diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'src/resolve')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/resolve/resolved-dns-cache.h | 1 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | src/resolve/resolved-dns-dnssec.c | 629 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | src/resolve/resolved-dns-dnssec.h | 48 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | src/resolve/test-dnssec.c | 217 |
4 files changed, 894 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/src/resolve/resolved-dns-cache.h b/src/resolve/resolved-dns-cache.h index 164435b4fb..561d31ad99 100644 --- a/src/resolve/resolved-dns-cache.h +++ b/src/resolve/resolved-dns-cache.h @@ -21,7 +21,6 @@ along with systemd; If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. ***/ - #include "hashmap.h" #include "list.h" #include "prioq.h" diff --git a/src/resolve/resolved-dns-dnssec.c b/src/resolve/resolved-dns-dnssec.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ad28d8adef --- /dev/null +++ b/src/resolve/resolved-dns-dnssec.c @@ -0,0 +1,629 @@ +/*-*- Mode: C; c-basic-offset: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil -*-*/ + +/*** + This file is part of systemd. + + Copyright 2015 Lennart Poettering + + systemd is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it + under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License as published by + the Free Software Foundation; either version 2.1 of the License, or + (at your option) any later version. + + systemd is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but + WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU + Lesser General Public License for more details. + + You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public License + along with systemd; If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. +***/ + +#include <gcrypt.h> + +#include "alloc-util.h" +#include "dns-domain.h" +#include "resolved-dns-dnssec.h" +#include "resolved-dns-packet.h" + +/* Open question: + * + * How does the DNSSEC canonical form of a hostname with a label + * containing a dot look like, the way DNS-SD does it? + * + * */ + +#define VERIFY_RRS_MAX 256 +#define MAX_KEY_SIZE (32*1024) + +/* + * The DNSSEC Chain of trust: + * + * Normal RRs are protected via RRSIG RRs in combination with DNSKEY RRs, all in the same zone + * DNSKEY RRs are either protected like normal RRs, or via a DS from a zone "higher" up the tree + * DS RRs are protected like normal RRs + * + * Example chain: + * Normal RR → RRSIG/DNSKEY+ → DS → RRSIG/DNSKEY+ → DS → ... → DS → RRSIG/DNSKEY+ → DS + */ + +static bool dnssec_algorithm_supported(int algorithm) { + return IN_SET(algorithm, DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_RSASHA1, DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_RSASHA256, DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_RSASHA512); +} + +static bool dnssec_digest_supported(int digest) { + return IN_SET(digest, DNSSEC_DIGEST_SHA1, DNSSEC_DIGEST_SHA256); +} + +uint16_t dnssec_keytag(DnsResourceRecord *dnskey) { + const uint8_t *p; + uint32_t sum; + size_t i; + + /* The algorithm from RFC 4034, Appendix B. */ + + assert(dnskey); + assert(dnskey->key->type == DNS_TYPE_DNSKEY); + + sum = (uint32_t) dnskey->dnskey.flags + + ((((uint32_t) dnskey->dnskey.protocol) << 8) + (uint32_t) dnskey->dnskey.algorithm); + + p = dnskey->dnskey.key; + + for (i = 0; i < dnskey->dnskey.key_size; i++) + sum += (i & 1) == 0 ? (uint32_t) p[i] << 8 : (uint32_t) p[i]; + + sum += (sum >> 16) & UINT32_C(0xFFFF); + + return sum & UINT32_C(0xFFFF); +} + +static int rr_compare(const void *a, const void *b) { + DnsResourceRecord **x = (DnsResourceRecord**) a, **y = (DnsResourceRecord**) b; + size_t m; + int r; + + /* Let's order the RRs according to RFC 4034, Section 6.3 */ + + assert(x); + assert(*x); + assert((*x)->wire_format); + assert(y); + assert(*y); + assert((*y)->wire_format); + + m = MIN((*x)->wire_format_size, (*y)->wire_format_size); + + r = memcmp((*x)->wire_format, (*y)->wire_format, m); + if (r != 0) + return r; + + if ((*x)->wire_format_size < (*y)->wire_format_size) + return -1; + else if ((*x)->wire_format_size > (*y)->wire_format_size) + return 1; + + return 0; +} + +static int dnssec_rsa_verify( + const char *hash_algorithm, + const void *signature, size_t signature_size, + const void *data, size_t data_size, + const void *exponent, size_t exponent_size, + const void *modulus, size_t modulus_size) { + + gcry_sexp_t public_key_sexp = NULL, data_sexp = NULL, signature_sexp = NULL; + gcry_mpi_t n = NULL, e = NULL, s = NULL; + gcry_error_t ge; + int r; + + assert(hash_algorithm); + + ge = gcry_mpi_scan(&s, GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, signature, signature_size, NULL); + if (ge != 0) { + r = -EIO; + goto finish; + } + + ge = gcry_mpi_scan(&e, GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, exponent, exponent_size, NULL); + if (ge != 0) { + r = -EIO; + goto finish; + } + + ge = gcry_mpi_scan(&n, GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, modulus, modulus_size, NULL); + if (ge != 0) { + r = -EIO; + goto finish; + } + + ge = gcry_sexp_build(&signature_sexp, + NULL, + "(sig-val (rsa (s %m)))", + s); + + if (ge != 0) { + r = -EIO; + goto finish; + } + + ge = gcry_sexp_build(&data_sexp, + NULL, + "(data (flags pkcs1) (hash %s %b))", + hash_algorithm, + (int) data_size, + data); + if (ge != 0) { + r = -EIO; + goto finish; + } + + ge = gcry_sexp_build(&public_key_sexp, + NULL, + "(public-key (rsa (n %m) (e %m)))", + n, + e); + if (ge != 0) { + r = -EIO; + goto finish; + } + + ge = gcry_pk_verify(signature_sexp, data_sexp, public_key_sexp); + if (ge == GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE) + r = 0; + else if (ge != 0) + r = -EIO; + else + r = 1; + +finish: + if (e) + gcry_mpi_release(e); + if (n) + gcry_mpi_release(n); + if (s) + gcry_mpi_release(s); + + if (public_key_sexp) + gcry_sexp_release(public_key_sexp); + if (signature_sexp) + gcry_sexp_release(signature_sexp); + if (data_sexp) + gcry_sexp_release(data_sexp); + + return r; +} + +static void md_add_uint8(gcry_md_hd_t md, uint8_t v) { + gcry_md_write(md, &v, sizeof(v)); +} + +static void md_add_uint16(gcry_md_hd_t md, uint16_t v) { + v = htobe16(v); + gcry_md_write(md, &v, sizeof(v)); +} + +static void md_add_uint32(gcry_md_hd_t md, uint32_t v) { + v = htobe32(v); + gcry_md_write(md, &v, sizeof(v)); +} + +int dnssec_verify_rrset(DnsAnswer *a, DnsResourceKey *key, DnsResourceRecord *rrsig, DnsResourceRecord *dnskey) { + uint8_t wire_format_name[DNS_WIRE_FOMAT_HOSTNAME_MAX]; + size_t exponent_size, modulus_size, hash_size; + void *exponent, *modulus, *hash; + DnsResourceRecord **list, *rr; + gcry_md_hd_t md = NULL; + size_t k, n = 0; + int r; + + assert(key); + assert(rrsig); + assert(dnskey); + + /* Verifies the the RRSet matching the specified "key" in "a", + * using the signature "rrsig" and the key "dnskey". It's + * assumed the RRSIG and DNSKEY match. */ + + if (!dnssec_algorithm_supported(rrsig->rrsig.algorithm)) + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + + if (a->n_rrs > VERIFY_RRS_MAX) + return -E2BIG; + + /* Collect all relevant RRs in a single array, so that we can look at the RRset */ + list = newa(DnsResourceRecord *, a->n_rrs); + + DNS_ANSWER_FOREACH(rr, a) { + r = dns_resource_key_equal(key, rr->key); + if (r < 0) + return r; + if (r == 0) + continue; + + /* We need the wire format for ordering, and digest calculation */ + r = dns_resource_record_to_wire_format(rr, true); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + list[n++] = rr; + } + + if (n <= 0) + return -ENODATA; + + /* Bring the RRs into canonical order */ + qsort_safe(list, n, sizeof(DnsResourceRecord), rr_compare); + + /* OK, the RRs are now in canonical order. Let's calculate the digest */ + switch (rrsig->rrsig.algorithm) { + + case DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_RSASHA1: + gcry_md_open(&md, GCRY_MD_SHA1, 0); + hash_size = 20; + break; + + case DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_RSASHA256: + gcry_md_open(&md, GCRY_MD_SHA256, 0); + hash_size = 32; + break; + + case DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_RSASHA512: + gcry_md_open(&md, GCRY_MD_SHA512, 0); + hash_size = 64; + break; + + default: + assert_not_reached("Unknown digest"); + } + + if (!md) + return -EIO; + + md_add_uint16(md, rrsig->rrsig.type_covered); + md_add_uint8(md, rrsig->rrsig.algorithm); + md_add_uint8(md, rrsig->rrsig.labels); + md_add_uint32(md, rrsig->rrsig.original_ttl); + md_add_uint32(md, rrsig->rrsig.expiration); + md_add_uint32(md, rrsig->rrsig.inception); + md_add_uint16(md, rrsig->rrsig.key_tag); + + r = dns_name_to_wire_format(rrsig->rrsig.signer, wire_format_name, sizeof(wire_format_name), true); + if (r < 0) + goto finish; + gcry_md_write(md, wire_format_name, r); + + for (k = 0; k < n; k++) { + size_t l; + rr = list[k]; + + r = dns_name_to_wire_format(DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(rr->key), wire_format_name, sizeof(wire_format_name), true); + if (r < 0) + goto finish; + gcry_md_write(md, wire_format_name, r); + + md_add_uint16(md, rr->key->type); + md_add_uint16(md, rr->key->class); + md_add_uint32(md, rrsig->rrsig.original_ttl); + + assert(rr->wire_format_rdata_offset <= rr->wire_format_size); + l = rr->wire_format_size - rr->wire_format_rdata_offset; + assert(l <= 0xFFFF); + + md_add_uint16(md, (uint16_t) l); + gcry_md_write(md, (uint8_t*) rr->wire_format + rr->wire_format_rdata_offset, l); + } + + hash = gcry_md_read(md, 0); + if (!hash) { + r = -EIO; + goto finish; + } + + if (*(uint8_t*) dnskey->dnskey.key == 0) { + /* exponent is > 255 bytes long */ + + exponent = (uint8_t*) dnskey->dnskey.key + 3; + exponent_size = + ((size_t) (((uint8_t*) dnskey->dnskey.key)[0]) << 8) | + ((size_t) ((uint8_t*) dnskey->dnskey.key)[1]); + + if (exponent_size < 256) { + r = -EINVAL; + goto finish; + } + + if (3 + exponent_size >= dnskey->dnskey.key_size) { + r = -EINVAL; + goto finish; + } + + modulus = (uint8_t*) dnskey->dnskey.key + 3 + exponent_size; + modulus_size = dnskey->dnskey.key_size - 3 - exponent_size; + + } else { + /* exponent is <= 255 bytes long */ + + exponent = (uint8_t*) dnskey->dnskey.key + 1; + exponent_size = (size_t) ((uint8_t*) dnskey->dnskey.key)[0]; + + if (exponent_size <= 0) { + r = -EINVAL; + goto finish; + } + + if (1 + exponent_size >= dnskey->dnskey.key_size) { + r = -EINVAL; + goto finish; + } + + modulus = (uint8_t*) dnskey->dnskey.key + 1 + exponent_size; + modulus_size = dnskey->dnskey.key_size - 1 - exponent_size; + } + + r = dnssec_rsa_verify( + gcry_md_algo_name(gcry_md_get_algo(md)), + rrsig->rrsig.signature, rrsig->rrsig.signature_size, + hash, hash_size, + exponent, exponent_size, + modulus, modulus_size); + if (r < 0) + goto finish; + + r = r ? DNSSEC_VERIFIED : DNSSEC_INVALID; + +finish: + gcry_md_close(md); + return r; +} + +int dnssec_rrsig_match_dnskey(DnsResourceRecord *rrsig, DnsResourceRecord *dnskey) { + + assert(rrsig); + assert(dnskey); + + /* Checks if the specified DNSKEY RR matches the key used for + * the signature in the specified RRSIG RR */ + + if (rrsig->key->type != DNS_TYPE_RRSIG) + return -EINVAL; + + if (dnskey->key->type != DNS_TYPE_DNSKEY) + return 0; + if (dnskey->key->class != rrsig->key->class) + return 0; + if ((dnskey->dnskey.flags & DNSKEY_FLAG_ZONE_KEY) == 0) + return 0; + if (dnskey->dnskey.protocol != 3) + return 0; + if (dnskey->dnskey.algorithm != rrsig->rrsig.algorithm) + return 0; + + if (dnssec_keytag(dnskey) != rrsig->rrsig.key_tag) + return 0; + + return dns_name_equal(DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(dnskey->key), DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(rrsig->key)); +} + +int dnssec_key_match_rrsig(DnsResourceKey *key, DnsResourceRecord *rrsig) { + assert(key); + assert(rrsig); + + /* Checks if the specified RRSIG RR protects the RRSet of the specified RR key. */ + + if (rrsig->key->type != DNS_TYPE_RRSIG) + return 0; + if (rrsig->key->class != key->class) + return 0; + if (rrsig->rrsig.type_covered != key->type) + return 0; + + return dns_name_equal(DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(rrsig->key), DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(key)); +} + +int dnssec_verify_rrset_search(DnsAnswer *a, DnsResourceKey *key, DnsAnswer *validated_dnskeys) { + bool found_rrsig = false, found_dnskey = false; + DnsResourceRecord *rrsig; + int r; + + assert(key); + + /* Verifies all RRs from "a" that match the key "key", against DNSKEY RRs in "validated_dnskeys" */ + + if (!a || a->n_rrs <= 0) + return -ENODATA; + + /* Iterate through each RRSIG RR. */ + DNS_ANSWER_FOREACH(rrsig, a) { + DnsResourceRecord *dnskey; + + r = dnssec_key_match_rrsig(key, rrsig); + if (r < 0) + return r; + if (r == 0) + continue; + + found_rrsig = true; + + DNS_ANSWER_FOREACH(dnskey, validated_dnskeys) { + + r = dnssec_rrsig_match_dnskey(rrsig, dnskey); + if (r < 0) + return r; + if (r == 0) + continue; + + found_dnskey = true; + + /* Yay, we found a matching RRSIG with a matching + * DNSKEY, awesome. Now let's verify all entries of + * the RRSet against the RRSIG and DNSKEY + * combination. */ + + r = dnssec_verify_rrset(a, key, rrsig, dnskey); + if (r < 0 && r != EOPNOTSUPP) + return r; + if (r == DNSSEC_VERIFIED) + return DNSSEC_VERIFIED; + + /* If the signature is invalid, or done using + an unsupported algorithm, let's try another + key and/or signature. After all they + key_tags and stuff are not unique, and + might be shared by multiple keys. */ + } + } + + if (found_dnskey) + return DNSSEC_INVALID; + + if (found_rrsig) + return DNSSEC_MISSING_KEY; + + return DNSSEC_NO_SIGNATURE; +} + +int dnssec_canonicalize(const char *n, char *buffer, size_t buffer_max) { + _cleanup_free_ char *s = NULL; + size_t c = 0; + int r; + + /* Converts the specified hostname into DNSSEC canonicalized + * form. */ + + if (buffer_max < 2) + return -ENOBUFS; + + for (;;) { + size_t i; + + r = dns_label_unescape(&n, buffer, buffer_max); + if (r < 0) + return r; + if (r == 0) + break; + if (r > 0) { + int k; + + /* DNSSEC validation is always done on the ASCII version of the label */ + k = dns_label_apply_idna(buffer, r, buffer, buffer_max); + if (k < 0) + return k; + if (k > 0) + r = k; + } + + if (buffer_max < (size_t) r + 2) + return -ENOBUFS; + + /* The DNSSEC canonical form is not clear on what to + * do with dots appearing in labels, the way DNS-SD + * does it. Refuse it for now. */ + + if (memchr(buffer, '.', r)) + return -EINVAL; + + for (i = 0; i < (size_t) r; i ++) { + if (buffer[i] >= 'A' && buffer[i] <= 'Z') + buffer[i] = buffer[i] - 'A' + 'a'; + } + + buffer[r] = '.'; + + buffer += r + 1; + c += r + 1; + + buffer_max -= r + 1; + } + + if (c <= 0) { + /* Not even a single label: this is the root domain name */ + + assert(buffer_max > 2); + buffer[0] = '.'; + buffer[1] = 0; + + return 1; + } + + return (int) c; +} + +int dnssec_verify_dnskey(DnsResourceRecord *dnskey, DnsResourceRecord *ds) { + gcry_md_hd_t md = NULL; + char owner_name[DNSSEC_CANONICAL_HOSTNAME_MAX]; + void *result; + int r; + + assert(dnskey); + assert(ds); + + /* Implements DNSKEY verification by a DS, according to RFC 4035, section 5.2 */ + + if (dnskey->key->type != DNS_TYPE_DNSKEY) + return -EINVAL; + if (ds->key->type != DNS_TYPE_DS) + return -EINVAL; + if ((dnskey->dnskey.flags & DNSKEY_FLAG_ZONE_KEY) == 0) + return -EKEYREJECTED; + if (dnskey->dnskey.protocol != 3) + return -EKEYREJECTED; + + if (!dnssec_algorithm_supported(dnskey->dnskey.algorithm)) + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + if (!dnssec_digest_supported(ds->ds.digest_type)) + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + + if (dnskey->dnskey.algorithm != ds->ds.algorithm) + return 0; + if (dnssec_keytag(dnskey) != ds->ds.key_tag) + return 0; + + switch (ds->ds.digest_type) { + + case DNSSEC_DIGEST_SHA1: + + if (ds->ds.digest_size != 20) + return 0; + + gcry_md_open(&md, GCRY_MD_SHA1, 0); + break; + + case DNSSEC_DIGEST_SHA256: + + if (ds->ds.digest_size != 32) + return 0; + + gcry_md_open(&md, GCRY_MD_SHA256, 0); + break; + + default: + assert_not_reached("Unknown digest"); + } + + if (!md) + return -EIO; + + r = dnssec_canonicalize(DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(dnskey->key), owner_name, sizeof(owner_name)); + if (r < 0) + goto finish; + + gcry_md_write(md, owner_name, r); + md_add_uint16(md, dnskey->dnskey.flags); + md_add_uint8(md, dnskey->dnskey.protocol); + md_add_uint8(md, dnskey->dnskey.algorithm); + gcry_md_write(md, dnskey->dnskey.key, dnskey->dnskey.key_size); + + result = gcry_md_read(md, 0); + if (!result) { + r = -EIO; + goto finish; + } + + r = memcmp(result, ds->ds.digest, ds->ds.digest_size) != 0; + +finish: + gcry_md_close(md); + return r; +} diff --git a/src/resolve/resolved-dns-dnssec.h b/src/resolve/resolved-dns-dnssec.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..56f0aec437 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/resolve/resolved-dns-dnssec.h @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +/*-*- Mode: C; c-basic-offset: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil -*-*/ + +#pragma once + +/*** + This file is part of systemd. + + Copyright 2015 Lennart Poettering + + systemd is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it + under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License as published by + the Free Software Foundation; either version 2.1 of the License, or + (at your option) any later version. + + systemd is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but + WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU + Lesser General Public License for more details. + + You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public License + along with systemd; If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. +***/ + +#include "dns-domain.h" +#include "resolved-dns-answer.h" +#include "resolved-dns-rr.h" + +enum { + DNSSEC_VERIFIED, + DNSSEC_INVALID, + DNSSEC_NO_SIGNATURE, + DNSSEC_MISSING_KEY, +}; + + +#define DNSSEC_CANONICAL_HOSTNAME_MAX (DNS_HOSTNAME_MAX + 2) + +int dnssec_rrsig_match_dnskey(DnsResourceRecord *rrsig, DnsResourceRecord *dnskey); +int dnssec_key_match_rrsig(DnsResourceKey *key, DnsResourceRecord *rrsig); + +int dnssec_verify_rrset(DnsAnswer *answer, DnsResourceKey *key, DnsResourceRecord *rrsig, DnsResourceRecord *dnskey); +int dnssec_verify_rrset_search(DnsAnswer *a, DnsResourceKey *key, DnsAnswer *validated_dnskeys); + +int dnssec_verify_dnskey(DnsResourceRecord *dnskey, DnsResourceRecord *ds); + +uint16_t dnssec_keytag(DnsResourceRecord *dnskey); + +int dnssec_canonicalize(const char *n, char *buffer, size_t buffer_max); diff --git a/src/resolve/test-dnssec.c b/src/resolve/test-dnssec.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..8cab025426 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/resolve/test-dnssec.c @@ -0,0 +1,217 @@ +/*-*- Mode: C; c-basic-offset: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil -*-*/ + +/*** + This file is part of systemd. + + Copyright 2015 Lennart Poettering + + systemd is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it + under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License as published by + the Free Software Foundation; either version 2.1 of the License, or + (at your option) any later version. + + systemd is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but + WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU + Lesser General Public License for more details. + + You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public License + along with systemd; If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. +***/ + +#include <arpa/inet.h> +#include <netinet/in.h> +#include <sys/socket.h> + +#include "alloc-util.h" +#include "resolved-dns-dnssec.h" +#include "resolved-dns-packet.h" +#include "resolved-dns-rr.h" +#include "string-util.h" + +static void test_dnssec_verify_rrset(void) { + + static const uint8_t signature_blob[] = { + 0x7f, 0x79, 0xdd, 0x5e, 0x89, 0x79, 0x18, 0xd0, 0x34, 0x86, 0x8c, 0x72, 0x77, 0x75, 0x48, 0x4d, + 0xc3, 0x7d, 0x38, 0x04, 0xab, 0xcd, 0x9e, 0x4c, 0x82, 0xb0, 0x92, 0xca, 0xe9, 0x66, 0xe9, 0x6e, + 0x47, 0xc7, 0x68, 0x8c, 0x94, 0xf6, 0x69, 0xcb, 0x75, 0x94, 0xe6, 0x30, 0xa6, 0xfb, 0x68, 0x64, + 0x96, 0x1a, 0x84, 0xe1, 0xdc, 0x16, 0x4c, 0x83, 0x6c, 0x44, 0xf2, 0x74, 0x4d, 0x74, 0x79, 0x8f, + 0xf3, 0xf4, 0x63, 0x0d, 0xef, 0x5a, 0xe7, 0xe2, 0xfd, 0xf2, 0x2b, 0x38, 0x7c, 0x28, 0x96, 0x9d, + 0xb6, 0xcd, 0x5c, 0x3b, 0x57, 0xe2, 0x24, 0x78, 0x65, 0xd0, 0x9e, 0x77, 0x83, 0x09, 0x6c, 0xff, + 0x3d, 0x52, 0x3f, 0x6e, 0xd1, 0xed, 0x2e, 0xf9, 0xee, 0x8e, 0xa6, 0xbe, 0x9a, 0xa8, 0x87, 0x76, + 0xd8, 0x77, 0xcc, 0x96, 0xa0, 0x98, 0xa1, 0xd1, 0x68, 0x09, 0x43, 0xcf, 0x56, 0xd9, 0xd1, 0x66, + }; + + static const uint8_t dnskey_blob[] = { + 0x03, 0x01, 0x00, 0x01, 0x9b, 0x49, 0x9b, 0xc1, 0xf9, 0x9a, 0xe0, 0x4e, 0xcf, 0xcb, 0x14, 0x45, + 0x2e, 0xc9, 0xf9, 0x74, 0xa7, 0x18, 0xb5, 0xf3, 0xde, 0x39, 0x49, 0xdf, 0x63, 0x33, 0x97, 0x52, + 0xe0, 0x8e, 0xac, 0x50, 0x30, 0x8e, 0x09, 0xd5, 0x24, 0x3d, 0x26, 0xa4, 0x49, 0x37, 0x2b, 0xb0, + 0x6b, 0x1b, 0xdf, 0xde, 0x85, 0x83, 0xcb, 0x22, 0x4e, 0x60, 0x0a, 0x91, 0x1a, 0x1f, 0xc5, 0x40, + 0xb1, 0xc3, 0x15, 0xc1, 0x54, 0x77, 0x86, 0x65, 0x53, 0xec, 0x10, 0x90, 0x0c, 0x91, 0x00, 0x5e, + 0x15, 0xdc, 0x08, 0x02, 0x4c, 0x8c, 0x0d, 0xc0, 0xac, 0x6e, 