTICATED;
return 0;
}
diff --git a/src/resolve/resolved-dns-dnssec.h b/src/resolve/resolved-dns-dnssec.h
index d7aecbce13..f106875027 100644
--- a/src/resolve/resolved-dns-dnssec.h
+++ b/src/resolve/resolved-dns-dnssec.h
@@ -87,10 +87,11 @@ uint16_t dnssec_keytag(DnsResourceRecord *dnskey);
int dnssec_canonicalize(const char *n, char *buffer, size_t buffer_max);
-int dnssec_nsec3_hash(DnsResourceRecord *nsec3, const char *name, void *ret);
+int dnssec_nsec3_hash(const DnsResourceRecord *nsec3, const char *name, void *ret);
typedef enum DnssecNsecResult {
DNSSEC_NSEC_NO_RR, /* No suitable NSEC/NSEC3 RR found */
+ DNSSEC_NSEC_CNAME, /* Would be NODATA, but for the existence of a CNAME RR */
DNSSEC_NSEC_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM,
DNSSEC_NSEC_NXDOMAIN,
DNSSEC_NSEC_NODATA,
diff --git a/src/resolve/resolved-dns-packet.c b/src/resolve/resolved-dns-packet.c
index 5f79701296..4750bf1f5d 100644
--- a/src/resolve/resolved-dns-packet.c
+++ b/src/resolve/resolved-dns-packet.c
@@ -499,7 +499,7 @@ int dns_packet_append_name(
saved_size = p->size;
- while (*name) {
+ while (!dns_name_is_root(name)) {
const char *z = name;
char label[DNS_LABEL_MAX];
size_t n = 0;
@@ -723,7 +723,40 @@ int dns_packet_append_opt(DnsPacket *p, uint16_t max_udp_size, bool edns0_do, si
goto fail;
/* RDLENGTH */
- r = dns_packet_append_uint16(p, 0, NULL);
+
+ if (edns0_do) {
+ /* If DO is on, also append RFC6975 Algorithm data */
+
+ static const uint8_t rfc6975[] = {
+
+ 0, 5, /* OPTION_CODE: DAU */
+ 0, 6, /* LIST_LENGTH */
+ DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_RSASHA1,
+ DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_RSASHA1_NSEC3_SHA1,
+ DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_RSASHA256,
+ DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_RSASHA512,
+ DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_ECDSAP256SHA256,
+ DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_ECDSAP384SHA384,
+
+ 0, 6, /* OPTION_CODE: DHU */
+ 0, 3, /* LIST_LENGTH */
+ DNSSEC_DIGEST_SHA1,
+ DNSSEC_DIGEST_SHA256,
+ DNSSEC_DIGEST_SHA384,
+
+ 0, 7, /* OPTION_CODE: N3U */
+ 0, 1, /* LIST_LENGTH */
+ NSEC3_ALGORITHM_SHA1,
+ };
+
+ r = dns_packet_append_uint16(p, sizeof(rfc6975), NULL);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto fail;
+
+ r = dns_packet_append_blob(p, rfc6975, sizeof(rfc6975), NULL);
+ } else
+ r = dns_packet_append_uint16(p, 0, NULL);
+
if (r < 0)
goto fail;
@@ -1580,6 +1613,11 @@ int dns_packet_read_rr(DnsPacket *p, DnsResourceRecord **ret, bool *ret_cache_fl
if (r < 0)
goto fail;
+ /* RFC 2181, Section 8, suggests to
+ * treat a TTL with the MSB set as a zero TTL. */
+ if (rr->ttl & UINT32_C(0x80000000))
+ rr->ttl = 0;
+
r = dns_packet_read_uint16(p, &rdlength, NULL);
if (r < 0)
goto fail;
diff --git a/src/resolve/resolved-dns-packet.h b/src/resolve/resolved-dns-packet.h
index a09ace5b75..6821be73e4 100644
--- a/src/resolve/resolved-dns-packet.h
+++ b/src/resolve/resolved-dns-packet.h
@@ -119,7 +119,17 @@ static inline uint8_t* DNS_PACKET_DATA(DnsPacket *p) {
#define DNS_PACKET_RA(p) ((be16toh(DNS_PACKET_HEADER(p)->flags) >> 7) & 1)
#define DNS_PACKET_AD(p) ((be16toh(DNS_PACKET_HEADER(p)->flags) >> 5) & 1)
#define DNS_PACKET_CD(p) ((be16toh(DNS_PACKET_HEADER(p)->flags) >> 4) & 1)
-#define DNS_PACKET_RCODE(p) (be16toh(DNS_PACKET_HEADER(p)->flags) & 15)
+
+static inline uint16_t DNS_PACKET_RCODE(DnsPacket *p) {
+ uint16_t rcode;
+
+ if (p->opt)
+ rcode = (uint16_t) (p->opt->ttl >> 24);
+ else
+ rcode = 0;
+
+ return rcode | (be16toh(DNS_PACKET_HEADER(p)->flags) & 15);
+}
/* LLMNR defines some bits differently */
