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internal libraries
Before:
$ ldd /lib/systemd/systemd-timestamp
linux-vdso.so.1 => (0x00007fffb05ff000)
libselinux.so.1 => /lib64/libselinux.so.1 (0x00007f90aac57000)
libcap.so.2 => /lib64/libcap.so.2 (0x00007f90aaa53000)
librt.so.1 => /lib64/librt.so.1 (0x00007f90aa84a000)
libc.so.6 => /lib64/libc.so.6 (0x00007f90aa494000)
/lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2 (0x00007f90aae90000)
libdl.so.2 => /lib64/libdl.so.2 (0x00007f90aa290000)
libattr.so.1 => /lib64/libattr.so.1 (0x00007f90aa08a000)
libpthread.so.0 => /lib64/libpthread.so.0 (0x00007f90a9e6e000)
After:
$ ldd systemd-timestamp
linux-vdso.so.1 => (0x00007fff3cbff000)
libselinux.so.1 => /lib64/libselinux.so.1 (0x00007f5eaa1c3000)
librt.so.1 => /lib64/librt.so.1 (0x00007f5ea9fbb000)
libc.so.6 => /lib64/libc.so.6 (0x00007f5ea9c04000)
/lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2 (0x00007f5eaa3fc000)
libdl.so.2 => /lib64/libdl.so.2 (0x00007f5ea9a00000)
libpthread.so.0 => /lib64/libpthread.so.0 (0x00007f5ea97e4000)
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This patch introduces socket_ipv6_is_supported() call that checks for
IPv6 availability. Code then check for it before using specific calls.
In order to be less intrusive, this patch avoids IPv6 entries being
parsed at all, this way we don't get such entries in the system and
all other code paths are automatically ignored. However an extra check
is done at socket_address_listen() to make sure of that.
As the number of Netlink messages is not know upfront anymore,
loopback-setup.c was refactored to dynamically calculate the sequence
number and count.
Lennart's suggestions were fixed and squashed with the original patch,
that was sent by Gustavo Sverzut Barbieri (barbieri@profusion.mobi).
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read them.
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On 07/28/2010 05:57 AM, Kay Sievers wrote:
> On Wed, Jul 28, 2010 at 11:43, Lennart Poettering
> <lennart@poettering.net> wrote:
>> On Mon, 26.07.10 16:42, Daniel J Walsh (dwalsh@redhat.com) wrote:
>>> tcontext=system_u:object_r:device_t:s0 tclass=chr_file
>>> type=1400 audit(1280174589.476:7): avc: denied { read } for pid=1
>>> comm="systemd" name="autofs" dev=devtmpfs ino=9482
>>> scontext=system_u:system_r:init_t:s0
>>> tcontext=system_u:object_r:device_t:s0 tclass=chr_file
>>> type=1400 audit(1280174589.476:8): avc: denied { read } for pid=1
>>> comm="systemd" name="autofs" dev=devtmpfs ino=9482
>>> scontext=system_u:system_r:init_t:s0
>>> tcontext=system_u:object_r:device_t:s0 tclass=chr_file
>>>
>>> Lennart, we talked about this earlier. I think this is caused by the
>>> modprobe calls to create /dev/autofs. Since udev is not created at the
>>> point that init loads the kernel modules, the devices get created with
>>> the wrong label. Once udev starts the labels get fixed.
>>>
>>> I can allow init_t to read device_t chr_files.
>>
>> Hmm, I think a cleaner fix would be to make systemd relabel this device
>> properly before accessing it? Given that this is only one device this
>> should not be a problem for us to maintain, I think? How would the
>> fixing of the label work? Would we have to spawn restorecon for this, or
>> can we actually do this in C without too much work?
>
> I guess we can just do what udev is doing, and call setfilecon(), with
> a context of an earlier matchpathcon().
>
> Kay
> _______________________________________________
> systemd-devel mailing list
> systemd-devel@lists.freedesktop.org
> http://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/systemd-devel
Here is the updated patch with a fix for the labeling of /dev/autofs
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It seems to work on my machine.
/proc/1/fd/20 system_u:system_r:system_dbusd_t:s0
/proc/1/fd/21 system_u:system_r:avahi_t:s0
And the AVC's seem to have dissapeared when a confined app trys to
connect to dbus or avahi.
If you run with this patch and selinux-policy-3.8.8-3.fc14.noarch
You should be able to boot in enforcing mode.
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