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Previously, .network files only knew a vaguely defined "Domains=" concept, for which the documentation declared it was
the "DNS domain" for the network connection, without specifying what that means.
With this the Domains setting is reworked, so that there are now "routing" domains and "search" domains. The former are
to be used by resolved to route DNS request to specific network interfaces, the latter is to be used for searching
single-label hostnames with (in addition to being used for routing). Both settings are configured in the "Domains="
setting. Normal domain names listed in it are now considered search domains (for compatibility with existing setups),
while those prefixed with "~" are considered routing domains only. To route all lookups to a specific interface the
routing domain "." may be used, referring to the root domain. An alternative syntax for this is the "*", as was already
implemented before using the "wildcard" domain concept.
This commit adds proper parsers for this new logic, and exposes this via the sd-network API. This information is not
used by resolved yet, this will be added in a later commit.
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So far, abritrary NSEC and NSEC3 RRs were implicitly consider "primary" for any transaction, meaning we'd abort the
transaction immediately if we couldn't validate it. With this patch this logic is removed, and the NSEC/NSEC3 RRs will
not be considered primary anymore. This has the effect that they will be dropped from the message if they don't
validate, but processing continues. This is safe to do, as they are required anyway to validate positive wildcard and
negative responses, and if they are missing then, then message will be considered unsigned, which hence means the
outcome is effectively the same.
This is benefical in case the server sends us NSEC/NSEC3 RRs that are not directly related to the lookup we did, but
simply auxiliary information. Previously, if we couldn't authenticate those RRs we'd fail the entire lookup while with
this change we'll simply drop the auxiliary information and proceed without it.
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authenticated
In some cases we get NSEC3 RRs that have not been authenticated (because the chain of trust to the root is somewhere
broken). We can use these for checking negative replies, as long as we don't claim they were ultimately authenticated.
This means we need to be able to deal with NSEC3 RRs that lack RRSIG metadata.
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We already properly propagate errors from transactions to queries. Make sure that errors that happened during handling
of query candidates are propagated to the query, too.
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Whenever we encounter an OS error we did not expect, we so far put the transaction into DNS_TRANSACTION_RESOURCES
state. Rename this state to DNS_TRANSACTION_ERRNO, and save + propagate the actual system error to the caller. This
should make error messages triggered by system errors much more readable by the user.
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If we downgrade from DNSSEC to non-DNSSEC mode, let's log about this in a recognizable way (i.e. with a message ID),
after all, this is of major importance.
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This way the difference between lookups via NSS and our native bus API should become minimal.
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When we synthesize A/AAAA for domains like "localhost", then make sure we generate ENODATA if the user asks for RR
types such a RP to be solved on the name. Previously, we'd pass the error back in that case that was generated from the
usual lookup procedure.
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The LLMNR spec suggests to do do reverse address lookups by doing direct LLMNR/TCP connections to the indicated
address, instead of doing any LLMNR multicast queries. When we do this and the peer doesn't actually implement LLMNR
this will result in a TCP connection error, which we need to handle. In contrast to most LLMNR lookups this will give
us a quick response on whether we can find a suitable name. Report this as new transaction state, since this should
mostly be treated like an NXDOMAIN rcode, except that it's not one.
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Since we honour the edns rcode extension we need more than 4 bits to format it. To avoid further confusion, derive the
right length from the type.
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Now that we count both negative and positive validation results, we shouldn't claim we just counted RRsets.
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Also, don't consider RRs that aren't primary to the lookups we do as relevant to the lookups.
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When using NSEC/NSEC3 RRs from the cache to derive existance of arbitrary RRs, we should not get confused by the fact
that NSEC/NSEC3 RRs exist twice at zone cuts: once in the parent zone, and once in the child zone. For most RR types we
should only consult the latter since that's where the beef is. However, for DS lookups we have to check the former.
This change makes sure we never cache NSEC/NSEC3 RRs from any parent zone of a zone-cut. It also makes sure that when
we look for a DS RR in the cache we never consider any cached NSEC RR, as those are now always from the child zone.
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an invalid packet event
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We already maintain statistics about positive DNSSEC proofs, and count them up by 1 for each validated RRset. Now,
update the same counters each time we validated a negative query, so that the statistics are the combined result of all
validation checks, both positive and negative.