#define DNS_PACKET_LLMNR_C(p) DNS_PACKET_AA(p)
@@ -203,6 +213,7 @@ static inline bool DNS_PACKET_SHALL_CACHE(DnsPacket *p) {
return in_addr_is_localhost(p->family, &p->sender) == 0;
}
+/* https://www.iana.org/assignments/dns-parameters/dns-parameters.xhtml#dns-parameters-6 */
enum {
DNS_RCODE_SUCCESS = 0,
DNS_RCODE_FORMERR = 1,
diff --git a/src/resolve/resolved-dns-rr.c b/src/resolve/resolved-dns-rr.c
index d479de7125..76723ec4d0 100644
--- a/src/resolve/resolved-dns-rr.c
+++ b/src/resolve/resolved-dns-rr.c
@@ -308,9 +308,12 @@ const struct hash_ops dns_resource_key_hash_ops = {
int dns_resource_key_to_string(const DnsResourceKey *key, char **ret) {
char cbuf[strlen("CLASS") + DECIMAL_STR_MAX(uint16_t)], tbuf[strlen("TYPE") + DECIMAL_STR_MAX(uint16_t)];
- const char *c, *t;
+ const char *c, *t, *n;
char *s;
+ /* If we cannot convert the CLASS/TYPE into a known string,
+ use the format recommended by RFC 3597, Section 5. */
+
c = dns_class_to_string(key->class);
if (!c) {
sprintf(cbuf, "CLASS%u", key->class);
@@ -323,7 +326,8 @@ int dns_resource_key_to_string(const DnsResourceKey *key, char **ret) {
t = tbuf;
}
- if (asprintf(&s, "%s. %s %-5s", DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(key), c, t) < 0)
+ n = DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(key);
+ if (asprintf(&s, "%s%s %s %-5s", n, endswith(n, ".") ? "" : ".", c, t) < 0)
return -ENOMEM;
*ret = s;
@@ -912,20 +916,21 @@ const char *dns_resource_record_to_string(DnsResourceRecord *rr) {
break;
case DNS_TYPE_DNSKEY: {
- const char *alg;
+ _cleanup_free_ char *alg = NULL;
- alg = dnssec_algorithm_to_string(rr->dnskey.algorithm);
+ r = dnssec_algorithm_to_string_alloc(rr->dnskey.algorithm, &alg);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return NULL;
t = base64mem(rr->dnskey.key, rr->dnskey.key_size);
if (!t)
return NULL;
- r = asprintf(&s, "%s %u %u %.*s%.*u %s",
+ r = asprintf(&s, "%s %u %u %s %s",
k,
rr->dnskey.flags,
rr->dnskey.protocol,
- alg ? -1 : 0, alg,
- alg ? 0 : 1, alg ? 0u : (unsigned) rr->dnskey.algorithm,
+ alg,
t);
if (r < 0)
return NULL;
@@ -933,11 +938,15 @@ const char *dns_resource_record_to_string(DnsResourceRecord *rr) {
}
case DNS_TYPE_RRSIG: {
- const char *type, *alg;
+ _cleanup_free_ char *alg = NULL;
char expiration[strlen("YYYYMMDDHHmmSS") + 1], inception[strlen("YYYYMMDDHHmmSS") + 1];
+ const char *type;
type = dns_type_to_string(rr->rrsig.type_covered);
- alg = dnssec_algorithm_to_string(rr->rrsig.algorithm);
+
+ r = dnssec_algorithm_to_string_alloc(rr->rrsig.algorithm, &alg);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return NULL;
t = base64mem(rr->rrsig.signature, rr->rrsig.signature_size);
if (!t)
@@ -954,12 +963,11 @@ const char *dns_resource_record_to_string(DnsResourceRecord *rr) {
/* TYPE?? follows
* http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3597#section-5 */
- r = asprintf(&s, "%s %s%.*u %.*s%.*u %u %u %s %s %u %s %s",
+ r = asprintf(&s, "%s %s%.*u %s %u %u %s %s %u %s %s",
k,
type ?: "TYPE",
type ? 0 : 1, type ? 0u : (unsigned) rr->rrsig.type_covered,
- alg ? -1 : 0, alg,
- alg ? 0 : 1, alg ? 0u : (unsigned) rr->rrsig.algorithm,
+ alg,
rr->rrsig.labels,
rr->rrsig.original_ttl,
expiration,
@@ -1021,6 +1029,7 @@ const char *dns_resource_record_to_string(DnsResourceRecord *rr) {
if (!t)
return NULL;
+ /* Format as documented in RFC 3597, Section 5 */
r = asprintf(&s, "%s \\# %zu %s", k, rr->generic.size, t);
if (r < 0)
return NULL;
@@ -1109,6 +1118,7 @@ bool dns_txt_item_equal(DnsTxtItem *a, DnsTxtItem *b) {
}
static const char* const dnssec_algorithm_table[_DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_MAX_DEFINED] = {
