Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author |
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gperf-3.1 generates lookup functions that take a size_t length
parameter instead of unsigned int. Test for this at configure time.
Fixes: https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/5039
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This is a v232-applicable version of upstream c9fd987279a462e.
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Commit b006762 inverted the initial exit code which is relevant for --help and
--version without a particular reason. For these special options, parse_argv()
returns 0 so that our main() immediately skips to the end without adjusting
"ret". Otherwise, if an actual container is being started, ret is set on error
in run(), which still provides the "non-zero exit on error" behaviour.
Fixes #4605.
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container"
This reverts commit 3539724c26a1b2b00c4eb3c004b635a4b8647de6.
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Let's make sure that our loopback files remain sparse, hence let's set
"discard" as mount option on file systems that support it if the backing device
is a loopback.
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This adds a new seccomp_init_conservative() helper call that is mostly just a
wrapper around seccomp_init(), but turns off NNP and adds in all secondary
archs, for best compatibility with everything else.
Pretty much all of our code used the very same constructs for these three
steps, hence unifying this in one small function makes things a lot shorter.
This also changes incorrect usage of the "scmp_filter_ctx" type at various
places. libseccomp defines it as typedef to "void*", i.e. it is a pointer type
(pretty poor choice already!) that casts implicitly to and from all other
pointer types (even poorer choice: you defined a confusing type now, and don't
even gain any bit of type safety through it...). A lot of the code assumed the
type would refer to a structure, and hence aded additional "*" here and there.
Remove that.
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https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/036d523641c66bef713042894a17f4335f199e49
> vfs: Don't create inodes with a uid or gid unknown to the vfs
It is expected that filesystems can not represent uids and gids from
outside of their user namespace. Keep things simple by not even
trying to create filesystem nodes with non-sense uids and gids.
So, we actually should `reset_uid_gid` early to prevent https://github.com/systemd/systemd/pull/4223#issuecomment-252522955
$ sudo UNIFIED_CGROUP_HIERARCHY=no LD_LIBRARY_PATH=.libs .libs/systemd-nspawn -D /var/lib/machines/fedora-rawhide -U -b systemd.unit=multi-user.target
Spawning container fedora-rawhide on /var/lib/machines/fedora-rawhide.
Press ^] three times within 1s to kill container.
Child died too early.
Selected user namespace base 1073283072 and range 65536.
Failed to mount to /sys/fs/cgroup/systemd: No such file or directory
Details: https://github.com/systemd/systemd/pull/4223#issuecomment-253046519
Fixes: #4352
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https://github.com/systemd/systemd/pull/4372#issuecomment-253723849:
* `mount_all (outer_child)` creates `container_dir/sys/fs/selinux`
* `mount_all (outer_child)` doesn't patch `container_dir/sys/fs` and so on.
* `mount_sysfs (inner_child)` tries to create `/sys/fs/cgroup`
* This fails
370 stat("/sys/fs", {st_dev=makedev(0, 28), st_ino=13880, st_mode=S_IFDIR|0755, st_nlink=3, st_uid=65534, st_gid=65534, st_blksize=4096, st_blocks=0, st_size=60, st_atime=2016/10/14-05:16:43.398665943, st_mtime=2016/10/14-05:16:43.399665943, st_ctime=2016/10/14-05:16:43.399665943}) = 0
370 mkdir("/sys/fs/cgroup", 0755) = -1 EACCES (Permission denied)
* `mount_syfs (inner_child)` ignores that error and
mount(NULL, "/sys", NULL, MS_RDONLY|MS_NOSUID|MS_NODEV|MS_NOEXEC|MS_REMOUNT|MS_BIND, NULL) = 0
* `mount_cgroups` finally fails
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Fixes: #4181
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Enhance nspawn debug logs for mount/unmount operations
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Fixes:
host# systemd-nspawn -D ... -U -b systemd.unit=multi-user.target
...
$ grep /tmp /proc/self/mountinfo
154 145 0:41 / /tmp rw - tmpfs tmpfs rw,seclabel,uid=1036124160,gid=1036124160
$ umount /tmp
umount: /root/tmp: not mounted
$ systemctl poweroff
...
[FAILED] Failed unmounting Temporary Directory.
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This makes it easier to debug failed nspawn invocations:
Mounting sysfs on /var/lib/machines/fedora-rawhide/sys (MS_RDONLY|MS_NOSUID|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NODEV "")...
Mounting tmpfs on /var/lib/machines/fedora-rawhide/dev (MS_NOSUID|MS_STRICTATIME "mode=755,uid=1450901504,gid=1450901504")...
