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-rw-r--r--src/core/execute.c567
1 files changed, 384 insertions, 183 deletions
diff --git a/src/core/execute.c b/src/core/execute.c
index d1acda6682..0028730889 100644
--- a/src/core/execute.c
+++ b/src/core/execute.c
@@ -21,18 +21,18 @@
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-#include <string.h>
+#include <glob.h>
+#include <grp.h>
+#include <poll.h>
#include <signal.h>
-#include <sys/socket.h>
-#include <sys/un.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/personality.h>
#include <sys/prctl.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
-#include <grp.h>
-#include <poll.h>
-#include <glob.h>
+#include <sys/un.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
#include <utmpx.h>
-#include <sys/personality.h>
#ifdef HAVE_PAM
#include <security/pam_appl.h>
@@ -51,45 +51,55 @@
#endif
#include "sd-messages.h"
-#include "rm-rf.h"
-#include "strv.h"
-#include "macro.h"
-#include "capability.h"
-#include "util.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "ioprio.h"
-#include "securebits.h"
-#include "namespace.h"
-#include "exit-status.h"
-#include "missing.h"
-#include "utmp-wtmp.h"
-#include "def.h"
-#include "path-util.h"
-#include "env-util.h"
-#include "fileio.h"
-#include "unit.h"
-#include "async.h"
-#include "selinux-util.h"
-#include "errno-list.h"
+
#include "af-list.h"
-#include "mkdir.h"
-#include "smack-util.h"
+#include "alloc-util.h"
+#ifdef HAVE_APPARMOR
+#include "apparmor-util.h"
+#endif
+#include "async.h"
+#include "barrier.h"
#include "bus-endpoint.h"
#include "cap-list.h"
+#include "capability-util.h"
+#include "def.h"
+#include "env-util.h"
+#include "errno-list.h"
+#include "execute.h"
+#include "exit-status.h"
+#include "fd-util.h"
+#include "fileio.h"
#include "formats-util.h"
+#include "fs-util.h"
+#include "glob-util.h"
+#include "io-util.h"
+#include "ioprio.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "macro.h"
+#include "missing.h"
+#include "mkdir.h"
+#include "namespace.h"
+#include "parse-util.h"
+#include "path-util.h"
#include "process-util.h"
-#include "terminal-util.h"
-#include "signal-util.h"
-
-#ifdef HAVE_APPARMOR
-#include "apparmor-util.h"
-#endif
-
+#include "rlimit-util.h"
+#include "rm-rf.h"
#ifdef HAVE_SECCOMP
#include "seccomp-util.h"
#endif
-
-#include "execute.h"
+#include "securebits.h"
+#include "selinux-util.h"
+#include "signal-util.h"
+#include "smack-util.h"
+#include "string-table.h"
+#include "string-util.h"
+#include "strv.h"
+#include "syslog-util.h"
+#include "terminal-util.h"
+#include "unit.h"
+#include "user-util.h"
+#include "util.h"
+#include "utmp-wtmp.h"
#define IDLE_TIMEOUT_USEC (5*USEC_PER_SEC)
#define IDLE_TIMEOUT2_USEC (1*USEC_PER_SEC)
@@ -357,12 +367,28 @@ static int fixup_output(ExecOutput std_output, int socket_fd) {
return std_output;
}
-static int setup_input(const ExecContext *context, int socket_fd, bool apply_tty_stdin) {
+static int setup_input(
+ const ExecContext *context,
+ const ExecParameters *params,
+ int socket_fd) {
+
ExecInput i;
assert(context);
+ assert(params);
+
+ if (params->stdin_fd >= 0) {
+ if (dup2(params->stdin_fd, STDIN_FILENO) < 0)
+ return -errno;
+
+ /* Try to make this the controlling tty, if it is a tty, and reset it */
+ (void) ioctl(STDIN_FILENO, TIOCSCTTY, context->std_input == EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FORCE);
+ (void) reset_terminal_fd(STDIN_FILENO, true);
+
+ return STDIN_FILENO;
+ }
- i = fixup_input(context->std_input, socket_fd, apply_tty_stdin);
+ i = fixup_input(context->std_input, socket_fd, params->apply_tty_stdin);