+ /* Mnemonics as listed on https://www.iana.org/assignments/dns-sec-alg-numbers/dns-sec-alg-numbers.xhtml */
[DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_RSAMD5] = "RSAMD5",
[DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_DH] = "DH",
[DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_DSA] = "DSA",
@@ -1118,14 +1128,20 @@ static const char* const dnssec_algorithm_table[_DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_MAX_DEFINED] =
[DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_RSASHA1_NSEC3_SHA1] = "RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1",
[DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_RSASHA256] = "RSASHA256",
[DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_RSASHA512] = "RSASHA512",
+ [DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_ECC_GOST] = "ECC-GOST",
+ [DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_ECDSAP256SHA256] = "ECDSAP256SHA256",
+ [DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_ECDSAP384SHA384] = "ECDSAP384SHA384",
[DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_INDIRECT] = "INDIRECT",
[DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_PRIVATEDNS] = "PRIVATEDNS",
[DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_PRIVATEOID] = "PRIVATEOID",
};
-DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(dnssec_algorithm, int);
+DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP_WITH_FALLBACK(dnssec_algorithm, int, 255);
static const char* const dnssec_digest_table[_DNSSEC_DIGEST_MAX_DEFINED] = {
- [DNSSEC_DIGEST_SHA1] = "SHA1",
- [DNSSEC_DIGEST_SHA256] = "SHA256",
+ /* Names as listed on https://www.iana.org/assignments/ds-rr-types/ds-rr-types.xhtml */
+ [DNSSEC_DIGEST_SHA1] = "SHA-1",
+ [DNSSEC_DIGEST_SHA256] = "SHA-256",
+ [DNSSEC_DIGEST_GOST_R_34_11_94] = "GOST_R_34.11-94",
+ [DNSSEC_DIGEST_SHA384] = "SHA-384",
};
-DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(dnssec_digest, int);
+DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP_WITH_FALLBACK(dnssec_digest, int, 255);
diff --git a/src/resolve/resolved-dns-rr.h b/src/resolve/resolved-dns-rr.h
index fccc4dba6a..90c3629166 100644
--- a/src/resolve/resolved-dns-rr.h
+++ b/src/resolve/resolved-dns-rr.h
@@ -51,8 +51,9 @@ enum {
DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_RSASHA1,
DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_DSA_NSEC3_SHA1,
DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_RSASHA1_NSEC3_SHA1,
- DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_RSASHA256 = 8, /* RFC 5702 */
- DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_RSASHA512 = 10, /* RFC 5702 */
+ DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_RSASHA256 = 8, /* RFC 5702 */
+ DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_RSASHA512 = 10, /* RFC 5702 */
+ DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_ECC_GOST = 12, /* RFC 5933 */
DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_ECDSAP256SHA256 = 13, /* RFC 6605 */
DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_ECDSAP384SHA384 = 14, /* RFC 6605 */
DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_INDIRECT = 252,
@@ -65,11 +66,19 @@ enum {
* https://www.iana.org/assignments/ds-rr-types/ds-rr-types.xhtml */
enum {
DNSSEC_DIGEST_SHA1 = 1,
- DNSSEC_DIGEST_SHA256 = 2,
- DNSSEC_DIGEST_SHA384 = 4,
+ DNSSEC_DIGEST_SHA256 = 2, /* RFC 4509 */
+ DNSSEC_DIGEST_GOST_R_34_11_94 = 3, /* RFC 5933 */
+ DNSSEC_DIGEST_SHA384 = 4, /* RFC 6605 */
_DNSSEC_DIGEST_MAX_DEFINED
};
+/* DNSSEC NSEC3 hash algorithms, see