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match, or just a covering enclosure
If we are looking for a DS RR we need to check the NSEC3 bitmap of the parent zone's NSEC3 RR, not the one from the
child. For any other RR we need to look at the child's however, hence enforce this with the bitmaps.
Note that not coverign checks only the lower zone's NSEC3 bitmaps matter, hence the existing check is fine.
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The tool resolves way more than just hosts, hence give it a more generic name. This should be safe, as the tool is
currently undocumented. Before we add documentation for it, let's get the name right.
This also moves the C source into src/resolve/ (from src/resolve-host/), since the old name is a misnomer now. Also,
since it links directly to many of the C files of resolved it really belongs into resolved's directory anyway.
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DNS_ANSWER_FOREACH() can deal with NULL answers anyway, let's simplify our code here.
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Also, while we are at it, set the "authenticated" bit for everything we synthesize
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the network is down
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This mimics what networkd is doing to detect a carrier.
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Noticed by @vcaputo
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Fixes #2380.
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Not only report whether the server actually supports DNSSEC, but also first check whether DNSSEC is actually enabled
for it in our local configuration.
Also, export a per-link DNSSECSupported property in addition to the existing manager-wide property.
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So far, we exposed SetLinkXYZ() on the Manager interface, to set a couple of link properties. This adds similar calls
SetXYZ() on the Link interface, and makes sure the former is little more than a shortcut to the latter.
SetLinkXYZ() has the benefit of not requiring a GetLink() round trip for setting these properties, while the method
actually belongs to the Link objects, and this change corrects that.
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The link objects expose as properties the current settings made with SetLinkDNS() and related calls, plus some more
information.
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various configuration files
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This is useful for alternative network management solutions (such as NetworkManager) to push DNS configuration data
into resolved.
The calls will fail should networkd already have taken possesion of a link, so that the bus API is only available if
we don't get the data from networkd.
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For mDNS and LLMNR we already created the scopes only if the specific interfaces where actually up and suitable for
Multicasting. Add a similar (but weaker) logic for unicast DNS as well.
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This should be generally useful information, hence show it.
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resolved: hide public mDNS configuration knobs for now
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Remove gcc warnings v2
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These bits were intenionally left out while mDNS is under development.
Remove the exposed knobs and man page entries again until this is settled.
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Fixes #2366
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Certain Belkin routers appear to implement a broken DNS cache for A RRs and some others, but implement a pass-thru for
AAAA RRs. This has the effect that we quickly recognize the broken logic of the router when we do an A lookup, but for
AAAA everything works fine until we actually try to validate the request. Given that the validation will necessarily
fail ultimately let's make sure we remember even when downgrading a feature level that OPT or RRSIG was missing.
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When we restart a transaction because of an incompatible server, pick a new transaction ID.
This should increase compatibility with DNS servers that don't like if they get different requests with the same
transaction ID.
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given that DNSSEC lookups may result in quite a number of auxiliary transactions, let's better be safe than sorry and
also enforce a limit on the number of total transactions, not just on the number of queries.
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Previously, when getting notified about a completed auxiliary DNSSEC transaction we'd immediately act on it, and
possibly abort the main transaction. This is problematic, as DNS transactions that already completed at the time we
started using them will never get the notification event, and hence never be acted on in the same way.
Hence, introduce a new call dns_transaction_dnssec_ready() that checks the state of auxiliary DNSSEC transactions, and
returns 1 when we are ready for the actual DNSSEC validation step. Then, make sure this is invoked when the auxiliary
transactions are first acquired (and thus possibly reused) as well when the notifications explained above take place.
This fixes problems particularly when doing combined A and AAAA lookups where the auxiliary DNSSEC transactions get
reused between them, and where we got confused if we reused an auxiliary DNSSEC transaction from one when it already
got completed from the other.
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Let's avoid thinking that a CNAME/DNAME chain traversal could be a good idea if QTYPE is already CNAME/DNAME.
(Also, let's bail out early when trying to see if some RR is a suitable CNAME/DNAME for some other RR).
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If the first step was done via a search domain, make sure the subsequent steps are not.
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IDNA checks
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