| Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author |
|---|
|
|
|
MDNS has a 'key cache flush' flag for records which must be masked out for
the parsers to do our right thing. We will also use that flag later (in a
different patch) in order to alter the cache behavior.
|
|
Validate mDNS queries and responses by looking at some header fields,
add mDNS flags.
|
|
The setting controls which kind of DNSSEC validation is done: none at
all, trusting the AD bit, or client-side validation.
For now, no validation is implemented, hence the setting doesn't do much
yet, except of toggling the CD bit in the generated messages if full
client-side validation is requested.
|
|
After all, they are for flags and parameters of RRs and already relevant
when dealing with RRs outside of the serialization concept.
|
|
This adds dns_resource_record_to_wire_format() that generates the raw
wire-format of a single DnsResourceRecord object, and caches it in the
object, optionally in DNSSEC canonical form. This call is used later to
generate the RR serialization of RRs to verify.
This adds four new fields to DnsResourceRecord objects:
- wire_format points to the buffer with the wire-format version of the
RR
- wire_format_size stores the size of that buffer
- wire_format_rdata_offset specifies the index into the buffer where the
RDATA of the RR begins (i.e. the size of the key part of the RR).
- wire_format_canonical is a boolean that stores whether the cached wire
format is in DNSSEC canonical form or not.
Note that this patch adds a mode where a DnsPacket is allocated on the
stack (instead of on the heap), so that it is cheaper to reuse the
DnsPacket object for generating this wire format. After all we reuse the
DnsPacket object for this, since it comes with all the dynamic memory
management, and serialization calls we need anyway.
|
|
|
|
When verifying signatures we need to be able to verify the original
data we got for an RR set, and that means we cannot simply drop flags
bits or consider RRs invalid too eagerly. Hence, instead of parsing the
DNSKEY flags store them as-is. Similar, accept the protocol field as it
is, and don't consider it a parsing error if it is not 3.
Of course, this means that the DNSKEY handling code later on needs to
check explicit for protocol != 3.
|
|
|
|
It essentially does the same as dns_packet_append_raw_string(), hence
make it a wrapper around it.
|
|
This indicates that we can handle DNSSEC records (per RFC3225), even if
all we do is silently drop them. This feature requires EDNS0 support.
As we do not yet support larger UDP packets, this feature increases the
risk of getting truncated packets.
Similarly to how we fall back to plain UDP if EDNS0 fails, we will fall
back to plain EDNS0 if EDNS0+DO fails (with the same logic of remembering
success and retrying after a grace period after failure).
|
|
This is a minimal implementation of RFC6891. Only default values
are used, so in reality this will be a noop.
EDNS0 support is dependent on the current server's feature level,
so appending the OPT pseudo RR is done when the packet is emitted,
rather than when it is assembled. To handle different feature
levels on retransmission, we strip off the OPT RR again after
sending the packet.
Similarly, to how we fall back to TCP if UDP fails, we fall back
to plain UDP if EDNS0 fails (but if EDNS0 ever succeeded we never
fall back again, and after a timeout we will retry EDNS0).
|
|
Needed for EDNS0.
|
|
resolved. Fully implement search domains for single-label names
|
|
The assumption that no NSEC bitmap could be empty due to the presence of the bit representing
the record itself turns out to be flawed. See (the admittedly experimental) RFC4956 for a
counter example.
|
|
The new dns_label_escape() call now operates on a buffer passed in,
similar to dns_label_unescape(). This should make decoding a bit faster,
and nicer.
|
|
RFC 6763 is very clear that TXT RRs should allow arbitrary binary
content, hence let's actually accept that. This also means accepting NUL
bytes in the middle of strings.
|
|
|
|
|
|
This partially reverts 106784ebb7b303ae471851100a773ad2aebf5b80, ad
readds separate DNS_PACKET_MAKE_FLAGS() invocations for the LLMNR and
DNS case. This is important since SOme flags have different names and
meanings on LLMNR and on DNS and we should clarify that via the comments
and how we put things together.
|
|
With more protocols to come, switch repetitive if-else blocks with a
switch-case statements.
|
|
We explicitly need to turn off name compression when marshalling or
demarshalling RRs for bus transfer, since they otherwise refer to packet
offsets that reference packets that are not transmitted themselves.
|
|
With this change we'll now also generate synthesized RRs for the local
LLMNR hostname (first label of system hostname), the local mDNS hostname
(first label of system hostname suffixed with .local), the "gateway"
hostname and all the reverse PTRs. This hence takes over part of what
nss-myhostname already implemented.
