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This patch removes includes that are not used. The removals were found with
include-what-you-use which checks if any of the symbols from a header is
in use.
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This was broken when the code was rearranged in "1e2fd62d70ff
core/load-fragment.c: correct argument sign and split up long lines"
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With a command line like "@/something" we would allocate an array with
0 elements. Avoid that, and add a test too.
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units
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The handling of the command name and other arguments is unified. This
simplifies things and should make them more predictable for users.
Incidentally, this makes ExecStart handling match the .desktop file
specification, apart for the requirment for an absolute path.
https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86171
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https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=87393
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cppcheck would give up with "syntax error" without them. This led
to reports of syntax errors in unrelated locations and potentially
hid other errors
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resulting name is actually valid
Also, rename filename_is_safe() to filename_is_valid(), since it
actually does a full validation for what the kernel will accept as file
name, it's not just a heuristic.
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This way, we can ensure we have a more complete, up-to-date list of
capabilities around, always.
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config_parse_warn_compat is now always used for removed options.
https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=87125
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Option was being parsed but not used for anything.
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In service file, if the file has some of special SMACK label in
ExecStart= and systemd has no permission for the special SMACK label
then permission error will occurred. To resolve this, systemd should
be able to set its SMACK label to something accessible of ExecStart=.
So introduce new SmackProcessLabel. If label is specified with
SmackProcessLabel= then the child systemd will set its label to
that. To successfully execute the ExecStart=, accessible label should
be specified with SmackProcessLabel=.
Additionally, by SMACK policy, if the file in ExecStart= has no
SMACK64EXEC then the executed process will have given label by
SmackProcessLabel=. But if the file has SMACK64EXEC then the
SMACK64EXEC label will be overridden.
[zj: reword man page]
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fatal for a start job if not met
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In order to make object destruction easier (in particular in combination
with _cleanup_) we usually make destructors deal with NULL objects as
NOPs. Change the calendar spec destructor to follow the same scheme.
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It is redundant to store 'hash' and 'compare' function pointers in
struct Hashmap separately. The functions always comprise a pair.
Store a single pointer to struct hash_ops instead.
systemd keeps hundreds of hashmaps, so this saves a little bit of
memory.
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Found with Coverity. Fixes: CID#996438
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Add a new directive called BusPolicy to define custom endpoint policies. If
one such directive is given, an endpoint object in the service's ExecContext is
created and the given policy is added to it.
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In order to re-use the policy definitions, factor them out into their own
files.
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With everything on one line they are just harder to read.
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$ systemd-analyze verify trailing-g.service
[./trailing-g.service:2] Trailing garbage, ignoring.
trailing-g.service lacks ExecStart setting. Refusing.
Error: org.freedesktop.systemd1.LoadFailed: Unit trailing-g.service failed to load: Invalid argument.
Failed to create trailing-g.service/start: Invalid argument
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String which ended in an unfinished quote were accepted, potentially
with bad memory accesses.
Reject anything which ends in a unfished quote, or contains
non-whitespace characters right after the closing quote.
_FOREACH_WORD now returns the invalid character in *state. But this return
value is not checked anywhere yet.
Also, make 'word' and 'state' variables const pointers, and rename 'w'
to 'word' in various places. Things are easier to read if the same name
is used consistently.
mbiebl_> am I correct that something like this doesn't work
mbiebl_> ExecStart=/usr/bin/encfs --extpass='/bin/systemd-ask-passwd "Unlock EncFS"'
mbiebl_> systemd seems to strip of the quotes
mbiebl_> systemctl status shows
mbiebl_> ExecStart=/usr/bin/encfs --extpass='/bin/systemd-ask-password Unlock EncFS $RootDir $MountPoint
mbiebl_> which is pretty weird
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Special care is needed so that we get an error message if the
file failed to parse, but not when it is missing. To avoid duplicating
the same error check in every caller, add an additional 'warn' boolean
to tell config_parse whether a message should be issued.
This makes things both shorter and more robust wrt. to error reporting.
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We should follow the naming scheme waitid() uses, not come up with our
own reversed one...
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It's not safe invoking NSS from PID 1, hence fork off worker processes
that upload the policy into the kernel for busnames.
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also mounting /etc read-only
Also, rename ProtectedHome= to ProtectHome=, to simplify things a bit.
With this in place we now have two neat options ProtectSystem= and
ProtectHome= for protecting the OS itself (and optionally its
configuration), and for protecting the user's data.
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With Symlinks= we can manage one or more symlinks to AF_UNIX or FIFO
nodes in the file system, with the same lifecycle as the socket itself.
This has two benefits: first, this allows us to remove /dev/log and
/dev/initctl from /dev, thus leaving only symlinks, device nodes and
directories in the /dev tree. More importantly however, this allows us
to move /dev/log out of /dev, while still making it accessible there, so
that PrivateDevices= can provide /dev/log too.
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ReadOnlySystem= uses fs namespaces to mount /usr and /boot read-only for
a service.
ProtectedHome= uses fs namespaces to mount /home and /run/user
inaccessible or read-only for a service.
This patch also enables these settings for all our long-running services.
Together they should be good building block for a minimal service
sandbox, removing the ability for services to modify the operating
system or access the user's private data.
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Only accept cpu quota values in percentages, get rid of period
definition.
It's not clear whether the CFS period controllable per-cgroup even has a
future in the kernel, hence let's simplify all this, hardcode the period
to 100ms and only accept percentage based quota values.
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Introduce a (unsigned long) -1 as "unset" state for cpu shares/block io
weights, and keep the startup unit set around all the time.
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Similar to CPUShares= and BlockIOWeight= respectively. However only
assign the specified weight during startup. Each control group
attribute is re-assigned as weight by CPUShares=weight and
BlockIOWeight=weight after startup. If not CPUShares= or
BlockIOWeight= be specified, then the attribute is re-assigned to each
default attribute value. (default cpu.shares=1024, blkio.weight=1000)
If only CPUShares=weight or BlockIOWeight=weight be specified, then
that implies StartupCPUShares=weight and StartupBlockIOWeight=weight.
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It's used for the FailureAction property as well.
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tcpwrap is legacy code, that is barely maintained upstream. It's APIs
are awful, and the feature set it exposes (such as DNS and IDENT
access control) questionnable. We should not support this natively in
systemd.
Hence, let's remove the code. If people want to continue making use of
this, they can do so by plugging in "tcpd" for the processes they start.
With that scheme things are as well or badly supported as they were from
traditional inetd, hence no functionality is really lost.
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Keep mounts done by udev rules private to udevd. Also, document how
MountFlags= may be used for this.
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safe_close() automatically becomes a NOP when a negative fd is passed,
and returns -1 unconditionally. This makes it easy to write lines like
this:
fd = safe_close(fd);
Which will close an fd if it is open, and reset the fd variable
correctly.
By making use of this new scheme we can drop a > 200 lines of code that
was required to test for non-negative fds or to reset the closed fd
variable afterwards.
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There are three directives to specify bus name polices in .busname
files:
* AllowUser [username] [access]
* AllowGroup [groupname] [access]
* AllowWorld [access]
Where [access] is one of
* 'see': The user/group/world is allowed to see a name on the bus
* 'talk': The user/group/world is allowed to talk to a name
* 'own': The user/group/world is allowed to own a name
There is no user added yet in this commit.
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already explicitly set
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