| Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author |
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This is a follow-up for dc7dd61de610e9330
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Fixes:
```
touch hola.service
systemctl link $(pwd)/hola.service $(pwd)/hola.service
```
```
==1==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: attempting double-free on 0x60300002c560 in thread T0 (systemd):
#0 0x7fc8c961cb00 in free (/lib64/libasan.so.3+0xc6b00)
#1 0x7fc8c90ebd3b in strv_clear src/basic/strv.c:83
#2 0x7fc8c90ebdb6 in strv_free src/basic/strv.c:89
#3 0x55637c758c77 in strv_freep src/basic/strv.h:37
#4 0x55637c763ba9 in method_enable_unit_files_generic src/core/dbus-manager.c:1960
#5 0x55637c763d16 in method_link_unit_files src/core/dbus-manager.c:2001
#6 0x7fc8c92537ec in method_callbacks_run src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-objects.c:418
#7 0x7fc8c9258830 in object_find_and_run src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-objects.c:1255
#8 0x7fc8c92594d7 in bus_process_object src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-objects.c:1371
#9 0x7fc8c91e7553 in process_message src/libsystemd/sd-bus/sd-bus.c:2563
#10 0x7fc8c91e78ce in process_running src/libsystemd/sd-bus/sd-bus.c:2605
#11 0x7fc8c91e8f61 in bus_process_internal src/libsystemd/sd-bus/sd-bus.c:2837
#12 0x7fc8c91e90d2 in sd_bus_process src/libsystemd/sd-bus/sd-bus.c:2856
#13 0x7fc8c91ea8f9 in io_callback src/libsystemd/sd-bus/sd-bus.c:3126
#14 0x7fc8c928333b in source_dispatch src/libsystemd/sd-event/sd-event.c:2268
#15 0x7fc8c9285cf7 in sd_event_dispatch src/libsystemd/sd-event/sd-event.c:2627
#16 0x7fc8c92865fa in sd_event_run src/libsystemd/sd-event/sd-event.c:2686
#17 0x55637c6b5257 in manager_loop src/core/manager.c:2274
#18 0x55637c6a2194 in main src/core/main.c:1920
#19 0x7fc8c7ac7400 in __libc_start_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x20400)
#20 0x55637c697339 in _start (/usr/lib/systemd/systemd+0xcd339)
0x60300002c560 is located 0 bytes inside of 19-byte region [0x60300002c560,0x60300002c573)
freed by thread T0 (systemd) here:
#0 0x7fc8c961cb00 in free (/lib64/libasan.so.3+0xc6b00)
#1 0x7fc8c90ee320 in strv_remove src/basic/strv.c:630
#2 0x7fc8c90ee190 in strv_uniq src/basic/strv.c:602
#3 0x7fc8c9180533 in unit_file_link src/shared/install.c:1996
#4 0x55637c763b25 in method_enable_unit_files_generic src/core/dbus-manager.c:1985
#5 0x55637c763d16 in method_link_unit_files src/core/dbus-manager.c:2001
#6 0x7fc8c92537ec in method_callbacks_run src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-objects.c:418
#7 0x7fc8c9258830 in object_find_and_run src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-objects.c:1255
#8 0x7fc8c92594d7 in bus_process_object src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-objects.c:1371
#9 0x7fc8c91e7553 in process_message src/libsystemd/sd-bus/sd-bus.c:2563
#10 0x7fc8c91e78ce in process_running src/libsystemd/sd-bus/sd-bus.c:2605
#11 0x7fc8c91e8f61 in bus_process_internal src/libsystemd/sd-bus/sd-bus.c:2837
#12 0x7fc8c91e90d2 in sd_bus_process src/libsystemd/sd-bus/sd-bus.c:2856
#13 0x7fc8c91ea8f9 in io_callback src/libsystemd/sd-bus/sd-bus.c:3126
#14 0x7fc8c928333b in source_dispatch src/libsystemd/sd-event/sd-event.c:2268
#15 0x7fc8c9285cf7 in sd_event_dispatch src/libsystemd/sd-event/sd-event.c:2627
#16 0x7fc8c92865fa in sd_event_run src/libsystemd/sd-event/sd-event.c:2686
#17 0x55637c6b5257 in manager_loop src/core/manager.c:2274
#18 0x55637c6a2194 in main src/core/main.c:1920
#19 0x7fc8c7ac7400 in __libc_start_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x20400)
previously allocated by thread T0 (systemd) here:
#0 0x7fc8c95b0160 in strdup (/lib64/libasan.so.3+0x5a160)
#1 0x7fc8c90edf32 in strv_extend src/basic/strv.c:552
#2 0x7fc8c923ae41 in bus_message_read_strv_extend src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-message.c:5578
#3 0x7fc8c923b0de in sd_bus_message_read_strv src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-message.c:5600
#4 0x55637c7639d1 in method_enable_unit_files_generic src/core/dbus-manager.c:1969
#5 0x55637c763d16 in method_link_unit_files src/core/dbus-manager.c:2001
#6 0x7fc8c92537ec in method_callbacks_run src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-objects.c:418
#7 0x7fc8c9258830 in object_find_and_run src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-objects.c:1255
#8 0x7fc8c92594d7 in bus_process_object src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-objects.c:1371
#9 0x7fc8c91e7553 in process_message src/libsystemd/sd-bus/sd-bus.c:2563
