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Commit 3bd5c3 added a check for EACCES, but missed the minus sign.
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Among other things, avoid log_struct() unless we really need it.
Also, use "r" as variable to store function errors in, instead of "err".
"r" is pretty much what we use everywhere else, hence using the same
here make sense.
FInally, in the child, when we want to log, make sure to open the
logging framework first, since it is explicitly closed in preparation
for the exec().
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non-fatal
This should be useful for user namespaces.
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LOG_DEBUG is already a log level, there is no need to use LOG_PRI which
is for filtering out the facility.
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When systemd starts a service, it first opened /run/systemd/journal/stdout
socket, and only later switched to the right user.group (if they are
specified). Later on, journald looked at the credentials, and saw
root.root, because credentials are stored at the time the socket is
opened. As a result, all messages passed over _TRANSPORT=stdout were
logged with _UID=0, _GID=0.
Drop real uid and gid temporarily to fix the issue.
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files from core
Stuff in src/shared or src/libsystemd should *never* include code from
src/core or any of the tools, so don't do that here either. It's not OK!
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rm_rf_dangerous() needlessly
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This way, we can ensure we have a more complete, up-to-date list of
capabilities around, always.
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We need original socket_fd around otherwise mac_selinux_get_child_mls_label
fails with -EINVAL return code. Also don't call setexeccon twice but rather pass
context value of SELinuxContext option as an extra argument.
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If the format string contains %m, clearly errno must have a meaningful
value, so we might as well use log_*_errno to have ERRNO= logged.
Using:
find . -name '*.[ch]' | xargs sed -r -i -e \
's/log_(debug|info|notice|warning|error|emergency)\((".*%m.*")/log_\1_errno(errno, \2/'
Plus some whitespace, linewrap, and indent adjustments.
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Using:
find . -name '*.[ch]' | xargs sed -r -i -e \
's/log_unit_(debug|info|notice|warning|error|emergency)\(([^"]+), "(.*)%s"(.*), strerror\(-([a-zA-Z_]+)\)\);/log_unit_\1_errno(\2, \5, "\3%m"\4);/'
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It corrrectly handles both positive and negative errno values.
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As a followup to 086891e5c1 "log: add an "error" parameter to all
low-level logging calls and intrdouce log_error_errno() as log calls
that take error numbers", use sed to convert the simple cases to use
the new macros:
find . -name '*.[ch]' | xargs sed -r -i -e \
's/log_(debug|info|notice|warning|error|emergency)\("(.*)%s"(.*), strerror\(-([a-zA-Z_]+)\)\);/log_\1_errno(-\4, "\2%m"\3);/'
Multi-line log_*() invocations are not covered.
And we also should add log_unit_*_errno().
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Also, while we are at it, introduce some syntactic sugar for creating
ERRNO= and MESSAGE= structured logging fields.
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- Rename log_meta() → log_internal(), to follow naming scheme of most
other log functions that are usually invoked through macros, but never
directly.
- Rename log_info_object() to log_object_info(), simply because the
object should be before any other parameters, to follow OO-style
programming style.
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In service file, if the file has some of special SMACK label in
ExecStart= and systemd has no permission for the special SMACK label
then permission error will occurred. To resolve this, systemd should
be able to set its SMACK label to something accessible of ExecStart=.
So introduce new SmackProcessLabel. If label is specified with
SmackProcessLabel= then the child systemd will set its label to
that. To successfully execute the ExecStart=, accessible label should
be specified with SmackProcessLabel=.
Additionally, by SMACK policy, if the file in ExecStart= has no
SMACK64EXEC then the executed process will have given label by
SmackProcessLabel=. But if the file has SMACK64EXEC then the
SMACK64EXEC label will be overridden.
[zj: reword man page]
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subhierarchies
For priviliged units this resource control property ensures that the
processes have all controllers systemd manages enabled.
For unpriviliged services (those with User= set) this ensures that
access rights to the service cgroup is granted to the user in question,
to create further subgroups. Note that this only applies to the
name=systemd hierarchy though, as access to other controllers is not
safe for unpriviliged processes.
