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-rw-r--r--TODO5
-rw-r--r--man/crypttab.xml11
-rw-r--r--man/machinectl.xml2
-rw-r--r--man/sd_journal_stream_fd.xml2
-rw-r--r--man/systemctl.xml2
-rw-r--r--man/systemd-escape.xml13
-rw-r--r--man/systemd-machine-id-setup.xml4
-rw-r--r--man/systemd-socket-activate.xml2
-rw-r--r--man/systemd-system.conf.xml2
-rw-r--r--man/systemd.exec.xml107
-rw-r--r--man/systemd.offline-updates.xml2
-rw-r--r--man/systemd.target.xml2
-rw-r--r--man/tmpfiles.d.xml2
-rw-r--r--src/basic/mount-util.c1
-rw-r--r--src/basic/path-util.c10
-rw-r--r--src/core/execute.c98
-rw-r--r--src/cryptsetup/cryptsetup.c14
-rw-r--r--src/shared/seccomp-util.c178
-rw-r--r--src/shared/seccomp-util.h2
-rw-r--r--src/systemctl/systemctl.c2
-rw-r--r--src/test/test-path-util.c41
-rw-r--r--src/test/test-seccomp.c33
-rw-r--r--src/test/test-unit-file.c2
-rw-r--r--src/udev/udev-builtin-net_id.c30
24 files changed, 396 insertions, 171 deletions
diff --git a/TODO b/TODO
index 7e21c3e8d5..c8266a549d 100644
--- a/TODO
+++ b/TODO
@@ -32,6 +32,11 @@ Janitorial Clean-ups:
Features:
+* drop nss-myhostname in favour of nss-resolve?
+
+* drop internal dlopen() based nss-dns fallback in nss-resolve, and rely on the
+ external nsswitch.conf based one
+
* add a percentage syntax for TimeoutStopSec=, e.g. TimeoutStopSec=150%, and
then use that for the setting used in user@.service. It should be understood
relative to the configured default value.
diff --git a/man/crypttab.xml b/man/crypttab.xml
index 4b8d4aa3d6..17976f3704 100644
--- a/man/crypttab.xml
+++ b/man/crypttab.xml
@@ -327,6 +327,17 @@
</varlistentry>
<varlistentry>
+ <term><option>tcrypt-veracrypt</option></term>
+
+ <listitem><para>Check for a VeraCrypt volume. VeraCrypt is a fork of
+ TrueCrypt that is mostly compatible, but uses different, stronger key
+ derivation algorithms that cannot be detected without this flag.
+ Enabling this option could substantially slow down unlocking, because
+ VeraCrypt's key derivation takes much longer than TrueCrypt's. This
+ option implies <option>tcrypt</option>.</para></listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
+ <varlistentry>
<term><option>timeout=</option></term>
<listitem><para>Specifies the timeout for querying for a
diff --git a/man/machinectl.xml b/man/machinectl.xml
index 0d57c01765..5a6ec294d2 100644
--- a/man/machinectl.xml
+++ b/man/machinectl.xml
@@ -188,7 +188,7 @@
<listitem><para>When used with the <command>shell</command> command, chooses the user ID to
open the interactive shell session as. If the argument to the <command>shell</command>
- command also specifies an user name, this option is ignored. If the name is not specified
+ command also specifies a user name, this option is ignored. If the name is not specified
in either way, <literal>root</literal> will be used by default. Note that this switch is
not supported for the <command>login</command> command (see below).</para></listitem>
</varlistentry>
diff --git a/man/sd_journal_stream_fd.xml b/man/sd_journal_stream_fd.xml
index 226298ae1b..db88eba1bc 100644
--- a/man/sd_journal_stream_fd.xml
+++ b/man/sd_journal_stream_fd.xml
@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@
<refsect1>
<title>Notes</title>
- <para>Function <function>sd_journal_stream_fd()</function> is thread-safe and may be be called
+ <para>Function <function>sd_journal_stream_fd()</function> is thread-safe and may be called
from multiple threads. All calls will return the same file descriptor, although temporarily
multiple file descriptors may be open.</para>
diff --git a/man/systemctl.xml b/man/systemctl.xml
index 225eb06d8b..ae3296d132 100644
--- a/man/systemctl.xml
+++ b/man/systemctl.xml
@@ -1265,7 +1265,7 @@ kobject-uevent 1 systemd-udevd-kernel.socket systemd-udevd.service
<literal>foo.service.d/</literal> with all their contained files are removed, both below the persistent and
runtime configuration directories (i.e. below <filename>/etc/systemd/system</filename> and
<filename>/run/systemd/system</filename>); if the unit file has a vendor-supplied version (i.e. a unit file
- located below <filename>/usr</filename>) any matching peristent or runtime unit file that overrides it is
+ located below <filename>/usr</filename>) any matching persistent or runtime unit file that overrides it is
removed, too. Note that if a unit file has no vendor-supplied version (i.e. is only defined below
<filename>/etc/systemd/system</filename> or <filename>/run/systemd/system</filename>, but not in a unit
file stored below <filename>/usr</filename>), then it is not removed. Also, if a unit is masked, it is
diff --git a/man/systemd-escape.xml b/man/systemd-escape.xml
index dbb3869a24..5e95e22536 100644
--- a/man/systemd-escape.xml
+++ b/man/systemd-escape.xml
@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@
<listitem><para>Inserts the escaped strings in a unit name
template. Takes a unit name template such as
- <filename>foobar@.service</filename> May not be used in
+ <filename>foobar@.service</filename>. May not be used in
conjunction with <option>--suffix=</option>,
<option>--unescape</option> or
<option>--mangle</option>.</para></listitem>
@@ -108,9 +108,10 @@
<term><option>-p</option></term>
<listitem><para>When escaping or unescaping a string, assume
- it refers to a file system path. This enables special
- processing of the initial <literal>/</literal> of the
- path.</para></listitem>
+ it refers to a file system path. This eliminates leading,
+ trailing or duplicate <literal>/</literal> characters
+ and rejects <literal>.</literal> and <literal>..</literal>
+ path components.</para></listitem>
</varlistentry>
<varlistentry>
@@ -143,7 +144,7 @@
<refsect1>
<title>Examples</title>
- <para>Escape a single string:</para>
+ <para>To escape a single string:</para>
<programlisting>$ systemd-escape 'Hallöchen, Meister'
Hall\xc3\xb6chen\x2c\x20Meister</programlisting>
@@ -155,7 +156,7 @@ Hallöchen, Meister</programlisting>
<programlisting>$ systemd-escape -p --suffix=mount "/tmp//waldi/foobar/"
tmp-waldi-foobar.mount</programlisting>
- <para>To generate instance names of three strings</para>
+ <para>To generate instance names of three strings:</para>
<programlisting>$ systemd-escape --template=systemd-nspawn@.service 'My Container 1' 'containerb' 'container/III'
systemd-nspawn@My\x20Container\x201.service systemd-nspawn@containerb.service systemd-nspawn@container-III.service</programlisting>
</refsect1>
diff --git a/man/systemd-machine-id-setup.xml b/man/systemd-machine-id-setup.xml
index 749987a937..944e899bd4 100644
--- a/man/systemd-machine-id-setup.xml
+++ b/man/systemd-machine-id-setup.xml
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@
