| Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author |
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Fixes:
```
$ ./libtool --mode=execute valgrind --leak-check=full ./test-fs-util
...
==22871==
==22871== 27 bytes in 1 blocks are definitely lost in loss record 1 of 1
==22871== at 0x4C2FC47: realloc (vg_replace_malloc.c:785)
==22871== by 0x4E86D05: strextend (string-util.c:726)
==22871== by 0x4E8F347: chase_symlinks (fs-util.c:712)
==22871== by 0x109EBF: test_chase_symlinks (test-fs-util.c:75)
==22871== by 0x10C381: main (test-fs-util.c:305)
==22871==
```
Closes #4888
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As suggested by @keszybz
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This new flag controls whether to consider a problem if the referenced path
doesn't actually exist. If specified it's OK if the final file doesn't exist.
Note that this permits one or more final components of the path not to exist,
but these must not contain "../" for safety reasons (or, to be extra safe,
neither "./" and a couple of others, i.e. what path_is_safe() permits).
This new flag is useful when resolving paths before issuing an mkdir() or
open(O_CREAT) on a path, as it permits that the file or directory is created
later.
The return code of chase_symlinks() is changed to return 1 if the file exists,
and 0 if it doesn't. The latter is only returned in case CHASE_NON_EXISTING is
set.
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Let's remove chase_symlinks_prefix() and instead introduce a flags parameter to
chase_symlinks(), with a flag CHASE_PREFIX_ROOT that exposes the behaviour of
chase_symlinks_prefix().
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Previously, we'd generate an EINVAL error if it is attempted to escape a root
directory with relative ".." symlinks. With this commit this is changed so that
".." from the root directory is a NOP, following the kernel's own behaviour
where /.. is equivalent to /.
As suggested by @keszybz.
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root
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This adds logic to chase symlinks for all mount points that shall be created in
a namespace environment in userspace, instead of leaving this to the kernel.
This has the advantage that we can correctly handle absolute symlinks that
shall be taken relative to a specific root directory. Moreover, we can properly
handle mounts created on symlinked files or directories as we can merge their
mounts as necessary.
(This also drops the "done" flag in the namespace logic, which was never
actually working, but was supposed to permit a partial rollback of the
namespace logic, which however is only mildly useful as it wasn't clear in
which case it would or would not be able to roll back.)
Fixes: #3867
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According to its manual page, flags given to mkostemp(3) shouldn't include
O_RDWR, O_CREAT or O_EXCL flags as these are always included. Beyond
those, the only flag that all callers (except a few tests where it
probably doesn't matter) use is O_CLOEXEC, so set that unconditionally.
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A follow-up for #3818 (992e8f2).
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Beef up the existing var_tmp() call, rename it to var_tmp_dir() and add a
matching tmp_dir() call (the former looks for the place for /var/tmp, the
latter for /tmp).
Both calls check $TMPDIR, $TEMP, $TMP, following the algorithm Python3 uses.
All dirs are validated before use. secure_getenv() is used in order to limite
exposure in suid binaries.
This also ports a couple of users over to these new APIs.
The var_tmp() return parameter is changed from an allocated buffer the caller
will own to a const string either pointing into environ[], or into a static
const buffer. Given that environ[] is mostly considered constant (and this is
exposed in the very well-known getenv() call), this should be OK behaviour and
allows us to avoid memory allocations in most cases.
Note that $TMPDIR and friends override both /var/tmp and /tmp usage if set.
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journalctl: Use env variable TMPDIR to save temporary files
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