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Types used for pids and uids in various interfaces are unpredictable.
Too bad.
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While it's a lovely scenario, it's probably not really useful. Fix our
GetConnectionUnixUser() to return the actual 'euid' which we asked for,
not the possible uninitialized 'uid'.
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Whenever a process performs an action on an object, the kernel uses the
EUID of the process to do permission checks and to apply on any newly
created objects. The UID of a process is only used if someone *ELSE* acts
on the process. That is, the UID of a process defines who owns the
process, the EUID defines what privileges are used by this process when
performing an action.
Process limits, on the other hand, are always applied to the real UID, not
the effective UID. This is, because a process has a user object linked,
which always corresponds to its UID. A process never has a user object
linked for its EUID. Thus, accounting (and limits) is always done on the
real UID.
This commit fixes all sd-bus users to use the EUID when performing
privilege checks and alike. Furthermore, it fixes unix-creds to be parsed
as EUID, not UID (as the kernel always takes the EUID on UDS). Anyone
using UID (eg., to do user-accounting) has to fall back to the EUID as UDS
does not transmit the UID.
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Make sure we tell the kernel to fake all UIDs/GIDs. Otherwise, the remote
side has no chance of querying our effective UID (which is usually what
they're interested in).
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We need to implicitly allow HELLO from users with the same uid as the bus.
Fix the bus-uid tracking to use the original uid, not the uid after
privilege-dropping.
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If we test the policy against multiple destination names, we really should
not print warnings if one of the names results in DENY. Instead, pass the
whole array of names to the policy and let it deal with it.
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Make sure to reload our xml policy configuration if requested via the bus.
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Fix whitespace indentation.
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We cannot use "User=" in unit-files if we want to retain privileges. So
make bus-proxy.c explicitly drop privileges. However, only do that if
we're root, as there is no need to drop it on the user-bus.
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This implements a shared policy cache with read-write locks. We no longer
parse the XML policy in each thread.
This will allow us to easily implement ReloadConfig().
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Set thread-names to "p$PIDu$UID" and suffix with '*' if truncated. This
helps debugging bus-proxy issues if we want to figure out which
connections are currently open.
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Instead of using Accept=true and running one proxy for each connection, we
now run one proxy-daemon with a thread per connection. This will enable us
to share resources like policies in the future.
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Now that we want to make bus-proxy multi-threaded, we have to bring back
the systemd-stdio-bridge for our TCP use-cases.
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Move all the proxy code into a "struct Proxy" object that can be used
from multiple binaries.
We now dropped SMACK as we have to refactor it to work properly. We can
introduce it later on.
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Move local and destination bus creation into a helper function. This
further reduces the line count of main().
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Move synthesize_name_acquired() to synthesize.c.
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Move synthesize_*() into synthesize.c and bus_proxy_process_driver() into
driver.c for better code separation.
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The 'at_console' policy-category allows to apply policy-items to clients
depending on whether they're run from within a valid user-session or not.
We use sd_uid_get_seats() to check whether a user has a valid seat (which
excludes remote-sessions like ssh).
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Make sure to print "dbus-1 to kernel" or "kernel to dbus-1" in policy logs
to better diagnose the situation.
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If a dbus-1 client sends a broadcasted signal via the bus-proxy to kdbus,
the bus-proxy has no idea who the receiver is. Classic dbus-daemon has
bus-access and can perform policy checks for each receiver, but we cant.
Instead, we know the kernel will perform receiver policy checks for
broadcasts, so we can skip the policy check and just push it into the
kernel.
This fixes wpa_supplicant which has DENY rules on receive_type=signal for
non-root. As we never know the target, we always DENY all broadcasts from
wpa_supplicant.
Note that will still perform receiver-policy checks for signals that we
get from the kernel back to us. In those cases, we know the receiver
(which is us).
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The policy debug messages swapped "path=" and "interface=", fix this.
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dbus-1 distinguishes expected and non-expected replies. An expected reply
is a reply that is sent as answer to a previously forwarded method-call
before the timeout fires. Those replies are, by default, forwarded and
DENY policy tags are ignored on them (unless explicitly stated otherwise).
We don't track reply-windows in the bus-proxy as the kernel already does
this. Furthermore, the kernel prohibits any non-expected replies (which
breaks dbus-1, but it was an odd feature, anyway).