<filename>/etc/machine-id</filename>.</para></listitem>
<listitem><para>If run inside a KVM virtual machine and a UUID
- is was configured (via the <option>-uuid</option>
+ is configured (via the <option>-uuid</option>
option), this UUID is used to initialize the machine ID. The
caller must ensure that the UUID passed is sufficiently unique
and is different for every booted instance of the
@@ -154,7 +154,7 @@
<varlistentry>
<term><option>--print</option></term>
- <listitem><para>Print the machine ID generated or commited after the operation is complete.</para></listitem>
+ <listitem><para>Print the machine ID generated or committed after the operation is complete.</para></listitem>
</varlistentry>
<xi:include href="standard-options.xml" xpointer="help" />
diff --git a/man/systemd-socket-activate.xml b/man/systemd-socket-activate.xml
index 2cf3a7d377..1c0619a840 100644
--- a/man/systemd-socket-activate.xml
+++ b/man/systemd-socket-activate.xml
@@ -142,7 +142,7 @@
<varname>FileDescriptorName=</varname> in socket unit files, and enables use of
<citerefentry><refentrytitle>sd_listen_fds_with_names</refentrytitle><manvolnum>3</manvolnum></citerefentry>.
Multiple entries may be specifies using separate options or by separating names with colons
- (<literal>:</literal>) in one option. In case more names are given than descriptors, superfluous ones willl be
+ (<literal>:</literal>) in one option. In case more names are given than descriptors, superfluous ones will be
ignored. In case less names are given than descriptors, the remaining file descriptors will be unnamed.
</para></listitem>
</varlistentry>
diff --git a/man/systemd-system.conf.xml b/man/systemd-system.conf.xml
index 80cad7f09c..e4e81f7f2e 100644
--- a/man/systemd-system.conf.xml
+++ b/man/systemd-system.conf.xml
@@ -330,7 +330,7 @@
<varname>TasksAccounting=</varname>. See
<citerefentry><refentrytitle>systemd.resource-control</refentrytitle><manvolnum>5</manvolnum></citerefentry>
for details on the per-unit
- settings. <varname>DefaulTasksAccounting=</varname> defaults
+ settings. <varname>DefaultTasksAccounting=</varname> defaults
to on, the other three settings to off.</para></listitem>
</varlistentry>
diff --git a/man/systemd.exec.xml b/man/systemd.exec.xml
index 54ec7e29ca..3c350df11f 100644
--- a/man/systemd.exec.xml
+++ b/man/systemd.exec.xml
@@ -1090,7 +1090,7 @@
mechanism. Almost no services need to write to these at runtime; it is hence recommended to turn this on for
most services. For this setting the same restrictions regarding mount propagation and privileges apply as for
<varname>ReadOnlyPaths=</varname> and related calls, see above. Defaults to off.
- Note that this option does not prevent kernel tuning through IPC interfaces and exeternal programs. However
+ Note that this option does not prevent kernel tuning through IPC interfaces and external programs. However
<varname>InaccessiblePaths=</varname> can be used to make some IPC file system objects
inaccessible.</para></listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -1255,30 +1255,28 @@
<varlistentry>
<term><varname>SystemCallFilter=</varname></term>
- <listitem><para>Takes a space-separated list of system call
- names. If this setting is used, all system calls executed by
- the unit processes except for the listed ones will result in
- immediate process termination with the
- <constant>SIGSYS</constant> signal (whitelisting). If the
- first character of the list is <literal>~</literal>, the
- effect is inverted: only the listed system calls will result
- in immediate process termination (blacklisting). If running in
- user mode, or in system mode, but without the
- <constant>CAP_SYS_ADMIN</constant> capability (e.g. setting
- <varname>User=nobody</varname>),
- <varname>NoNewPrivileges=yes</varname> is implied. This
- feature makes use of the Secure Computing Mode 2 interfaces of
- the kernel ('seccomp filtering') and is useful for enforcing a
- minimal sandboxing environment. Note that the
- <function>execve</function>,
- <function>rt_sigreturn</function>,
- <function>sigreturn</function>,
- <function>exit_group</function>, <function>exit</function>
- system calls are implicitly whitelisted and do not need to be
- listed explicitly. This option may be specified more than once,
- in which case the filter masks are merged. If the empty string
- is assigned, the filter is reset, all prior assignments will
- have no effect. This does not affect commands prefixed with <literal>+</literal>.</para>
+ <listitem><para>Takes a space-separated list of system call names. If this setting is used, all system calls
+ executed by the unit processes except for the listed ones will result in immediate process termination with the
+ <constant>SIGSYS</constant> signal (whitelisting). If the first character of the list is <literal>~</literal>,
+ the effect is inverted: only the listed system calls will result in immediate process termination
+ (blacklisting). If running in user mode, or in system mode, but without the <constant>CAP_SYS_ADMIN</constant>
+ capability (e.g. setting <varname>User=nobody</varname>), <varname>NoNewPrivileges=yes</varname> is
+ implied. This feature makes use of the Secure Computing Mode 2 interfaces of the kernel ('seccomp filtering')
+ and is useful for enforcing a minimal sandboxing environment. Note that the <function>execve</function>,
+ <function>exit</function>, <function>exit_group</function>, <function>getrlimit</function>,
+ <function>rt_sigreturn</function>, <function>sigreturn</function> system calls and the system calls for
+ querying time and sleeping are implicitly whitelisted and do not need to be listed explicitly. This option may
+ be specified more than once, in which case the filter masks are merged. If the empty string is assigned, the
+ filter is reset, all prior assignments will have no effect. This does not affect commands prefixed with
+ <literal>+</literal>.</para>
+
+ <para>Note that strict system call filters may impact execution and error handling code paths of the service
+ invocation. Specifically, access to the <function>execve</function> system call is required for the execution
+ of the service binary — if it is blocked service invocation will necessarily fail. Also, if execution of the
+ service binary fails for some reason (for example: missing service executable), the error handling logic might
+ require access to an additional set of system calls in order to process and log this failure correctly. It
+ might be necessary to temporarily disable system call filters in order to simplify debugging of such
+ failures.</para>
<para>If you specify both types of this option (i.e.