switch (i) {
@@ -399,16 +425,40 @@ static int setup_input(const ExecContext *context, int socket_fd, bool apply_tty
}
}
-static int setup_output(Unit *unit, const ExecContext *context, int fileno, int socket_fd, const char *ident, bool apply_tty_stdin, uid_t uid, gid_t gid) {
+static int setup_output(
+ Unit *unit,
+ const ExecContext *context,
+ const ExecParameters *params,
+ int fileno,
+ int socket_fd,
+ const char *ident,
+ uid_t uid, gid_t gid) {
+
ExecOutput o;
ExecInput i;
int r;
assert(unit);
assert(context);
+ assert(params);
assert(ident);
- i = fixup_input(context->std_input, socket_fd, apply_tty_stdin);
+ if (fileno == STDOUT_FILENO && params->stdout_fd >= 0) {
+
+ if (dup2(params->stdout_fd, STDOUT_FILENO) < 0)
+ return -errno;
+
+ return STDOUT_FILENO;
+ }
+
+ if (fileno == STDERR_FILENO && params->stderr_fd >= 0) {
+ if (dup2(params->stderr_fd, STDERR_FILENO) < 0)
+ return -errno;
+
+ return STDERR_FILENO;
+ }
+
+ i = fixup_input(context->std_input, socket_fd, params->apply_tty_stdin);
o = fixup_output(context->std_output, socket_fd);
if (fileno == STDERR_FILENO) {
@@ -501,9 +551,9 @@ static int chown_terminal(int fd, uid_t uid) {
return 0;
}
-static int setup_confirm_stdio(int *_saved_stdin,
- int *_saved_stdout) {
- int fd = -1, saved_stdin, saved_stdout = -1, r;
+static int setup_confirm_stdio(int *_saved_stdin, int *_saved_stdout) {
+ _cleanup_close_ int fd = -1, saved_stdin = -1, saved_stdout = -1;
+ int r;
assert(_saved_stdin);
assert(_saved_stdout);
@@ -513,10 +563,8 @@ static int setup_confirm_stdio(int *_saved_stdin,
return -errno;
saved_stdout = fcntl(STDOUT_FILENO, F_DUPFD, 3);
- if (saved_stdout < 0) {
- r = errno;
- goto fail;
- }
+ if (saved_stdout < 0)
+ return -errno;
fd = acquire_terminal(
"/dev/console",
@@ -524,39 +572,33 @@ static int setup_confirm_stdio(int *_saved_stdin,
false,
false,
DEFAULT_CONFIRM_USEC);
- if (fd < 0) {
- r = fd;
- goto fail;
- }
+ if (fd < 0)
+ return fd;
r = chown_terminal(fd, getuid());
if (r < 0)
- goto fail;
+ return r;
- if (dup2(fd, STDIN_FILENO) < 0) {
- r = -errno;
- goto fail;
- }
+ r = reset_terminal_fd(fd, true);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
- if (dup2(fd, STDOUT_FILENO) < 0) {
- r = -errno;
- goto fail;
- }
+ if (dup2(fd, STDIN_FILENO) < 0)
+ return -errno;
+
+ if (dup2(fd, STDOUT_FILENO) < 0)
+ return -errno;
if (fd >= 2)
safe_close(fd);
+ fd = -1;
*_saved_stdin = saved_stdin;
*_saved_stdout = saved_stdout;
- return 0;
-
-fail:
- safe_close(saved_stdout);
- safe_close(saved_stdin);
- safe_close(fd);
+ saved_stdin = saved_stdout = -1;
- return r;
+ return 0;
}
_printf_(1, 2) static int write_confirm_message(const char *format, ...) {
@@ -576,9 +618,7 @@ _printf_(1, 2) static int write_confirm_message(const char *format, ...) {
return 0;
}
-static int restore_confirm_stdio(int *saved_stdin,
- int *saved_stdout) {
-
+static int restore_confirm_stdio(int *saved_stdin, int *saved_stdout) {
int r = 0;
assert(saved_stdin);
@@ -594,8 +634,8 @@ static int restore_confirm_stdio(int *saved_stdin,
if (dup2(*saved_stdout, STDOUT_FILENO) < 0)
r = -errno;
- safe_close(*saved_stdin);
- safe_close(*saved_stdout);
+ *saved_stdin = safe_close(*saved_stdin);
+ *saved_stdout = safe_close(*saved_stdout);
return r;
}
@@ -629,15 +669,6 @@ static int enforce_groups(const ExecContext *context, const char *username, gid_
* we avoid NSS lookups for gid=0. */
if (context->group || username) {
-
- if (context->group) {
- const char *g = context->group;
-
- r = get_group_creds(&g, &gid);
- if (r < 0)
- return r;
- }
-
/* First step, initialize groups from /etc/groups */
