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Suggested by Zbyszek on IRC.
[zj: /run/nologin is used with PAM. systemd-user-session is independent
of logind.]
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This patch removes includes that are not used. The removals were found with
include-what-you-use which checks if any of the symbols from a header is
in use.
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Also, allow clients to alter their own objects without any further
priviliges. i.e. this allows clients to kill and lock their own sessions
without involving PK.
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After all it is now much more like strjoin() than strappend(). At the
same time, add support for NULL sentinels, even if they are normally not
necessary.
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It may happen that you have several sessions with the same VT:
- Open a session c1 which leaves some processes around, and log out. The
session will stay in State=closing and become Active=no.
- Log back in on the same VT, get a new session "c2" which is State=active and
Active=yes.
When restarting logind after that, the first session that matches the current
VT becomes Active=yes, which will be c1; c2 thus is Active=no and does not get
the usual polkit/device ACL privileges.
Restore the "closing" state in session_load(), to avoid treating all restored
sessions as State=active. In seat_active_vt_changed(), prefer active sessions
over closing ones if more than one session matches the current VT.
Finally, fix the confusing comment in session_load() and explain it a bit
better.
https://launchpad.net/bugs/1415104
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In containers without CAP_SYS_ADMIN, it is not possible to mount tmpfs
(or any filesystem for that matter) on top of /run/user/$UID.
Previously, logind just failed in such a situation.
Now, logind will resort to chown+chmod of the directory instead. This
allows logind still to work in those environments, although without the
guarantees it provides (i.e. users not being able to DOS /run or other
users' /run/user/$UID space) when CAP_SYS_ADMIN is available.
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If setup of per-user runtime dir fails, clean up afterwards by removing
the directory before returning from the function, so we don't leave the
directory behind.
If this is not done, the second time the user logs in logind would
assume that the directory is already set up, even though it isn't.
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If the third argument is non-null, the kernel will always error out with
EINVAL and devices won't get revoked.
Reported-by: Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
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Types used for pids and uids in various interfaces are unpredictable.
Too bad.
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Whenever a process performs an action on an object, the kernel uses the
EUID of the process to do permission checks and to apply on any newly
created objects. The UID of a process is only used if someone *ELSE* acts
on the process. That is, the UID of a process defines who owns the
process, the EUID defines what privileges are used by this process when
performing an action.
Process limits, on the other hand, are always applied to the real UID, not
the effective UID. This is, because a process has a user object linked,
which always corresponds to its UID. A process never has a user object
linked for its EUID. Thus, accounting (and limits) is always done on the
real UID.
This commit fixes all sd-bus users to use the EUID when performing
privilege checks and alike. Furthermore, it fixes unix-creds to be parsed
as EUID, not UID (as the kernel always takes the EUID on UDS). Anyone
using UID (eg., to do user-accounting) has to fall back to the EUID as UDS
does not transmit the UID.
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If the caller does not run in a session/seat or has no tracked user, hide
the /org/freedesktop/login1/.../self links in introspection data.
Otherwise, "busctl tree org.freedesktop.login1" tries to query those nodes
even though it cant.
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The lifetime of compound literals is bound to the local scope, we hence
cannot refernce them outside of it.
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imply calling session/user instead
This turns "lock-session", "activate", "unlock-session",
"enable-linger", "disable-linger" into commands that take no argument,
optionally in which case the callers session/user is implied.
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determine them from the caller credentials
More specifically, if an operation is requested on a session with an
empty name, the caller's session is used. If an operation is requested
on a seat with an empty name, the seat of the caller's session is used.
Finally, if an operation on the user with UID -1 is requested, the user
of the client's session is used (and not the UID of the client!).
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Makes "busctl introspect" a lot more fun.
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caller's session status
Similar for user-status and seat-status.
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user-status" and "loginctl session-status"
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It carries no additional information and forces a passive sentence
structure which is longer and harder to parse.
