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It is not acceptable to load unit files during enable/disable operations
just to figure out the selinux labels. systemd implements lazy loading
for units, so the selinux hooks need to follow it.
This drops the mac_selinux_unit_access_check_strv() helper which
implements a non-acceptable policy check. If anyone cares for that
functionality, you really should pass a callback+userdata to the helpers
in src/shared/install.c which does policy checks on each touched file.
See #1050 on github for more.
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Some places invoked fflush() directly with their own manual error
checking, let's unify all that by using fflush_and_check().
This also unifies the general error paths of fflush()+rename() file
writers.
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It's primarily just a property of the Manager object after all, and we
try to refer to PID 1 as "manager" instead of "systemd", hence let's to
stick to this here too.
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After all it can be derived from the message directly, and already is.
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If NULL is specified for the bus it is now automatically derived from
the passed in message.
This commit also changes a number of invocations of sd_bus_send() to
make use of this.
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This should simplify the prototype a bit. The bus parameter is redundant
in most cases, and in the few where it matters it can be derived from
the message via sd_bus_message_get_bus().
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We'd use the generic check for disable, and a unit-file-specific one for enable.
Use the more specific one both ways.
systemd[1]: SELinux access check scon=system_u:system_r:systemd_timedated_t:s0 tcon=system_u:system_r:init_t:s0 tclass=system perm=disable path=(null) cmdline=/usr/lib/systemd/systemd-timedated: -13
systemd[1]: SELinux access check scon=system_u:system_r:systemd_timedated_t:s0 tcon=system_u:object_r:systemd_unit_file_t:s0 tclass=service perm=enable path=/usr/lib/systemd/system/systemd-timesyncd.service cmdline=/usr/lib/systemd/systemd-timedated: -13
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1014315
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CID #1257766.
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By notifying the clients when this property is changed it's possible to
allow "system health monitor" tools to get transitions like
running<->degraded. This is an alternative to send changes on the
SystemState property since the latter is more difficult to derive.
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- Always issue selinux access check as early as possible, and PK check
as late as possible.
- Introduce a new policykit action for altering environment
- Open most remaining bus calls to unprivileged clients via PK
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Types used for pids and uids in various interfaces are unpredictable.
Too bad.
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src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-common-errors.h
Stuff in src/shared/ should not use stuff from src/libsystemd/ really.
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Support timer options --on-active=, --on-boot=, --on-startup=,
--on-unit-active=, --on-unit-inactive=, --on-calendar=. Each options
corresponding with OnActiveSec=, OnBootSec=, OnStartupSec=,
OnUnitActiveSec=, OnUnitInactiveSec=, OnCalendar= of timer
respectively. And OnCalendar= and WakeSystem= supported by
--timer-property= option like --property= of systemd-run.
And if --unit= option and timer options are specified the command can
be omitted. In this case, systemd-run assumes the target service is
already loaded. And just try to generate transient timer unit only.
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It corrrectly handles both positive and negative errno values.
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As a followup to 086891e5c1 "log: add an "error" parameter to all
low-level logging calls and intrdouce log_error_errno() as log calls
that take error numbers", use sed to convert the simple cases to use
the new macros:
find . -name '*.[ch]' | xargs sed -r -i -e \
's/log_(debug|info|notice|warning|error|emergency)\("(.*)%s"(.*), strerror\(-([a-zA-Z_]+)\)\);/log_\1_errno(-\4, "\2%m"\3);/'
Multi-line log_*() invocations are not covered.
And we also should add log_unit_*_errno().
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It is redundant to store 'hash' and 'compare' function pointers in
struct Hashmap separately. The functions always comprise a pair.
Store a single pointer to struct hash_ops instead.
systemd keeps hundreds of hashmaps, so this saves a little bit of
memory.
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Fixup for v208-615-g718db96199.
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DBus methods that retrieve information can be called by anyone.
DBus methods that modify state of units are verified via polkit
action: org.freedesktop.systemd1.manage-units
DBus methods that modify state of unit files are verified via polkit
action: org.freedesktop.systemd1.manage-unit-files
DBus methods that reload the entire daemon state are verified via polkit
action: org.freedesktop.systemd1.reload-daemon
DBus methods that modify job state are callable from the clients
that started the job.
root (ie: CAP_SYS_ADMIN) can continue to perform all calls, property
access etc. There are several DBus methods that can only be
called by root.
Open up the dbus1 policy for the above methods.
(Heavily modified by Lennart, making use of the new
bus_verify_polkit_async() version that doesn't force us to always
pass the original callback around. Also, interactive auhentication must
be opt-in, not unconditional, hence I turned this off.)
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Both ofs.Job.Cancel() and ofs.Manager.CancelJob() now use same
implementation. So we can add caller verify logic appropriately.