if (username && gid != 0) {
if (initgroups(username, gid) < 0)
@@ -706,12 +737,7 @@ static int enforce_user(const ExecContext *context, uid_t uid) {
/* Sets (but doesn't lookup) the uid and make sure we keep the
* capabilities while doing so. */
- if (context->capabilities) {
- _cleanup_cap_free_ cap_t d = NULL;
- static const cap_value_t bits[] = {
- CAP_SETUID, /* Necessary so that we can run setresuid() below */
- CAP_SETPCAP /* Necessary so that we can set PR_SET_SECUREBITS later on */
- };
+ if (context->capabilities || context->capability_ambient_set != 0) {
/* First step: If we need to keep capabilities but
* drop privileges we need to make sure we keep our
@@ -727,16 +753,24 @@ static int enforce_user(const ExecContext *context, uid_t uid) {
/* Second step: set the capabilities. This will reduce
* the capabilities to the minimum we need. */
- d = cap_dup(context->capabilities);
- if (!d)
- return -errno;
+ if (context->capabilities) {
+ _cleanup_cap_free_ cap_t d = NULL;
+ static const cap_value_t bits[] = {
+ CAP_SETUID, /* Necessary so that we can run setresuid() below */
+ CAP_SETPCAP /* Necessary so that we can set PR_SET_SECUREBITS later on */
+ };
- if (cap_set_flag(d, CAP_EFFECTIVE, ELEMENTSOF(bits), bits, CAP_SET) < 0 ||
- cap_set_flag(d, CAP_PERMITTED, ELEMENTSOF(bits), bits, CAP_SET) < 0)
- return -errno;
+ d = cap_dup(context->capabilities);
+ if (!d)
+ return -errno;
- if (cap_set_proc(d) < 0)
- return -errno;
+ if (cap_set_flag(d, CAP_EFFECTIVE, ELEMENTSOF(bits), bits, CAP_SET) < 0 ||
+ cap_set_flag(d, CAP_PERMITTED, ELEMENTSOF(bits), bits, CAP_SET) < 0)
+ return -errno;
+
+ if (cap_set_proc(d) < 0)
+ return -errno;
+ }
}
/* Third step: actually set the uids */
@@ -777,10 +811,11 @@ static int setup_pam(
.appdata_ptr = NULL
};
+ _cleanup_(barrier_destroy) Barrier barrier = BARRIER_NULL;
pam_handle_t *handle = NULL;
sigset_t old_ss;
int pam_code = PAM_SUCCESS;
- int err;
+ int err = 0;
char **e = NULL;
bool close_session = false;
pid_t pam_pid = 0, parent_pid;
@@ -797,6 +832,10 @@ static int setup_pam(
* daemon. We do things this way to ensure that the main PID
* of the daemon is the one we initially fork()ed. */
+ err = barrier_create(&barrier);
+ if (err < 0)
+ goto fail;
+
if (log_get_max_level() < LOG_DEBUG)
flags |= PAM_SILENT;
@@ -845,6 +884,7 @@ static int setup_pam(
/* The child's job is to reset the PAM session on
* termination */
+ barrier_set_role(&barrier, BARRIER_CHILD);
/* This string must fit in 10 chars (i.e. the length
* of "/sbin/init"), to look pretty in /bin/ps */
@@ -872,6 +912,11 @@ static int setup_pam(
if (prctl(PR_SET_PDEATHSIG, SIGTERM) < 0)
goto child_finish;
+ /* Tell the parent that our setup is done. This is especially
+ * important regarding dropping privileges. Otherwise, unit
+ * setup might race against our setresuid(2) call. */
+ barrier_place(&barrier);
+
/* Check if our parent process might already have
* died? */
if (getppid() == parent_pid) {
@@ -907,6 +952,8 @@ static int setup_pam(
_exit(r);
}
+ barrier_set_role(&barrier, BARRIER_PARENT);
+
/* If the child was forked off successfully it will do all the
* cleanups, so forget about the handle here. */
handle = NULL;
@@ -918,6 +965,11 @@ static int setup_pam(
* might have opened it, but we don't want this fd around. */
closelog();
+ /* Synchronously wait for the child to initialize. We don't care for
+ * errors as we cannot recover. However, warn loudly if it happens. */
+ if (!barrier_place_and_sync(&barrier))
+ log_error("PAM initialization failed");
+
*pam_env = e;
e = NULL;
@@ -928,7 +980,7 @@ fail:
log_error("PAM failed: %s", pam_strerror(handle, pam_code));
err = -EPERM; /* PAM errors do not map to errno */
} else {
- err = log_error_errno(errno, "PAM failed: %m");
+ err = log_error_errno(err < 0 ? err : errno, "PAM failed: %m");
}
if (handle) {
@@ -1160,8 +1212,8 @@ static void do_idle_pipe_dance(int idle_pipe[4]) {
assert(idle_pipe);
- safe_close(idle_pipe[1]);
- safe_close(idle_pipe[2]);
+ idle_pipe[1] = safe_close(idle_pipe[1]);
+ idle_pipe[2] = safe_close(idle_pipe[2]);
if (idle_pipe[0] >= 0) {
int r;
@@ -1169,23 +1221,26 @@ static void do_idle_pipe_dance(int idle_pipe[4]) {
r = fd_wait_for_event(idle_pipe[0], POLLHUP, IDLE_TIMEOUT_USEC);
if (idle_pipe[3] >= 0 && r == 0 /* timeout */) {
+ ssize_t n;
+
/* Signal systemd that we are bored and want to continue. */
- r = write(idle_pipe[3], "x", 1);
- if (r > 0)
+ n = write(idle_pipe[3], "x", 1);
+ if (n > 0)
/* Wait for systemd to react to the signal above. */
fd_wait_for_event(idle_pipe[0], POLLHUP, IDLE_TIMEOUT2_USEC);
}
- safe_close(idle_pipe[0]);
+ idle_pipe[0] = safe_close(idle_pipe[0]);
}
- safe_close(idle_pipe[3]);
+ idle_pipe[3] = safe_close(idle_pipe[3]);
}
static int build_environment(
const ExecContext *c,
unsigned n_fds,
+ char ** fd_names,
usec_t watchdog_usec,
const char *home,
const char *username,
@@ -1199,11 +1254,13 @@ static int build_environment(
assert(c);
assert(ret);
- our_env = new0(char*, 10);
+ our_env = new0(char*, 11);
if (!our_env)
return -ENOMEM;
if (n_fds > 0) {
+ _cleanup_free_ char *joined = NULL;
+
if (asprintf(&x, "LISTEN_PID="PID_FMT, getpid()) < 0)
return -ENOMEM;
our_env[n_env++] = x;
@@ -1211,6 +1268,15 @@ static int build_environment(
if (asprintf(&x, "LISTEN_FDS=%u", n_fds) < 0)
return -ENOMEM;
our_env[n_env++] = x;
+
+ joined = strv_join(fd_names, ":");
+ if (!joined)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ x = strjoin("LISTEN_FDNAMES=", joined, NULL);
+ if (!x)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ our_env[n_env++] = x;
}
if (watchdog_usec > 0) {
@@ -1261,7 +1327,7 @@ static int build_environment(
}
our_env[n_env++] = NULL;
- assert(n_env <= 10);
+ assert(n_env <= 11);
*ret = our_env;
our_env = NULL;
@@ -1269,6 +1335,34 @@ static int build_environment(
return 0;
}
+static int build_pass_environment(const ExecContext *c, char ***ret) {
+ _cleanup_strv_free_ char **pass_env = NULL;
+ size_t n_env = 0, n_bufsize = 0;
+ char **i;
+
+ STRV_FOREACH(i, c->pass_environment) {
+ _cleanup_free_ char *x = NULL;
+ char *v;
+
+ v = getenv(*i);
+ if (!v)
+ continue;
+ x = strjoin(*i, "=", v, NULL);
+ if (!x)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ if (!GREEDY_REALLOC(pass_env, n_bufsize, n_env + 2))
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ pass_env[n_env++] = x;
+ pass_env[n_env] = NULL;
+ x = NULL;
+ }
+
+ *ret = pass_env;
+ pass_env = NULL;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
static bool exec_needs_mount_namespace(
const ExecContext *context,
const ExecParameters *params,
@@ -1299,6 +1393,44 @@ static bool exec_needs_mount_namespace(
return false;
}
+static int close_remaining_fds(
+ const ExecParameters *params,
+ ExecRuntime *runtime,
+ int socket_fd,
+ int *fds, unsigned n_fds) {
+
+ unsigned n_dont_close = 0;
+ int dont_close[n_fds + 7];
+
+ assert(params);
+
+ if (params->stdin_fd >= 0)
+ dont_close[n_dont_close++] = params->stdin_fd;
+ if (params->stdout_fd >= 0)
+ dont_close[n_dont_close++] = params->stdout_fd;
+ if (params->stderr_fd >= 0)
+ dont_close[n_dont_close++] = params->stderr_fd;
+
+ if (socket_fd >= 0)
+ dont_close[n_dont_close++] = socket_fd;
+ if (n_fds > 0) {