+ * https://www.iana.org/assignments/dnssec-nsec3-parameters/dnssec-nsec3-parameters.xhtml */
+enum {
+ NSEC3_ALGORITHM_SHA1 = 1,
+ _NSEC3_ALGORITHM_MAX_DEFINED
+};
+
struct DnsResourceKey {
unsigned n_ref;
uint16_t class, type;
@@ -155,6 +164,7 @@ struct DnsResourceRecord {
char *exchange;
} mx;
+ /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc1876 */
struct {
uint8_t version;
uint8_t size;
@@ -165,14 +175,6 @@ struct DnsResourceRecord {
uint32_t altitude;
} loc;
- struct {
- uint16_t key_tag;
- uint8_t algorithm;
- uint8_t digest_type;
- void *digest;
- size_t digest_size;
- } ds;
-
/* https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4255#section-3.1 */
struct {
uint8_t algorithm;
@@ -210,6 +212,15 @@ struct DnsResourceRecord {
Bitmap *types;
} nsec;
+ /* https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4034#section-5.1 */
+ struct {
+ uint16_t key_tag;
+ uint8_t algorithm;
+ uint8_t digest_type;
+ void *digest;
+ size_t digest_size;
+ } ds;
+
struct {
uint8_t algorithm;
uint8_t flags;
@@ -268,8 +279,8 @@ bool dns_txt_item_equal(DnsTxtItem *a, DnsTxtItem *b);
extern const struct hash_ops dns_resource_key_hash_ops;
-const char* dnssec_algorithm_to_string(int i) _const_;
+int dnssec_algorithm_to_string_alloc(int i, char **ret);
int dnssec_algorithm_from_string(const char *s) _pure_;
-const char *dnssec_digest_to_string(int i) _const_;
+int dnssec_digest_to_string_alloc(int i, char **ret);
int dnssec_digest_from_string(const char *s) _pure_;
diff --git a/src/resolve/resolved-dns-server.c b/src/resolve/resolved-dns-server.c
index a57385d47d..fbd1c27c14 100644
--- a/src/resolve/resolved-dns-server.c
+++ b/src/resolve/resolved-dns-server.c
@@ -253,7 +253,7 @@ void dns_server_packet_received(DnsServer *s, DnsServerFeatureLevel level, usec_
if (s->max_rtt < rtt) {
s->max_rtt = rtt;
- s->resend_timeout = MIN(MAX(DNS_TIMEOUT_MIN_USEC, s->max_rtt * 2), DNS_TIMEOUT_MAX_USEC);
+ s->resend_timeout = CLAMP(s->max_rtt * 2, DNS_TIMEOUT_MIN_USEC, DNS_TIMEOUT_MAX_USEC);
}
}
diff --git a/src/resolve/resolved-dns-transaction.c b/src/resolve/resolved-dns-transaction.c
index fb95554db3..f7671e070f 100644
--- a/src/resolve/resolved-dns-transaction.c
+++ b/src/resolve/resolved-dns-transaction.c
@@ -588,6 +588,11 @@ void dns_transaction_process_reply(DnsTransaction *t, DnsPacket *p) {
break;
case DNS_PROTOCOL_DNS:
+ /* Note that we do not need to verify the
+ * addresses/port numbers of incoming traffic, as we
+ * invoked connect() on our UDP socket in which case
+ * the kernel already does the needed verification for
+ * us. */
break;
default:
@@ -887,7 +892,7 @@ static int dns_transaction_prepare(DnsTransaction *t, usec_t ts) {
/* Check the trust anchor. Do so only on classic DNS, since DNSSEC does not apply otherwise. */
if (t->scope->protocol == DNS_PROTOCOL_DNS) {
- r = dns_trust_anchor_lookup(&t->scope->manager->trust_anchor, t->key, &t->answer);
+ r = dns_trust_anchor_lookup_positive(&t->scope->manager->trust_anchor, t->key, &t->answer);
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (r > 0) {
@@ -1265,7 +1270,7 @@ static int dns_transaction_request_dnssec_rr(DnsTransaction *t, DnsResourceKey *
return 0;
/* Try to get the data from the trust anchor */
- r = dns_trust_anchor_lookup(&t->scope->manager->trust_anchor, key, &a);
+ r = dns_trust_anchor_lookup_positive(&t->scope->manager->trust_anchor, key, &a);
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (r > 0) {
@@ -1323,6 +1328,14 @@ static int dns_transaction_has_unsigned_negative_answer(DnsTransaction *t) {
if (r > 0)
return false;
+ /* Is this key explicitly listed as a negative trust anchor?
