Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author |
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seccomp_syscall_resolve_name() can return a mix of positive and negative
(pseudo-) syscall numbers, while errors are signaled via __NR_SCMP_ERROR.
This commit lets the syscall filter parser only abort on real parsing
failures, letting libseccomp handle pseudo-syscall number on its own
and allowing proper multiplexed syscalls filtering.
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Follow up on #3503 (pass service env vars to PAM sessions)
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Prevent free from being called on (a part of) the call-by-reference
variable env when setup_pam fails.
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The unit load queue can be processed in the middle of setting the
unit's properties, so its load_state would no longer be UNIT_STUB
for the check in bus_unit_set_properties(), which would cause it to
incorrectly return an error.
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Commit da4d897e ("core: add cgroup memory controller support on the unified
hierarchy (#3315)") changed the code in src/core/cgroup.c to always write
the real numeric value from the cgroup parameters to the
"memory.limit_in_bytes" attribute file.
For parameters set to CGROUP_LIMIT_MAX, this results in the string
"18446744073709551615" being written into that file, which is UINT64_MAX.
Before that commit, CGROUP_LIMIT_MAX was special-cased to the string "-1".
This causes a regression on CentOS 7, which is based on kernel 3.10, as the
value is interpreted as *signed* 64 bit, and clamped to 0:
[root@n54 ~]# echo 18446744073709551615 >/sys/fs/cgroup/memory/user.slice/memory.limit_in_bytes
[root@n54 ~]# cat /sys/fs/cgroup/memory/user.slice/memory.limit_in_bytes
0
[root@n54 ~]# echo -1 >/sys/fs/cgroup/memory/user.slice/memory.limit_in_bytes
[root@n54 ~]# cat /sys/fs/cgroup/memory/user.slice/memory.limit_in_bytes
9223372036854775807
Hence, all units that are subject to the limits enforced by the memory
controller will crash immediately, even though they have no actual limit
set. This happens to for the user.slice, for instance:
[ 453.577153] Hardware name: SeaMicro SM15000-64-CC-AA-1Ox1/AMD Server CRB, BIOS Estoc.3.72.19.0018 08/19/2014
[ 453.587024] ffff880810c56780 00000000aae9501f ffff880813d7fcd0 ffffffff816360fc
[ 453.594544] ffff880813d7fd60 ffffffff8163109c ffff88080ffc5000 ffff880813d7fd28
[ 453.602120] ffffffff00000202 fffeefff00000000 0000000000000001 ffff880810c56c03
[ 453.609680] Call Trace:
[ 453.612156] [<ffffffff816360fc>] dump_stack+0x19/0x1b
[ 453.617324] [<ffffffff8163109c>] dump_header+0x8e/0x214
[ 453.622671] [<ffffffff8116d20e>] oom_kill_process+0x24e/0x3b0
[ 453.628559] [<ffffffff81088dae>] ? has_capability_noaudit+0x1e/0x30
[ 453.634969] [<ffffffff811d4155>] mem_cgroup_oom_synchronize+0x575/0x5a0
[ 453.641721] [<ffffffff811d3520>] ? mem_cgroup_charge_common+0xc0/0xc0
[ 453.648299] [<ffffffff8116da84>] pagefault_out_of_memory+0x14/0x90
[ 453.654621] [<ffffffff8162f4cc>] mm_fault_error+0x68/0x12b
[ 453.660233] [<ffffffff81642012>] __do_page_fault+0x3e2/0x450
[ 453.666017] [<ffffffff816420a3>] do_page_fault+0x23/0x80
[ 453.671467] [<ffffffff8163e308>] page_fault+0x28/0x30
[ 453.676656] Task in /user.slice/user-0.slice/user@0.service killed as a result of limit of /user.slice/user-0.slice/user@0.service
[ 453.688477] memory: usage 0kB, limit 0kB, failcnt 7
[ 453.693391] memory+swap: usage 0kB, limit 9007199254740991kB, failcnt 0
[ 453.700039] kmem: usage 0kB, limit 9007199254740991kB, failcnt 0
[ 453.706076] Memory cgroup stats for /user.slice/user-0.slice/user@0.service: cache:0KB rss:0KB rss_huge:0KB mapped_file:0KB swap:0KB inactive_anon:0KB active_anon:0KB inactive_file:0KB active_file:0KB unevictable:0KB
[ 453.725702] [ pid ] uid tgid total_vm rss nr_ptes swapents oom_score_adj name
[ 453.733614] [ 2837] 0 2837 11950 899 23 0 0 (systemd)
[ 453.741919] Memory cgroup out of memory: Kill process 2837 ((systemd)) score 1 or sacrifice child
[ 453.750831] Killed process 2837 ((systemd)) total-vm:47800kB, anon-rss:3188kB, file-rss:408kB
Fix this issue by special-casing the UINT64_MAX case again.
