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Shit's broke, yo.
https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/4575
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is set
Make sure that when DynamicUser= is set that we intialize the user
supplementary groups and that we also support SupplementaryGroups=
Fixes: https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/4539
Thanks Evgeny Vereshchagin (@evverx)
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more seccomp fixes, and change of order of selinux/aa/smack and seccomp application on exec
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(#4533)
Always initialize the supplementary groups of caller before checking the
unit SupplementaryGroups= option.
Fixes https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/4531
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Seccomp is generally an unprivileged operation, changing security contexts is
most likely associated with some form of policy. Moreover, while seccomp may
influence our own flow of code quite a bit (much more than the security context
change) make sure to apply the seccomp filters immediately before executing the
binary to invoke.
This also moves enforcement of NNP after the security context change, so that
NNP cannot affect it anymore. (However, the security policy now has to permit
the NNP change).
This change has a good chance of breaking current SELinux/AA/SMACK setups, because
the policy might not expect this change of behaviour. However, it's technically
the better choice I think and should hence be applied.
Fixes: #3993
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seccomp: also block shmat(..., SHM_EXEC) for MemoryDenyWriteExecute
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This makes applying groups after applying the working directory, this
may allow some flexibility but at same it is not a big deal since we
don't execute or do anything between applying working directory and
droping groups.
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Improve apply_working_directory() and lets get the current working directory
inside of it.
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shmat(..., SHM_EXEC) can be used to create writable and executable
memory, so let's block it when MemoryDenyWriteExecute is set.
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This allows us to unify most of the code in apply_protect_kernel_modules() and
apply_private_devices().
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This adds a new seccomp_init_conservative() helper call that is mostly just a
wrapper around seccomp_init(), but turns off NNP and adds in all secondary
archs, for best compatibility with everything else.
Pretty much all of our code used the very same constructs for these three
steps, hence unifying this in one small function makes things a lot shorter.
This also changes incorrect usage of the "scmp_filter_ctx" type at various
places. libseccomp defines it as typedef to "void*", i.e. it is a pointer type
(pretty poor choice already!) that casts implicitly to and from all other
pointer types (even poorer choice: you defined a confusing type now, and don't
even gain any bit of type safety through it...). A lot of the code assumed the
type would refer to a structure, and hence aded additional "*" here and there.
Remove that.
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seccomp_add_syscall_filter_set()
Let's simplify this call, by making use of the new infrastructure.
This is actually more in line with Djalal's original patch but instead of
search the filter set in the array by its name we can now use the set index and
jump directly to it.
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A variety of fixes:
- rename the SystemCallFilterSet structure to SyscallFilterSet. So far the main
instance of it (the syscall_filter_sets[] array) used to abbreviate
"SystemCall" as "Syscall". Let's stick to one of the two syntaxes, and not
mix and match too wildly. Let's pick the shorter name in this case, as it is
sufficiently well established to not confuse hackers reading this.
- Export explicit indexes into the syscall_filter_sets[] array via an enum.
This way, code that wants to make use of a specific filter set, can index it
directly via the enum, instead of having to search for it. This makes
apply_private_devices() in particular a lot simpler.
- Provide two new helper calls in seccomp-util.c: syscall_filter_set_find() to
find a set by its name, seccomp_add_syscall_filter_set() to add a set to a
seccomp object.
- Update SystemCallFilter= parser to use extract_first_word(). Let's work on
deprecating FOREACH_WORD_QUOTED().
- Simplify apply_private_devices() using this functionality
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Let's prefer early-exit over deep-indented if blocks. Not behavioural change.
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Remove the assert and check the return code of sysconf(_SC_NGROUPS_MAX).
_SC_NGROUPS_MAX maps to NGROUPS_MAX which is defined in <limits.h> to
65536 these days. The value is a sysctl read-only
/proc/sys/kernel/ngroups_max and the kernel assumes that it is always
positive otherwise things may break. Follow this and support only
positive values for all other case return either -errno or -EOPNOTSUPP.