+ memcpy(dont_close + n_dont_close, fds, sizeof(int) * n_fds);
+ n_dont_close += n_fds;
+ }
+
+ if (params->bus_endpoint_fd >= 0)
+ dont_close[n_dont_close++] = params->bus_endpoint_fd;
+
+ if (runtime) {
+ if (runtime->netns_storage_socket[0] >= 0)
+ dont_close[n_dont_close++] = runtime->netns_storage_socket[0];
+ if (runtime->netns_storage_socket[1] >= 0)
+ dont_close[n_dont_close++] = runtime->netns_storage_socket[1];
+ }
+
+ return close_all_fds(dont_close, n_dont_close);
+}
+
static int exec_child(
Unit *unit,
ExecCommand *command,
@@ -1311,11 +1443,9 @@ static int exec_child(
char **files_env,
int *exit_status) {
- _cleanup_strv_free_ char **our_env = NULL, **pam_env = NULL, **final_env = NULL, **final_argv = NULL;
+ _cleanup_strv_free_ char **our_env = NULL, **pass_env = NULL, **pam_env = NULL, **final_env = NULL, **final_argv = NULL;
_cleanup_free_ char *mac_selinux_context_net = NULL;
- const char *username = NULL, *home = NULL, *shell = NULL;
- unsigned n_dont_close = 0;
- int dont_close[n_fds + 4];
+ const char *username = NULL, *home = NULL, *shell = NULL, *wd;
uid_t uid = UID_INVALID;
gid_t gid = GID_INVALID;
int i, r;
@@ -1355,22 +1485,7 @@ static int exec_child(
log_forget_fds();
- if (socket_fd >= 0)
- dont_close[n_dont_close++] = socket_fd;
- if (n_fds > 0) {
- memcpy(dont_close + n_dont_close, fds, sizeof(int) * n_fds);
- n_dont_close += n_fds;
- }
- if (params->bus_endpoint_fd >= 0)
- dont_close[n_dont_close++] = params->bus_endpoint_fd;
- if (runtime) {
- if (runtime->netns_storage_socket[0] >= 0)
- dont_close[n_dont_close++] = runtime->netns_storage_socket[0];
- if (runtime->netns_storage_socket[1] >= 0)
- dont_close[n_dont_close++] = runtime->netns_storage_socket[1];
- }
-
- r = close_all_fds(dont_close, n_dont_close);
+ r = close_remaining_fds(params, runtime, socket_fd, fds, n_fds);
if (r < 0) {
*exit_status = EXIT_FDS;
return r;
@@ -1412,24 +1527,35 @@ static int exec_child(
}
}
+ if (context->group) {
+ const char *g = context->group;
+
+ r = get_group_creds(&g, &gid);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ *exit_status = EXIT_GROUP;
+ return r;
+ }
+ }
+
+
/* If a socket is connected to STDIN/STDOUT/STDERR, we
* must sure to drop O_NONBLOCK */
if (socket_fd >= 0)
- fd_nonblock(socket_fd, false);
+ (void) fd_nonblock(socket_fd, false);
- r = setup_input(context, socket_fd, params->apply_tty_stdin);
+ r = setup_input(context, params, socket_fd);
if (r < 0) {
*exit_status = EXIT_STDIN;
return r;
}
- r = setup_output(unit, context, STDOUT_FILENO, socket_fd, basename(command->path), params->apply_tty_stdin, uid, gid);
+ r = setup_output(unit, context, params, STDOUT_FILENO, socket_fd, basename(command->path), uid, gid);
if (r < 0) {
*exit_status = EXIT_STDOUT;
return r;
}
- r = setup_output(unit, context, STDERR_FILENO, socket_fd, basename(command->path), params->apply_tty_stdin, uid, gid);
+ r = setup_output(unit, context, params, STDERR_FILENO, socket_fd, basename(command->path), uid, gid);
if (r < 0) {
*exit_status = EXIT_STDERR;
return r;
@@ -1578,25 +1704,50 @@ static int exec_child(
}
}
+ umask(context->umask);
+
if (params->apply_permissions) {
r = enforce_groups(context, username, gid);
if (r < 0) {
*exit_status = EXIT_GROUP;
return r;
}
- }
+#ifdef HAVE_SMACK
+ if (context->smack_process_label) {
+ r = mac_smack_apply_pid(0, context->smack_process_label);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ *exit_status = EXIT_SMACK_PROCESS_LABEL;
+ return r;
+ }
+ }
+#ifdef SMACK_DEFAULT_PROCESS_LABEL
+ else {
+ _cleanup_free_ char *exec_label = NULL;
- umask(context->umask);