#10 0x7fc8c91e78ce in process_running src/libsystemd/sd-bus/sd-bus.c:2605
#11 0x7fc8c91e8f61 in bus_process_internal src/libsystemd/sd-bus/sd-bus.c:2837
#12 0x7fc8c91e90d2 in sd_bus_process src/libsystemd/sd-bus/sd-bus.c:2856
#13 0x7fc8c91ea8f9 in io_callback src/libsystemd/sd-bus/sd-bus.c:3126
#14 0x7fc8c928333b in source_dispatch src/libsystemd/sd-event/sd-event.c:2268
#15 0x7fc8c9285cf7 in sd_event_dispatch src/libsystemd/sd-event/sd-event.c:2627
#16 0x7fc8c92865fa in sd_event_run src/libsystemd/sd-event/sd-event.c:2686
#17 0x55637c6b5257 in manager_loop src/core/manager.c:2274
#18 0x55637c6a2194 in main src/core/main.c:1920
#19 0x7fc8c7ac7400 in __libc_start_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x20400)
SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: double-free (/lib64/libasan.so.3+0xc6b00) in free
==1==ABORTING
```
Closes #5015
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Easily reproducible:
1) systemctl mask foo
2) systemctl unmask foo foo
The problem here is that the *i that is put into todo[] is later freed
in strv_uniq(), which is not directly visible from this patch. Somewhere
further in the code, the string that *i pointed to is freed again. That
happens only when multiple services with the same name/path are specified.
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This permits "systemctl enable" and "systemctl add-wants" on template
units without any specifications of an instance name, neither specified
on the command line, nor specified in DefaultInstance= field of the
[install] section.
Fixes: #3473
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This means that callers can distiguish an error from flags==0,
and don't have to special-case the empty string.
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Otherwise we might get started too early.
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Fixes: #4402
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This adds two new settings BindPaths= and BindReadOnlyPaths=. They allow
defining arbitrary bind mounts specific to particular services. This is
particularly useful for services with RootDirectory= set as this permits making
specific bits of the host directory available to chrooted services.
The two new settings follow the concepts nspawn already possess in --bind= and
--bind-ro=, as well as the .nspawn settings Bind= and BindReadOnly= (and these
latter options should probably be renamed to BindPaths= and BindReadOnlyPaths=
too).
Fixes: #3439
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This makes "systemd-run -p MountFlags=shared -t /bin/sh" work, by making
MountFlags= to the list of properties that may be accessed transiently.
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Fix some build issues and warnings
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A prettification of the dissect code, mkosi and TODO updates
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This is already fixed upstream, so warning is not useful.
Let's keep the workaround until the fix has percolated downstream.
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We define those macros, and there's no reason to have one without
the other.
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Generalize image dissection logic of nspawn, and make it useful for other tools.
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This makes the code to set arg_flags much more readable.
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This adds support for discovering and making use of properly tagged dm-verity
data integrity partitions. This extends both systemd-nspawn and systemd-dissect
with a new --root-hash= switch that takes the root hash to use for the root
partition, and is otherwise fully automatic.
Verity partitions are discovered automatically by GPT table type UUIDs, as
listed in
https://www.freedesktop.org/wiki/Specifications/DiscoverablePartitionsSpec/
(which I updated prior to this change, to include new UUIDs for this purpose.
mkosi with https://github.com/systemd/mkosi/pull/39 applied may generate images
that carry the necessary integrity data. With that PR and this commit, the
following simply lines suffice to boot up an integrity-protected container image:
```
# mkdir test
# cd test
# mkosi --verity
# systemd-nspawn -i ./image.raw -bn
```
Note that mkosi writes the image file to "image.raw" next to a a file
"image.roothash" that contains the root hash. systemd-nspawn will look for that
file and use it if it exists, in case --root-hash= is not specified explicitly.