0xc4, 0x3e, 0x1b, 0x80, 0x19, 0xe4, + 0xf7, 0x5f, 0x77, 0x51, 0x06, 0x87, 0x61, 0xde, 0xa2, 0x18, 0x0f, 0x40, 0x8b, 0x79, 0x72, 0xfa, + 0x8d, 0x1a, 0x44, 0x47, 0x0d, 0x8e, 0x3a, 0x2d, 0xc7, 0x39, 0xbf, 0x56, 0x28, 0x97, 0xd9, 0x20, + 0x4f, 0x00, 0x51, 0x3b, + }; + + _cleanup_(dns_resource_record_unrefp) DnsResourceRecord *a = NULL, *rrsig = NULL, *dnskey = NULL; + _cleanup_(dns_answer_unrefp) DnsAnswer *answer = NULL; + _cleanup_free_ char *x = NULL, *y = NULL, *z = NULL; + + a = dns_resource_record_new_full(DNS_CLASS_IN, DNS_TYPE_A, "nAsA.gov"); + assert_se(a); + + a->a.in_addr.s_addr = inet_addr("52.0.14.116"); + + assert_se(dns_resource_record_to_string(a, &x) >= 0); + log_info("A: %s", x); + + rrsig = dns_resource_record_new_full(DNS_CLASS_IN, DNS_TYPE_RRSIG, "NaSa.GOV."); + assert_se(rrsig); + + rrsig->rrsig.type_covered = DNS_TYPE_A; + rrsig->rrsig.algorithm = DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_RSASHA256; + rrsig->rrsig.labels = 2; + rrsig->rrsig.original_ttl = 600; + rrsig->rrsig.expiration = 0x5683135c; + rrsig->rrsig.inception = 0x565b7da8; + rrsig->rrsig.key_tag = 63876; + rrsig->rrsig.signer = strdup("Nasa.Gov."); + assert_se(rrsig->rrsig.signer); + rrsig->rrsig.signature_size = sizeof(signature_blob); + rrsig->rrsig.signature = memdup(signature_blob, rrsig->rrsig.signature_size); + assert_se(rrsig->rrsig.signature); + + assert_se(dns_resource_record_to_string(rrsig, &y) >= 0); + log_info("RRSIG: %s", y); + + dnskey = dns_resource_record_new_full(DNS_CLASS_IN, DNS_TYPE_DNSKEY, "nASA.gOV"); + assert_se(dnskey); + + dnskey->dnskey.flags = 256; + dnskey->dnskey.protocol = 3; + dnskey->dnskey.algorithm = DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_RSASHA256; + dnskey->dnskey.key_size = sizeof(dnskey_blob); + dnskey->dnskey.key = memdup(dnskey_blob, sizeof(dnskey_blob)); + assert_se(dnskey->dnskey.key); + + assert_se(dns_resource_record_to_string(dnskey, &z) >= 0); + log_info("DNSKEY: %s", z); + log_info("DNSKEY keytag: %u", dnssec_keytag(dnskey)); + + assert_se(dnssec_key_match_rrsig(a->key, rrsig) > 0); + assert_se(dnssec_rrsig_match_dnskey(rrsig, dnskey) > 0); + + answer = dns_answer_new(1); + assert_se(answer); + assert_se(dns_answer_add(answer, a, 0) >= 0); + + assert_se(dnssec_verify_rrset(answer, a->key, rrsig, dnskey) == DNSSEC_VERIFIED); +} + +static void test_dnssec_verify_dns_key(void) { + + static const uint8_t ds1_fprint[] = { + 0x46, 0x8B, 0xC8, 0xDD, 0xC7, 0xE8, 0x27, 0x03, 0x40, 0xBB, 0x8A, 0x1F, 0x3B, 0x2E, 0x45, 0x9D, + 0x80, 0x67, 0x14, 0x01, + }; + static const uint8_t ds2_fprint[] = { + 0x8A, 0xEE, 0x80, 0x47, 0x05, 0x5F, 0x83, 0xD1, 0x48, 0xBA, 0x8F, 0xF6, 0xDD, 0xA7, 0x60, 0xCE, + 0x94, 0xF7, 0xC7, 0x5E, 0x52, 0x4C, 0xF2, 0xE9, 0x50, 0xB9, 0x2E, 0xCB, 0xEF, 0x96, 0xB9, 0x98, + }; + static const uint8_t dnskey_blob[] = { + 0x03, 0x01, 0x00, 0x01, 0xa8, 0x12, 0xda, 0x4f, 0xd2, 0x7d, 0x54, 0x14, 0x0e, 0xcc, 0x5b, 0x5e, + 0x45, 0x9c, 0x96, 0x98, 0xc0, 0xc0, 0x85, 0x81, 0xb1, 0x47, 0x8c, 0x7d, 0xe8, 0x39, 0x50, 0xcc, + 0xc5, 0xd0, 0xf2, 0x00, 0x81, 0x67, 0x79, 0xf6, 0xcc, 0x9d, 0xad, 0x6c, 0xbb, 0x7b, 0x6f, 0x48, + 0x97, 0x15, 0x1c, 0xfd, 0x0b, 0xfe, 0xd3, 0xd7, 0x7d, 0x9f, 0x81, 0x26, 0xd3, 0xc5, 0x65, 0x49, + 0xcf, 0x46, 0x62, 0xb0, 0x55, 0x6e, 0x47, 0xc7, 0x30, 0xef, 0x51, 0xfb, 0x3e, 0xc6, 0xef, 0xde, + 0x27, 0x3f, 0xfa, 0x57, 0x2d, 0xa7, 0x1d, 0x80, 0x46, 0x9a, 0x5f, 0x14, 0xb3, 0xb0, 0x2c, 0xbe, + 0x72, 0xca, 0xdf, 0xb2, 0xff, 0x36, 0x5b, 0x4f, 0xec, 0x58, 0x8e, 0x8d, 0x01, 0xe9, 0xa9, 0xdf, + 0xb5, 0x60, 0xad, 0x52, 0x4d, 0xfc, 0xa9, 0x3e, 0x8d, 