summaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/src/core/execute.c
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
Diffstat (limited to 'src/core/execute.c')
-rw-r--r--src/core/execute.c177
1 files changed, 97 insertions, 80 deletions
diff --git a/src/core/execute.c b/src/core/execute.c
index 5e7d7c25d7..7f343c4902 100644
--- a/src/core/execute.c
+++ b/src/core/execute.c
@@ -1470,7 +1470,7 @@ finish:
return r;
}
-static int apply_protect_sysctl(Unit *u, const ExecContext *c) {
+static int apply_protect_sysctl(const Unit *u, const ExecContext *c) {
scmp_filter_ctx seccomp;
int r;
@@ -1501,7 +1501,7 @@ finish:
return r;
}
-static int apply_protect_kernel_modules(Unit *u, const ExecContext *c) {
+static int apply_protect_kernel_modules(const Unit *u, const ExecContext *c) {
assert(c);
/* Turn off module syscalls on ProtectKernelModules=yes */
@@ -1512,7 +1512,7 @@ static int apply_protect_kernel_modules(Unit *u, const ExecContext *c) {
return seccomp_load_filter_set(SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, syscall_filter_sets + SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_MODULE, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM));
}
-static int apply_private_devices(Unit *u, const ExecContext *c) {
+static int apply_private_devices(const Unit *u, const ExecContext *c) {
assert(c);
/* If PrivateDevices= is set, also turn off iopl and all @raw-io syscalls. */
@@ -2003,6 +2003,92 @@ static int compile_read_write_paths(
return 0;
}
+static int apply_mount_namespace(Unit *u, const ExecContext *context,
+ const ExecParameters *params,
+ ExecRuntime *runtime) {
+ int r;
+ _cleanup_free_ char **rw = NULL;
+ char *tmp = NULL, *var = NULL;
+ const char *root_dir = NULL;
+ NameSpaceInfo ns_info = {
+ .private_dev = context->private_devices,
+ .protect_control_groups = context->protect_control_groups,
+ .protect_kernel_tunables = context->protect_kernel_tunables,
+ .protect_kernel_modules = context->protect_kernel_modules,
+ };
+
+ assert(context);
+
+ /* The runtime struct only contains the parent of the private /tmp,
+ * which is non-accessible to world users. Inside of it there's a /tmp
+ * that is sticky, and that's the one we want to use here. */
+
+ if (context->private_tmp && runtime) {
+ if (runtime->tmp_dir)
+ tmp = strjoina(runtime->tmp_dir, "/tmp");
+ if (runtime->var_tmp_dir)
+ var = strjoina(runtime->var_tmp_dir, "/tmp");
+ }
+
+ r = compile_read_write_paths(context, params, &rw);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ if (params->flags & EXEC_APPLY_CHROOT)
+ root_dir = context->root_directory;
+
+ r = setup_namespace(root_dir, &ns_info, rw,
+ context->read_only_paths,
+ context->inaccessible_paths,
+ tmp,
+ var,
+ context->protect_home,
+ context->protect_system,
+ context->mount_flags);
+
+ /* If we couldn't set up the namespace this is probably due to a
+ * missing capability. In this case, silently proceeed. */
+ if (IN_SET(r, -EPERM, -EACCES)) {
+ log_open();
+ log_unit_debug_errno(u, r, "Failed to set up namespace, assuming containerized execution, ignoring: %m");
+ log_close();
+ r = 0;
+ }
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int apply_working_directory(const ExecContext *context,
+ const ExecParameters *params,
+ const char *home,
+ const bool needs_mount_ns) {
+ const char *d;
+ const char *wd;
+
+ assert(context);
+
+ if (context->working_directory_home)
+ wd = home;
+ else if (context->working_directory)
+ wd = context->working_directory;
+ else
+ wd = "/";
+
+ if (params->flags & EXEC_APPLY_CHROOT) {
+ if (!needs_mount_ns && context->root_directory)
+ if (chroot(context->root_directory) < 0)
