diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'src/libcore/selinux-access.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/libcore/selinux-access.c | 280 |
1 files changed, 280 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/libcore/selinux-access.c b/src/libcore/selinux-access.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..2cdfcf7b5d --- /dev/null +++ b/src/libcore/selinux-access.c @@ -0,0 +1,280 @@ +/*** + This file is part of systemd. + + Copyright 2012 Dan Walsh + + systemd is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it + under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License as published by + the Free Software Foundation; either version 2.1 of the License, or + (at your option) any later version. + + systemd is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but + WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU + Lesser General Public License for more details. + + You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public License + along with systemd; If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. +***/ + +#include "selinux-access.h" + +#ifdef HAVE_SELINUX + +#include <errno.h> +#include <selinux/avc.h> +#include <selinux/selinux.h> +#include <stdio.h> +#ifdef HAVE_AUDIT +#include <libaudit.h> +#endif + +#include "sd-bus.h" + +#include "alloc-util.h" +#include "audit-fd.h" +#include "bus-util.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "path-util.h" +#include "selinux-util.h" +#include "stdio-util.h" +#include "strv.h" +#include "util.h" + +static bool initialized = false; + +struct audit_info { + sd_bus_creds *creds; + const char *path; + const char *cmdline; +}; + +/* + Any time an access gets denied this callback will be called + with the audit data. We then need to just copy the audit data into the msgbuf. +*/ +static int audit_callback( + void *auditdata, + security_class_t cls, + char *msgbuf, + size_t msgbufsize) { + + const struct audit_info *audit = auditdata; + uid_t uid = 0, login_uid = 0; + gid_t gid = 0; + char login_uid_buf[DECIMAL_STR_MAX(uid_t) + 1] = "n/a"; + char uid_buf[DECIMAL_STR_MAX(uid_t) + 1] = "n/a"; + char gid_buf[DECIMAL_STR_MAX(gid_t) + 1] = "n/a"; + + if (sd_bus_creds_get_audit_login_uid(audit->creds, &login_uid) >= 0) + xsprintf(login_uid_buf, UID_FMT, login_uid); + if (sd_bus_creds_get_euid(audit->creds, &uid) >= 0) + xsprintf(uid_buf, UID_FMT, uid); + if (sd_bus_creds_get_egid(audit->creds, &gid) >= 0) + xsprintf(gid_buf, GID_FMT, gid); + + snprintf(msgbuf, msgbufsize, + "auid=%s uid=%s gid=%s%s%s%s%s%s%s", + login_uid_buf, uid_buf, gid_buf, + audit->path ? " path=\"" : "", strempty(audit->path), audit->path ? "\"" : "", + audit->cmdline ? " cmdline=\"" : "", strempty(audit->cmdline), audit->cmdline ? "\"" : ""); + + return 0; +} + +static int callback_type_to_priority(int type) { + switch(type) { + + case SELINUX_ERROR: + return LOG_ERR; + + case SELINUX_WARNING: + return LOG_WARNING; + + case SELINUX_INFO: + return LOG_INFO; + + case SELINUX_AVC: + default: + return LOG_NOTICE; + } +} + +/* + libselinux uses this callback when access gets denied or other + events happen. If audit is turned on, messages will be reported + using audit netlink, otherwise they will be logged using the usual + channels. + + Code copied from dbus and modified. +*/ +_printf_(2, 3) static int log_callback(int type, const char *fmt, ...) { + va_list ap; + +#ifdef HAVE_AUDIT + int fd; + + fd = get_audit_fd(); + + if (fd >= 0) { + _cleanup_free_ char *buf = NULL; + int r; + + va_start(ap, fmt); + r = vasprintf(&buf, fmt, ap); + va_end(ap); + + if (r >= 0) { + audit_log_user_avc_message(fd, AUDIT_USER_AVC, buf, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0); + return 0; + } + } +#endif + + va_start(ap, fmt); + log_internalv(LOG_AUTH | callback_type_to_priority(type), 0, __FILE__, __LINE__, __FUNCTION__, fmt, ap); + va_end(ap); + + return 0; +} + +static int