Therefore, skip policy checks on replies and always let the kernel deal
with it!
To be correct, we should still process DENY tags marked as
send_expected_reply=true (which is *NOT* the default!). However, so far we
don't parse those attributes, and no-one really uses it, so lets not
implement it for now. It's marked as TODO if anyone feels like fixing it.
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to the bus owner should be allowed
Hence, copy this behaviour for bus-proxy too.
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Imagine a kdbus peer sending a method-call without EXPECT_REPLY set
through the proxy to a dbus1 peer. The proxy turns the missing
EXPECT_REPLY flag into a dbus1 NO_REPLY_EXPECTED flag. However, if the
receipient ignores that flag (valid dbus1 behavior) and sends a reply, the
proxy will try to forward it to the original peer. This will fail with
EPERM as the kernel didn't track the reply.
We have two options now: Either we ignore EPERM for reply messages, or we
track reply-windows in the proxy so we can properly ignore replies if
EXPECT_REPLY wasn't set.
This commit chose the first option: ignore EPERM for replies. The only
down-side is that replies without matching method call will no longer be
forwarded by the proxy. This works on dbus1, though.
Nobody sane does this, so lets ignore it.
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If a caller does not request a reply, dont send it. This skips message
creation and speeds up NO_REPLY_EXPECTED cases. Note that sd-bus still
handles this case internally, but if we handle it in bus-proxyd, we can
skip the whole message creation step.
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dbus1 does not provide cmdline, so we have to augment our credentials from
/proc to beautify the bus-proxyd cmdline. We dont use this for anything
but beautification, so there shouldn't be any problems due to /proc
pid-recycling races.
This fixes bus-proxyd to no longer display 'xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx'
in its cmdline.
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"org.freedesktop.DBus" and "org.freedesktop.DBus.Local" and refuse them
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https://github.com/vlajos/misspell_fixer
https://github.com/torstehu/systemd/commit/b6fdeb618cf2f3ce1645b3315f15f482710c7ffa
Thanks to Torstein Husebo <torstein@huseboe.net>.
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We *must* not use sd_bus_reply_*() as it does not set the sender field
correctly. Use the synthetic_reply_*() helpers instead!
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files from core
Stuff in src/shared or src/libsystemd should *never* include code from
src/core or any of the tools, so don't do that here either. It's not OK!
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sd_bus_creds_get_well_known_names() fails with -ENODATA in case the
message has no names attached, which is intended behavior if the
remote connection didn't own any names at the time of sending.
The function already deals with 'sender_names' being an empty strv,
so we can just continue in such cases.
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Messages to destinations that are not currently owned by any bus connection
will cause kdbus related function to return with either -ENXIO or -ESRCH.
Such conditions should not make the proxyd terminate but send a sane
SD_BUS_ERROR_NAME_HAS_NO_OWNER error reply to the proxied connection.
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When dbus client connects to systemd-bus-proxyd through
Unix domain socket proxy takes client's smack label and sets for itself.
It is done before and independent of dropping privileges.
The reason of such soluton is fact that tests of access rights
performed by lsm may take place inside kernel, not only
in userspace of recipient of message.
The bus-proxyd needs CAP_MAC_ADMIN to manipulate its label.
In case of systemd running in system mode, CAP_MAC_ADMIN
should be added to CapabilityBoundingSet in service file of bus-proxyd.
In case of systemd running in user mode ('systemd --user')
it can be achieved by addition
Capabilities=cap_mac_admin=i and SecureBits=keep-caps
to user@.service file
and setting cap_mac_admin+ei on bus-proxyd binary.
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The ID returned really doesn't identify the owner, but the bus instance,
hence fix this misnaming.
Also, update "busctl status" to show the ID in its output.
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If the format string contains %m, clearly errno must have a meaningful
value, so we might as well use log_*_errno to have ERRNO= logged.
Using:
find . -name '*.[ch]' | xargs sed -r -i -e \
's/log_(debug|info|notice|warning|error|emergency)\((".*%m.*")/log_\1_errno(errno, \2/'
Plus some whitespace, linewrap, and indent adjustments.
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to load from that
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"addresses"
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Also, make the call to free kdbus slices generic and use it everywhere
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It corrrectly handles both positive and negative errno values.
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