+ r = mac_smack_read(command->path, SMACK_ATTR_EXEC, &exec_label);
+ if (r < 0 && r != -ENODATA && r != -EOPNOTSUPP) {
+ *exit_status = EXIT_SMACK_PROCESS_LABEL;
+ return r;
+ }
+ r = mac_smack_apply_pid(0, exec_label ? : SMACK_DEFAULT_PROCESS_LABEL);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ *exit_status = EXIT_SMACK_PROCESS_LABEL;
+ return r;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+#endif
#ifdef HAVE_PAM
- if (params->apply_permissions && context->pam_name && username) {
- r = setup_pam(context->pam_name, username, uid, context->tty_path, &pam_env, fds, n_fds);
- if (r < 0) {
- *exit_status = EXIT_PAM;
- return r;
+ if (context->pam_name && username) {
+ r = setup_pam(context->pam_name, username, uid, context->tty_path, &pam_env, fds, n_fds);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ *exit_status = EXIT_PAM;
+ return r;
+ }
}
- }
#endif
+ }
if (context->private_network && runtime && runtime->netns_storage_socket[0] >= 0) {
r = setup_netns(runtime->netns_storage_socket);
@@ -1650,6 +1801,13 @@ static int exec_child(
}
}
+ if (context->working_directory_home)
+ wd = home;
+ else if (context->working_directory)
+ wd = context->working_directory;
+ else
+ wd = "/";
+
if (params->apply_chroot) {
if (!needs_mount_namespace && context->root_directory)
if (chroot(context->root_directory) < 0) {
@@ -1657,21 +1815,15 @@ static int exec_child(
return -errno;
}
- if (chdir(context->working_directory ?: "/") < 0 &&
+ if (chdir(wd) < 0 &&
!context->working_directory_missing_ok) {
*exit_status = EXIT_CHDIR;
return -errno;
}
} else {
- _cleanup_free_ char *d = NULL;
-
- if (asprintf(&d, "%s/%s",
- context->root_directory ?: "",
- context->working_directory ?: "") < 0) {
- *exit_status = EXIT_MEMORY;
- return -ENOMEM;
- }
+ const char *d;
+ d = strjoina(strempty(context->root_directory), "/", strempty(wd));
if (chdir(d) < 0 &&
!context->working_directory_missing_ok) {
*exit_status = EXIT_CHDIR;
@@ -1707,6 +1859,8 @@ static int exec_child(
if (params->apply_permissions) {
+ int secure_bits = context->secure_bits;
+
for (i = 0; i < _RLIMIT_MAX; i++) {
if (!context->rlimit[i])
continue;
@@ -1717,40 +1871,38 @@ static int exec_child(
}
}
- if (context->capability_bounding_set_drop) {
- r = capability_bounding_set_drop(context->capability_bounding_set_drop, false);
+ if (!cap_test_all(context->capability_bounding_set)) {
+ r = capability_bounding_set_drop(context->capability_bounding_set, false);
if (r < 0) {
*exit_status = EXIT_CAPABILITIES;
return r;
}
}
-#ifdef HAVE_SMACK
- if (context->smack_process_label) {
- r = mac_smack_apply_pid(0, context->smack_process_label);
+ /* This is done before enforce_user, but ambient set
+ * does not survive over setresuid() if keep_caps is not set. */
+ if (context->capability_ambient_set != 0) {
+ r = capability_ambient_set_apply(context->capability_ambient_set, true);
if (r < 0) {
- *exit_status = EXIT_SMACK_PROCESS_LABEL;
+ *exit_status = EXIT_CAPABILITIES;
return r;
}
- }
-#ifdef SMACK_DEFAULT_PROCESS_LABEL
- else {
- _cleanup_free_ char *exec_label = NULL;
- r = mac_smack_read(command->path, SMACK_ATTR_EXEC, &exec_label);
- if (r < 0 && r != -ENODATA && r != -EOPNOTSUPP) {
- *exit_status = EXIT_SMACK_PROCESS_LABEL;
- return r;
- }
+ if (context->capabilities) {
- r = mac_smack_apply_pid(0, exec_label ? : SMACK_DEFAULT_PROCESS_LABEL);
- if (r < 0) {
- *exit_status = EXIT_SMACK_PROCESS_LABEL;
- return r;
+ /* The capabilities in ambient set need to be also in the inherited
+ * set. If they aren't, trying to get them will fail. Add the ambient
+ * set inherited capabilities to the capability set in the context.
