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-rw-r--r--man/systemd.exec.xml50
1 files changed, 34 insertions, 16 deletions
diff --git a/man/systemd.exec.xml b/man/systemd.exec.xml
index 0973f4047a..3b39a9c912 100644
--- a/man/systemd.exec.xml
+++ b/man/systemd.exec.xml
@@ -1234,22 +1234,16 @@
<varlistentry>
<term><varname>NoNewPrivileges=</varname></term>
- <listitem><para>Takes a boolean argument. If true, ensures that the service
- process and all its children can never gain new privileges through
- <function>execve</function> (e.g. via setuid or setgid bits, or filesystem
- capabilities). This is the simplest and most effective way to ensure that
- a process and its children can never elevate privileges again. Defaults to false,
- but in the user manager instance certain settings force
- <varname>NoNewPrivileges=yes</varname>, ignoring the value of this setting.
- This is the case when <varname>SystemCallFilter=</varname>,
- <varname>SystemCallArchitectures=</varname>,
- <varname>RestrictAddressFamilies=</varname>,
- <varname>PrivateDevices=</varname>,
- <varname>ProtectKernelTunables=</varname>,
- <varname>ProtectKernelModules=</varname>,
- <varname>MemoryDenyWriteExecute=</varname>, or
- <varname>RestrictRealtime=</varname> are specified.
- </para></listitem>
+ <listitem><para>Takes a boolean argument. If true, ensures that the service process and all its children can
+ never gain new privileges through <function>execve()</function> (e.g. via setuid or setgid bits, or filesystem
+ capabilities). This is the simplest and most effective way to ensure that a process and its children can never
+ elevate privileges again. Defaults to false, but in the user manager instance certain settings force
+ <varname>NoNewPrivileges=yes</varname>, ignoring the value of this setting. This is the case when
+ <varname>SystemCallFilter=</varname>, <varname>SystemCallArchitectures=</varname>,
+ <varname>RestrictAddressFamilies=</varname>, <varname>RestrictNamespaces=</varname>,
+ <varname>PrivateDevices=</varname>, <varname>ProtectKernelTunables=</varname>,
+ <varname>ProtectKernelModules=</varname>, <varname>MemoryDenyWriteExecute=</varname>, or
+ <varname>RestrictRealtime=</varname> are specified.</para></listitem>
</varlistentry>
<varlistentry>
@@ -1468,6 +1462,30 @@
</varlistentry>
<varlistentry>
+ <term><varname>RestrictNamespaces=</varname></term>
+
+ <listitem><para>Restricts access to Linux namespace functionality for the processes of this unit. For details
+ about Linux namespaces, see
+ <citerefentry><refentrytitle>namespaces</refentrytitle><manvolnum>7</manvolnum></citerefentry>. Either takes a
+ boolean argument, or a space-separated list of namespace type identifiers. If false (the default), no
+ restrictions on namespace creation and switching are made. If true, access to any kind of namespacing is
+ prohibited. Otherwise, a space-separated list of namespace type identifiers must be specified, consisting of
+ any combination of: <constant>cgroup</constant>, <constant>ipc</constant>, <constant>net</constant>,
+ <constant>mnt</constant>, <constant>pid</constant>, <constant>user</constant> and <constant>uts</constant>. Any
+ namespace type listed is made accessible to the unit's processes, access to namespace types not listed is
+ prohibited (whitelisting). By prepending the list with a single tilda character (<literal>~</literal>) the
+ effect may be inverted: only the listed namespace types will be made inaccessible, all unlisted ones are
+ permitted (blacklisting). If the empty string is assigned, the default namespace restrictions are applied,
+ which is equivalent to false. Internally, this setting limits access to the
+ <citerefentry><refentrytitle>unshare</refentrytitle><manvolnum>2</manvolnum></citerefentry>,
+ <citerefentry><refentrytitle>clone</refentrytitle><manvolnum>2</manvolnum></citerefentry> and
+ <citerefentry><refentrytitle>setns</refentrytitle><manvolnum>2</manvolnum></citerefentry> system calls, taking
+ the specified flags parameters into account. Note that — if this option is used — in addition to restricting
+ creation and switching of the specified types of namespaces (or all of them, if true) access to the
+ <function>setns()</function> system call with a zero flags parameter is prohibited.</para></listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
+ <varlistentry>
<term><varname>ProtectKernelModules=</varname></term>
<listitem><para>Takes a boolean argument. If true, explicit module loading will