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This adds a new seccomp_init_conservative() helper call that is mostly just a
wrapper around seccomp_init(), but turns off NNP and adds in all secondary
archs, for best compatibility with everything else.
Pretty much all of our code used the very same constructs for these three
steps, hence unifying this in one small function makes things a lot shorter.
This also changes incorrect usage of the "scmp_filter_ctx" type at various
places. libseccomp defines it as typedef to "void*", i.e. it is a pointer type
(pretty poor choice already!) that casts implicitly to and from all other
pointer types (even poorer choice: you defined a confusing type now, and don't
even gain any bit of type safety through it...). A lot of the code assumed the
type would refer to a structure, and hence aded additional "*" here and there.
Remove that.
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Fail hard if SECCOMP was detected but could not be installed
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Let's block access to the kernel keyring and a number of obsolete system calls.
Also, update list of syscalls that may alter the system clock, and do raw IO
access. Filter ptrace() if CAP_SYS_PTRACE is not passed to the container and
acct() if CAP_SYS_PACCT is not passed.
This also changes things so that kexec(), some profiling calls, the swap calls
and quotactl() is never available to containers, not even if CAP_SYS_ADMIN is
passed. After all we currently permit CAP_SYS_ADMIN to containers by default,
but these calls should not be available, even then.
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Split seccomp into nspawn-seccomp.[ch]. Currently there are no changes,
but this will make it easy in the future to share or use the seccomp logic
from systemd core.
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