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This adds two new settings BindPaths= and BindReadOnlyPaths=. They allow
defining arbitrary bind mounts specific to particular services. This is
particularly useful for services with RootDirectory= set as this permits making
specific bits of the host directory available to chrooted services.
The two new settings follow the concepts nspawn already possess in --bind= and
--bind-ro=, as well as the .nspawn settings Bind= and BindReadOnly= (and these
latter options should probably be renamed to BindPaths= and BindReadOnlyPaths=
too).
Fixes: #3439
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This is relevant as many of the mounts we try to establish only can be followed
when some other prior mount that is a prefix of it is established. Hence: move
the symlink chasing into the actual mount functions, so that we do it as late
as possibly but as early as necessary.
Fixes: #4588
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After all, these don#t strictly encapsulate bind mounts anymore, and we are
preparing this for adding arbitrary user-defined bind mounts in a later commit,
at which point this would become really confusing. Let's clean this up, rename
the BindMount structure to MountEntry, so that it is clear that it can contain
information about any kind of mount.
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This reworks handling of the read-only management for mount points. This will
become handy as soon as we add arbitrary bind mount support (which comes in a
later commit).
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All other tables got reindented, but one was forgotten. Fix that.
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Let's remove chase_symlinks_prefix() and instead introduce a flags parameter to
chase_symlinks(), with a flag CHASE_PREFIX_ROOT that exposes the behaviour of
chase_symlinks_prefix().
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Let's use chase_symlinks() everywhere, and stop using GNU
canonicalize_file_name() everywhere. For most cases this should not change
behaviour, however increase exposure of our function to get better tested. Most
importantly in a few cases (most notably nspawn) it can take the correct root
directory into account when chasing symlinks.
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Let's align all our BindMount tables, let's use the same column widths in all
of them, and let's make them not any wider than necessary.
This only changes whitespace, not contents of any of the tables.
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This changes a couple of things in the namespace handling:
It merges the BindMount and TargetMount structures. They are mostly the same,
hence let's just use the same structue, and rely on C's implicit zero
initialization of partially initialized structures for the unneeded fields.
This reworks memory management of each entry a bit. It now contains one "const"
and one "malloc" path. We use the former whenever we can, but use the latter
when we have to, which is the case when we have to chase symlinks or prefix a
root directory. This means in the common case we don't actually need to
allocate any dynamic memory. To make this easy to use we add an accessor
function bind_mount_path() which retrieves the right path string from a
BindMount structure.
While we are at it, also permit "+" as prefix for dirs configured with
ReadOnlyPaths= and friends: if specified the root directory of the unit is
implicited prefixed.
This also drops set_bind_mount() and uses C99 structure initialization instead,
which I think is more readable and clarifies what is being done.
This drops append_protect_kernel_tunables() and
append_protect_kernel_modules() as append_static_mounts() is now simple enough
to be called directly.
Prefixing with the root dir is now done in an explicit step in
prefix_where_needed(). It will prepend the root directory on each entry that
doesn't have it prefixed yet. The latter is determined depending on an extra
bit in the BindMount structure.
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This certainly fixes a bug that was introduced by PR
https://github.com/systemd/systemd/pull/4594 that intended to fix
https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/4567.
The fix was not complete. This patch makes sure that we count and free
all paths that fail inside chase_all_symlinks().
Fixes https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/4567
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(#4596)
This adds a variable that is always set to false to make sure that
protect paths inside sandbox are always enforced and not ignored. The only
case when it is set to true is on DynamicUser=no and RootDirectory=/chroot
is set. This allows users to use more our sandbox features inside RootDirectory=
The only exception is ProtectSystem=full|strict and when DynamicUser=yes
is implied. Currently RootDirectory= is not fully compatible with these
due to two reasons:
* /chroot/usr|etc has to be present on ProtectSystem=full
* /chroot// has to be a mount point on ProtectSystem=strict.
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Instead of having two fields inside BindMount struct where one is stack
based and the other one is heap, use one field to store the full path
and updated it when we chase symlinks. This way we avoid dealing with
both at the same time.