+ * If so, it's nothing we need to care about */
+ r = dns_trust_anchor_lookup_negative(&t->scope->manager->trust_anchor, DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(t->key));
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+ if (r > 0)
+ return false;
+
/* The answer does not contain any RRs that match to the
* question. If so, let's see if there are any NSEC/NSEC3 RRs
* included. If not, the answer is unsigned. */
@@ -1407,6 +1420,13 @@ int dns_transaction_request_dnssec_keys(DnsTransaction *t) {
if (dns_type_is_pseudo(rr->key->type))
continue;
+ /* If this RR is in the negative trust anchor, we don't need to validate it. */
+ r = dns_trust_anchor_lookup_negative(&t->scope->manager->trust_anchor, DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(rr->key));
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+ if (r > 0)
+ continue;
+
switch (rr->key->type) {
case DNS_TYPE_RRSIG: {
@@ -1751,6 +1771,12 @@ static int dns_transaction_requires_rrsig(DnsTransaction *t, DnsResourceRecord *
if (dns_type_is_pseudo(rr->key->type))
return -EINVAL;
+ r = dns_trust_anchor_lookup_negative(&t->scope->manager->trust_anchor, DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(rr->key));
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+ if (r > 0)
+ return false;
+
switch (rr->key->type) {
case DNS_TYPE_RRSIG:
@@ -1888,6 +1914,12 @@ static int dns_transaction_requires_nsec(DnsTransaction *t) {
if (dns_type_is_pseudo(t->key->type))
return -EINVAL;
+ r = dns_trust_anchor_lookup_negative(&t->scope->manager->trust_anchor, DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(t->key));
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+ if (r > 0)
+ return false;
+
name = DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(t->key);
if (IN_SET(t->key->type, DNS_TYPE_SOA, DNS_TYPE_NS, DNS_TYPE_DS)) {
@@ -1939,6 +1971,12 @@ static int dns_transaction_dnskey_authenticated(DnsTransaction *t, DnsResourceRe
* the specified RRset is authenticated (i.e. has a matching
* DS RR). */
+ r = dns_trust_anchor_lookup_negative(&t->scope->manager->trust_anchor, DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(rr->key));
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+ if (r > 0)
+ return false;
+
DNS_ANSWER_FOREACH(rrsig, t->answer) {
DnsTransaction *dt;
Iterator i;
@@ -2300,6 +2338,7 @@ int dns_transaction_validate_dnssec(DnsTransaction *t) {
break;
case DNSSEC_NSEC_FOUND:
+ case DNSSEC_NSEC_CNAME:
/* NSEC says it needs to be there, but we couldn't find it? Bummer! */
t->answer_dnssec_result = DNSSEC_NSEC_MISMATCH;
break;
diff --git a/src/resolve/resolved-dns-trust-anchor.c b/src/resolve/resolved-dns-trust-anchor.c
index 208b7fefc4..03c5b9406e 100644
--- a/src/resolve/resolved-dns-trust-anchor.c
+++ b/src/resolve/resolved-dns-trust-anchor.c
@@ -20,25 +20,37 @@
***/
#include "alloc-util.h"
+#include "conf-files.h"
+#include "def.h"
+#include "dns-domain.h"
+#include "fd-util.h"
+#include "fileio.h"
+#include "hexdecoct.h"
+#include "parse-util.h"
#include "resolved-dns-trust-anchor.h"
+#include "set.h"
+#include "string-util.h"
+#include "strv.h"
-/* The DS RR from https://data.iana.org/root-anchors/root-anchors.xml */
+static const char trust_anchor_dirs[] = CONF_PATHS_NULSTR("systemd/dnssec-trust-anchors.d");
+
+/* The DS RR from https://data.iana.org/root-anchors/root-anchors.xml, retrieved December 2015 */
static const uint8_t root_digest[] =
{ 0x49, 0xAA, 0xC1, 0x1D, 0x7B, 0x6F, 0x64, 0x46, 0x70, 0x2E, 0x54, 0xA1, 0x60, 0x73, 0x71, 0x60,
0x7A, 0x1A, 0x41, 0x85, 0x52, 0x00, 0xFD, 0x2C, 0xE1, 0xCD, 0xDE, 0x32, 0xF2, 0x4E, 0x8F, 0xB5 };
-int dns_trust_anchor_load(DnsTrustAnchor *d) {
+static int dns_trust_anchor_add_builtin(DnsTrustAnchor *d) {
_cleanup_(dns_resource_record_unrefp) DnsResourceRecord *rr = NULL;
_cleanup_(dns_answer_unrefp) DnsAnswer *answer = NULL;
int r;
assert(d);
- r = hashmap_ensure_allocated(&d->by_key, &dns_resource_key_hash_ops);
+ r = hashmap_ensure_allocated(&d->positive_by_key, &dns_resource_key_hash_ops);
if (r < 0)
return r;
- if (hashmap_get(d->by_key, &DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_CONST(DNS_CLASS_IN, DNS_TYPE_DS, ".")))