+ * This is needed because if capabilities are set (using "Capabilities="
+ * keyword), they will override whatever we set now. */
+
+ r = capability_update_inherited_set(context->capabilities, context->capability_ambient_set);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ *exit_status = EXIT_CAPABILITIES;
+ return r;
+ }
}
}
-#endif
-#endif
if (context->user) {
r = enforce_user(context, uid);
@@ -1758,14 +1910,32 @@ static int exec_child(
*exit_status = EXIT_USER;
return r;
}
+ if (context->capability_ambient_set != 0) {
+
+ /* Fix the ambient capabilities after user change. */
+ r = capability_ambient_set_apply(context->capability_ambient_set, false);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ *exit_status = EXIT_CAPABILITIES;
+ return r;
+ }
+
+ /* If we were asked to change user and ambient capabilities
+ * were requested, we had to add keep-caps to the securebits
+ * so that we would maintain the inherited capability set
+ * through the setresuid(). Make sure that the bit is added
+ * also to the context secure_bits so that we don't try to
+ * drop the bit away next. */
+
+ secure_bits |= 1<<SECURE_KEEP_CAPS;
+ }
}
/* PR_GET_SECUREBITS is not privileged, while
* PR_SET_SECUREBITS is. So to suppress
* potential EPERMs we'll try not to call
* PR_SET_SECUREBITS unless necessary. */
- if (prctl(PR_GET_SECUREBITS) != context->secure_bits)
- if (prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS, context->secure_bits) < 0) {
+ if (prctl(PR_GET_SECUREBITS) != secure_bits)
+ if (prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS, secure_bits) < 0) {
*exit_status = EXIT_SECUREBITS;
return -errno;
}
@@ -1828,15 +1998,22 @@ static int exec_child(
#endif
}
- r = build_environment(context, n_fds, params->watchdog_usec, home, username, shell, &our_env);
+ r = build_environment(context, n_fds, params->fd_names, params->watchdog_usec, home, username, shell, &our_env);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ *exit_status = EXIT_MEMORY;
+ return r;
+ }
+
+ r = build_pass_environment(context, &pass_env);
if (r < 0) {
*exit_status = EXIT_MEMORY;
return r;
}
- final_env = strv_env_merge(5,
+ final_env = strv_env_merge(6,
params->environment,
our_env,
+ pass_env,
context->environment,
files_env,
pam_env,
@@ -1927,7 +2104,7 @@ int exec_spawn(Unit *unit,
NULL);
pid = fork();
if (pid < 0)
- return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to fork: %m");
+ return log_unit_error_errno(unit, errno, "Failed to fork: %m");
if (pid == 0) {
int exit_status;
@@ -1985,6 +2162,7 @@ void exec_context_init(ExecContext *c) {
c->timer_slack_nsec = NSEC_INFINITY;
c->personality = PERSONALITY_INVALID;
c->runtime_directory_mode = 0755;
+ c->capability_bounding_set = CAP_ALL;
}
void exec_context_done(ExecContext *c) {
@@ -1994,6 +2172,7 @@ void exec_context_done(ExecContext *c) {
c->environment = strv_free(c->environment);
c->environment_files = strv_free(c->environment_files);
+ c->pass_environment = strv_free(c->pass_environment);