0x35, 0x95, 0xb3, 0x4e, 0x0f, 0xca, 0x45, + 0x1b, 0xf7, 0xef, 0x3a, 0x88, 0x25, 0x08, 0xc7, 0x4e, 0x06, 0xc1, 0x62, 0x1a, 0xce, 0xd8, 0x77, + 0xbd, 0x02, 0x65, 0xf8, 0x49, 0xfb, 0xce, 0xf6, 0xa8, 0x09, 0xfc, 0xde, 0xb2, 0x09, 0x9d, 0x39, + 0xf8, 0x63, 0x9c, 0x32, 0x42, 0x7c, 0xa0, 0x30, 0x86, 0x72, 0x7a, 0x4a, 0xc6, 0xd4, 0xb3, 0x2d, + 0x24, 0xef, 0x96, 0x3f, 0xc2, 0xda, 0xd3, 0xf2, 0x15, 0x6f, 0xda, 0x65, 0x4b, 0x81, 0x28, 0x68, + 0xf4, 0xfe, 0x3e, 0x71, 0x4f, 0x50, 0x96, 0x72, 0x58, 0xa1, 0x89, 0xdd, 0x01, 0x61, 0x39, 0x39, + 0xc6, 0x76, 0xa4, 0xda, 0x02, 0x70, 0x3d, 0xc0, 0xdc, 0x8d, 0x70, 0x72, 0x04, 0x90, 0x79, 0xd4, + 0xec, 0x65, 0xcf, 0x49, 0x35, 0x25, 0x3a, 0x14, 0x1a, 0x45, 0x20, 0xeb, 0x31, 0xaf, 0x92, 0xba, + 0x20, 0xd3, 0xcd, 0xa7, 0x13, 0x44, 0xdc, 0xcf, 0xf0, 0x27, 0x34, 0xb9, 0xe7, 0x24, 0x6f, 0x73, + 0xe7, 0xea, 0x77, 0x03, + }; + + _cleanup_(dns_resource_record_unrefp) DnsResourceRecord *dnskey = NULL, *ds1 = NULL, *ds2 = NULL; + _cleanup_free_ char *a = NULL, *b = NULL, *c = NULL; + + /* The two DS RRs in effect for nasa.gov on 2015-12-01. */ + ds1 = dns_resource_record_new_full(DNS_CLASS_IN, DNS_TYPE_DS, "nasa.gov"); + assert_se(ds1); + + ds1->ds.key_tag = 47857; + ds1->ds.algorithm = DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_RSASHA256; + ds1->ds.digest_type = DNSSEC_DIGEST_SHA1; + ds1->ds.digest_size = sizeof(ds1_fprint); + ds1->ds.digest = memdup(ds1_fprint, ds1->ds.digest_size); + assert_se(ds1->ds.digest); + + assert_se(dns_resource_record_to_string(ds1, &a) >= 0); + log_info("DS1: %s", a); + + ds2 = dns_resource_record_new_full(DNS_CLASS_IN, DNS_TYPE_DS, "NASA.GOV"); + assert_se(ds2); + + ds2->ds.key_tag = 47857; + ds2->ds.algorithm = DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_RSASHA256; + ds2->ds.digest_type = DNSSEC_DIGEST_SHA256; + ds2->ds.digest_size = sizeof(ds2_fprint); + ds2->ds.digest = memdup(ds2_fprint, ds2->ds.digest_size); + assert_se(ds2->ds.digest); + + assert_se(dns_resource_record_to_string(ds2, &b) >= 0); + log_info("DS2: %s", b); + + dnskey = dns_resource_record_new_full(DNS_CLASS_IN, DNS_TYPE_DNSKEY, "nasa.GOV"); + assert_se(dnskey); + + dnskey->dnskey.flags = 257; + dnskey->dnskey.protocol = 3; + dnskey->dnskey.algorithm = DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_RSASHA256; + dnskey->dnskey.key_size = sizeof(dnskey_blob); + dnskey->dnskey.key = memdup(dnskey_blob, sizeof(dnskey_blob)); + assert_se(dnskey->dnskey.key); + + assert_se(dns_resource_record_to_string(dnskey, &c) >= 0); + log_info("DNSKEY: %s", c); + log_info("DNSKEY keytag: %u", dnssec_keytag(dnskey)); + + assert_se(dnssec_verify_dnskey(dnskey, ds1) > 0); + assert_se(dnssec_verify_dnskey(dnskey, ds2) > 0); +} + +static void test_dnssec_canonicalize_one(const char *original, const char *canonical, int r) { + char canonicalized[DNSSEC_CANONICAL_HOSTNAME_MAX]; + + assert_se(dnssec_canonicalize(original, canonicalized, sizeof(canonicalized)) == r); + if (r < 0) + return; + + assert_se(streq(canonicalized, canonical)); +} + +static void test_dnssec_canonicalize(void) { + test_dnssec_canonicalize_one("", ".", 1); + test_dnssec_canonicalize_one(".", ".", 1); + test_dnssec_canonicalize_one("foo", "foo.", 4); + test_dnssec_canonicalize_one("foo.", "foo.", 4); + test_dnssec_canonicalize_one("FOO.", "foo.", 4); + test_dnssec_canonicalize_one("FOO.bar.", "foo.bar.", 8); + test_dnssec_canonicalize_one("FOO..bar.", NULL, -EINVAL); +} + +int main(int argc, char*argv[]) { + + test_dnssec_canonicalize(); + test_dnssec_verify_dns_key(); + test_dnssec_verify_rrset(); + + return 0; +} |