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The ExecParameters structure contains a number of bit-flags, that were so far
exposed as bool:1, change this to a proper, single binary bit flag field. This
makes things a bit more expressive, and is helpful as we add more flags, since
these booleans are passed around in various callers, for example
service_spawn(), whose signature can be made much shorter now.
Not all bit booleans from ExecParameters are moved into the flags field for
now, but this can be added later.
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This setting adds minimal user namespacing support to a service. When set the invoked
processes will run in their own user namespace. Only a trivial mapping will be
set up: the root user/group is mapped to root, and the user/group of the
service will be mapped to itself, everything else is mapped to nobody.
If this setting is used the service runs with no capabilities on the host, but
configurable capabilities within the service.
This setting is particularly useful in conjunction with RootDirectory= as the
need to synchronize /etc/passwd and /etc/group between the host and the service
OS tree is reduced, as only three UID/GIDs need to match: root, nobody and the
user of the service itself. But even outside the RootDirectory= case this
setting is useful to substantially reduce the attack surface of a service.
Example command to test this:
systemd-run -p PrivateUsers=1 -p User=foobar -t /bin/sh
This runs a shell as user "foobar". When typing "ps" only processes owned by
"root", by "foobar", and by "nobody" should be visible.
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interesting data
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This way, invoking nspawn from a shell in the best case inherits the TERM
setting all the way down into the login shell spawned in the container.
Fixes: #3697
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With this NSS module all dynamic service users will be resolvable via NSS like
any real user.
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service is running
This adds a new boolean setting DynamicUser= to service files. If set, a new
user will be allocated dynamically when the unit is started, and released when
it is stopped. The user ID is allocated from the range 61184..65519. The user
will not be added to /etc/passwd (but an NSS module to be added later should
make it show up in getent passwd).
For now, care should be taken that the service writes no files to disk, since
this might result in files owned by UIDs that might get assigned dynamically to
a different service later on. Later patches will tighten sandboxing in order to
ensure that this cannot happen, except for a few selected directories.
A simple way to test this is:
systemd-run -p DynamicUser=1 /bin/sleep 99999
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All other functions in execute.c that need the unit id take a Unit* parameter
as first argument. Let's change connect_logger_as() to follow a similar logic.
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This patch renames Read{Write,Only}Directories= and InaccessibleDirectories=
to Read{Write,Only}Paths= and InaccessiblePaths=, previous names are kept
as aliases but they are not advertised in the documentation.
Renamed variables:
`read_write_dirs` --> `read_write_paths`
`read_only_dirs` --> `read_only_paths`
`inaccessible_dirs` --> `inaccessible_paths`
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Prevent free from being called on (a part of) the call-by-reference
variable env when setup_pam fails.
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By cleaning up before setting up PAM we maintain control of overriding
behavior in setting variables. Otherwise, pam_putenv is in control.
This also makes sure we use a cleaned up environment in replacing
variables in argv.
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It takes a boolean value. If true, access to SCHED_RR, SCHED_FIFO and
SCHED_DEADLINE is blocked, which my be used to lock up the system.
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Let's politely refuse with EPERM rather than kill the whole thing right-away.
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This was forgotten when MemoryDenyWriteExecute= was added: we should set NNP in
all cases when we set seccomp filters.
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It's a function defined by us, hence we should look for the error in its return
value, not in "errno".
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executed services
This permits services to detect whether their stdout/stderr is connected to the
journal, and if so talk to the journal directly, thus permitting carrying of
metadata.
As requested by the gtk folks: #2473
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Move the merger of environment variables before setting up the PAM
session and pass the aggregate environment to PAM setup. This allows
control over the PAM session hooks through environment variables.
PAM session initiation may update the environment. On successful
initiation of a PAM session, we adopt the environment of the
PAM context.
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This patch implements the new magic character '!'. By putting '!' in front
of a command, systemd executes it with full privileges ignoring paramters
such as User, Group, SupplementaryGroups, CapabilityBoundingSet,
AmbientCapabilities, SecureBits, SystemCallFilter, SELinuxContext,
AppArmorProfile, SmackProcessLabel, and RestrictAddressFamilies.
Fixes partially https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/3414
Related to https://github.com/coreos/rkt/issues/2482
Testing:
1. Create a user 'bob'
2. Create the unit file /etc/systemd/system/exec-perm.service
(You can use the example below)
3. sudo systemctl start ext-perm.service
4. Verify that the commands starting with '!' were not executed as bob,
4.1 Looking to the output of ls -l /tmp/exec-perm
4.2 Each file contains the result of the id command.
`````````````````````````````````````````````````````````````````
[Unit]
Description=ext-perm
[Service]
Type=oneshot
TimeoutStartSec=0
User=bob
ExecStartPre=!/usr/bin/sh -c "/usr/bin/rm /tmp/exec-perm*" ;
/usr/bin/sh -c "/usr/bin/id > /tmp/exec-perm-start-pre"
ExecStart=/usr/bin/sh -c "/usr/bin/id > /tmp/exec-perm-start" ;
!/usr/bin/sh -c "/usr/bin/id > /tmp/exec-perm-star-2"
ExecStartPost=/usr/bin/sh -c "/usr/bin/id > /tmp/exec-perm-start-post"
ExecReload=/usr/bin/sh -c "/usr/bin/id > /tmp/exec-perm-reload"
ExecStop=!/usr/bin/sh -c "/usr/bin/id > /tmp/exec-perm-stop"
ExecStopPost=/usr/bin/sh -c "/usr/bin/id > /tmp/exec-perm-stop-post"
[Install]
WantedBy=multi-user.target]
`````````````````````````````````````````````````````````````````
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it (#3457)
Let's add an extra safety check before we chmod/chown a TTY to the right user,
as we might end up having connected something to STDIN/STDOUT that is actually
not a TTY, even though this might have been requested, due to permissive
StandardInput= settings or transient service activation with fds passed in.