This makes RootDirectory= work with ProtectHome= and ProtectKernelModules=yes
Fixes: https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/4567
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This makes strjoin and strjoina more similar and avoids the useless final
argument.
spatch -I . -I ./src -I ./src/basic -I ./src/basic -I ./src/shared -I ./src/shared -I ./src/network -I ./src/locale -I ./src/login -I ./src/journal -I ./src/journal -I ./src/timedate -I ./src/timesync -I ./src/nspawn -I ./src/resolve -I ./src/resolve -I ./src/systemd -I ./src/core -I ./src/core -I ./src/libudev -I ./src/udev -I ./src/udev/net -I ./src/udev -I ./src/libsystemd/sd-bus -I ./src/libsystemd/sd-event -I ./src/libsystemd/sd-login -I ./src/libsystemd/sd-netlink -I ./src/libsystemd/sd-network -I ./src/libsystemd/sd-hwdb -I ./src/libsystemd/sd-device -I ./src/libsystemd/sd-id128 -I ./src/libsystemd-network --sp-file coccinelle/strjoin.cocci --in-place $(git ls-files src/*.c)
git grep -e '\bstrjoin\b.*NULL' -l|xargs sed -i -r 's/strjoin\((.*), NULL\)/strjoin(\1)/'
This might have missed a few cases (spatch has a really hard time dealing
with _cleanup_ macros), but that's no big issue, they can always be fixed
later.
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Lets go further and make /lib/modules/ inaccessible for services that do
not have business with modules, this is a minor improvment but it may
help on setups with custom modules and they are limited... in regard of
kernel auto-load feature.
This change introduce NameSpaceInfo struct which we may embed later
inside ExecContext but for now lets just reduce the argument number to
setup_namespace() and merge ProtectKernelModules feature.
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As with previous patch simplify ProtectHome and don't care about
duplicates, they will be sorted by most restrictive mode and cleaned.
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ProtectSystem= with all its different modes and other options like
PrivateDevices= + ProtectKernelTunables= + ProtectHome= are orthogonal,
however currently it's a bit hard to parse that from the implementation
view. Simplify it by giving each mode its own table with all paths and
references to other Protect options.
With this change some entries are duplicated, but we do not care since
duplicate mounts are first sorted by the most restrictive mode then
cleaned.
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Make ALSA entries, latency interface, mtrr, apm/acpi, suspend interface,
filesystems configuration and IRQ tuning readonly.
Most of these interfaces now days should be in /sys but they are still
available through /proc, so just protect them. This patch does not touch
/proc/net/...
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Move out mount calculation on its own function. Actually the logic is
smart enough to later drop nop and duplicates mounts, this change
improves code readability.
---
src/core/namespace.c | 47 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
1 file changed, 36 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
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Instead of having all these paths everywhere, put the ones that are
protected by ProtectKernelTunables= into their own table. This way it
is easy to add paths and track which ones are protected.
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There's no point in mounting these, if they are outside of the root directory
we'll move to.
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already is one
Let's not stack mounts needlessly.
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This adds logic to chase symlinks for all mount points that shall be created in
a namespace environment in userspace, instead of leaving this to the kernel.
This has the advantage that we can correctly handle absolute symlinks that
shall be taken relative to a specific root directory. Moreover, we can properly
handle mounts created on symlinked files or directories as we can merge their
mounts as necessary.
(This also drops the "done" flag in the namespace logic, which was never
actually working, but was supposed to permit a partial rollback of the
namespace logic, which however is only mildly useful as it wasn't clear in
which case it would or would not be able to roll back.)
Fixes: #3867
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Let's create the new namespace only after we validated and processed all
parameters, right before we start with actually mounting things.
This way, the window where we can roll back is larger (not that it matters
IRL...)
