Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author |
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While an interface is still being processed by udev, it is in state "pending",
instead of "unmanaged". We must not flush device configuration then.
Further fixes commit 3104883ddc24 after commit c436d55397.
Fixes #4186
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Replaces #4103.
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Fix journal hmac calculation.
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configuration files (#4205)
Currently, systemd-sysctl command configures kernel parameters in each sysctl
configuration files in random order due to characteristics of iterator of
Hashmap.
However, kernel parameters need to be configured in the order they occur in
each sysctl configuration files.
- For example, consider fs.suid_coredump and kernel.core_pattern. If
fs.suid_coredump=2 is configured before kernel.core_pattern= whose default
value is "core", then kernel outputs the following message:
Unsafe core_pattern used with suid_dumpable=2. Pipe handler or fully qualified core dump path required.
Note that the security issue mentioned in this message has already been fixed
on recent kernels, so this is just a warning message on such kernels. But
it's still confusing to users that this message is output on some boot and
not output on another boot.
- I don't know but there could be other kernel parameters that are significant
in the order they are configured.
- The legacy sysctl command configures kernel parameters in the order they
occur in each sysctl configuration files. Although I didn't find any official
specification explaining this behavior of sysctl command, I don't think there
is any meaningful reason to change this behavior, in particular, to the
random one.
This commit does the change by simply using OrderedHashmap instead of Hashmap.
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This commit is a minor tweak after the split of `--share-system`, decoupling the `--boot`
option from IPC namespacing.
Historically there has been a single `--share-system` option for sharing IPC/PID/UTS with the
host, which was incompatible with boot/pid1 mode. After the split, it is now possible to express
the requirements with better granularity.
For reference, this is a followup to #4023 which contains references to previous discussions.
I realized too late that CLONE_NEWIPC is not strictly needed for boot mode.
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Since commit 5996c7c295e073ce21d41305169132c8aa993ad0 (v190 !), the
calculation of the HMAC is broken because the hash for a data object
including a field is done in the wrong order: the field object is
hashed before the data object is.
However during verification, the hash is done in the opposite order as
objects are scanned sequentially.
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We shouldn't silently fail when appending the tag to a journal file
since FSS protection will simply be disabled in this case.
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Further discussion showed that this better gets addressed at the packaging
level.
This reverts commit 34210af7c63640fca1fd4a09fc23b01a8cd70bf3.
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Network file dropins
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If Kind is not specied, the message about "Invalid Kind" was misleading.
If Kind was specified in an invalid way, we get a message in the parsing
phase anyway. Reword the message to cover both cases better.
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This way we don't have to create a nulstr just to unpack it in a moment.
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In preparation for adding a version which takes a strv.
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Fixes #3655.
[zj: Fix the tests.]
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The key used to be jammed next to the local file path. Based on the format string on line 1675, I determined that the order of arguments was written incorrectly, and updated the function based on that assumption.
Before:
```
Please write down the following secret verification key. It should be stored
at a safe location and should not be saved locally on disk.
/var/log/journal/9b47c1a5b339412887a197b7654673a7/fss8f66d6-f0a998-f782d0-1fe522/18fdb8-35a4e900
The sealing key is automatically changed every 15min.
```
After:
```
Please write down the following secret verification key. It should be stored
at a safe location and should not be saved locally on disk.
d53ed4-cc43d6-284e10-8f0324/18fdb8-35a4e900
The sealing key is automatically changed every 15min.
```
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condition: ignore nanoseconds in timestamps for ConditionNeedsUpdate=
Fixes #4130.
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When a docker container is confined with AppArmor [1] and happens to run
on top of a kernel that supports mount mediation [2], e.g. any Ubuntu
kernel, mount(2) returns EACCES instead of EPERM. This then leads to:
systemd-logind[33]: Failed to mount per-user tmpfs directory /run/user/1000: Permission denied
login[42]: pam_systemd(login:session): Failed to create session: Access denied
and user sessions don't start.
This also applies to selinux that too returns EACCES on mount denial.
[1] https://github.com/docker/docker/blob/master/docs/security/apparmor.md#understand-the-policies
[2] http://bazaar.launchpad.net/~apparmor-dev/apparmor/master/view/head:/kernel-patches/4.7/0025-UBUNTU-SAUCE-apparmor-Add-the-ability-to-mediate-mou.patch
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to prevent false-positives
This fixes https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=90192 and #4130
for real. Also, remove timestamp check in update-done.c altogether since
the whole operation is idempotent.
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1. add support for kind vcan
2. fixup indention netlink-types.c, networkd-netdev.c
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Strerror removal and other janitorial cleanups
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Will be used by rpm-ostree (and likely lorax) to suppress
RPM->kernel->%posttrans->dracut runs, and basically everything
else this script is doing.
I'll also likely change the `kernel.spec` to respect this as well.
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We were already unconditionally using the unicode character when the
input string was not pure ASCII, leading to different behaviour in
depending on the input string.
systemd[1]: Starting printit.service.
python3[19962]: foooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo…oooo
python3[19964]: fooąęoooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo…oooo
python3[19966]: fooąęoooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo…ąęąę
python3[19968]: fooąęoooooooooooooooooąęąęąęąęąęąęąęą…ąęąę
systemd[1]: Started printit.service.
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sd_bus_error_set_errnof supports %m, so there's no need to call
strerror manually.
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It's prone to error and annoying to have to add it manually. It was
missing from a few places.
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errno value is not protected (it is undefined after this function returns).
Various mhd_* functions are not documented to protect errno, so this could not
guaranteed anyway.
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According to its manual page, flags given to mkostemp(3) shouldn't include
O_RDWR, O_CREAT or O_EXCL flags as these are always included. Beyond
those, the only flag that all callers (except a few tests where it
probably doesn't matter) use is O_CLOEXEC, so set that unconditionally.
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https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1374371
When root was empty or equal to "/", chroot_symlinks_same was called with
root==NULL, and strjoina returned "", so the code thought both paths are equal
even if they were not. Fix that by always providing a non-null first argument
to strjoina.
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A follow-up for #3818 (992e8f2).
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Drop more kdbus functionality
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Previous fix didn't consider handling multiple ExecStop commands.
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One trailing dot is valid, but more than one isn't. This also fixes glibc's
posix/tst-getaddrinfo5 test.
Fixes #3978.
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If the unit is in the dbus queue when it is removed then the last change
signal is never sent. Fix this by checking the dbus queue and explicitly
send the change signal before sending the remove signal.
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ENOTCONN may be a legitimate return code if the endpoint disappeared,
but the service should still attempt to shutdown cleanly.
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Fail hard if SECCOMP was detected but could not be installed
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In https://github.com/systemd/systemd/pull/4004 , a runtime detection
method for seccomp was added. However, it does not detect the case
where CONFIG_SECCOMP=y but CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER=n. This is possible
if the architecture does not support filtering yet.
Add a check for that case too.
While at it, change get_proc_field usage to use PR_GET_SECCOMP prctl,
as that should save a few system calls and (unnecessary) allocations.
Previously, reading of /proc/self/stat was done as recommended by
prctl(2) as safer. However, given that we need to do the prctl call
anyway, lets skip opening, reading and parsing the file.
Code for checking inspired by
https://outflux.net/teach-seccomp/autodetect.html
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