+ return -errno;
+
+ d = wd;
+ } else
+ d = strjoina(strempty(context->root_directory), "/", strempty(wd));
+
+ if (chdir(d) < 0 && !context->working_directory_missing_ok)
+ return -errno;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
static void append_socket_pair(int *array, unsigned *n, int pair[2]) {
assert(array);
assert(n);
@@ -2139,7 +2225,7 @@ static int exec_child(
_cleanup_free_ char *mac_selinux_context_net = NULL;
_cleanup_free_ gid_t *supplementary_gids = NULL;
const char *username = NULL, *groupname = NULL;
- const char *home = NULL, *shell = NULL, *wd;
+ const char *home = NULL, *shell = NULL;
dev_t journal_stream_dev = 0;
ino_t journal_stream_ino = 0;
bool needs_mount_namespace;
@@ -2466,65 +2552,19 @@ static int exec_child(
needs_mount_namespace = exec_needs_mount_namespace(context, params, runtime);
if (needs_mount_namespace) {
- _cleanup_free_ char **rw = NULL;
- char *tmp = NULL, *var = NULL;
- NameSpaceInfo ns_info = {
- .private_dev = context->private_devices,
- .protect_control_groups = context->protect_control_groups,
- .protect_kernel_tunables = context->protect_kernel_tunables,
- .protect_kernel_modules = context->protect_kernel_modules,
- };
-
- /* The runtime struct only contains the parent
- * of the private /tmp, which is
- * non-accessible to world users. Inside of it
- * there's a /tmp that is sticky, and that's
- * the one we want to use here. */
-
- if (context->private_tmp && runtime) {
- if (runtime->tmp_dir)
- tmp = strjoina(runtime->tmp_dir, "/tmp");
- if (runtime->var_tmp_dir)
- var = strjoina(runtime->var_tmp_dir, "/tmp");
- }
-
- r = compile_read_write_paths(context, params, &rw);
+ r = apply_mount_namespace(unit, context, params, runtime);
if (r < 0) {
*exit_status = EXIT_NAMESPACE;
return r;
}
-
- r = setup_namespace(
- (params->flags & EXEC_APPLY_CHROOT) ? context->root_directory : NULL,
- &ns_info,
- rw,
- context->read_only_paths,
- context->inaccessible_paths,
- tmp,
- var,
- context->protect_home,
- context->protect_system,
- context->mount_flags);
-
- /* If we couldn't set up the namespace this is
- * probably due to a missing capability. In this case,
- * silently proceeed. */
- if (r == -EPERM || r == -EACCES) {
- log_open();
- log_unit_debug_errno(unit, r, "Failed to set up namespace, assuming containerized execution, ignoring: %m");
- log_close();
- } else if (r < 0) {
- *exit_status = EXIT_NAMESPACE;
- return r;
- }
}
- if (context->working_directory_home)
- wd = home;
- else if (context->working_directory)
- wd = context->working_directory;
- else
- wd = "/";
+ /* Apply just after mount namespace setup */
+ r = apply_working_directory(context, params, home, needs_mount_namespace);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ *exit_status = EXIT_CHROOT;
+ return r;
+ }
/* Drop group as early as possbile */
if ((params->flags & EXEC_APPLY_PERMISSIONS) && !command->privileged) {
@@ -2535,29 +2575,6 @@ static int exec_child(
}
}
- if (params->flags & EXEC_APPLY_CHROOT) {
- if (!needs_mount_namespace && context->root_directory)
- if (chroot(context->root_directory) < 0) {
- *exit_status = EXIT_CHROOT;
- return -errno;
- }
-
- if (chdir(wd) < 0 &&
- !context->working_directory_missing_ok) {
- *exit_status = EXIT_CHDIR;
- return -errno;
- }
- } else {
- const char *d;
-
- d = strjoina(strempty(context->root_directory), "/", strempty(wd));
- if (chdir(d) < 0 &&
- !context->working_directory_missing_ok) {
- *exit_status = EXIT_CHDIR;
- return -errno;
- }
- }
-
#ifdef HAVE_SELINUX
if ((params->flags & EXEC_APPLY_PERMISSIONS) &&
mac_selinux_use() &&
generated by cgit v1.2.3-54-g00ecf (git 2.45.2) at 2024-12-04 18:45:58 +0000