+ if (hashmap_get(d->positive_by_key, &DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_CONST(DNS_CLASS_IN, DNS_TYPE_DS, ".")))
return 0;
/* Add the RR from https://data.iana.org/root-anchors/root-anchors.xml */
@@ -62,11 +74,297 @@ int dns_trust_anchor_load(DnsTrustAnchor *d) {
if (r < 0)
return r;
- r = hashmap_put(d->by_key, rr->key, answer);
+ r = hashmap_put(d->positive_by_key, rr->key, answer);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ answer = NULL;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int dns_trust_anchor_load_positive(DnsTrustAnchor *d, const char *path, unsigned line, const char *s) {
+ _cleanup_(dns_resource_record_unrefp) DnsResourceRecord *rr = NULL;
+ _cleanup_free_ char *domain = NULL, *class = NULL, *type = NULL;
+ _cleanup_(dns_answer_unrefp) DnsAnswer *answer = NULL;
+ DnsAnswer *old_answer = NULL;
+ const char *p = s;
+ int r;
+
+ assert(d);
+ assert(line);
+
+ r = extract_first_word(&p, &domain, NULL, EXTRACT_QUOTES);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_warning_errno(r, "Unable to parse domain in line %s:%u: %m", path, line);
+
+ if (!dns_name_is_valid(domain)) {
+ log_warning("Domain name %s is invalid, at line %s:%u, ignoring line.", domain, path, line);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ r = extract_many_words(&p, NULL, 0, &class, &type, NULL);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_warning_errno(r, "Unable to parse class and type in line %s:%u: %m", path, line);
+ if (r != 2) {
+ log_warning("Missing class or type in line %s:%u", path, line);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (!strcaseeq(class, "IN")) {
+ log_warning("RR class %s is not supported, ignoring line %s:%u.", class, path, line);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (strcaseeq(type, "DS")) {
+ _cleanup_free_ char *key_tag = NULL, *algorithm = NULL, *digest_type = NULL, *digest = NULL;
+ _cleanup_free_ void *dd = NULL;
+ uint16_t kt;
+ int a, dt;
+ size_t l;
+
+ r = extract_many_words(&p, NULL, 0, &key_tag, &algorithm, &digest_type, &digest, NULL);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to parse DS parameters on line %s:%u: %m", path, line);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ if (r != 4) {
+ log_warning("Missing DS parameters on line %s:%u", path, line);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ r = safe_atou16(key_tag, &kt);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to parse DS key tag %s on line %s:%u: %m", key_tag, path, line);
+
+ a = dnssec_algorithm_from_string(algorithm);
+ if (a < 0) {
+ log_warning("Failed to parse DS algorithm %s on line %s:%u", algorithm, path, line);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ dt = dnssec_digest_from_string(digest_type);
+ if (dt < 0) {
+ log_warning("Failed to parse DS digest type %s on line %s:%u", digest_type, path, line);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ r = unhexmem(digest, strlen(digest), &dd, &l);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ log_warning("Failed to parse DS digest %s on line %s:%u", digest, path, line);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ rr = dns_resource_record_new_full(DNS_CLASS_IN, DNS_TYPE_DS, domain);
+ if (!rr)
+ return log_oom();
+
+ rr->ds.key_tag = kt;
+ rr->ds.algorithm = a;
+ rr->ds.digest_type = dt;
+ rr->ds.digest_size = l;
+ rr->ds.digest = dd;
+ dd = NULL;
+
+ } else if (strcaseeq(type, "DNSKEY")) {
+ _cleanup_free_ char *flags = NULL, *protocol = NULL, *algorithm = NULL, *key = NULL;
+ _cleanup_free_ void *k = NULL;
+ uint16_t f;
+ size_t l;
+ int a;
+