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do all-unit preset operations
The new "systemctl preset-all" command may now be used to put all
installed units back into the enable/disable state the vendor/admin
encoded in preset files.
Also, introduce "systemctl --preset-mode=enable-only" and "systemctl
--preset-mode=disable-only" to only apply the enable or only the disable
operations of a "systemctl preset" or "systemctl preset-all" operation.
"systemctl preset-all" implements this RFE:
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=630174
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The file should have been in /usr/lib/ in the first place, since it
describes the OS container in /usr (and not the configuration in /etc),
hence, let's support os-release files in /usr/lib as fallback if no
version in /etc exists, following the usual override logic.
A prior commit already enabled tmpfiles to create /etc/os-release as a
symlink to /usr/lib/os-release should it be missing, thus providing nice
compatibility with applications only checking in /etc.
While it's probably a good idea if all apps check both locations via a
fallback logic, it is only necessary in the early boot process, as long
as the /etc/os-release symlink has not been restored, in case we boot
with an empty /etc.
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The system state knows the states starting →
running/degraded/maintenance → stopping, where:
starting = system startup
running = normal operation
degraded = at least one unit is currently in failed state
maintenance = rescue/emergency mode is active or queued
stopping = system shutdown
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When we try to send a signal on a connection we didn't hae the time to
process the Disconnected message yet, don't generate multiple warning
messages, but only a single debug message.
https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=75874
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This is primarily useful for services that need to track clients which
reference certain objects they maintain, or which explicitly want to
subscribe to certain events. Something like this is done in a large
number of services, and not trivial to do. Hence, let's unify this at
one place.
This also ports over PID 1 to use this to ensure that subscriptions to
job and manager events are correctly tracked. As a side-effect this
makes sure we properly serialize and restore the track list across
daemon reexec/reload, which didn't work correctly before.
This also simplifies how we distribute messages to broadcast to the
direct busses: we only track subscriptions for the API bus and
implicitly assume that all direct busses are subscribed. This should be
a pretty OK simplification since clients connected via direct bus
connections are shortlived anyway.
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remotely
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We expose the control group of the units on the bus, so let's also
expose the root control group.
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first (or second)
Previously the returned object of constructor functions where sometimes
returned as last, sometimes as first and sometimes as second parameter.
Let's clean this up a bit. Here are the new rules:
1. The object the new object is derived from is put first, if there is any
2. The object we are creating will be returned in the next arguments
3. This is followed by any additional arguments
Rationale:
For functions that operate on an object we always put that object first.
Constructors should probably not be too different in this regard. Also,
if the additional parameters might want to use varargs which suggests to
put them last.
Note that this new scheme only applies to constructor functions, not to
all other functions. We do give a lot of freedom for those.
Note that this commit only changes the order of the new functions we
added, for old ones we accept the wrong order and leave it like that.
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If -flto is used then gcc will generate a lot more warnings than before,
among them a number of use-without-initialization warnings. Most of them
without are false positives, but let's make them go away, because it
doesn't really matter.
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SELinux check will be done using the context of the unit file as as a
target instead of the default init_t context, allowing selinux control
on the level of individual units.
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1022762
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where appropriate
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Introduces a new concept of "trusted" vs. "untrusted" busses. For the
latter libsystemd-bus will automatically do per-method access control,
for the former all access is automatically granted. Per-method access
control is encoded in the vtables: by default all methods are only
accessible to privileged clients. If the SD_BUS_VTABLE_UNPRIVILEGED flag
is set for a method it is accessible to unprivileged clients too. By
default whether a client is privileged is determined via checking for
its CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability, but this can be altered via the
SD_BUS_VTABLE_CAPABILITY() macro that can be ORed into the flags field
of the method.
Writable properties are also subject to SD_BUS_VTABLE_UNPRIVILEGED and
SD_BUS_VTABLE_CAPABILITY() for controlling write access to them. Note
however that read access is unrestricted, as PropertiesChanged messages
might send out the values anyway as an unrestricted broadcast.
By default the system bus is set to "untrusted" and the user bus is
"trusted" since per-method access control on the latter is unnecessary.
On dbus1 busses we check the UID of the caller rather than the
configured capability since the capability cannot be determined without
race. On kdbus the capability is checked if possible from the attached
meta-data of a message and otherwise queried from the sending peer.
This also decorates the vtables of the various daemons we ship with
these flags.
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This way we can unify handling of credentials that are attached to
messages, or can be queried for bus name owners or connection peers.
This also adds the ability to extend incomplete credential information
with data from /proc,
Also, provide a convenience call that will automatically determine the
most appropriate credential object for an incoming message, by using the
the attached information if possible, the sending name information if
available and otherwise the peer's credentials.
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