whitelisting and blacklisting), the first encountered will
@@ -1312,6 +1310,10 @@
</thead>
<tbody>
<row>
+ <entry>@basic-io</entry>
+ <entry>System calls for basic I/O: reading, writing, seeking, file descriptor duplication and closing (<citerefentry project='man-pages'><refentrytitle>read</refentrytitle><manvolnum>2</manvolnum></citerefentry>, <citerefentry project='man-pages'><refentrytitle>write</refentrytitle><manvolnum>2</manvolnum></citerefentry>, and related calls)</entry>
+ </row>
+ <row>
<entry>@clock</entry>
<entry>System calls for changing the system clock (<citerefentry project='man-pages'><refentrytitle>adjtimex</refentrytitle><manvolnum>2</manvolnum></citerefentry>, <citerefentry project='man-pages'><refentrytitle>settimeofday</refentrytitle><manvolnum>2</manvolnum></citerefentry>, and related calls)</entry>
</row>
@@ -1329,7 +1331,7 @@
</row>
<row>
<entry>@ipc</entry>
- <entry>SysV IPC, POSIX Message Queues or other IPC (<citerefentry project='man-pages'><refentrytitle>mq_overview</refentrytitle><manvolnum>7</manvolnum></citerefentry>, <citerefentry project='man-pages'><refentrytitle>svipc</refentrytitle><manvolnum>7</manvolnum></citerefentry>)</entry>
+ <entry>Pipes, SysV IPC, POSIX Message Queues and other IPC (<citerefentry project='man-pages'><refentrytitle>mq_overview</refentrytitle><manvolnum>7</manvolnum></citerefentry>, <citerefentry project='man-pages'><refentrytitle>svipc</refentrytitle><manvolnum>7</manvolnum></citerefentry>)</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>@keyring</entry>
@@ -1357,17 +1359,21 @@
</row>
<row>
<entry>@process</entry>
- <entry>Process control, execution, namespaces (<citerefentry project='man-pages'><refentrytitle>execve</refentrytitle><manvolnum>2</manvolnum></citerefentry>, <citerefentry project='man-pages'><refentrytitle>kill</refentrytitle><manvolnum>2</manvolnum></citerefentry>, <citerefentry project='man-pages'><refentrytitle>namespaces</refentrytitle><manvolnum>7</manvolnum></citerefentry>, …</entry>
+ <entry>Process control, execution, namespaces (<citerefentry project='man-pages'><refentrytitle>clone</refentrytitle><manvolnum>2</manvolnum></citerefentry>, <citerefentry project='man-pages'><refentrytitle>kill</refentrytitle><manvolnum>2</manvolnum></citerefentry>, <citerefentry project='man-pages'><refentrytitle>namespaces</refentrytitle><manvolnum>7</manvolnum></citerefentry>, …</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>@raw-io</entry>
- <entry>Raw I/O port access (<citerefentry project='man-pages'><refentrytitle>ioperm</refentrytitle><manvolnum>2</manvolnum></citerefentry>, <citerefentry project='man-pages'><refentrytitle>iopl</refentrytitle><manvolnum>2</manvolnum></citerefentry>, <function>pciconfig_read()</function>, …</entry>
+ <entry>Raw I/O port access (<citerefentry project='man-pages'><refentrytitle>ioperm</refentrytitle><manvolnum>2</manvolnum></citerefentry>, <citerefentry project='man-pages'><refentrytitle>iopl</refentrytitle><manvolnum>2</manvolnum></citerefentry>, <function>pciconfig_read()</function>, …)</entry>
+ </row>
+ <row>
+ <entry>@resources</entry>
+ <entry>System calls for changing resource limits, memory and scheduling parameters (<citerefentry project='man-pages'><refentrytitle>setrlimit</refentrytitle><manvolnum>2</manvolnum></citerefentry>, <citerefentry project='man-pages'><refentrytitle>setpriority</refentrytitle><manvolnum>2</manvolnum></citerefentry>, …)</entry>
</row>
</tbody>
</tgroup>
</table>
- Note, that as new system calls are added to the kernel, additional system calls might be added to the groups
+ Note that as new system calls are added to the kernel, additional system calls might be added to the groups
above, so the contents of the sets may change between systemd versions.</para>
<para>It is recommended to combine the file system namespacing related options with
@@ -1396,28 +1402,25 @@
<varlistentry>
<term><varname>SystemCallArchitectures=</varname></term>
- <listitem><para>Takes a space-separated list of architecture
- identifiers to include in the system call filter. The known
- architecture identifiers are <constant>x86</constant>,
- <constant>x86-64</constant>, <constant>x32</constant>,
- <constant>arm</constant>, <constant>s390</constant>,
- <constant>s390x</constant> as well as the special identifier
- <constant>native</constant>. Only system calls of the
- specified architectures will be permitted to processes of this
- unit. This is an effective way to disable compatibility with
- non-native architectures for processes, for example to
- prohibit execution of 32-bit x86 binaries on 64-bit x86-64
- systems. The special <constant>native</constant> identifier
- implicitly maps to the native architecture of the system (or
- more strictly: to the architecture the system manager is
- compiled for). If running in user mode, or in system mode,
- but without the <constant>CAP_SYS_ADMIN</constant>
- capability (e.g. setting <varname>User=nobody</varname>),
- <varname>NoNewPrivileges=yes</varname> is implied. Note
- that setting this option to a non-empty list implies that
- <constant>native</constant> is included too. By default, this
- option is set to the empty list, i.e. no architecture system
- call filtering is applied.</para></listitem>
+ <listitem><para>Takes a space-separated list of architecture identifiers to
+ include in the system call filter. The known architecture identifiers are the same
+ as for <varname>ConditionArchitecture=</varname> described in
+ <citerefentry><refentrytitle>systemd.unit</refentrytitle><manvolnum>5</manvolnum></citerefentry>,
+ as well as <constant>x32</constant>, <constant>mips64-n32</constant>,
+ <constant>mips64-le-n32</constant>, and the special identifier
+ <constant>native</constant>. Only system calls of the specified architectures will
+ be permitted to processes of this unit. This is an effective way to disable
+ compatibility with non-native architectures for processes, for example to prohibit
+ execution of 32-bit x86 binaries on 64-bit x86-64 systems. The special
+ <constant>native</constant> identifier implicitly maps to the native architecture
+ of the system (or more strictly: to the architecture the system manager is
+ compiled for). If running in user mode, or in system mode, but without the
+ <constant>CAP_SYS_ADMIN</constant> capability (e.g. setting
+ <varname>User=nobody</varname>), <varname>NoNewPrivileges=yes</varname> is
+ implied. Note that setting this option to a non-empty list implies that
+ <constant>native</constant> is included too. By default, this option is set to the
+ empty list, i.e. no architecture system call filtering is applied.
