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Note that this is not complete yet, as we don't handle wildcard domains
correctly, nor handle domains correctly that use empty non-terminals.
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necessary
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It's not OK to drop these for our proof of non-existance checks.
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candidate state
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digest ids
Let's move this into a function digest_to_gcrypt() that we can reuse
later on when implementing NSEC3 validation.
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validation
Specifically, it appears as if the NSEC next domain name should be in
the original casing rather than canonical form, when validating.
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treewide: fix typos and indentation
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build-sys: fix --disable-tests
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Fixes:
$ ./configure ... --disable-tests
$ make
$ sudo make check
FAIL: test/udev-test.pl
PASS: test/rule-syntax-check.py
PASS: test/sysv-generator-test.py
...
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build-sys: fix ./configure --enable-smack
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Fixes:
$ ./configure ... --enable-smack
$ make src/core/load-fragment-gperf.c
$ grep -i smack src/core/load-fragment-gperf.c
{"Swap.SmackProcessLabel", config_parse_warn_compat, DISABLED_CONFIGURATION, 0},
...
should be
{"Swap.SmackProcessLabel", config_parse_exec_smack_process_label, 0, offsetof(Swap, exec_context)},
...
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Another batch of DNSSEC fixes
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dns_resource_key_match_soa() and dns_resource_key_match_cname_or_dname()
may return errors as negative return values. Make sure to propagate
those.
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This changes answer validation to be more accepting to unordered RRs in
responses. The agorithm we now implement goes something like this:
1. populate validated keys list for this transaction from DS RRs
2. as long as the following changes the unvalidated answer list:
2a. try to validate the first RRset we find in unvalidated answer
list
2b. if that worked: add to validated answer; if DNSKEY also add to
validated keys list; remove from unvalidated answer.
2c. continue at 2a, with the next RRset, or restart from the
beginning when we hit the end
3. as long as the following changes the unvalidated answer list:
3a. try to validate the first RRset again. This will necessarily
fail, but we learn the precise error
3b. If this was a "primary" response to the question, fail the
entire transaction. "Primary" in this context means that it is
directly a response to the query, or a CNAME/DNAME for it.
3c. Otherwise, remove the RRset from the unvalidated answer list.
Note that we the too loops in 2 + 3 are actually coded as a single one,
but the dnskeys_finalized bool indicates which loop we are currently
processing.
Note that loop 2 does not drop any invalidated RRsets yet, that's
something only loop 3 does. This is because loop 2 might still encounter
additional DNSKEYS which might validate more stuff, and if we'd already
have dropped those RRsets we couldn't validate those anymore. The first
loop is hence a "constructive" loop, the second loop a "destructive"
one: the first one validates whatever is possible, the second one then
deletes whatever still isn't.
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This adds a new validation result DNSSEC_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM which is
returned when we encounter an unsupported crypto algorithm when trying
to validate RRSIG/DNSKEY combinations. Previously we'd return ENOTSUPP
in this case, but it's better to consider this a non-error DNSSEC
validation result, since our reaction to this case needs to be more like
in cases such as expired or missing keys: we need to keep continue
validation looking for another RRSIG/DNSKEY combination that works
better for us.
This also reworks how dnssec_validate_rrsig_search() propagates errors
from dnssec_validate_rrsig(). Previously, errors such as unsupported
algorithms or expired signatures would not be propagated, but simply be
returned as "missing-key".
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Instead of figuring out how many RRs to cache right before we do so,
determine this at the time we install the answer RRs, so that we can
still alter this as we manipulate the answer during validation.
The primary purpose of this is to pave the way so that we can drop
unsigned RRsets from the answer and invalidate the number of RRs to
cache at the same time.
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Check the validity of RR types as we parse or receive data from IPC
clients, and use the same code for all of them.
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section
We later rely that the DnsAnswer object contains all RRs from the
original packet, at least when it comes to the answer and authorization
sections, hence we better make sure we don#t silently end up removing an
OPT RR from these two sections.
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dns_packet_unref()
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Also, explain the situation with a longer comment.
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Misc resolved cache fixes
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This is in the fast path, so let's not do all this work unneccessarily.
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When the DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_CACHE_FLUSH flag is not set for an mDNS packet, we should not flush
the cache for RRs with matching keys. However, we were unconditionally flushing the cache
also for these packets.
Now mark all packets as cache_flush by default, except for these mDNS packets, and respect
that flag in the cache handling.
This fixes 90325e8c2e559a21ef0bc2f26b844c140faf8020.