Mounting tmpfs on /var/lib/machines/fedora-rawhide/dev/shm (MS_NOSUID|MS_NODEV|MS_STRICTATIME "mode=1777,uid=1450901504,gid=1450901504")...
Mounting tmpfs on /var/lib/machines/fedora-rawhide/run (MS_NOSUID|MS_NODEV|MS_STRICTATIME "mode=755,uid=1450901504,gid=1450901504")...
Bind-mounting /sys/fs/selinux on /var/lib/machines/fedora-rawhide/sys/fs/selinux (MS_BIND "")...
Remounting /var/lib/machines/fedora-rawhide/sys/fs/selinux (MS_RDONLY|MS_NOSUID|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NODEV|MS_BIND|MS_REMOUNT "")...
Mounting proc on /proc (MS_NOSUID|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NODEV "")...
Bind-mounting /proc/sys on /proc/sys (MS_BIND "")...
Remounting /proc/sys (MS_RDONLY|MS_NOSUID|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NODEV|MS_BIND|MS_REMOUNT "")...
Bind-mounting /proc/sysrq-trigger on /proc/sysrq-trigger (MS_BIND "")...
Remounting /proc/sysrq-trigger (MS_RDONLY|MS_NOSUID|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NODEV|MS_BIND|MS_REMOUNT "")...
Mounting tmpfs on /tmp (MS_STRICTATIME "mode=1777,uid=0,gid=0")...
Mounting tmpfs on /sys/fs/cgroup (MS_NOSUID|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NODEV|MS_STRICTATIME "mode=755,uid=0,gid=0")...
Mounting cgroup on /sys/fs/cgroup/systemd (MS_NOSUID|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NODEV "none,name=systemd,xattr")...
Failed to mount cgroup on /sys/fs/cgroup/systemd (MS_NOSUID|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NODEV "none,name=systemd,xattr"): No such file or directory
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- check for oom after strdup
- no need to truncate the line since we're only extracting one field anyway
- use STR_IN_SET
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We would check the condition cg_ns_supported() twice. No functional
change.
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nspawn --private-users parsing, v2
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Autodetect systemd version in containers started by systemd-nspawn
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In particular, the check for arg_uid_range <= 0 is moved to the end, so that
"foobar:0" gives "Failed to parse UID", and not "UID range cannot be 0.".
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This is like the previous reverted commit, but any boolean is still accepted,
not just "yes" and "no". Man page is adjusted to match the code.
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This reverts commit bfd292ec35c7b768f9fb5cff4d921f3133e62b19.
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The documentation says lists "yes", "no", "pick", and numeric arguments.
But parse_boolean was attempted first, so various numeric arguments were
misinterpreted.
In particular, this fixes --private-users=0 to mean the same thing as
--private-users=0:65536.
While at it, use strndupa to avoid some error handling.
Also give a better error for an empty UID range. I think it's likely that
people will use --private-users=0:0 thinking that the argument means UID:GID.
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Current systemd version detection routine cannot detect systemd 230,
only systmed >= 231. This means that we'll still use the legacy hierarchy
in some cases where we wouldn't have too. If somebody figures out a nice
way to detect systemd 230 this can be later improved.
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systemd-soon-to-be-released-232 is able to deal with the mixed hierarchy.
So make an educated guess, and use the mixed hierarchy in that case.
Tested by running the host with mixed hierarchy (i.e. simply using a recent
kernel with systemd from git), and booting first a container with older systemd,
and then one with a newer systemd.
Fixes #4008.
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The new function has 416 lines by itself!
"return log_error_errno" is used to nicely reduce the volume of error
handling code.
A few minor issues are fixed on the way:
- positive value was used as error value (EIO), causing systemd-nspawn
to return success, even though it shouldn't.
- In two places random values were used as error status, when the
actual value was in an unusual place (etc_password_lock, notify_socket).
Those are the only functional changes.
There is another potential issue, which is marked with a comment, and left
unresolved: the container can also return 133 by itself, causing a spurious
reboot.
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If we are going to use the env var to override the detection result
anyway, there is not point in doing the detection, especially that
it can fail.
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gcc at some optimization levels thinks thes variables were used without
initialization. it's wrong, but let's make the message go anyway.
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directory (#4226)
Fixes https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/3695
At the same time it adds a protection against userns chown of inodes of
a shared mount point.
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core:sandbox: Add new ProtectKernelTunables=, ProtectControlGroups=, ProtectSystem=strict and fixes
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LXC does this, and we should probably too. Better safe than sorry.
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Previously, if ReadWritePaths= was nested inside a ReadOnlyPaths=
specification, then we'd first recursively apply the ReadOnlyPaths= paths, and
make everything below read-only, only in order to then flip the read-only bit
again for the subdirs listed in ReadWritePaths= below it.