+ </para></listitem>
</varlistentry>
<varlistentry>
@@ -1464,7 +1467,7 @@
<listitem><para>Takes a boolean argument. If true, explicit module loading will
be denied. This allows to turn off module load and unload operations on modular
- kernels. It is recomended to turn this on for most services that do not need special
+ kernels. It is recommended to turn this on for most services that do not need special
file systems or extra kernel modules to work. Default to off. Enabling this option
removes <constant>CAP_SYS_MODULE</constant> from the capability bounding set for
the unit, and installs a system call filter to block module system calls,
diff --git a/man/systemd.offline-updates.xml b/man/systemd.offline-updates.xml
index f404c8d72f..07a5225512 100644
--- a/man/systemd.offline-updates.xml
+++ b/man/systemd.offline-updates.xml
@@ -143,7 +143,7 @@
<varname>FailureAction=</varname> makes sure that the specified unit is activated if your
script exits uncleanly (by non-zero error code, or signal/coredump). If your script succeeds
you should trigger the reboot in your own code, for example by invoking logind's
- <command>Reboot()</command> call or calling <command>systemct reboot</command>. See
+ <command>Reboot()</command> call or calling <command>systemctl reboot</command>. See
<ulink url="http://www.freedesktop.org/wiki/Software/systemd/logind">logind dbus API</ulink>
for details.</para>
</listitem>
diff --git a/man/systemd.target.xml b/man/systemd.target.xml
index 2e35e54fc4..b3cccd4e52 100644
--- a/man/systemd.target.xml
+++ b/man/systemd.target.xml
@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@
<title>Automatic Dependencies</title>
<para>Unless <varname>DefaultDependencies=</varname> is set to
- <option>no</option> in either of releated units or an explicit ordering
+ <option>no</option> in either of related units or an explicit ordering
dependency is already defined, target units will implicitly complement all
configured dependencies of type <varname>Wants=</varname> or
<varname>Requires=</varname> with dependencies of type
diff --git a/man/tmpfiles.d.xml b/man/tmpfiles.d.xml
index 75fb901102..e040a1636d 100644
--- a/man/tmpfiles.d.xml
+++ b/man/tmpfiles.d.xml
@@ -644,7 +644,7 @@ d /run/uscreens 0755 root screen 10d12h
t /run/cups - - - - security.SMACK64=printing user.attr-with-spaces="foo bar"
</programlisting>
- <para>The direcory will be owned by root and have default mode. It's contents are
+ <para>The directory will be owned by root and have default mode. Its contents are
not subject to time based cleanup, but will be obliterated when
<command>systemd-tmpfiles --remove</command> runs.</para>
</example>
diff --git a/src/basic/mount-util.c b/src/basic/mount-util.c
index 2985cc475a..c8f8022578 100644
--- a/src/basic/mount-util.c
+++ b/src/basic/mount-util.c
@@ -525,6 +525,7 @@ bool fstype_is_network(const char *fstype) {
"glusterfs\0"
"pvfs2\0" /* OrangeFS */
"ocfs2\0"
+ "lustre\0"
;
const char *x;
diff --git a/src/basic/path-util.c b/src/basic/path-util.c
index 0f5b20cf05..fd38f51c4c 100644
--- a/src/basic/path-util.c
+++ b/src/basic/path-util.c
@@ -354,6 +354,16 @@ char* path_startswith(const char *path, const char *prefix) {
assert(path);
assert(prefix);
+ /* Returns a pointer to the start of the first component after the parts matched by
+ * the prefix, iff
+ * - both paths are absolute or both paths are relative,
+ * and
+ * - each component in prefix in turn matches a component in path at the same position.
+ * An empty string will be returned when the prefix and path are equivalent.
+ *
+ * Returns NULL otherwise.
+ */
+
if ((path[0] == '/') != (prefix[0] == '/'))
return NULL;
diff --git a/src/core/execute.c b/src/core/execute.c
index ae9df41b99..3f053602b5 100644
--- a/src/core/execute.c
+++ b/src/core/execute.c
@@ -787,6 +787,20 @@ static int get_fixed_supplementary_groups(const ExecContext *c,
assert(c);
+ /*
+ * If user is given, then lookup GID and supplementary groups list.
+ * We avoid NSS lookups for gid=0. Also we have to initialize groups
+ * as early as possible so we keep the list of supplementary groups
+ * of the caller.
+ */
+ if (user && gid_is_valid(gid) && gid != 0) {
+ /* First step, initialize groups from /etc/groups */
+ if (initgroups(user, gid) < 0)
+ return -errno;
+
+ keep_groups = true;
+ }
+
if (!c->supplementary_groups)
return 0;
@@ -803,18 +817,6 @@ static int get_fixed_supplementary_groups(const ExecContext *c,
return -EOPNOTSUPP; /* For all other values */
}
- /*
- * If user is given, then lookup GID and supplementary group list.
- * We avoid NSS lookups for gid=0.