Now if there are systems that want to re-write NGROUPS_MAX then they
should not pass SupplementaryGroups= in units even if it is empty, in
this case nothing fails and we just ignore supplementary groups. However
if SupplementaryGroups= is passed even if it is empty we have to assume
that there will be groups manipulation from our side or the kernel and
since the kernel always assumes that NGROUPS_MAX is positive, then
follow that and support only positive values.
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This is minor but lets try to split and move bit by bit cgroups and
portable environment setup before applying the security context.
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This fixes: https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/4357
Let's lookup and cache creds then apply them. We also switch from
getgroups() to getgrouplist().
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This commit adds a `fd` option to `StandardInput=`,
`StandardOutput=` and `StandardError=` properties in order to
connect standard streams to externally named descriptors provided
by some socket units.
This option looks for a file descriptor named as the corresponding
stream. Custom names can be specified, separated by a colon.
If multiple name-matches exist, the first matching fd will be used.
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Lets go further and make /lib/modules/ inaccessible for services that do
not have business with modules, this is a minor improvment but it may
help on setups with custom modules and they are limited... in regard of
kernel auto-load feature.
This change introduce NameSpaceInfo struct which we may embed later
inside ExecContext but for now lets just reduce the argument number to
setup_namespace() and merge ProtectKernelModules feature.
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This is useful to turn off explicit module load and unload operations on modular
kernels. This option removes CAP_SYS_MODULE from the capability bounding set for
the unit, and installs a system call filter to block module system calls.
This option will not prevent the kernel from loading modules using the module
auto-load feature which is a system wide operation.
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used (#4347)
If stdin is supplied as an fd for transient units (using the
StandardInputFileDescriptor pseudo-property for transient units), then we
should also fix up the TTY ownership, not just when we opened the TTY
ourselves.
This simply drops the explicit is_terminal_input()-based check. Note that
chown_terminal() internally does a much more appropriate isatty()-based check
anyway, hence we can drop this without replacement.
Fixes: #4260
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This adds a new invocation ID concept to the service manager. The invocation ID
identifies each runtime cycle of a unit uniquely. A new randomized 128bit ID is
generated each time a unit moves from and inactive to an activating or active
state.
The primary usecase for this concept is to connect the runtime data PID 1
maintains about a service with the offline data the journal stores about it.
Previously we'd use the unit name plus start/stop times, which however is
highly racy since the journal will generally process log data after the service
already ended.
The "invocation ID" kinda matches the "boot ID" concept of the Linux kernel,
except that it applies to an individual unit instead of the whole system.
The invocation ID is passed to the activated processes as environment variable.
It is additionally stored as extended attribute on the cgroup of the unit. The
latter is used by journald to automatically retrieve it for each log logged
message and attach it to the log entry. The environment variable is very easily
accessible, even for unprivileged services. OTOH the extended attribute is only
accessible to privileged processes (this is because cgroupfs only supports the
"trusted." xattr namespace, not "user."). The environment variable may be
altered by services, the extended attribute may not be, hence is the better
choice for the journal.
Note that reading the invocation ID off the extended attribute from journald is
racy, similar to the way reading the unit name for a logging process is.
This patch adds APIs to read the invocation ID to sd-id128:
sd_id128_get_invocation() may be used in a similar fashion to
sd_id128_get_boot().
PID1's own logging is updated to always include the invocation ID when it logs
information about a unit.
A new bus call GetUnitByInvocationID() is added that allows retrieving a bus
path to a unit by its invocation ID. The bus path is built using the invocation
ID, thus providing a path for referring to a unit that is valid only for the
current runtime cycleof it.
Outlook for the future: should the kernel eventually allow passing of cgroup
information along AF_UNIX/SOCK_DGRAM messages via a unique cgroup id, then we
can alter the invocation ID to be generated as hash from that rather than
entirely randomly. This way we can derive the invocation race-freely from the
messages.
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Let's drop the caching of the setgroups /proc field for now. While there's a
strict regime in place when it changes states, let's better not cache it since
we cannot really be sure we follow that regime correctly.
More importantly however, this is not in performance sensitive code, and
there's no indication the cache is really beneficial, hence let's drop the
caching and make things a bit simpler.