+ r = extract_many_words(&p, NULL, 0, &flags, &protocol, &algorithm, &key, NULL);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to parse DNSKEY parameters on line %s:%u: %m", path, line);
+ if (r != 4) {
+ log_warning("Missing DNSKEY parameters on line %s:%u", path, line);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (!streq(protocol, "3")) {
+ log_warning("DNSKEY Protocol is not 3 on line %s:%u", path, line);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ r = safe_atou16(flags, &f);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to parse DNSKEY flags field %s on line %s:%u", flags, path, line);
+
+ a = dnssec_algorithm_from_string(algorithm);
+ if (a < 0) {
+ log_warning("Failed to parse DNSKEY algorithm %s on line %s:%u", algorithm, path, line);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ r = unbase64mem(key, strlen(key), &k, &l);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to parse DNSKEY key data %s on line %s:%u", key, path, line);
+
+ rr = dns_resource_record_new_full(DNS_CLASS_IN, DNS_TYPE_DNSKEY, domain);
+ if (!rr)
+ return log_oom();
+
+ rr->dnskey.flags = f;
+ rr->dnskey.protocol = 3;
+ rr->dnskey.algorithm = a;
+ rr->dnskey.key_size = l;
+ rr->dnskey.key = k;
+ k = NULL;
+
+ } else {
+ log_warning("RR type %s is not supported, ignoring line %s:%u.", type, path, line);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (!isempty(p)) {
+ log_warning("Trailing garbage on line %s:%u, ignoring line.", path, line);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ r = hashmap_ensure_allocated(&d->positive_by_key, &dns_resource_key_hash_ops);
if (r < 0)
return r;
+ old_answer = hashmap_get(d->positive_by_key, rr->key);
+ answer = dns_answer_ref(old_answer);
+
+ r = dns_answer_add_extend(&answer, rr, 0, DNS_ANSWER_AUTHENTICATED);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to add trust anchor RR: %m");
+
+ r = hashmap_replace(d->positive_by_key, rr->key, answer);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to add answer to trust anchor: %m");
+
+ old_answer = dns_answer_unref(old_answer);
answer = NULL;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int dns_trust_anchor_load_negative(DnsTrustAnchor *d, const char *path, unsigned line, const char *s) {
+ _cleanup_free_ char *domain = NULL;
+ const char *p = s;
+ int r;
+
+ assert(d);
+ assert(line);
+
+ r = extract_first_word(&p, &domain, NULL, EXTRACT_QUOTES);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_warning_errno(r, "Unable to parse line %s:%u: %m", path, line);
+
+ if (!dns_name_is_valid(domain)) {
+ log_warning("Domain name %s is invalid, at line %s:%u, ignoring line.", domain, path, line);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (!isempty(p)) {
+ log_warning("Trailing garbage at line %s:%u, ignoring line.", path, line);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ r = set_ensure_allocated(&d->negative_by_name, &dns_name_hash_ops);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ r = set_put(d->negative_by_name, domain);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_oom();
+ if (r > 0)
+ domain = NULL;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int dns_trust_anchor_load_files(
+ DnsTrustAnchor *d,
+ const char *suffix,
+ int (*loader)(DnsTrustAnchor *d, const char *path, unsigned n, const char *line)) {
+
+ _cleanup_strv_free_ char **files = NULL;
+ char **f;
+ int r;
+
+ assert(d);
+ assert(suffix);
+ assert(loader);
+
+ r = conf_files_list_nulstr(&files, suffix, NULL, trust_anchor_dirs);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to enumerate %s trust anchor files: %m", suffix);