- */
- if (user && gid_is_valid(gid) && gid != 0) {
- /* First step, initialize groups from /etc/groups */
- if (initgroups(user, gid) < 0)
- return -errno;
-
- keep_groups = true;
- }
-
l_gids = new(gid_t, ngroups_max);
if (!l_gids)
return -ENOMEM;
@@ -2538,12 +2540,6 @@ static int exec_child(
(void) umask(context->umask);
if ((params->flags & EXEC_APPLY_PERMISSIONS) && !command->privileged) {
- r = setup_smack(context, command);
- if (r < 0) {
- *exit_status = EXIT_SMACK_PROCESS_LABEL;
- return r;
- }
-
if (context->pam_name && username) {
r = setup_pam(context->pam_name, username, uid, gid, context->tty_path, &accum_env, fds, n_fds);
if (r < 0) {
@@ -2577,7 +2573,7 @@ static int exec_child(
return r;
}
- /* Drop group as early as possbile */
+ /* Drop groups as early as possbile */
if ((params->flags & EXEC_APPLY_PERMISSIONS) && !command->privileged) {
r = enforce_groups(context, gid, supplementary_gids, ngids);
if (r < 0) {
@@ -2693,6 +2689,41 @@ static int exec_child(
}
}
+ /* Apply the MAC contexts late, but before seccomp syscall filtering, as those should really be last to
+ * influence our own codepaths as little as possible. Moreover, applying MAC contexts usually requires
+ * syscalls that are subject to seccomp filtering, hence should probably be applied before the syscalls
+ * are restricted. */
+
+#ifdef HAVE_SELINUX
+ if (mac_selinux_use()) {
+ char *exec_context = mac_selinux_context_net ?: context->selinux_context;
+
+ if (exec_context) {
+ r = setexeccon(exec_context);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ *exit_status = EXIT_SELINUX_CONTEXT;
+ return r;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
+ r = setup_smack(context, command);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ *exit_status = EXIT_SMACK_PROCESS_LABEL;
+ return r;
+ }
+
+#ifdef HAVE_APPARMOR
+ if (context->apparmor_profile && mac_apparmor_use()) {
+ r = aa_change_onexec(context->apparmor_profile);
+ if (r < 0 && !context->apparmor_profile_ignore) {
+ *exit_status = EXIT_APPARMOR_PROFILE;
+ return -errno;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
/* PR_GET_SECUREBITS is not privileged, while
* PR_SET_SECUREBITS is. So to suppress
* potential EPERMs we'll try not to call
@@ -2758,6 +2789,8 @@ static int exec_child(
}
}
+ /* This really should remain the last step before the execve(), to make sure our own code is unaffected
+ * by the filter as little as possible. */
if (context_has_syscall_filters(context)) {
r = apply_seccomp(unit, context);
if (r < 0) {
@@ -2766,30 +2799,6 @@ static int exec_child(
}
}
#endif
-
-#ifdef HAVE_SELINUX
- if (mac_selinux_use()) {
- char *exec_context = mac_selinux_context_net ?: context->selinux_context;
-
- if (exec_context) {
- r = setexeccon(exec_context);
- if (r < 0) {
- *exit_status = EXIT_SELINUX_CONTEXT;
- return r;
- }
- }
- }
-#endif
-
-#ifdef HAVE_APPARMOR
- if (context->apparmor_profile && mac_apparmor_use()) {
- r = aa_change_onexec(context->apparmor_profile);
- if (r < 0 && !context->apparmor_profile_ignore) {
- *exit_status = EXIT_APPARMOR_PROFILE;
- return -errno;
- }
- }
-#endif
}
final_argv = replace_env_argv(argv, accum_env);
@@ -3611,7 +3620,8 @@ char *exec_command_line(char **argv) {
STRV_FOREACH(a, argv)
k += strlen(*a)+3;
- if (!(n = new(char, k)))
+ n = new(char, k);
+ if (!n)
return NULL;
p = n;
diff --git a/src/cryptsetup/cryptsetup.c b/src/cryptsetup/cryptsetup.c
index 9927621ea0..ff5a3f36fb 100644
--- a/src/cryptsetup/cryptsetup.c
+++ b/src/cryptsetup/cryptsetup.c
@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ static bool arg_verify = false;
static bool arg_discards = false;
static bool arg_tcrypt_hidden = false;
static bool arg_tcrypt_system = false;
+static bool arg_tcrypt_veracrypt = false;
static char **arg_tcrypt_keyfiles = NULL;
static uint64_t arg_offset = 0;
static uint64_t arg_skip = 0;
@@ -179,6 +180,14 @@ static int parse_one_option(const char *option) {
} else if (streq(option, "tcrypt-system")) {
arg_type = CRYPT_TCRYPT;
arg_tcrypt_system = true;
+ } else if (streq(option, "tcrypt-veracrypt")) {
+#ifdef CRYPT_TCRYPT_VERA_MODES
+ arg_type = CRYPT_TCRYPT;
+ arg_tcrypt_veracrypt = true;
+#else
+ log_error("This version of cryptsetup does not support tcrypt-veracrypt; refusing.");
+ return -EINVAL;
+#endif
} else if (STR_IN_SET(option, "plain", "swap", "tmp"))
arg_type = CRYPT_PLAIN;
else if (startswith(option, "timeout=")) {
@@ -441,6 +450,11 @@ static int attach_tcrypt(
if (arg_tcrypt_system)
params.flags |= CRYPT_TCRYPT_SYSTEM_HEADER;
+#ifdef CRYPT_TCRYPT_VERA_MODES
+ if (arg_tcrypt_veracrypt)
+ params.flags |= CRYPT_TCRYPT_VERA_MODES;
+#endif
+
if (key_file) {
r = read_one_line_file(key_file, &passphrase);
if (r < 0) {
diff --git a/src/shared/seccomp-util.c b/src/shared/seccomp-util.c
index 6252cd16a6..c9b24f1065 100644
--- a/src/shared/seccomp-util.c
+++ b/src/shared/seccomp-util.c
@@ -29,23 +29,49 @@
#include "util.h"
const char* seccomp_arch_to_string(uint32_t c) {
+ /* Maintain order used in <seccomp.h>.