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It does not use any functions or constants from libcap directly.
Tested that "pam_systemd.la" builds cleanly and works after this change.
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They do not use any functions from libcap directly. The CAP_* constants in use
through these files come from "missing.h" which will import <linux/capability.h>
and complement it with CAP_* constants not defined by the current kernel
headers. The "missing.h" header is imported through "util.h" which gets
imported in "logind.h".
Tested that "systemd-logind" builds cleanly and works after this change.
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Pretty much everywhere else we use the generic term "machine" when
referring to containers in API, so let's do though in sd-bus too. In
particular, since the concept of a "container" exists in sd-bus too, but
as part of the marshalling system.
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After all, pretty much all our tools include it, and it should hence be
shared.
Also move sysfs-show.h from core/ to login/, since it has no point to
exist in core.
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src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-common-errors.h
Stuff in src/shared/ should not use stuff from src/libsystemd/ really.
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Otherwise they can be optimized away with -DNDEBUG
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https://bugs.debian/org/771397
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Using the same scripts as in f647962d64e "treewide: yet more log_*_errno
+ return simplifications".
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If the format string contains %m, clearly errno must have a meaningful
value, so we might as well use log_*_errno to have ERRNO= logged.
Using:
find . -name '*.[ch]' | xargs sed -r -i -e \
's/log_(debug|info|notice|warning|error|emergency)\((".*%m.*")/log_\1_errno(errno, \2/'
Plus some whitespace, linewrap, and indent adjustments.
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Using:
find . -name '*.[ch]' | while read f; do perl -i.mmm -e \
'local $/;
local $_=<>;
s/(if\s*\([^\n]+\))\s*{\n(\s*)(log_[a-z_]*_errno\(\s*([->a-zA-Z_]+)\s*,[^;]+);\s*return\s+\g4;\s+}/\1\n\2return \3;/msg;
print;'
$f
done
And a couple of manual whitespace fixups.
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"addresses"
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It corrrectly handles both positive and negative errno values.
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As a followup to 086891e5c1 "log: add an "error" parameter to all
low-level logging calls and intrdouce log_error_errno() as log calls
that take error numbers", use sed to convert the simple cases to use
the new macros:
find . -name '*.[ch]' | xargs sed -r -i -e \
's/log_(debug|info|notice|warning|error|emergency)\("(.*)%s"(.*), strerror\(-([a-zA-Z_]+)\)\);/log_\1_errno(-\4, "\2%m"\3);/'
Multi-line log_*() invocations are not covered.
And we also should add log_unit_*_errno().
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Also, while we are at it, introduce some syntactic sugar for creating
ERRNO= and MESSAGE= structured logging fields.
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This makes it possible to drop in logind configuration snippets from a
package or other configuration management mechanism.
Add documentation to the header of /etc/logind.conf pointing the user at
/etc/logind.conf.d/*.conf.
Introduce a new helper, conf_parse_many, to parse configuration files in
a search path.
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username was already checked with isempty() and cannot be null at
this point.
CID#1237766
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kdbus has seen a larger update than expected lately, most notably with
kdbusfs, a file system to expose the kdbus control files:
* Each time a file system of this type is mounted, a new kdbus
domain is created.
* The layout inside each mount point is the same as before, except
that domains are not hierarchically nested anymore.
* Domains are therefore also unnamed now.
* Unmounting a kdbusfs will automatically also detroy the
associated domain.
* Hence, the action of creating a kdbus domain is now as
privileged as mounting a filesystem.
* This way, we can get around creating dev nodes for everything,
which is last but not least something that is not limited by
20-bit minor numbers.
The kdbus specific bits in nspawn have all been dropped now, as nspawn
can rely on the container OS to set up its own kdbus domain, simply by
mounting a new instance.
A new set of mounts has been added to mount things *after* the kernel
modules have been loaded. For now, only kdbus is in this set, which is
invoked with mount_setup_late().
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