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This adds two new settings BindPaths= and BindReadOnlyPaths=. They allow
defining arbitrary bind mounts specific to particular services. This is
particularly useful for services with RootDirectory= set as this permits making
specific bits of the host directory available to chrooted services.
The two new settings follow the concepts nspawn already possess in --bind= and
--bind-ro=, as well as the .nspawn settings Bind= and BindReadOnly= (and these
latter options should probably be renamed to BindPaths= and BindReadOnlyPaths=
too).
Fixes: #3439
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(#4596)
This adds a variable that is always set to false to make sure that
protect paths inside sandbox are always enforced and not ignored. The only
case when it is set to true is on DynamicUser=no and RootDirectory=/chroot
is set. This allows users to use more our sandbox features inside RootDirectory=
The only exception is ProtectSystem=full|strict and when DynamicUser=yes
is implied. Currently RootDirectory= is not fully compatible with these
due to two reasons:
* /chroot/usr|etc has to be present on ProtectSystem=full
* /chroot// has to be a mount point on ProtectSystem=strict.
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Lets go further and make /lib/modules/ inaccessible for services that do
not have business with modules, this is a minor improvment but it may
help on setups with custom modules and they are limited... in regard of
kernel auto-load feature.
This change introduce NameSpaceInfo struct which we may embed later
inside ExecContext but for now lets just reduce the argument number to
setup_namespace() and merge ProtectKernelModules feature.
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Let's tighten our sandbox a bit more: with this change ProtectSystem= gains a
new setting "strict". If set, the entire directory tree of the system is
mounted read-only, but the API file systems /proc, /dev, /sys are excluded
(they may be managed with PrivateDevices= and ProtectKernelTunables=). Also,
/home and /root are excluded as those are left for ProtectHome= to manage.
In this mode, all "real" file systems (i.e. non-API file systems) are mounted
read-only, and specific directories may only be excluded via
ReadWriteDirectories=, thus implementing an effective whitelist instead of
blacklist of writable directories.
While we are at, also add /efi to the list of paths always affected by
ProtectSystem=. This is a follow-up for
b52a109ad38cd37b660ccd5394ff5c171a5e5355 which added /efi as alternative for
/boot. Our namespacing logic should respect that too.
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ProtectControlGroups=
If enabled, these will block write access to /sys, /proc/sys and
/proc/sys/fs/cgroup.
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This patch renames Read{Write,Only}Directories= and InaccessibleDirectories=
to Read{Write,Only}Paths= and InaccessiblePaths=, previous names are kept
as aliases but they are not advertised in the documentation.
Renamed variables:
`read_write_dirs` --> `read_write_paths`
`read_only_dirs` --> `read_only_paths`
`inaccessible_dirs` --> `inaccessible_paths`
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This feature will not be used anytime soon, so remove a bit of cruft.
The BusPolicy= config directive will stay around as compat noop.
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This should be handled fine now by .dir-locals.el, so need to carry that
stuff in every file.
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When a service is chrooted with the option RootDirectory=/opt/..., then
the options PrivateDevices, PrivateTmp, ProtectHome, ProtectSystem must
mount the directories under $RootDirectory/{dev,tmp,home,usr,boot}.
The test-ns tool can test setup_namespace() with and without chroot:
$ sudo TEST_NS_PROJECTS=/home/lennart/projects ./test-ns
$ sudo TEST_NS_CHROOT=/home/alban/debian-tree TEST_NS_PROJECTS=/home/alban/debian-tree/home/alban/Documents ./test-ns
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If a path to a previously created custom kdbus endpoint is passed in,
bind-mount a new devtmpfs that contains a 'bus' node, which in turn in
bind-mounted with the custom endpoint. This tmpfs then mounted over the
kdbus subtree that refers to the current bus.
This way, we can fake the bus node in order to lock down services with
a kdbus custom endpoint policy.
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also mounting /etc read-only
Also, rename ProtectedHome= to ProtectHome=, to simplify things a bit.
With this in place we now have two neat options ProtectSystem= and
ProtectHome= for protecting the OS itself (and optionally its
configuration), and for protecting the user's data.
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ReadOnlySystem= uses fs namespaces to mount /usr and /boot read-only for
a service.
ProtectedHome= uses fs namespaces to mount /home and /run/user
inaccessible or read-only for a service.
This patch also enables these settings for all our long-running services.
Together they should be good building block for a minimal service
sandbox, removing the ability for services to modify the operating
system or access the user's private data.
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Similar to PrivateNetwork=, PrivateTmp= introduce PrivateDevices= that
sets up a private /dev with only the API pseudo-devices like /dev/null,
/dev/zero, /dev/random, but not any physical devices in them.
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PrivateTmp= namespaces
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Unit name is used whole in the directory name, so that the unit name
can be easily extracted from it, e.g. "/tmp/systemd-abcd.service-DEDBIF1".
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=957439
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ExecContext isn't used in this header file, and everything seems to
build just fine without this typedef. The typedef doesn't really belong
here, and at least my gcc-4.4.6 gives an error on type redefined.
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All Execs within the service, will get mounted the same
/tmp and /var/tmp directories, if service is configured with
PrivateTmp=yes. Temporary directories are cleaned up by service
itself in addition to systemd-tmpfiles. Directory which is mounted
as inaccessible is created at runtime in /run/systemd.
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#pragma once has been "un-deprecated" in gcc since 3.3, and is widely supported
in other compilers.
I've been using and maintaining (rebasing) this patch for a while now, as
it annoyed me to see #ifndef fooblahfoo, etc all over the place,
almost arrogant about the annoyance of having to define all these names to
perform a commen but neccicary functionality, when a completely superior
alternative exists.
I havn't sent it till now, cause its kindof a style change, and it is bad
voodoo to mess with style that has been established by more established
editors. So feel free to lambast me as a crazy bafoon.
v2 - preserve externally used headers
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We finally got the OK from all contributors with non-trivial commits to
relicense systemd from GPL2+ to LGPL2.1+.
Some udev bits continue to be GPL2+ for now, but we are looking into
relicensing them too, to allow free copy/paste of all code within
systemd.
The bits that used to be MIT continue to be MIT.
The big benefit of the relicensing is that closed source code may now
link against libsystemd-login.so and friends.
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