+ *
+ * Names used here should be the same as those used for ConditionArchitecture=,
+ * except for "subarchitectures" like x32. */
- if (c == SCMP_ARCH_NATIVE)
+ switch(c) {
+ case SCMP_ARCH_NATIVE:
return "native";
- if (c == SCMP_ARCH_X86)
+ case SCMP_ARCH_X86:
return "x86";
- if (c == SCMP_ARCH_X86_64)
+ case SCMP_ARCH_X86_64:
return "x86-64";
- if (c == SCMP_ARCH_X32)
+ case SCMP_ARCH_X32:
return "x32";
- if (c == SCMP_ARCH_ARM)
+ case SCMP_ARCH_ARM:
return "arm";
- if (c == SCMP_ARCH_S390)
+ case SCMP_ARCH_AARCH64:
+ return "arm64";
+ case SCMP_ARCH_MIPS:
+ return "mips";
+ case SCMP_ARCH_MIPS64:
+ return "mips64";
+ case SCMP_ARCH_MIPS64N32:
+ return "mips64-n32";
+ case SCMP_ARCH_MIPSEL:
+ return "mips-le";
+ case SCMP_ARCH_MIPSEL64:
+ return "mips64-le";
+ case SCMP_ARCH_MIPSEL64N32:
+ return "mips64-le-n32";
+ case SCMP_ARCH_PPC:
+ return "ppc";
+ case SCMP_ARCH_PPC64:
+ return "ppc64";
+ case SCMP_ARCH_PPC64LE:
+ return "ppc64-le";
+ case SCMP_ARCH_S390:
return "s390";
- if (c == SCMP_ARCH_S390X)
+ case SCMP_ARCH_S390X:
return "s390x";
-
- return NULL;
+ default:
+ return NULL;
+ }
}
int seccomp_arch_from_string(const char *n, uint32_t *ret) {
@@ -64,6 +90,26 @@ int seccomp_arch_from_string(const char *n, uint32_t *ret) {
*ret = SCMP_ARCH_X32;
else if (streq(n, "arm"))
*ret = SCMP_ARCH_ARM;
+ else if (streq(n, "arm64"))
+ *ret = SCMP_ARCH_AARCH64;
+ else if (streq(n, "mips"))
+ *ret = SCMP_ARCH_MIPS;
+ else if (streq(n, "mips64"))
+ *ret = SCMP_ARCH_MIPS64;
+ else if (streq(n, "mips64-n32"))
+ *ret = SCMP_ARCH_MIPS64N32;
+ else if (streq(n, "mips-le"))
+ *ret = SCMP_ARCH_MIPSEL;
+ else if (streq(n, "mips64-le"))
+ *ret = SCMP_ARCH_MIPSEL64;
+ else if (streq(n, "mips64-le-n32"))
+ *ret = SCMP_ARCH_MIPSEL64N32;
+ else if (streq(n, "ppc"))
+ *ret = SCMP_ARCH_PPC;
+ else if (streq(n, "ppc64"))
+ *ret = SCMP_ARCH_PPC64;
+ else if (streq(n, "ppc64-le"))
+ *ret = SCMP_ARCH_PPC64LE;
else if (streq(n, "s390"))
*ret = SCMP_ARCH_S390;
else if (streq(n, "s390x"))
@@ -101,41 +147,52 @@ finish:
return r;
}
-int seccomp_add_secondary_archs(scmp_filter_ctx c) {
-
-#if defined(__i386__) || defined(__x86_64__)
- int r;
+int seccomp_add_secondary_archs(scmp_filter_ctx ctx) {
/* Add in all possible secondary archs we are aware of that
* this kernel might support. */
- r = seccomp_arch_add(c, SCMP_ARCH_X86);
- if (r < 0 && r != -EEXIST)
- return r;
-
- r = seccomp_arch_add(c, SCMP_ARCH_X86_64);
- if (r < 0 && r != -EEXIST)
- return r;
-
- r = seccomp_arch_add(c, SCMP_ARCH_X32);
- if (r < 0 && r != -EEXIST)
- return r;
+ static const int seccomp_arches[] = {
+#if defined(__i386__) || defined(__x86_64__)
+ SCMP_ARCH_X86,
+ SCMP_ARCH_X86_64,
+ SCMP_ARCH_X32,
+
+#elif defined(__arm__) || defined(__aarch64__)
+ SCMP_ARCH_ARM,
+ SCMP_ARCH_AARCH64,
+
+#elif defined(__arm__) || defined(__aarch64__)
+ SCMP_ARCH_ARM,
+ SCMP_ARCH_AARCH64,
+
+#elif defined(__mips__) || defined(__mips64__)
+ SCMP_ARCH_MIPS,
+ SCMP_ARCH_MIPS64,
+ SCMP_ARCH_MIPS64N32,
+ SCMP_ARCH_MIPSEL,
+ SCMP_ARCH_MIPSEL64,
+ SCMP_ARCH_MIPSEL64N32,
+
+#elif defined(__powerpc__) || defined(__powerpc64__)
+ SCMP_ARCH_PPC,
+ SCMP_ARCH_PPC64,
+ SCMP_ARCH_PPC64LE,
#elif defined(__s390__) || defined(__s390x__)
- int r;
-
- /* Add in all possible secondary archs we are aware of that
- * this kernel might support. */
-
- r = seccomp_arch_add(c, SCMP_ARCH_S390);
- if (r < 0 && r != -EEXIST)
- return r;
+ SCMP_ARCH_S390,
+ SCMP_ARCH_S390X,
+#endif
+ };
- r = seccomp_arch_add(c, SCMP_ARCH_S390X);
- if (r < 0 && r != -EEXIST)
- return r;
+ unsigned i;
+ int r;
-#endif
+ for (i = 0; i < ELEMENTSOF(seccomp_arches); i++) {
+ r = seccomp_arch_add(ctx, seccomp_arches[i]);
+ if (r < 0 && r != -EEXIST)
+ return r;
+ }
return 0;
}
@@ -160,6 +217,24 @@ bool is_seccomp_available(void) {
}
const SyscallFilterSet syscall_filter_sets[_SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_MAX] = {
+ [SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_BASIC_IO] = {
+ /* Basic IO */
+ .name = "@basic-io",
+ .value =
+ "close\0"
+ "dup2\0"
+ "dup3\0"
+ "dup\0"
+ "lseek\0"
+ "pread64\0"
+ "preadv\0"
+ "pwrite64\0"
+ "pwritev\0"
+ "read\0"
+ "readv\0"
+ "write\0"
+ "writev\0"
+ },
[SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_CLOCK] = {
/* Clock */
.name = "@clock",
@@ -196,15 +271,22 @@ const SyscallFilterSet syscall_filter_sets[_SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_MAX] = {
"sys_debug_setcontext\0"
},
[SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_DEFAULT] = {
- /* Default list */
+ /* Default list: the most basic of operations */
.name = "@default",
.value =
+ "clock_getres\0"
+ "clock_gettime\0"
+ "clock_nanosleep\0"
"execve\0"
"exit\0"
"exit_group\0"
"getrlimit\0" /* make sure processes can query stack size and such */
+ "gettimeofday\0"
+ "nanosleep\0"
+ "pause\0"
"rt_sigreturn\0"
"sigreturn\0"
+ "time\0"
},
[SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_IO_EVENT] = {
/* Event loop use */
@@ -226,9 +308,10 @@ const SyscallFilterSet syscall_filter_sets[_SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_MAX] = {