Fixes:
https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85255
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New exec boolean MemoryDenyWriteExecute, when set, installs
a seccomp filter to reject mmap(2) with PAGE_WRITE|PAGE_EXEC
and mprotect(2) with PAGE_EXEC.
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The macro determines the right length of a AF_UNIX "struct sockaddr_un" to pass to
connect() or bind(). It automatically figures out if the socket refers to an
abstract namespace socket, or a socket in the file system, and properly handles
the full length of the path field.
This macro is not only safer, but also simpler to use, than the usual
offsetof() + strlen() logic.
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core: set NoNewPrivileges for seccomp if we don't have CAP_SYS_ADMIN
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The manpage of seccomp specify that using seccomp with
SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER will return EACCES if the caller do not have
CAP_SYS_ADMIN set, or if the no_new_privileges bit is not set. Hence,
without NoNewPrivilege set, it is impossible to use a SystemCall*
directive with a User directive set in system mode.
Now, NoNewPrivileges is set if we are in user mode, or if we are in
system mode and we don't have CAP_SYS_ADMIN, and SystemCall*
directives are used.
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Throughout the tree there's spurious use of spaces separating ++ and --
operators from their respective operands. Make ++ and -- operator
consistent with the majority of existing uses; discard the spaces.
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The setting is hardly useful (since its effect is generally reduced to zero due
to file system caps), and with the advent of ambient caps an actually useful
replacement exists, hence let's get rid of this.
I am pretty sure this was unused and our man page already recommended against
its use, hence this should be a safe thing to remove.
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This feature will not be used anytime soon, so remove a bit of cruft.
The BusPolicy= config directive will stay around as compat noop.
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This should be handled fine now by .dir-locals.el, so need to carry that
stuff in every file.
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transient service
Otherwise we might end resetting /dev/console all the time when a transient service starts or stops.
Fixes #2377
Fixes #2198
Fixes #2061
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Assign errno-style errors to a variable called "r" when they happen, the same way we do this in most other calls. It's
bad enough that the error handling part of the function deals with two different error variables (pam_code and r) now,
but before this fix it was even three!
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We only go to fail label if pam_pid <= 0.
CID #1306746.
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Compare errno with zero in a way that tells gcc that
(if the condition is true) errno is positive.
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gcc is confused by the common idiom of
return errno ? -errno : -ESOMETHING
and thinks a positive value may be returned. Replace this condition
with errno > 0 to help gcc and avoid many spurious warnings. I filed
a gcc rfe a long time ago, but it hard to say if it will ever be
implemented [1].
Both conventions were used in the codebase, this change makes things
more consistent. This is a follow up to bcb161b0230f.
[1] https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=61846
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This patch adds support for ambient capabilities in service files. The
idea with ambient capabilities is that the execed processes can run with
non-root user and get some inherited capabilities, without having any
need to add the capabilities to the executable file.
You need at least Linux 4.3 to use ambient capabilities. SecureBit
keep-caps is automatically added when you use ambient capabilities and
wish to change the user.
An example system service file might look like this:
[Unit]
Description=Service for testing caps
[Service]
ExecStart=/usr/bin/sleep 10000
User=nobody
AmbientCapabilities=CAP_NET_ADMIN CAP_NET_RAW
After starting the service it has these capabilities:
CapInh: 0000000000003000
CapPrm: 0000000000003000
CapEff: 0000000000003000
CapBnd: 0000003fffffffff
CapAmb: 0000000000003000
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Change the capability bounding set parser and logic so that the bounding
set is kept as a positive set internally. This means that the set
reflects those capabilities that we want to keep instead of drop.
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If pid < 0 after fork(), 0 is always returned because r =
exec_context_load_environment() has exited successfully.
This will make the caller of exec_spawn() not able to handle
the fork() error case and make systemd abort assert() possibly.
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This directive allows passing environment variables from the system
manager to spawned services. Variables in the system manager can be set
inside a container by passing `--set-env=...` options to systemd-spawn.
Tested with an on-disk test.service unit. Tested using multiple variable
names on a single line, with an empty setting to clear the current list
of variables, with non-existing variables.
Tested using `systemd-run -p PassEnvironment=VARNAME` to confirm it
works with transient units.
Confirmed that `systemctl show` will display the PassEnvironment
settings.
Checked that man pages are generated correctly.
No regressions in `make check`.
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capability-util.[ch]
The files are named too generically, so that they might conflict with
the upstream project headers. Hence, let's add a "-util" suffix, to
clarify that this are just our utility headers and not any official
upstream headers.
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