Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author |
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Various changes to src/basic/
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There are more than enough to deserve their own .c file, hence move them
over.
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systemd-run can launch units with ReadWriteDirectories, ReadOnlyDirectories, InaccessibleDirectories
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InaccessibleDirectories
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from ceb728cf
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run: fix Environment parsing
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* `Environment=` resets previous assignments
* `Environment='a=1 b=2'` sets `a` to `1` and `b` to `2`
* `Environment='"a=1 2" b=2"'` sets `a` to `1 2` and `b` to `2`
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systemd-run can now launch units with EnvironmentFile set.
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core: expose `SyslogFacility` and `SyslogLevel` as properties on dbus
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If set to ~ the working directory is set to the home directory of the
user configured in User=.
This change also exposes the existing switch for the working directory
that allowed making missing working directories non-fatal.
This also changes "machinectl shell" to make use of this to ensure that
the invoked shell is by default in the user's home directory.
Fixes #1268.
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systemd-run can now launch units with WorkingDirectory, RootDirectory set.
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systemd-run can now launch units with PrivateTmp, PrivateDevices,
PrivateNetwork, NoNewPrivileges set.
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This replaces this:
free(p);
p = NULL;
by this:
p = mfree(p);
Change generated using coccinelle. Semantic patch is added to the
sources.
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This is preparation for a later commit that makes use of these
properties for spawning an interactive shell in a container.
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When generating utmp/wtmp entries, optionally add both LOGIN_PROCESS and
INIT_PROCESS entries or even all three of LOGIN_PROCESS, INIT_PROCESS
and USER_PROCESS entries, instead of just a single INIT_PROCESS entry.
With this change systemd may be used to not only invoke a getty directly
in a SysV-compliant way but alternatively also a login(1) implementation
or even forego getty and login entirely, and invoke arbitrary shells in
a way that they appear in who(1) or w(1).
This is preparation for a later commit that adds a "machinectl shell"
operation to invoke a shell in a container, in a way that is compatible
with who(1) and w(1).
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In service file, if the file has some of special SMACK label in
ExecStart= and systemd has no permission for the special SMACK label
then permission error will occurred. To resolve this, systemd should
be able to set its SMACK label to something accessible of ExecStart=.
So introduce new SmackProcessLabel. If label is specified with
SmackProcessLabel= then the child systemd will set its label to
that. To successfully execute the ExecStart=, accessible label should
be specified with SmackProcessLabel=.
Additionally, by SMACK policy, if the file in ExecStart= has no
SMACK64EXEC then the executed process will have given label by
SmackProcessLabel=. But if the file has SMACK64EXEC then the
SMACK64EXEC label will be overridden.
[zj: reword man page]
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properly written to unit files
https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=76744
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also mounting /etc read-only
Also, rename ProtectedHome= to ProtectHome=, to simplify things a bit.
With this in place we now have two neat options ProtectSystem= and
ProtectHome= for protecting the OS itself (and optionally its
configuration), and for protecting the user's data.
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ReadOnlySystem= uses fs namespaces to mount /usr and /boot read-only for
a service.
ProtectedHome= uses fs namespaces to mount /home and /run/user
inaccessible or read-only for a service.
This patch also enables these settings for all our long-running services.
Together they should be good building block for a minimal service
sandbox, removing the ability for services to modify the operating
system or access the user's private data.
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tcpwrap is legacy code, that is barely maintained upstream. It's APIs
are awful, and the feature set it exposes (such as DNS and IDENT
access control) questionnable. We should not support this natively in
systemd.
Hence, let's remove the code. If people want to continue making use of
this, they can do so by plugging in "tcpd" for the processes they start.
With that scheme things are as well or badly supported as they were from
traditional inetd, hence no functionality is really lost.
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portable value (uint64_t) -1
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This mirrors set_consume and makes the common use a bit nicer.
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As discussed on the ML these are useful to manage runtime directories
below /run for services.
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This new unit settings allows restricting which address families are
available to processes. This is an effective way to minimize the attack
surface of services, by turning off entire network stacks for them.
This is based on seccomp, and does not work on x86-32, since seccomp
cannot filter socketcall() syscalls on that platform.
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This permit to switch to a specific apparmor profile when starting a daemon. This
will result in a non operation if apparmor is disabled.
It also add a new build requirement on libapparmor for using this feature.
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processes
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architecture support for system calls
Also, turn system call filter bus properties into complex types instead
of concatenated strings.
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- Allow configuration of an errno error to return from blacklisted
syscalls, instead of immediately terminating a process.
- Fix parsing logic when libseccomp support is turned off
- Only keep the actual syscall set in the ExecContext, and generate the
string version only on demand.
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This permit to let system administrators decide of the domain of a service.
This can be used with templated units to have each service in a différent
domain ( for example, a per customer database, using MLS or anything ),
or can be used to force a non selinux enabled system (jvm, erlang, etc)
to start in a different domain for each service.
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introduced in c7040b5d1c2c148f12b6a5eef3dfce1661805131
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