+
+ STRV_FOREACH(f, files) {
+ _cleanup_fclose_ FILE *g = NULL;
+ char line[LINE_MAX];
+ unsigned n = 0;
+
+ g = fopen(*f, "r");
+ if (!g) {
+ if (errno == ENOENT)
+ continue;
+
+ log_warning_errno(errno, "Failed to open %s: %m", *f);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ FOREACH_LINE(line, g, log_warning_errno(errno, "Failed to read %s, ignoring: %m", *f)) {
+ char *l;
+
+ n++;
+
+ l = strstrip(line);
+ if (isempty(l))
+ continue;
+
+ if (*l == ';')
+ continue;
+
+ (void) loader(d, *f, n, l);
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void dns_trust_anchor_dump(DnsTrustAnchor *d) {
+ DnsAnswer *a;
+ Iterator i;
+
+ assert(d);
+
+ log_info("Positive Trust Anchors:");
+ HASHMAP_FOREACH(a, d->positive_by_key, i) {
+ DnsResourceRecord *rr;
+
+ DNS_ANSWER_FOREACH(rr, a)
+ log_info("%s", dns_resource_record_to_string(rr));
+ }
+
+ if (!set_isempty(d->negative_by_name)) {
+ char *n;
+ log_info("Negative trust anchors:");
+
+ SET_FOREACH(n, d->negative_by_name, i)
+ log_info("%s%s", n, endswith(n, ".") ? "" : ".");
+ }
+}
+
+int dns_trust_anchor_load(DnsTrustAnchor *d) {
+ int r;
+
+ assert(d);
+
+ /* If loading things from disk fails, we don't consider this fatal */
+ (void) dns_trust_anchor_load_files(d, ".positive", dns_trust_anchor_load_positive);
+ (void) dns_trust_anchor_load_files(d, ".negative", dns_trust_anchor_load_negative);
+
+ /* However, if the built-in DS fails, then we have a problem. */
+ r = dns_trust_anchor_add_builtin(d);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to add trust anchor built-in: %m");
+
+ dns_trust_anchor_dump(d);
+
return 0;
}
@@ -75,13 +373,14 @@ void dns_trust_anchor_flush(DnsTrustAnchor *d) {
assert(d);
- while ((a = hashmap_steal_first(d->by_key)))
+ while ((a = hashmap_steal_first(d->positive_by_key)))
dns_answer_unref(a);
- d->by_key = hashmap_free(d->by_key);
+ d->positive_by_key = hashmap_free(d->positive_by_key);
+ d->negative_by_name = set_free_free(d->negative_by_name);
}
-int dns_trust_anchor_lookup(DnsTrustAnchor *d, DnsResourceKey *key, DnsAnswer **ret) {
+int dns_trust_anchor_lookup_positive(DnsTrustAnchor *d, const DnsResourceKey *key, DnsAnswer **ret) {
DnsAnswer *a;
assert(d);
@@ -92,10 +391,17 @@ int dns_trust_anchor_lookup(DnsTrustAnchor *d, DnsResourceKey *key, DnsAnswer **
if (!IN_SET(key->type, DNS_TYPE_DS, DNS_TYPE_DNSKEY))
return 0;
- a = hashmap_get(d->by_key, key);
+ a = hashmap_get(d->positive_by_key, key);
if (!a)
return 0;
*ret = dns_answer_ref(a);
return 1;
}
+
+int dns_trust_anchor_lookup_negative(DnsTrustAnchor *d, const char *name) {
+ assert(d);
+ assert(name);
+
+ return set_contains(d->negative_by_name, name);
+}
diff --git a/src/resolve/resolved-dns-trust-anchor.h b/src/resolve/resolved-dns-trust-anchor.h
index 06f3723914..1140cde041 100644
--- a/src/resolve/resolved-dns-trust-anchor.h
+++ b/src/resolve/resolved-dns-trust-anchor.h
@@ -30,10 +30,12 @@ typedef struct DnsTrustAnchor DnsTrustAnchor;
/* This contains a fixed database mapping domain names to DS or DNSKEY records. */
struct DnsTrustAnchor {
- Hashmap *by_key;
+ Hashmap *positive_by_key;
+ Set *negative_by_name;
};
int dns_trust_anchor_load(DnsTrustAnchor *d);
void dns_trust_anchor_flush(DnsTrustAnchor *d);
-int dns_trust_anchor_lookup(DnsTrustAnchor *d, DnsResourceKey* key, DnsAnswer **answer);
+int dns_trust_anchor_lookup_positive(DnsTrustAnchor *d, const DnsResourceKey* key, DnsAnswer **answer);
+int dns_trust_anchor_lookup_negative(DnsTrustAnchor *d, const char *name);
generated by cgit v1.2.3-54-g00ecf (git 2.45.2) at 2024-11-05 07:58:21 +0000