Delegate=yes should be set for container scopes where a systemd instance
inside the container shall manage the hierarchies below its own cgroup
and have access to all controllers.
Delegate=yes should also be set for user@.service, so that systemd
--user can run, controlling its own cgroup tree.
This commit changes machined, systemd-nspawn@.service and user@.service
to set this boolean, in order to ensure that container management will
just work, and the user systemd instance can run fine.
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new mac_{smack,selinux,apparmor}_xyz() convention
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Also, extend the printed warning a bit, explaining the situation more
verbosely.
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If we don't have privileges to setup the namespaces then we are most likely
running inside some sort of unprivileged container, hence not being able to
create namespace is not a problem because spawned service can't access host
system anyway.
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Since aa_change_onexec return the error code in errno, and return
-1, the current code do not give any useful information when
something fail. This make apparmor easier to debug, as seen on
https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=760526
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Process possible "discard" values from /etc/fstab.
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This makes possible to spawn service instances triggered by socket with
MLS/MCS SELinux labels which are created based on information provided by
connected peer.
Implementation of label_get_child_mls_label derived from xinetd.
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
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Mark two function parameters as const
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If BusPolicy= was passed, the parser function will have created
an ExecContext->bus_endpoint object, along with policy information.
In that case, create a kdbus endpoint, and pass its path name to the
namespace logic, to it will be mounted over the actual 'bus' node.
At endpoint creation time, no policy is updloaded. That is done after
fork(), through a separate call. This is necessary because we don't
know the real uid of the process earlier than that.
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If a path to a previously created custom kdbus endpoint is passed in,
bind-mount a new devtmpfs that contains a 'bus' node, which in turn in
bind-mounted with the custom endpoint. This tmpfs then mounted over the
kdbus subtree that refers to the current bus.
This way, we can fake the bus node in order to lock down services with
a kdbus custom endpoint policy.
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Add types to describe endpoints and associated policy entries,
and add a BusEndpoint instace to ExecContext.
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This factors out one conditional branch that has grown way too big, and
makes the code more readable by using return statements rather than jump
labels.
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This way, the list of arguments to that function gets more comprehensive,
and we can get around passing lots of NULL and 0 arguments from socket.c,
swap.c and mount.c.
It also allows for splitting up the code in exec_spawn().
While at it, make ExecContext const in execute.c.
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time differently
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This reverts commit cf8bd44339b00330fdbc91041d6731ba8aba9fec.
Needs more discussion on the mailing list.
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This makes possible to spawn service instances triggered by socket with
MLS/MCS SELinux labels which are created based on information provided by
connected peer.
Implementation of label_get_child_label derived from xinetd.
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
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or when creating OS images offline
A new tool "systemd-firstboot" can be used either interactively on boot,
where it will query basic locale, timezone, hostname, root password
information and set it. Or it can be used non-interactively from the
command line when prepareing disk images for booting. When used
non-inertactively the tool can either copy settings from the host, or
take settings on the command line.
$ systemd-firstboot --root=/path/to/my/new/root --copy-locale --copy-root-password --hostname=waldi
The tool will be automatically invoked (interactively) now on first boot
if /etc is found unpopulated.
This also creates the infrastructure for generators to be notified via
an environment variable whether they are running on the first boot, or
not.
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also mounting /etc read-only
Also, rename ProtectedHome= to ProtectHome=, to simplify things a bit.
With this in place we now have two neat options ProtectSystem= and
ProtectHome= for protecting the OS itself (and optionally its
configuration), and for protecting the user's data.
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ReadOnlySystem= uses fs namespaces to mount /usr and /boot read-only for
a service.
ProtectedHome= uses fs namespaces to mount /home and /run/user
inaccessible or read-only for a service.
This patch also enables these settings for all our long-running services.
Together they should be good building block for a minimal service
sandbox, removing the ability for services to modify the operating
system or access the user's private data.
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No functional change expected :)
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