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By cleaning up before setting up PAM we maintain control of overriding
behavior in setting variables. Otherwise, pam_putenv is in control.
This also makes sure we use a cleaned up environment in replacing
variables in argv.
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A 'llu' formatting statement was used in a debugging printf statement
instead of a 'PRIu64'. Correcting that mistake here.
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manager: Only invoke a single sigchld per unit within a cleanup cycle
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make "machinectl clean" asynchronous, and open it up via PolicyKit
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By default, each iteration of manager_dispatch_sigchld() results in a unit level
sigchld event being invoked. For scope units, this results in a scope_sigchld_event()
which can seemingly stall for workloads that have a large number of PIDs within the
scope. The stall exhibits itself as a SIG_0 being initiated for each u->pids entry
as a result of pid_is_unwaited().
v2:
This patch resolves this condition by only paying to cost of a sigchld in the underlying
scope unit once per sigchld iteration. A new "sigchldgen" member resides within the
Unit struct. The Manager is incremented via the sd event loop, accessed via
sd_event_get_iteration, and the Unit member is set to the same value as the manager each
time that a sigchld event is invoked. If the Manager iteration value and Unit member
match, the sigchld event is not invoked for that iteration.
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Commit 3a18b60489504056f9b0b1a139439cbfa60a87e1 introduced a regression that
disabled the color mode for container.
This patch fixes this.
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It takes a boolean value. If true, access to SCHED_RR, SCHED_FIFO and
SCHED_DEADLINE is blocked, which my be used to lock up the system.
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Let's politely refuse with EPERM rather than kill the whole thing right-away.
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This was forgotten when MemoryDenyWriteExecute= was added: we should set NNP in
all cases when we set seccomp filters.
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It's a function defined by us, hence we should look for the error in its return
value, not in "errno".
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This is a fix-up for 2a9a6f8ac04a69ca36d645f9305a33645f22a22b which covered
non-transient units, but missed the case for transient units.
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Add sd_notify() parameter to change watchdog_usec during runtime.
Application can change watchdog_usec value by
sd_notify like this. Example. sd_notify(0, "WATCHDOG_USEC=20000000").
To reset watchdog_usec as configured value in service file,
restart service.
Notice.
sd_event is not currently supported. If application uses
sd_event_set_watchdog, or sd_watchdog_enabled, do not use
"WATCHDOG_USEC" option through sd_notify.
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Fix console log color
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Also we had to connect PID's stdio to null later since colors_enabled()
assume that stdout is connected to the console.
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When systemd is started by the kernel, the kernel set the TERM
environment variable unconditionnally to "linux" no matter the console
device used. This might be an issue for dumb devices with no colors
support.
This patch uses default_term_for_tty() for getting a more accurate
value. But it makes sure to keep the user preferences (if any) which
might be passed via the kernel command line. For that purpose /proc
should be mounted.
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Jun 16 05:12:08 systemd[1]: Controller 'io' supported: yes
Jun 16 05:12:08 systemd[1]: Controller 'memory' supported: yes
Jun 16 05:12:08 systemd[1]: Controller 'pids' supported: yes
instead of
Jun 16 04:06:50 systemd[1]: Controller 'memory' supported: yes
Jun 16 04:06:50 systemd[1]: Controller 'devices' supported: yes
Jun 16 04:06:50 systemd[1]: Controller 'pids' supported: yes
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This reverts commit ce8aba568156f2b9d0d3b023e960cda3d9d7db81.
We should pass an environment as close as possible to what we originally
got.
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When re-executed, reconnect the console to PID1's stdios as it was the case
when PID1 was initially started by the kernel.
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Delete the dbus1 generator and some critical wiring. This prevents
kdbus from being loaded or detected. As such, it will never be used,
even if the user still has a useful kdbus module loaded on their system.
Sort of fixes #3480. Not really, but it's better than the current state.
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various changes, most importantly regarding memory metrics
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Permit services to detect whether their stdout/stderr is connected to the journal.
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If for whatever reason the file system is "corrupted", we want
to be resilient and ignore the error, as long as we can load the units
from a different place.
Arch bug https://bugs.archlinux.org/task/49547.
A user had an ntfs symlink (essentially a file) instead of a directory after
restoring from backup. We should just ignore that like we would treat a missing
directory, for general resiliency.
We should treat permission errors similarly. For example an unreadable
/usr/local/lib directory would prevent (user) instances of systemd from
loading any units. It seems better to continue.