access_init(sd_bus_error *error) { + + if (!mac_selinux_use()) + return 0; + + if (initialized) + return 1; + + if (avc_open(NULL, 0) != 0) { + int enforce, saved_errno = errno; + + enforce = security_getenforce(); + log_full_errno(enforce != 0 ? LOG_ERR : LOG_WARNING, saved_errno, "Failed to open the SELinux AVC: %m"); + + /* If enforcement isn't on, then let's suppress this + * error, and just don't do any AVC checks. The + * warning we printed is hence all the admin will + * see. */ + if (enforce == 0) + return 0; + + /* Return an access denied error, if we couldn't load + * the AVC but enforcing mode was on, or we couldn't + * determine whether it is one. */ + return sd_bus_error_setf(error, SD_BUS_ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED, "Failed to open the SELinux AVC: %s", strerror(saved_errno)); + } + + selinux_set_callback(SELINUX_CB_AUDIT, (union selinux_callback) audit_callback); + selinux_set_callback(SELINUX_CB_LOG, (union selinux_callback) log_callback); + + initialized = true; + return 1; +} + +/* + This function communicates with the kernel to check whether or not it should + allow the access. + If the machine is in permissive mode it will return ok. Audit messages will + still be generated if the access would be denied in enforcing mode. +*/ +int mac_selinux_generic_access_check( + sd_bus_message *message, + const char *path, + const char *permission, + sd_bus_error *error) { + + _cleanup_(sd_bus_creds_unrefp) sd_bus_creds *creds = NULL; + const char *tclass = NULL, *scon = NULL; + struct audit_info audit_info = {}; + _cleanup_free_ char *cl = NULL; + security_context_t fcon = NULL; + char **cmdline = NULL; + int r = 0; + + assert(message); + assert(permission); + assert(error); + + r = access_init(error); + if (r <= 0) + return r; + + r = sd_bus_query_sender_creds( + message, + SD_BUS_CREDS_PID|SD_BUS_CREDS_EUID|SD_BUS_CREDS_EGID| + SD_BUS_CREDS_CMDLINE|SD_BUS_CREDS_AUDIT_LOGIN_UID| + SD_BUS_CREDS_SELINUX_CONTEXT| + SD_BUS_CREDS_AUGMENT /* get more bits from /proc */, + &creds); + if (r < 0) + goto finish; + + /* The SELinux context is something we really should have + * gotten directly from the message or sender, and not be an + * augmented field. If it was augmented we cannot use it for + * authorization, since this is racy and vulnerable. Let's add + * an extra check, just in case, even though this really + * shouldn't be possible. */ + assert_return((sd_bus_creds_get_augmented_mask(creds) & SD_BUS_CREDS_SELINUX_CONTEXT) == 0, -EPERM); + + r = sd_bus_creds_get_selinux_context(creds, &scon); + if (r < 0) + goto finish; + + if (path) { + /* Get the file context of the unit file */ + + r = getfilecon_raw(path, &fcon); + if (r < 0) { + r = sd_bus_error_setf(error, SD_BUS_ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED, "Failed to get file context on %s.", path); + goto finish; + } + + tclass = "service"; + } else { + r = getcon_raw(&fcon); + if (r < 0) { + r = sd_bus_error_setf(error, SD_BUS_ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED, "Failed to get current context."); + goto finish; + } + + tclass = "system"; + } + + sd_bus_creds_get_cmdline(creds, &cmdline); + cl = strv_join(cmdline, " "); + + audit_info.creds = creds; + audit_info.path = path; + audit_info.cmdline = cl; + + r = selinux_check_access(scon, fcon, tclass, permission, &audit_info); + if (r < 0) + r = sd_bus_error_setf(error, SD_BUS_ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED, "SELinux policy denies access."); + + log_debug("SELinux access check scon=%s tcon=%s tclass=%s perm=%s path=%s cmdline=%s: %i", scon, fcon, tclass, permission, path, cl, r); + +finish: + freecon(fcon); + + if (r < 0 && security_getenforce() != 1) { + sd_bus_error_free(error); + r = 0; + } + + return r; +} + +#else + +int mac_selinux_generic_access_check( + sd_bus_message *message, + const char *path, + const char *permission, + sd_bus_error *error) { + + return 0; +} + +#endif |