"select\0"
},
[SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_IPC] = {
- /* Message queues, SYSV IPC or other IPC: unusual */
+ /* Message queues, SYSV IPC or other IPC */
.name = "@ipc",
.value = "ipc\0"
+ "memfd_create\0"
"mq_getsetattr\0"
"mq_notify\0"
"mq_open\0"
@@ -239,6 +322,8 @@ const SyscallFilterSet syscall_filter_sets[_SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_MAX] = {
"msgget\0"
"msgrcv\0"
"msgsnd\0"
+ "pipe2\0"
+ "pipe\0"
"process_vm_readv\0"
"process_vm_writev\0"
"semctl\0"
@@ -379,7 +464,6 @@ const SyscallFilterSet syscall_filter_sets[_SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_MAX] = {
.value =
"arch_prctl\0"
"clone\0"
- "execve\0"
"execveat\0"
"fork\0"
"kill\0"
@@ -406,6 +490,22 @@ const SyscallFilterSet syscall_filter_sets[_SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_MAX] = {
"s390_pci_mmio_write\0"
#endif
},
+ [SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_RESOURCES] = {
+ /* Alter resource settings */
+ .name = "@resources",
+ .value =
+ "sched_setparam\0"
+ "sched_setscheduler\0"
+ "sched_setaffinity\0"
+ "setpriority\0"
+ "setrlimit\0"
+ "set_mempolicy\0"
+ "migrate_pages\0"
+ "move_pages\0"
+ "mbind\0"
+ "sched_setattr\0"
+ "prlimit64\0"
+ },
};
const SyscallFilterSet *syscall_filter_set_find(const char *name) {
diff --git a/src/shared/seccomp-util.h b/src/shared/seccomp-util.h
index 8050fc6fbf..8e209efef2 100644
--- a/src/shared/seccomp-util.h
+++ b/src/shared/seccomp-util.h
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ typedef struct SyscallFilterSet {
} SyscallFilterSet;
enum {
+ SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_BASIC_IO,
SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_CLOCK,
SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_CPU_EMULATION,
SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_DEBUG,
@@ -52,6 +53,7 @@ enum {
SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_PRIVILEGED,
SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_PROCESS,
SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_RAW_IO,
+ SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_RESOURCES,
_SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_MAX
};
diff --git a/src/systemctl/systemctl.c b/src/systemctl/systemctl.c
index d311bbec1a..b6d66aa363 100644
--- a/src/systemctl/systemctl.c
+++ b/src/systemctl/systemctl.c
@@ -5272,7 +5272,7 @@ static int cat(int argc, char *argv[], void *userdata) {
else
puts("");
- if (need_daemon_reload(bus, *name))
+ if (need_daemon_reload(bus, *name) > 0) /* ignore errors (<0), this is informational output */
fprintf(stderr,
"%s# Warning: %s changed on disk, the version systemd has loaded is outdated.\n"
"%s# This output shows the current version of the unit's original fragment and drop-in files.\n"
diff --git a/src/test/test-path-util.c b/src/test/test-path-util.c
index 0b10d8e25e..a6a09a0031 100644
--- a/src/test/test-path-util.c
+++ b/src/test/test-path-util.c
@@ -263,16 +263,37 @@ static void test_strv_resolve(void) {
}
static void test_path_startswith(void) {
- assert_se(path_startswith("/foo/bar/barfoo/", "/foo"));
- assert_se(path_startswith("/foo/bar/barfoo/", "/foo/"));
- assert_se(path_startswith("/foo/bar/barfoo/", "/"));
- assert_se(path_startswith("/foo/bar/barfoo/", "////"));
- assert_se(path_startswith("/foo/bar/barfoo/", "/foo//bar/////barfoo///"));
- assert_se(path_startswith("/foo/bar/barfoo/", "/foo/bar/barfoo////"));
- assert_se(path_startswith("/foo/bar/barfoo/", "/foo/bar///barfoo/"));
- assert_se(path_startswith("/foo/bar/barfoo/", "/foo////bar/barfoo/"));
- assert_se(path_startswith("/foo/bar/barfoo/", "////foo/bar/barfoo/"));
- assert_se(path_startswith("/foo/bar/barfoo/", "/foo/bar/barfoo"));
+ const char *p;
+
+ p = path_startswith("/foo/bar/barfoo/", "/foo");
+ assert_se(streq_ptr(p, "bar/barfoo/"));
+
+ p = path_startswith("/foo/bar/barfoo/", "/foo/");
+ assert_se(streq_ptr(p, "bar/barfoo/"));
+
+ p = path_startswith("/foo/bar/barfoo/", "/");
+ assert_se(streq_ptr(p, "foo/bar/barfoo/"));
+
+ p = path_startswith("/foo/bar/barfoo/", "////");
+ assert_se(streq_ptr(p, "foo/bar/barfoo/"));
+
+ p = path_startswith("/foo/bar/barfoo/", "/foo//bar/////barfoo///");
+ assert_se(streq_ptr(p, ""));
+
+ p = path_startswith("/foo/bar/barfoo/", "/foo/bar/barfoo////");
+ assert_se(streq_ptr(p, ""));
+
+ p = path_startswith("/foo/bar/barfoo/", "/foo/bar///barfoo/");
+ assert_se(streq_ptr(p, ""));
+
+ p = path_startswith("/foo/bar/barfoo/", "/foo////bar/barfoo/");
+ assert_se(streq_ptr(p, ""));
+
+ p = path_startswith("/foo/bar/barfoo/", "////foo/bar/barfoo/");
+ assert_se(streq_ptr(p, ""));
+
+ p = path_startswith("/foo/bar/barfoo/", "/foo/bar/barfoo");
+ assert_se(streq_ptr(p, ""));
assert_se(!path_startswith("/foo/bar/barfoo/", "/foo/bar/barfooa/"));
assert_se(!path_startswith("/foo/bar/barfoo/", "/foo/bar/barfooa"));
diff --git a/src/test/test-seccomp.c b/src/test/test-seccomp.c
index 0060ecdf02..43d1567288 100644
--- a/src/test/test-seccomp.c
+++ b/src/test/test-seccomp.c
@@ -25,6 +25,8 @@