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executed services
This permits services to detect whether their stdout/stderr is connected to the
journal, and if so talk to the journal directly, thus permitting carrying of
metadata.
As requested by the gtk folks: #2473
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Super-important change, yeah!
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Fix-up for 2a9a6f8ac04a69ca36d645f9305a33645f22a22b
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The unit files already accept relative, percent-based memory limit
specification, let's make sure "systemctl set-property" support this too.
Since we want the physical memory size of the destination machine to apply we
pass the percentage in a new set of properties that only exist for this
purpose, and can only be set.
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The various bits of code did the scaling all different, let's unify this,
given that the code is not trivial.
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THe latter is a kernelism, we only understand "infinity".
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When parsing unit files we already refuse unit memory limits of zero, let's
also refuse it when the value is set via the bus.
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settings
If a percentage is used, it is taken relative to the installed RAM size. This
should make it easier to write generic unit files that adapt to the local system.
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And port a couple of users over to it.
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When unit is marked as UNSURE, we are trying to find if it state was
changed over and over again. So lets not go through the UNSURE states
again. Also when we find a GOOD unit lets propagate the GOOD state to
all units that this unit reference.
This is a problem on machines with a lot of initscripts with different
starting priority, since those units will reference each other and the
original algorithm might get to n! complexity.
Thanks HATAYAMA Daisuke for the expand_good_state code.
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notifications (#3531)
Fixes: #3483
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Typing `rd.rescue` is easier than `rd.systemd.unit=rescue.target`.
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Move the merger of environment variables before setting up the PAM
session and pass the aggregate environment to PAM setup. This allows
control over the PAM session hooks through environment variables.
PAM session initiation may update the environment. On successful
initiation of a PAM session, we adopt the environment of the
PAM context.
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This patch implements the new magic character '!'. By putting '!' in front
of a command, systemd executes it with full privileges ignoring paramters
such as User, Group, SupplementaryGroups, CapabilityBoundingSet,
AmbientCapabilities, SecureBits, SystemCallFilter, SELinuxContext,
AppArmorProfile, SmackProcessLabel, and RestrictAddressFamilies.
Fixes partially https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/3414
Related to https://github.com/coreos/rkt/issues/2482
Testing:
1. Create a user 'bob'
2. Create the unit file /etc/systemd/system/exec-perm.service
(You can use the example below)
3. sudo systemctl start ext-perm.service
4. Verify that the commands starting with '!' were not executed as bob,
4.1 Looking to the output of ls -l /tmp/exec-perm
4.2 Each file contains the result of the id command.
`````````````````````````````````````````````````````````````````
[Unit]
Description=ext-perm
[Service]
Type=oneshot
TimeoutStartSec=0
User=bob
ExecStartPre=!/usr/bin/sh -c "/usr/bin/rm /tmp/exec-perm*" ;
/usr/bin/sh -c "/usr/bin/id > /tmp/exec-perm-start-pre"
ExecStart=/usr/bin/sh -c "/usr/bin/id > /tmp/exec-perm-start" ;
!/usr/bin/sh -c "/usr/bin/id > /tmp/exec-perm-star-2"
ExecStartPost=/usr/bin/sh -c "/usr/bin/id > /tmp/exec-perm-start-post"
ExecReload=/usr/bin/sh -c "/usr/bin/id > /tmp/exec-perm-reload"
ExecStop=!/usr/bin/sh -c "/usr/bin/id > /tmp/exec-perm-stop"
ExecStopPost=/usr/bin/sh -c "/usr/bin/id > /tmp/exec-perm-stop-post"
[Install]
WantedBy=multi-user.target]
`````````````````````````````````````````````````````````````````
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an instance (#3451)
Corrects: 7aad67e7
Fixes: #3438
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it (#3457)
Let's add an extra safety check before we chmod/chown a TTY to the right user,
as we might end up having connected something to STDIN/STDOUT that is actually
not a TTY, even though this might have been requested, due to permissive
StandardInput= settings or transient service activation with fds passed in.
Fixes:
https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85255
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Let's explain #3444 briefly in the sources, too.
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Without this code the following can happen:
1. Open a file to keep a mount busy
2. Try to stop the corresponding mount unit with systemctl
-> umount fails and the failure is remembered in mount->result
3. Close the file and umount the filesystem manually
-> mount_dispatch_io() calls "mount_enter_dead(mount, MOUNT_SUCCESS)"
-> Old error in mount->result is reused and the mount unit enters a
failed state
Clear the old error result when 'mountinfo' reports a successful umount to
fix this.
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