Local hostnames resolve to the set of local IP addresses. Since the
addresses are possibly on different interfaces it is necessary to change
the internal DnsAnswer object to track per-RR interface indexes, and to
change the bus API to always return the interface per-address rather than
per-reply. This change also patches the existing clients for resolved
accordingly (nss-resolve + systemd-resolve-host).
This also changes the routing logic for queries slightly: we now ensure
that the local hostname is never resolved via LLMNR, thus making it
trustable on the local system.
|
|
|
|
The NSEC type itself must at least be in the bitmap, so NSEC records with empty
bitmaps must be bogus.
|
|
We were tracking the bit offset inside each byte, rather than inside the whole bitmap.
|
|
We were counting the number of bits set rather than the number of bytes they occupied.
|
|
A size_t was being accessed as a char* due to the order of arguments being inverted.
|
|
|
|
We were appending rather than reading the bitmap.
|
|
We can never read past the end of the packet, so this seems impossible
to exploit, but let's error out early as reading past the end of the
current RR is clearly an error.
Found by Lennart, based on patch by Daniel.
|
|
Rename the field to make this clearer.
|
|
Most blobs (keys, signatures, ...) should have a specific size given by
the relevant algorithm. However, as we don't use/verify the algorithms
yet, let's just ensure that we don't read out zero-length data in cases
where this does not make sense.
The only exceptions, where zero-length data is allowed are in the NSEC3
salt field, and the generic data (which we don't know anything about,
so better not make any assumptions).
|
|
resolve: unify memdup() code when parsing RRs
|
|
dns_packet_append_type_window()
|
|
Let's make dns_packet_read_public_key() more generic by renaming it to
dns_packet_read_memdup() (which more accurately describes what it
does...). Then, patch all cases where we memdup() RR data to use this
new call.
This specifically checks for zero-length objects, and handles them
gracefully. It will set zero length payload fields as a result.
Special care should be taken to ensure that any code using this call
can handle the returned allocated field to be NULL if the size is
specified as 0!
|
|
Reuse the Iterator object from hashmap.h and expose a similar API.
This allows us to do
{
Iterator i;
unsigned n;
BITMAP_FOREACH(n, b, i) {
Iterator j;
unsigned m;
BITMAP_FOREACH(m, b, j) {
...
}
}
}
without getting confused. Requested by David.
|
|
Needed for DNSSEC.
|
|
Needed for DNSSEC.
|
|
resolved: minor improvements to RR handling
|
|
Needed for DNSSEC.
|
|
Currently we only make sure our links can handle the size of the payload witohut
taking the headers into account.
|
|
Make all LLMNR related packet inspections conditional to p->protocol.
Use switch-case statements while at it, which will make future additions
more readable.
|
|
The key tag is 16, not 8 bits.
|
|
|
|
https://github.com/vlajos/misspell_fixer
https://github.com/torstehu/systemd/commit/b6fdeb618cf2f3ce1645b3315f15f482710c7ffa
Thanks to Torstein Husebo <torstein@huseboe.net>.
|
|
section 6.1
The RFC says to encode an single empty TXT string instead of an empty
TXT array. It also says to treat a zero-length TXT RR as a TXT array
with a single zero-length string.
|
|
TXT records should have at least one character, so enforce this.
Before 0f84a72 parser SIGSEGV'd on ->txt.strings being NULL, but
even if this is fixed we should reject invalid TXT records.
|
|
Set the error code in case of incorrect name. This prevents continuing
and failing an assert(name) later on.
|
|
Loops in RR compression were only detected for the first entry.
Multiple redirections should be allowed, each one checking for an
infinite loop on its own starting point.
Also update the pointer on each redirection to avoid longer loops of
labels and redirections, in names like:
(start) [len=1] "A", [ptr to start]
(David: rename variable to "jump_barrier" and add reference to RFC)
|