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This adds support to the image dissector to deal with encrypted images (only
LUKS). Given that we now have a neatly isolated image dissector codebase, let's
add a new feature to it: support for automatically dealing with encrypted
images. This is then exposed in systemd-dissect and nspawn.
It's pretty basic: only support for passphrase-based encryption.
In order to ensure that "systemd-dissect --mount" results in mount points whose
backing LUKS DM devices are cleaned up automatically we use the DM_DEV_REMOVE
ioctl() directly on the device (in DM_DEFERRED_REMOVE mode). libgcryptsetup at
the moment doesn't provide a proper API for this. Thankfully, the ioctl() API
is pretty easy to use.
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This adds a small tool that may be used to look into OS images, and mount them
to any place. This is mostly a friendlier version of test-dissect-image.c. I am
not sure this should really become a proper command of systemd, hence for now
do not install it into bindir, but simply libexecdir.
This tool is already pretty useful since you can mount image files with it,
honouring the various partitions correctly. I figure this is going to become
more interesting if the dissctor learns luks and verity support.
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This adds two new APIs to systemd:
- loop-util.h is a simple internal API for allocating, setting up and releasing
loopback block devices.
- dissect-image.h is an internal API for taking apart disk images and figuring
out what the purpose of each partition is.
Both APIs are basically refactored versions of similar code in nspawn. This
rework should permit us to reuse this in other places than just nspawn in the
future. Specifically: to implement RootImage= in the service image, similar to
RootDirectory=, but operating on a disk image; to unify the gpt-auto-discovery
generator code with the discovery logic in nspawn; to add new API to machined
for determining the OS version of a disk image (i.e. not just running
containers). This PR does not make any such changes however, it just provides
the new reworked API.
The reworked code is also slightly more powerful than the nspawn original one.
When pointing it to an image or block device with a naked file system (i.e. no
partition table) it will simply make it the root device.
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Let's use chase_symlinks() everywhere, and stop using GNU
canonicalize_file_name() everywhere. For most cases this should not change
behaviour, however increase exposure of our function to get better tested. Most
importantly in a few cases (most notably nspawn) it can take the correct root
directory into account when chasing symlinks.
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Various networkd/DHCP fixes.
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Given that other file systems (notably: xfs) support reflinks these days, let's
extend the file system snapshotting logic to fall back to plan copies or
reflinks when full btrfs subvolume snapshots are not available.
This essentially makes "systemd-nspawn --ephemeral" and "systemd-nspawn
--template=" available on non-btrfs subvolumes. Of course, both operations will
still be slower on non-btrfs than on btrfs (simply because reflinking each file
individually in a directory tree is still slower than doing this in one step
for a whole subvolume), but it's probably good enough for many cases, and we
should provide the users with the tools, they have to figure out what's good
for them.
Note that "machinectl clone" already had a fallback like this in place, this
patch generalizes this, and adds similar support to our other cases.
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This adds a new undocumented env var $SYSTEMD_NSPAWN_LOCK. When set to "0",
nspawn will not attempt to lock the image.
Fixes: #4037
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on success
We forgot to initialize the "global" return parameter in one case. Fix that.
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@filesystem groups various file system operations, such as opening files and
directories for read/write and stat()ing them, plus renaming, deleting,
symlinking, hardlinking.
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Confirm spawn fixes/enhancements
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Support on the server side has already been in place for quite some time, let's
also add support on the client side for this.
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In contrast to all other unit types device units when queued just track
external state, they cannot effect state changes on their own. Hence unless a
client or other job waits for them there's no reason to keep them in the job
queue. This adds a concept of GC'ing jobs of this type as soon as no client or
other job waits for them anymore.
To ensure this works correctly we need to track which clients actually
reference a job (i.e. which ones enqueued it). Unfortunately that's pretty
nasty to do for direct connections, as sd_bus_track doesn't work for
them. For now, work around this, by simply remembering in a boolean that a job
was requested by a direct connection, and reset it when we notice the direct
connection is gone. This means the GC logic works fine, except that jobs are
not immediately removed when direct connections disconnect.
In the longer term, a rework of the bus logic should fix this properly. For now
this should be good enough, as GC works for fine all cases except this one, and
thus is a clear improvement over the previous behaviour.
Fixes: #1921
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Let's introduce a new call bus_track_add_name_many() that adds a string list to
a tracking object.