Also, while we are at it, rework the error handling a bit, and always return
negative errno-style error codes, following our usual coding style. This has
the benefit that we can sensible hanld read_one_line_file() errors, without
having to updat errno explicitly.
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In the process execution code of PID 1, before
096424d1230e0a0339735c51b43949809e972430 the GID settings where changed before
invoking PAM, and the UID settings after. After the change both changes are
made after the PAM session hooks are run. When invoking PAM we fork once, and
leave a stub process around which will invoke the PAM session end hooks when
the session goes away. This code previously was dropping the remaining privs
(which were precisely the UID). Fix this code to do this correctly again, by
really dropping them else (i.e. the GID as well).
While we are at it, also fix error logging of this code.
Fixes: #4238
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It might be blocked through /proc/PID/setgroups
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is set
Instead of having a local syscall list, use the @raw-io group which
contains the same set of syscalls to filter.
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While we are at it, move PAM code #ifdeffery into setup_pam() to simplify the
main execution logic a bit.
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If device access is restricted via PrivateDevices=, let's also block the
various low-level I/O syscalls at the same time, so that we know that the
minimal set of devices in our virtualized /dev are really everything the unit
can access.
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If PrivateDevices=yes is set, the namespace code creates device nodes in /dev
that should be owned by the host's root, hence let's make sure we set up the
namespace before dropping group privileges.
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Implicitly make all dirs set with RuntimeDirectory= writable, as the concept
otherwise makes no sense.
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This adds a new call get_user_creds_clean(), which is just like
get_user_creds() but returns NULL in the home/shell parameters if they contain
no useful information. This code previously lived in execute.c, but by
generalizing this we can reuse it in run.c.
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ProtectControlGroups=
If enabled, these will block write access to /sys, /proc/sys and
/proc/sys/fs/cgroup.
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Let's make sure that all our rules apply to all archs the local kernel
supports.
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In https://github.com/systemd/systemd/pull/4004 , a runtime detection
method for seccomp was added. However, it does not detect the case
where CONFIG_SECCOMP=y but CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER=n. This is possible
if the architecture does not support filtering yet.
Add a check for that case too.
While at it, change get_proc_field usage to use PR_GET_SECCOMP prctl,
as that should save a few system calls and (unnecessary) allocations.
Previously, reading of /proc/self/stat was done as recommended by
prctl(2) as safer. However, given that we need to do the prctl call
anyway, lets skip opening, reading and parsing the file.
Code for checking inspired by
https://outflux.net/teach-seccomp/autodetect.html
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Fixes #3882
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dbus-daemon does NSS name look-ups in order to enforce its bus policy. This
might dead-lock if an NSS module use wants to use D-Bus for the look-up itself,
like our nss-systemd does. Let's work around this by bypassing bus
communication in the NSS module if we run inside of dbus-daemon. To make this
work we keep a bit of extra state in /run/systemd/dynamic-uid/ so that we don't
have to consult the bus, but can still resolve the names.
Note that the normal codepath continues to be via the bus, so that resolving
works from all mount namespaces and is subject to authentication, as before.
This is a bit dirty, but not too dirty, as dbus daemon is kinda special anyway
for PID 1.
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This adds the boolean RemoveIPC= setting to service, socket, mount and swap
units (i.e. all unit types that may invoke processes). if turned on, and the
unit's user/group is not root, all IPC objects of the user/group are removed
when the service is shut down. The life-cycle of the IPC objects is hence bound
to the unit life-cycle.
This is particularly relevant for units with dynamic users, as it is essential
that no objects owned by the dynamic users survive the service exiting. In
fact, this patch adds code to imply RemoveIPC= if DynamicUser= is set.
In order to communicate the UID/GID of an executed process back to PID 1 this
adds a new "user lookup" socket pair, that is inherited into the forked
processes, and closed before the exec(). This is needed since we cannot do NSS
from PID 1 due to deadlock risks, However need to know the used UID/GID in
order to clean up IPC owned by it if the unit shuts down.
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