for (l = 0; l < ELEMENTSOF(c->rlimit); l++)
c->rlimit[l] = mfree(c->rlimit[l]);
@@ -2140,7 +2319,7 @@ int exec_context_load_environment(Unit *unit, const ExecContext *c, char ***l) {
continue;
strv_free(r);
- return errno ? -errno : -EINVAL;
+ return errno > 0 ? -errno : -EINVAL;
}
count = pglob.gl_pathc;
if (count == 0) {
@@ -2228,7 +2407,7 @@ static void strv_fprintf(FILE *f, char **l) {
}
void exec_context_dump(ExecContext *c, FILE* f, const char *prefix) {
- char **e;
+ char **e, **d;
unsigned i;
assert(c);
@@ -2264,6 +2443,14 @@ void exec_context_dump(ExecContext *c, FILE* f, const char *prefix) {
STRV_FOREACH(e, c->environment_files)
fprintf(f, "%sEnvironmentFile: %s\n", prefix, *e);
+ STRV_FOREACH(e, c->pass_environment)
+ fprintf(f, "%sPassEnvironment: %s\n", prefix, *e);
+
+ fprintf(f, "%sRuntimeDirectoryMode: %04o\n", prefix, c->runtime_directory_mode);
+
+ STRV_FOREACH(d, c->runtime_directory)
+ fprintf(f, "%sRuntimeDirectory: %s\n", prefix, *d);
+
if (c->nice_set)
fprintf(f,
"%sNice: %i\n",
@@ -2275,9 +2462,12 @@ void exec_context_dump(ExecContext *c, FILE* f, const char *prefix) {
prefix, c->oom_score_adjust);
for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++)
- if (c->rlimit[i])
- fprintf(f, "%s%s: "RLIM_FMT"\n",
+ if (c->rlimit[i]) {
+ fprintf(f, "%s%s: " RLIM_FMT "\n",
prefix, rlimit_to_string(i), c->rlimit[i]->rlim_max);
+ fprintf(f, "%s%sSoft: " RLIM_FMT "\n",
+ prefix, rlimit_to_string(i), c->rlimit[i]->rlim_cur);
+ }
if (c->ioprio_set) {
_cleanup_free_ char *class_str = NULL;
@@ -2376,12 +2566,23 @@ void exec_context_dump(ExecContext *c, FILE* f, const char *prefix) {
(c->secure_bits & 1<<SECURE_NOROOT) ? " noroot" : "",
(c->secure_bits & 1<<SECURE_NOROOT_LOCKED) ? "noroot-locked" : "");
- if (c->capability_bounding_set_drop) {
+ if (c->capability_bounding_set != CAP_ALL) {
unsigned long l;
fprintf(f, "%sCapabilityBoundingSet:", prefix);
for (l = 0; l <= cap_last_cap(); l++)
- if (!(c->capability_bounding_set_drop & ((uint64_t) 1ULL << (uint64_t) l)))
+ if (c->capability_bounding_set & (UINT64_C(1) << l))
+ fprintf(f, " %s", strna(capability_to_name(l)));
+
+ fputs("\n", f);
+ }
+
+ if (c->capability_ambient_set != 0) {
+ unsigned long l;
+ fprintf(f, "%sAmbientCapabilities:", prefix);
+
+ for (l = 0; l <= cap_last_cap(); l++)
+ if (c->capability_ambient_set & (UINT64_C(1) << l))
fprintf(f, " %s", strna(capability_to_name(l)));
fputs("\n", f);
@@ -2482,7 +2683,7 @@ void exec_context_dump(ExecContext *c, FILE* f, const char *prefix) {
fputc('\n', f);
}
- if (c->syscall_errno != 0)
+ if (c->syscall_errno > 0)
fprintf(f,
"%sSystemCallErrorNumber: %s\n",
prefix, strna(errno_to_name(c->syscall_errno)));
@@ -2690,7 +2891,7 @@ int exec_command_append(ExecCommand *c, const char *path, ...) {
if (!l)
return -ENOMEM;
- r = strv_extend_strv(&c->argv, l);
+ r = strv_extend_strv(&c->argv, l, false);
if (r < 0)
return r;
generated by cgit v1.2.3-54-g00ecf (git 2.45.2) at 2025-04-24 08:47:06 +0000