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Allow all callers that want to print RestrictNamespaces= returned from D-Bus
as a string instead of a u64 value.
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extract_first_words deals fine with the string being NULL, so drop the upfront
check for that.
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This also fixes the build when seccomp is disabled.
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core: add new RestrictNamespaces= unit file setting
Merging, not rebasing, because this touches many files and there were tree-wide cleanups in the mean time.
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Format string tweaks (and a small fix on 32bit)
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Remove FOREACH_WORD_QUOTED
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We don't have plural in the name of any other -util files and this
inconsistency trips me up every time I try to type this file name
from memory. "formats-util" is even hard to pronounce.
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It's the default, and NULL is shorter.
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journalctl: fix memleak
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This new setting permits restricting whether namespaces may be created and
managed by processes started by a unit. It installs a seccomp filter blocking
certain invocations of unshare(), clone() and setns().
RestrictNamespaces=no is the default, and does not restrict namespaces in any
way. RestrictNamespaces=yes takes away the ability to create or manage any kind
of namspace. "RestrictNamespaces=mnt ipc" restricts the creation of namespaces
so that only mount and IPC namespaces may be created/managed, but no other
kind of namespaces.
This setting should be improve security quite a bit as in particular user
namespacing was a major source of CVEs in the kernel in the past, and is
accessible to unprivileged processes. With this setting the entire attack
surface may be removed for system services that do not make use of namespaces.
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systemd-analyze syscall-filter
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Fixes:
$ ./libtool --mode execute valgrind --leak-check=full ./journalctl >/dev/null
==22309== Memcheck, a memory error detector
==22309== Copyright (C) 2002-2015, and GNU GPL'd, by Julian Seward et al.
==22309== Using Valgrind-3.11.0 and LibVEX; rerun with -h for copyright info
==22309== Command: /home/vagrant/systemd/.libs/lt-journalctl
==22309==
Hint: You are currently not seeing messages from other users and the system.
Users in groups 'adm', 'systemd-journal', 'wheel' can see all messages.
Pass -q to turn off this notice.
==22309==
==22309== HEAP SUMMARY:
==22309== in use at exit: 8,680 bytes in 4 blocks
==22309== total heap usage: 5,543 allocs, 5,539 frees, 9,045,618 bytes allocated
==22309==
==22309== 488 (56 direct, 432 indirect) bytes in 1 blocks are definitely lost in loss record 2 of 4
==22309== at 0x4C2BBAD: malloc (vg_replace_malloc.c:299)
==22309== by 0x6F37A0A: __new_var_obj_p (__libobj.c:36)
==22309== by 0x6F362F7: __acl_init_obj (acl_init.c:28)
==22309== by 0x6F37731: __acl_from_xattr (__acl_from_xattr.c:54)
==22309== by 0x6F36087: acl_get_file (acl_get_file.c:69)
==22309== by 0x4F15752: acl_search_groups (acl-util.c:172)
==22309== by 0x113A1E: access_check_var_log_journal (journalctl.c:1836)
==22309== by 0x113D8D: access_check (journalctl.c:1889)
==22309== by 0x115681: main (journalctl.c:2236)
==22309==
==22309== LEAK SUMMARY:
==22309== definitely lost: 56 bytes in 1 blocks
==22309== indirectly lost: 432 bytes in 1 blocks
==22309== possibly lost: 0 bytes in 0 blocks
==22309== still reachable: 8,192 bytes in 2 blocks
==22309== suppressed: 0 bytes in 0 blocks
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bash-4.3# journalctl --no-hostname >/dev/null
=================================================================
==288==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks
Direct leak of 48492 byte(s) in 2694 object(s) allocated from:
#0 0x7fb4aba13e60 in malloc (/lib64/libasan.so.3+0xc6e60)
#1 0x7fb4ab5b2cc4 in malloc_multiply src/basic/alloc-util.h:70
#2 0x7fb4ab5b3194 in parse_field src/shared/logs-show.c:98
#3 0x7fb4ab5b4918 in output_short src/shared/logs-show.c:347
#4 0x7fb4ab5b7cb7 in output_journal src/shared/logs-show.c:977
#5 0x5650e29cd83d in main src/journal/journalctl.c:2581
#6 0x7fb4aabdb730 in __libc_start_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x20730)
SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 48492 byte(s) leaked in 2694 allocation(s).
Closes: #4568
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Tree wide cleanups
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Just to make the whole thing easier for users.
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Now that the list is user-visible, @default should be first.
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