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Given a container "foo", that maps user id $UID to container user, using
user namespaces, this NSS module extenstion will now map the $UID to a
name "vu-foo-$TUID" for the translated UID $UID.
Similar, userns groups are mapped to "vg-foo-$TGID" for translated GIDs
of $GID.
This simple change should make userns users more discoverable. Also,
given that many tools like "adduser" check NSS before allocating a UID,
should lower the chance of UID range conflicts between tools.
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Many of machined's operations are now opened up to unprivileged clients
via PolicyKit. Open up the dbus policy so that we can actually make
these calls.
kdbus doesn't reuqire this, hence this wasn't noticed before.
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This way "machinectl login" can be opened up to run without privileges.
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This adds a new bus call to machined that enumerates /var/lib/container
and returns all trees stored in it, distuingishing three types:
- GPT disk images, which are files suffixed with ".gpt"
- directory trees
- btrfs subvolumes
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OS version
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processes
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Introduces a new concept of "trusted" vs. "untrusted" busses. For the
latter libsystemd-bus will automatically do per-method access control,
for the former all access is automatically granted. Per-method access
control is encoded in the vtables: by default all methods are only
accessible to privileged clients. If the SD_BUS_VTABLE_UNPRIVILEGED flag
is set for a method it is accessible to unprivileged clients too. By
default whether a client is privileged is determined via checking for
its CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability, but this can be altered via the
SD_BUS_VTABLE_CAPABILITY() macro that can be ORed into the flags field
of the method.
Writable properties are also subject to SD_BUS_VTABLE_UNPRIVILEGED and
SD_BUS_VTABLE_CAPABILITY() for controlling write access to them. Note
however that read access is unrestricted, as PropertiesChanged messages
might send out the values anyway as an unrestricted broadcast.
By default the system bus is set to "untrusted" and the user bus is
"trusted" since per-method access control on the latter is unnecessary.
On dbus1 busses we check the UID of the caller rather than the
configured capability since the capability cannot be determined without
race. On kdbus the capability is checked if possible from the attached
meta-data of a message and otherwise queried from the sending peer.
This also decorates the vtables of the various daemons we ship with
these flags.
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Embedded folks don't need the machine registration stuff, hence it's
nice to make this optional. Also, I'd expect that machinectl will grow
additional commands quickly, for example to join existing containers and
suchlike, hence it's better keeping that separate from loginctl.
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