This is not only ugly (as for the dirs in question we first turn on the RO bit,
only to turn it off again immediately after), but also problematic in
containers, where a container manager might have marked a set of dirs read-only
and this code will undo this is ReadWritePaths= is set for any.
With this patch behaviour in this regard is altered: ReadOnlyPaths= will not be
applied to the children listed in ReadWritePaths= in the first place, so that
we do not need to turn off the RO bit for those after all.
This means that ReadWritePaths=/ReadOnlyPaths= may only be used to turn on the
RO bit, but never to turn it off again. Or to say this differently: if some
dirs are marked read-only via some external tool, then ReadWritePaths= will not
undo it.
This is not only the safer option, but also more in-line with what the man page
currently claims:
"Entries (files or directories) listed in ReadWritePaths= are
accessible from within the namespace with the same access rights as
from outside."
To implement this change bind_remount_recursive() gained a new "blacklist"
string list parameter, which when passed may contain subdirs that shall be
excluded from the read-only mounting.
A number of functions are updated to add more debug logging to make this more
digestable.
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This commit is a minor tweak after the split of `--share-system`, decoupling the `--boot`
option from IPC namespacing.
Historically there has been a single `--share-system` option for sharing IPC/PID/UTS with the
host, which was incompatible with boot/pid1 mode. After the split, it is now possible to express
the requirements with better granularity.
For reference, this is a followup to #4023 which contains references to previous discussions.
I realized too late that CLONE_NEWIPC is not strictly needed for boot mode.
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Fail hard if SECCOMP was detected but could not be installed
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This commit follows further on the deprecation path for --share-system,
by splitting and gating each share-able namespace behind its own
environment flag.
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This is done exactly the same way a couple of times at various places, let's
unify this into one version.
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Currently, systemd uses either the legacy hierarchies or the unified hierarchy.
When the legacy hierarchies are used, systemd uses a named legacy hierarchy
mounted on /sys/fs/cgroup/systemd without any kernel controllers for process
management. Due to the shortcomings in the legacy hierarchy, this involves a
lot of workarounds and complexities.
Because the unified hierarchy can be mounted and used in parallel to legacy
hierarchies, there's no reason for systemd to use a legacy hierarchy for
management even if the kernel resource controllers need to be mounted on legacy
hierarchies. It can simply mount the unified hierarchy under
/sys/fs/cgroup/systemd and use it without affecting other legacy hierarchies.
This disables a significant amount of fragile workaround logics and would allow
using features which depend on the unified hierarchy membership such bpf cgroup
v2 membership test. In time, this would also allow deleting the said
complexities.
This patch updates systemd so that it prefers the unified hierarchy for the
systemd cgroup controller hierarchy when legacy hierarchies are used for kernel
resource controllers.
* cg_unified(@controller) is introduced which tests whether the specific
controller in on unified hierarchy and used to choose the unified hierarchy
code path for process and service management when available. Kernel
controller specific operations remain gated by cg_all_unified().
* "systemd.legacy_systemd_cgroup_controller" kernel argument can be used to
force the use of legacy hierarchy for systemd cgroup controller.
* nspawn: By default nspawn uses the same hierarchies as the host. If
UNIFIED_CGROUP_HIERARCHY is set to 1, unified hierarchy is used for all. If
0, legacy for all.
* nspawn: arg_unified_cgroup_hierarchy is made an enum and now encodes one of
three options - legacy, only systemd controller on unified, and unified. The
value is passed into mount setup functions and controls cgroup configuration.
* nspawn: Interpretation of SYSTEMD_CGROUP_CONTROLLER to the actual mount
option is moved to mount_legacy_cgroup_hierarchy() so that it can take an
appropriate action depending on the configuration of the host.
v2: - CGroupUnified enum replaces open coded integer values to indicate the
cgroup operation mode.
- Various style updates.
v3: Fixed a bug in detect_unified_cgroup_hierarchy() introduced during v2.
v4: Restored legacy container on unified host support and fixed another bug in
detect_unified_cgroup_hierarchy().
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A following patch will update cgroup handling so that the systemd controller
(/sys/fs/cgroup/systemd) can use the unified hierarchy even if the kernel
resource controllers are on the legacy hierarchies. This would require
distinguishing whether all controllers are on cgroup v2 or only the systemd
controller is. In preparation, this patch renames cg_unified() to
cg_all_unified().
This patch doesn't cause any functional changes.
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Update help for "short-full" and shorten to 80 columns
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make dist-check-help FTW!
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It's probably better to be safe here.
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