Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author |
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This was tested on ppc64le. Assume the same is true for ppc64.
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Add a bit of code that tries to get the right parameter order in place
for some of the better known architectures, and skips
restrict_namespaces for other archs.
This also bypasses the test on archs where we don't know the right
order.
In this case I didn't bother with testing the case where no filter is
applied, since that is hopefully just an issue for now, as there's
nothing stopping us from supporting more archs, we just need to know
which order is right.
Fixes: #5241
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On i386 we block the old mmap() call entirely, since we cannot properly
filter it. Thankfully it hasn't been used by glibc since quite some
time.
Fixes: #5240
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it a NOP
See: #5215
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This substantially reworks the seccomp code, to ensure better
compatibility with some architectures, including i386.
So far we relied on libseccomp's internal handling of the multiple
syscall ABIs supported on Linux. This is problematic however, as it does
not define clear semantics if an ABI is not able to support specific
seccomp rules we install.
This rework hence changes a couple of things:
- We no longer use seccomp_rule_add(), but only
seccomp_rule_add_exact(), and fail the installation of a filter if the
architecture doesn't support it.
- We no longer rely on adding multiple syscall architectures to a single filter,
but instead install a separate filter for each syscall architecture
supported. This way, we can install a strict filter for x86-64, while
permitting a less strict filter for i386.
- All high-level filter additions are now moved from execute.c to
seccomp-util.c, so that we can test them independently of the service
execution logic.
- Tests have been added for all types of our seccomp filters.
- SystemCallFilters= and SystemCallArchitectures= are now implemented in
independent filters and installation logic, as they semantically are
very much independent of each other.
Fixes: #4575
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These groupe reboot()/kexec() and swapon()/swapoff() respectively
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@filesystem groups various file system operations, such as opening files and
directories for read/write and stat()ing them, plus renaming, deleting,
symlinking, hardlinking.
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This new setting permits restricting whether namespaces may be created and
managed by processes started by a unit. It installs a seccomp filter blocking
certain invocations of unshare(), clone() and setns().
RestrictNamespaces=no is the default, and does not restrict namespaces in any
way. RestrictNamespaces=yes takes away the ability to create or manage any kind
of namspace. "RestrictNamespaces=mnt ipc" restricts the creation of namespaces
so that only mount and IPC namespaces may be created/managed, but no other
kind of namespaces.
This setting should be improve security quite a bit as in particular user
namespacing was a major source of CVEs in the kernel in the past, and is
accessible to unprivileged processes. With this setting the entire attack
surface may be removed for system services that do not make use of namespaces.
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Just to make the whole thing easier for users.
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Now that the list is user-visible, @default should be first.
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@resources contains various syscalls that alter resource limits and memory and
scheduling parameters of processes. As such they are good candidates to block
for most services.
@basic-io contains a number of basic syscalls for I/O, similar to the list
seccomp v1 permitted but slightly more complete. It should be useful for
building basic whitelisting for minimal sandboxes
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This validates the system call set table and many of our seccomp-util.c APIs.
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This allows us to unify most of the code in apply_protect_kernel_modules() and
apply_private_devices().
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This adds a new seccomp_init_conservative() helper call that is mostly just a
wrapper around seccomp_init(), but turns off NNP and adds in all secondary
archs, for best compatibility with everything else.
Pretty much all of our code used the very same constructs for these three
steps, hence unifying this in one small function makes things a lot shorter.
This also changes incorrect usage of the "scmp_filter_ctx" type at various
places. libseccomp defines it as typedef to "void*", i.e. it is a pointer type
(pretty poor choice already!) that casts implicitly to and from all other
pointer types (even poorer choice: you defined a confusing type now, and don't
even gain any bit of type safety through it...). A lot of the code assumed the
type would refer to a structure, and hence aded additional "*" here and there.
Remove that.
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A variety of fixes:
- rename the SystemCallFilterSet structure to SyscallFilterSet. So far the main
instance of it (the syscall_filter_sets[] array) used to abbreviate
"SystemCall" as "Syscall". Let's stick to one of the two syntaxes, and not
mix and match too wildly. Let's pick the shorter name in this case, as it is
sufficiently well established to not confuse hackers reading this.
- Export explicit indexes into the syscall_filter_sets[] array via an enum.
This way, code that wants to make use of a specific filter set, can index it
directly via the enum, instead of having to search for it. This makes
apply_private_devices() in particular a lot simpler.
- Provide two new helper calls in seccomp-util.c: syscall_filter_set_find() to
find a set by its name, seccomp_add_syscall_filter_set() to add a set to a
seccomp object.
- Update SystemCallFilter= parser to use extract_first_word(). Let's work on
deprecating FOREACH_WORD_QUOTED().
- Simplify apply_private_devices() using this functionality
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Fixes #3882
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Implement sets of system calls to help constructing system call
filters. A set starts with '@' to distinguish from a system call.
Closes: #3053, #3157
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This should be handled fine now by .dir-locals.el, so need to carry that
stuff in every file.
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The next step of a general cleanup of our includes. This one mostly
adds missing includes but there are a few removals as well.
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And make use of it where appropriate for executing services and for
nspawn.
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architecture support for system calls
Also, turn system call filter bus properties into complex types instead
of concatenated strings.
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