#include "macro.h"
#include "process-util.h"
#include "seccomp-util.h"
+#include "string-util.h"
+#include "util.h"
static void test_seccomp_arch_to_string(void) {
uint32_t a, b;
@@ -38,6 +40,36 @@ static void test_seccomp_arch_to_string(void) {
assert_se(a == b);
}
+static void test_architecture_table(void) {
+ const char *n, *n2;
+
+ NULSTR_FOREACH(n,
+ "native\0"
+ "x86\0"
+ "x86-64\0"
+ "x32\0"
+ "arm\0"
+ "arm64\0"
+ "mips\0"
+ "mips64\0"
+ "mips64-n32\0"
+ "mips-le\0"
+ "mips64-le\0"
+ "mips64-le-n32\0"
+ "ppc\0"
+ "ppc64\0"
+ "ppc64-le\0"
+ "s390\0"
+ "s390x\0") {
+ uint32_t c;
+
+ assert_se(seccomp_arch_from_string(n, &c) >= 0);
+ n2 = seccomp_arch_to_string(c);
+ log_info("seccomp-arch: %s → 0x%"PRIx32" → %s", n, c, n2);
+ assert_se(streq_ptr(n, n2));
+ }
+}
+
static void test_syscall_filter_set_find(void) {
assert_se(!syscall_filter_set_find(NULL));
assert_se(!syscall_filter_set_find(""));
@@ -96,6 +128,7 @@ static void test_filter_sets(void) {
int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
test_seccomp_arch_to_string();
+ test_architecture_table();
test_syscall_filter_set_find();
test_filter_sets();
diff --git a/src/test/test-unit-file.c b/src/test/test-unit-file.c
index 7ef087a2e3..12f48bf435 100644
--- a/src/test/test-unit-file.c
+++ b/src/test/test-unit-file.c
@@ -589,7 +589,7 @@ static void test_install_printf(void) {
assert_se(specifier_machine_id('m', NULL, NULL, &mid) >= 0 && mid);
assert_se(specifier_boot_id('b', NULL, NULL, &bid) >= 0 && bid);
assert_se((host = gethostname_malloc()));
- assert_se((user = getusername_malloc()));
+ assert_se((user = uid_to_name(getuid())));
assert_se(asprintf(&uid, UID_FMT, getuid()) >= 0);
#define expect(src, pattern, result) \
diff --git a/src/udev/udev-builtin-net_id.c b/src/udev/udev-builtin-net_id.c
index a7be2a4eed..0eb2500dd2 100644
--- a/src/udev/udev-builtin-net_id.c
+++ b/src/udev/udev-builtin-net_id.c
@@ -35,10 +35,12 @@
* Type of names:
* b<number> — BCMA bus core number
* c<bus_id> — CCW bus group name, without leading zeros [s390]
- * o<index>[d<dev_port>] — on-board device index number
- * s<slot>[f<function>][d<dev_port>] — hotplug slot index number
+ * o<index>[n<phys_port_name>|d<dev_port>]
+ * — on-board device index number
+ * s<slot>[f<function>][n<phys_port_name>|d<dev_port>]
+ * — hotplug slot index number
* x<MAC> — MAC address
- * [P<domain>]p<bus>s<slot>[f<function>][d<dev_port>]
+ * [P<domain>]p<bus>s<slot>[f<function>][n<phys_port_name>|d<dev_port>]
* — PCI geographical location
* [P<domain>]p<bus>s<slot>[f<function>][u<port>][..][c<config>][i<interface>]
* — USB port number chain
@@ -137,7 +139,7 @@ static int dev_pci_onboard(struct udev_device *dev, struct netnames *names) {
unsigned dev_port = 0;
size_t l;
char *s;
- const char *attr;
+ const char *attr, *port_name;
int idx;
/* ACPI _DSM — device specific method for naming a PCI or PCI Express device */
@@ -164,10 +166,15 @@ static int dev_pci_onboard(struct udev_device *dev, struct netnames *names) {
if (attr)
dev_port = strtol(attr, NULL, 10);
+ /* kernel provided front panel port name for multiple port PCI device */
+ port_name = udev_device_get_sysattr_value(dev, "phys_port_name");
+
s = names->pci_onboard;
l = sizeof(names->pci_onboard);
l = strpcpyf(&s, l, "o%d", idx);
- if (dev_port > 0)
+ if (port_name)
+ l = strpcpyf(&s, l, "n%s", port_name);
+ else if (dev_port > 0)
l = strpcpyf(&s, l, "d%d", dev_port);
if (l == 0)
names->pci_onboard[0] = '\0';
@@ -202,7 +209,7 @@ static int dev_pci_slot(struct udev_device *dev, struct netnames *names) {
unsigned domain, bus, slot, func, dev_port = 0;
size_t l;
char *s;
- const char *attr;
+ const char *attr, *port_name;
struct udev_device *pci = NULL;
char slots[256], str[256];
_cleanup_closedir_ DIR *dir = NULL;
@@ -217,6 +224,9 @@ static int dev_pci_slot(struct udev_device *dev, struct netnames *names) {
if (attr)
dev_port = strtol(attr, NULL, 10);
+ /* kernel provided front panel port name for multiple port PCI device */
+ port_name = udev_device_get_sysattr_value(dev, "phys_port_name");
+
/* compose a name based on the raw kernel's PCI bus, slot numbers */
s = names->pci_path;
l = sizeof(names->pci_path);
@@ -225,7 +235,9 @@ static int dev_pci_slot(struct udev_device *dev, struct netnames *names) {
l = strpcpyf(&s, l, "p%us%u", bus, slot);
if (func > 0 || is_pci_multifunction(names->pcidev))
l = strpcpyf(&s, l, "f%u", func);
- if (dev_port > 0)
+ if (port_name)
+ l = strpcpyf(&s, l, "n%s", port_name);
+ else if (dev_port > 0)
l = strpcpyf(&s, l, "d%u", dev_port);
if (l == 0)
names->pci_path[0] = '\0';
@@ -275,7 +287,9 @@ static int dev_pci_slot(struct udev_device *dev, struct netnames *names) {
l = strpcpyf(&s, l, "s%d", hotplug_slot);
if (func > 0 || is_pci_multifunction(names->pcidev))
l = strpcpyf(&s, l, "f%d", func);
- if (dev_port > 0)
+ if (port_name)
+ l = strpcpyf(&s, l, "n%s", port_name);
+ else if (dev_port > 0)
l = strpcpyf(&s, l, "d%d", dev_port);
if (l == 0)
names->pci_slot[0] = '\0';
generated by cgit v1.2.3-54-g00ecf (git 2.45.2) at 2024-09-16 21:52:13 +0000