diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'src/util.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/util.c | 291 |
1 files changed, 245 insertions, 46 deletions
diff --git a/src/util.c b/src/util.c index e93e6f6cf5..26c2f22ff0 100644 --- a/src/util.c +++ b/src/util.c @@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ #include <linux/rtc.h> #include <glob.h> #include <grp.h> +#include <sys/mman.h> #include "macro.h" #include "util.h" @@ -73,7 +74,7 @@ size_t page_size(void) { static __thread size_t pgsz = 0; long r; - if (_likely_(pgsz)) + if (_likely_(pgsz > 0)) return pgsz; assert_se((r = sysconf(_SC_PAGESIZE)) > 0); @@ -993,46 +994,51 @@ char *truncate_nl(char *s) { return s; } -int get_process_name(pid_t pid, char **name) { - char *p; +int get_process_comm(pid_t pid, char **name) { int r; - assert(pid >= 1); assert(name); - if (asprintf(&p, "/proc/%lu/comm", (unsigned long) pid) < 0) - return -ENOMEM; - - r = read_one_line_file(p, name); - free(p); + if (pid == 0) + r = read_one_line_file("/proc/self/comm", name); + else { + char *p; + if (asprintf(&p, "/proc/%lu/comm", (unsigned long) pid) < 0) + return -ENOMEM; - if (r < 0) - return r; + r = read_one_line_file(p, name); + free(p); + } - return 0; + return r; } -int get_process_cmdline(pid_t pid, size_t max_length, char **line) { - char *p, *r, *k; +int get_process_cmdline(pid_t pid, size_t max_length, bool comm_fallback, char **line) { + char *r, *k; int c; bool space = false; size_t left; FILE *f; - assert(pid >= 1); assert(max_length > 0); assert(line); - if (asprintf(&p, "/proc/%lu/cmdline", (unsigned long) pid) < 0) - return -ENOMEM; + if (pid == 0) + f = fopen("/proc/self/cmdline", "re"); + else { + char *p; + if (asprintf(&p, "/proc/%lu/cmdline", (unsigned long) pid) < 0) + return -ENOMEM; - f = fopen(p, "re"); - free(p); + f = fopen(p, "re"); + free(p); + } if (!f) return -errno; - if (!(r = new(char, max_length))) { + r = new(char, max_length); + if (!r) { fclose(f); return -ENOMEM; } @@ -1076,13 +1082,17 @@ int get_process_cmdline(pid_t pid, size_t max_length, char **line) { free(r); - if ((h = get_process_name(pid, &t)) < 0) + if (!comm_fallback) + return -ENOENT; + + h = get_process_comm(pid, &t); + if (h < 0) return h; - h = asprintf(&r, "[%s]", t); + r = join("[", t, "]", NULL); free(t); - if (h < 0) + if (!r) return -ENOMEM; } @@ -1090,6 +1100,25 @@ int get_process_cmdline(pid_t pid, size_t max_length, char **line) { return 0; } +int get_process_exe(pid_t pid, char **name) { + int r; + + assert(name); + + if (pid == 0) + r = readlink_malloc("/proc/self/exe", name); + else { + char *p; + if (asprintf(&p, "/proc/%lu/exe", (unsigned long) pid) < 0) + return -ENOMEM; + + r = readlink_malloc(p, name); + free(p); + } + + return r; +} + char *strnappend(const char *s, const char *suffix, size_t b) { size_t a; char *r; @@ -3503,6 +3532,22 @@ int chmod_and_chown(const char *path, mode_t mode, uid_t uid, gid_t gid) { return 0; } +int fchmod_and_fchown(int fd, mode_t mode, uid_t uid, gid_t gid) { + assert(fd >= 0); + + /* Under the assumption that we are running privileged we + * first change the access mode and only then hand out + * ownership to avoid a window where access is too open. */ + + if (fchmod(fd, mode) < 0) + return -errno; + + if (fchown(fd, uid, gid) < 0) + return -errno; + + return 0; +} + cpu_set_t* cpu_set_malloc(unsigned *ncpus) { cpu_set_t *r; unsigned n = 1024; @@ -4270,7 +4315,7 @@ const char *default_term_for_tty(const char *tty) { return term; } -bool dirent_is_file(struct dirent *de) { +bool dirent_is_file(const struct dirent *de) { assert(de); if (ignore_file(de->d_name)) @@ -4284,6 +4329,15 @@ bool dirent_is_file(struct dirent *de) { return true; } +bool dirent_is_file_with_suffix(const struct dirent *de, const char *suffix) { + assert(de); + + if (!dirent_is_file(de)) + return false; + + return endswith(de->d_name, suffix); +} + void execute_directory(const char *directory, DIR *d, char *argv[]) { DIR *_d = NULL; struct dirent *de; @@ -4456,6 +4510,98 @@ void parse_syslog_priority(char **p, int *priority) { *p += k; } +void skip_syslog_pid(char **buf) { + char *p; + + assert(buf); + assert(*buf); + + p = *buf; + + if (*p != '[') + return; + + p++; + p += strspn(p, "0123456789"); + + if (*p != ']') + return; + + p++; + + *buf = p; +} + +void skip_syslog_date(char **buf) { + enum { + LETTER, + SPACE, + NUMBER, + SPACE_OR_NUMBER, + COLON + } sequence[] = { + LETTER, LETTER, LETTER, + SPACE, + SPACE_OR_NUMBER, NUMBER, + SPACE, + SPACE_OR_NUMBER, NUMBER, + COLON, + SPACE_OR_NUMBER, NUMBER, + COLON, + SPACE_OR_NUMBER, NUMBER, + SPACE + }; + + char *p; + unsigned i; + + assert(buf); + assert(*buf); + + p = *buf; + + for (i = 0; i < ELEMENTSOF(sequence); i++, p++) { + + if (!*p) + return; + + switch (sequence[i]) { + + case SPACE: + if (*p != ' ') + return; + break; + + case SPACE_OR_NUMBER: + if (*p == ' ') + break; + + /* fall through */ + + case NUMBER: + if (*p < '0' || *p > '9') + return; + + break; + + case LETTER: + if (!(*p >= 'A' && *p <= 'Z') && + !(*p >= 'a' && *p <= 'z')) + return; + + break; + + case COLON: + if (*p != ':') + return; + break; + + } + } + + *buf = p; +} + int have_effective_cap(int value) { cap_t cap; cap_flag_value_t fv; @@ -4675,21 +4821,6 @@ int vt_disallocate(const char *name) { return 0; } - -static int file_is_conf(const struct dirent *d, const char *suffix) { - assert(d); - - if (ignore_file(d->d_name)) - return 0; - - if (d->d_type != DT_REG && - d->d_type != DT_LNK && - d->d_type != DT_UNKNOWN) - return 0; - - return endswith(d->d_name, suffix); -} - static int files_add(Hashmap *h, const char *path, const char *suffix) { DIR *dir; struct dirent buffer, *de; @@ -4715,7 +4846,7 @@ static int files_add(Hashmap *h, const char *path, const char *suffix) { if (!de) break; - if (!file_is_conf(de, suffix)) + if (!dirent_is_file_with_suffix(de, suffix)) continue; if (asprintf(&p, "%s/%s", path, de->d_name) < 0) { @@ -5066,21 +5197,27 @@ int symlink_or_copy_atomic(const char *from, const char *to) { } int audit_session_from_pid(pid_t pid, uint32_t *id) { - char *p, *s; + char *s; uint32_t u; int r; - assert(pid >= 1); assert(id); if (have_effective_cap(CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL) <= 0) return -ENOENT; - if (asprintf(&p, "/proc/%lu/sessionid", (unsigned long) pid) < 0) - return -ENOMEM; + if (pid == 0) + r = read_one_line_file("/proc/self/sessionid", &s); + else { + char *p; + + if (asprintf(&p, "/proc/%lu/sessionid", (unsigned long) pid) < 0) + return -ENOMEM; + + r = read_one_line_file(p, &s); + free(p); + } - r = read_one_line_file(p, &s); - free(p); if (r < 0) return r; @@ -5097,6 +5234,51 @@ int audit_session_from_pid(pid_t pid, uint32_t *id) { return 0; } +int audit_loginuid_from_pid(pid_t pid, uid_t *uid) { + char *s; + uid_t u; + int r; + + assert(uid); + + /* Only use audit login uid if we are executed with sufficient + * capabilities so that pam_loginuid could do its job. If we + * are lacking the CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL capabality we most likely + * are being run in a container and /proc/self/loginuid is + * useless since it probably contains a uid of the host + * system. */ + + if (have_effective_cap(CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL) <= 0) + return -ENOENT; + + if (pid == 0) + r = read_one_line_file("/proc/self/loginuid", &s); + else { + char *p; + + if (asprintf(&p, "/proc/%lu/loginuid", (unsigned long) pid) < 0) + return -ENOMEM; + + r = read_one_line_file(p, &s); + free(p); + } + + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = parse_uid(s, &u); + free(s); + + if (r < 0) + return r; + + if (u == (uid_t) -1) + return -ENOENT; + + *uid = (uid_t) u; + return 0; +} + bool display_is_local(const char *display) { assert(display); @@ -5704,6 +5886,23 @@ int strdup_or_null(const char *a, char **b) { return 0; } +int prot_from_flags(int flags) { + + switch (flags & O_ACCMODE) { + + case O_RDONLY: + return PROT_READ; + + case O_WRONLY: + return PROT_WRITE; + + case O_RDWR: + return PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE; + + default: + return -EINVAL; + } + unsigned long cap_last_cap(void) { static __thread unsigned long saved; static __thread bool valid = false; |