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Let's tighten our sandbox a bit more: with this change ProtectSystem= gains a
new setting "strict". If set, the entire directory tree of the system is
mounted read-only, but the API file systems /proc, /dev, /sys are excluded
(they may be managed with PrivateDevices= and ProtectKernelTunables=). Also,
/home and /root are excluded as those are left for ProtectHome= to manage.
In this mode, all "real" file systems (i.e. non-API file systems) are mounted
read-only, and specific directories may only be excluded via
ReadWriteDirectories=, thus implementing an effective whitelist instead of
blacklist of writable directories.
While we are at, also add /efi to the list of paths always affected by
ProtectSystem=. This is a follow-up for
b52a109ad38cd37b660ccd5394ff5c171a5e5355 which added /efi as alternative for
/boot. Our namespacing logic should respect that too.
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Previously, if ReadWritePaths= was nested inside a ReadOnlyPaths=
specification, then we'd first recursively apply the ReadOnlyPaths= paths, and
make everything below read-only, only in order to then flip the read-only bit
again for the subdirs listed in ReadWritePaths= below it.
This is not only ugly (as for the dirs in question we first turn on the RO bit,
only to turn it off again immediately after), but also problematic in
containers, where a container manager might have marked a set of dirs read-only
and this code will undo this is ReadWritePaths= is set for any.
With this patch behaviour in this regard is altered: ReadOnlyPaths= will not be
applied to the children listed in ReadWritePaths= in the first place, so that
we do not need to turn off the RO bit for those after all.
This means that ReadWritePaths=/ReadOnlyPaths= may only be used to turn on the
RO bit, but never to turn it off again. Or to say this differently: if some
dirs are marked read-only via some external tool, then ReadWritePaths= will not
undo it.
This is not only the safer option, but also more in-line with what the man page
currently claims:
"Entries (files or directories) listed in ReadWritePaths= are
accessible from within the namespace with the same access rights as
from outside."
To implement this change bind_remount_recursive() gained a new "blacklist"
string list parameter, which when passed may contain subdirs that shall be
excluded from the read-only mounting.
A number of functions are updated to add more debug logging to make this more
digestable.
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If /foo is marked to be read-only, and /foo/bar too, then the latter may be
suppressed as it has no effect.
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If a dir is marked to be inaccessible then everything below it should be masked
by it.
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ProtectControlGroups=
If enabled, these will block write access to /sys, /proc/sys and
/proc/sys/fs/cgroup.
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Assorted fixes
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Fix bug introduced by #3263: mount(2) return value is 0 or -1, not errno.
Thanks to Evgeny Vereshchagin (@evverx) for reporting.
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We generally try to avoid strerror(), due to its threads-unsafety, let's do
this here, too.
Also, let's be tiny bit more explanatory with the log messages, and let's
shorten a few things.
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This patch renames Read{Write,Only}Directories= and InaccessibleDirectories=
to Read{Write,Only}Paths= and InaccessiblePaths=, previous names are kept
as aliases but they are not advertised in the documentation.
Renamed variables:
`read_write_dirs` --> `read_write_paths`
`read_only_dirs` --> `read_only_paths`
`inaccessible_dirs` --> `inaccessible_paths`
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Despite the name, `Read{Write,Only}Directories=` already allows for
regular file paths to be masked. This commit adds the same behavior
to `InaccessibleDirectories=` and makes it explicit in the doc.
This patch introduces `/run/systemd/inaccessible/{reg,dir,chr,blk,fifo,sock}`
{dile,device}nodes and mounts on the appropriate one the paths specified
in `InacessibleDirectories=`.
Based on Luca's patch from https://github.com/systemd/systemd/pull/3327
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Private /dev will not be managed by udev or others, so we can make it
noexec and readonly after we have made all device nodes. As /dev/shm
needs to be writable, we can't use bind_remount_recursive().
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Drop all dangling old /dev mounts before mounting a new private /dev tree.
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This feature will not be used anytime soon, so remove a bit of cruft.
The BusPolicy= config directive will stay around as compat noop.
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This should be handled fine now by .dir-locals.el, so need to carry that
stuff in every file.
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socket-util.[ch]
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