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importd: drop dkr support
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The logic of dns_cache_get() is now:
- look up the precise key;
- look up NXDOMAIN item;
- if an RR type that may be redirected
(i.e., not CNAME, DNAME, RRSIG, NSEC, NSEC3, SIG, KEY, or
NXT) look up a correpsonding CNAME or DNAME record;
- look up a corresponding NSEC record;
Before this change we would give up before potentially finding
negative cache entries for DNAME, CNAME and NSEC records, we
would return NSEC records for aliases where we had DNAME or CNAME
records available and we would incorrectly try to redirect DNSSEC RRs.
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Some DNS servers will hand out negative answers without SOA records,
these can not be cached, so log about that fact.
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An NXDOMAIN entry means there are no RRs of any type for a name,
so only cache by CLASS + NAME, rather than CLASS + NAME + TYPE.
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Apart from dropping redundant information, this fixes an issue
where, due to broken DNS servers, we can only be certain of whether
an apparent NODATA response is in fact an NXDOMAIN response after
explicitly resolving the canonical name. This issue is outlined in
RFC2308. Moreover, by caching NXDOMAIN for an existing name, we
would mistakenly return NXDOMAIN for types which should not be
redirected. I.e., a query for AAAA on test-nx-1.jklm.no correctly
returns NXDOMAIN, but a query for CNAME should return the record
and a query for DNAME should return NODATA.
Note that this means we will not cache an NXDOMAIN response in the
presence of redirection, meaning one redundant roundtrip in case the
name is queried again.
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Use /proc/net/sockstat6 to detect IPv6 support
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The current code is not compatible with current dkr protocols anyway,
and dkr has a different focus ("microservices") than nspawn anyway
("whole machine containers"), hence drop support for it, we cannot
reasonably keep this up to date, and it creates the impression we'd
actually care for the microservices usecase.
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resolved: more mDNS specific bits (3)
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RFC6762, 18.1:
In multicast query messages, the Query Identifier SHOULD be set to
zero on transmission.
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Only .in-addr.arpa and .local are considered local in mDNS, so discard the
packet if anything else is thrown at us.
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Third DNSSEC patch series
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The file /sys/module/ipv6 does not exist in all container
implementations (e.g. Virtuozzo). Using /proc/net/sockstat6
detects IPv6 support reliably in these environments, too.
This file does not exist when the kernel is not compiled with
IPv6 support, or if IPv6 support is disabled, so simply checking
for existence should be a suitable check.
Fixes #2059
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build: fix systemd-journal-upload installation
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They are our friends, do systemd development, hence add them.
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core: do not warn about Wants depencencies on masked units
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Let's simply call it dns_transaction_prepare(), so that we have the nice
cycle for prepare() → go() → emit() → process().
After all it's pretty clear that what we prepare there, and we dont call
the others go_next_attempt(), emit_next_attempt() or
process_next_attempt().
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destructors
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This adds initial support for validating RRSIG/DNSKEY/DS chains when
doing lookups. Proof-of-non-existance, or proof-of-unsigned-zones is not
implemented yet.
With this change DnsTransaction objects will generate additional
DnsTransaction objects when looking for DNSKEY or DS RRs to validate an
RRSIG on a response. DnsTransaction objects are thus created for three
reasons now:
1) Because a user asked for something to be resolved, i.e. requested by
a DnsQuery/DnsQueryCandidate object.
2) As result of LLMNR RR probing, requested by a DnsZoneItem.
3) Because another DnsTransaction requires the requested RRs for
validation of its own response.
DnsTransactions are shared between all these users, and are GC
automatically as soon as all of these users don't need a specific
transaction anymore.
To unify the handling of these three reasons for existance for a
DnsTransaction, a new common naming is introduced: each DnsTransaction
now tracks its "owners" via a Set* object named "notify_xyz", containing
all owners to notify on completion.
A new DnsTransaction state is introduced called "VALIDATING" that is
entered after a response has been receieved which needs to be validated,
as long as we are still waiting for the DNSKEY/DS RRs from other
DnsTransactions.
This patch will request the DNSKEY/DS RRs bottom-up, and then validate
them top-down.
Caching of RRs is now only done after verification, so that the cache is
not poisoned with known invalid data.
The "DnsAnswer" object gained a substantial number of new calls, since
we need to add/remove RRs to it dynamically now.
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the DNSKEY's algorithm
As long as we support the digest we are good.
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name, not the owner name
When the DNSKEY is in higher zone, then that's OK, and we need to check
the RRSIG's signer name against the DNSKEY hence.
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