| Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author |
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Let's make sure O_CLOEXEC is set for the file descriptor.
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Also, O_NOCTTY is a safer bet, let's add that too.
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Let's use chase_symlinks() when looking for /etc/os-release and
/usr/lib/os-release as these files might be symlinks (and actually are IRL on
some distros).
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Let's permit invoking chase_symlinks() with a NULL return parameter. If so, the
resolved name is not returned, and call is useful for checking for existance of
a file, without actually returning its ultimate path.
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containers
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This moves the VolatileMode enum and its helper functions to src/shared/. This
is useful to then reuse them to implement systemd.volatile= in a later commit.
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calendarspec: allow repetition values with ranges
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Core was generated by `systemctl cat test@.target test@.service'.
Program terminated with signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
32 movdqu (%rdi), %xmm0
(gdb) bt
-0 strrchr () at ../sysdeps/x86_64/strrchr.S:32
-1 0x00007f57fdf837fe in __GI___basename (filename=0x0) at basename.c:24
-2 0x000055b8a77d0d91 in unit_find_paths (bus=0x55b8a9242f90, unit_name=0x55b8a92428f0 "test@.service", lp=0x7ffdc9070400, fragment_path=0x7ffdc90703e0, dropin_paths=0x7ffdc90703e8) at src/systemctl/systemctl.c:2584
-3 0x000055b8a77dbae5 in cat (argc=3, argv=0x7ffdc9070678, userdata=0x0) at src/systemctl/systemctl.c:5324
-4 0x00007f57fe55fc6b in dispatch_verb (argc=5, argv=0x7ffdc9070668, verbs=0x55b8a77f1c60 <verbs>, userdata=0x0) at src/basic/verbs.c:92
-5 0x000055b8a77e477f in systemctl_main (argc=5, argv=0x7ffdc9070668) at src/systemctl/systemctl.c:8141
-6 0x000055b8a77e5572 in main (argc=5, argv=0x7ffdc9070668) at src/systemctl/systemctl.c:8412
The right behaviour is not easy in this case. Implement some "sensible" logic.
Fixes #4912.
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At least bird's implementation of router advertisement does not
set MTU option by default (instead it supplies an option to the user).
In this case just leave MTU as it is.
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That message is emitted by every systemd instance on every resume:
Dec 06 08:03:38 laptop systemd[1]: Time has been changed
Dec 06 08:03:38 laptop systemd[823]: Time has been changed
Dec 06 08:03:38 laptop systemd[916]: Time has been changed
Dec 07 08:00:32 laptop systemd[1]: Time has been changed
Dec 07 08:00:32 laptop systemd[823]: Time has been changed
Dec 07 08:00:32 laptop systemd[916]: Time has been changed
-- Reboot --
Dec 07 08:02:46 laptop systemd[836]: Time has been changed
Dec 07 08:02:46 laptop systemd[1]: Time has been changed
Dec 07 08:02:46 laptop systemd[926]: Time has been changed
Dec 07 19:48:12 laptop systemd[1]: Time has been changed
Dec 07 19:48:12 laptop systemd[836]: Time has been changed
Dec 07 19:48:12 laptop systemd[926]: Time has been changed
...
Fixes #4896.
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691b90d465 fixed one spot, but missed the other one.
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Also free the allocated memory before exiting.
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This means that callers can distiguish an error from flags==0,
and don't have to special-case the empty string.
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Various smaller fixes
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Even if pressing Ctrl-c after spawning gdb with "coredumpctl gdb" is not really
useful, we should let gdb handle the signal entirely otherwise the user can be
suprised to see a different behavior when gdb is started by coredumpctl vs when
it's started directly.
Indeed in the former case, gdb exits due to coredumpctl being killed by the
signal.
So this patch makes coredumpctl ignore SIGINT as long as gdb is running.
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value/range_end -> start/stop
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"Every other hour from 9 until 5" can be written as
`9..17/2:00` instead of `9,11,13,15,17:00`
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(#4515)
Since commit 9d06297, mount units from mountinfo are not bound to their devices
anymore (they use the "Requires" dependency instead).
This has the following drawback: if a media is mounted and the eject button is
pressed then the media is unconditionally ejected leaving some inconsistent
states.
Since udev is the component that is reacting (no matter if the device is used
or not) to the eject button, users expect that udev at least try to unmount the
media properly.
This patch introduces a new property "SYSTEMD_MOUNT_DEVICE_BOUND". When set on
a block device, all units that requires this device will see their "Requires"
dependency upgraded to a "BindTo" one. This is currently only used by cdrom
devices.
This patch also gives the possibility to the user to restore the previous
behavior that is bind a mount unit to a device. This is achieved by passing the
"x-systemd.device-bound" option to mount(8). Please note that currently this is
not working because libmount treats the x-* options has comments therefore
they're not available in utab for later application retrievals.
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socket_find_symlink_target() returns a pointer to
p->address.sockaddr.un.sun_path when the first byte is non-zero without
checking that this is AF_UNIX socket. Since sockaddr is a union this
byte could be non-zero for AF_INET sockets.
Existing callers happen to be safe but is an accident waiting to happen.
Use socket_address_get_path() since it checks for AF_UNIX.
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This prevents memory leaks on strings like `*~*-*`.
Fixes #4887
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PR_SET_MM_ARG_START allows us to relatively cleanly implement process renaming.
However, it's only available with privileges. Hence, let's try to make use of
it, and if we can't fall back to the traditional way of overriding argv[0].
This removes size restrictions on the process name shown in argv[] at least for
privileged processes.
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We used the wrong return value in one case, so that our translations were
thrown away.
While we are at it, make sure to always initialize *ret on successful function
exits.
Fixes: #4762
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Fixes: #4823
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Fixes: #4660
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The container detection code in virt.c we ship checks for /proc/1/environ,
looking for "container=" in it. Let's make sure our "-a" init stub exposes that
correctly.
Without this "systemd-detect-virt" run in a "-a" container won't detect that it
is being run in a container.
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Previously, systemd-detect-virt was unable to detect "systemd-nspawn -a"
container environments, i.e. where PID 1 is a stub process running in host
context, as in that case /proc/1/environ was inherited from the host. Let's
improve that, and add an additional check for container environments where
/proc/1/environ is not cleaned up and does not contain the $container
environment variable:
The /proc/1/sched file shows the host PID in the first line. if this is not
1, we know we are running in a PID namespace (but not which implementation).
With these changes we should be able to detect container environments that
don't set $container at all.
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Fixes #1188.
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test-fs-util: fix memleak
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Otherwise we might get started too early.
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This adds a concept of "extrinsic" mounts. If mounts are extrinsic we consider
them managed by something else and do not add automatic ordering against
umount.target, local-fs.target, remote-fs.target.
Extrinsic mounts are considered:
- All mounts if we are running in --user mode
- API mounts such as everything below /proc, /sys, /dev, which exist from
earliest boot to latest shutdown.
- All mounts marked as initrd mounts, if we run on the host
- The initrd's private directory /run/initrams that should survive until last
reboot.
This primarily merges a couple of different exclusion lists into a single
concept.
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also ordered against it
Let's tweak the automatic dependency generation of target units: not only add a
Conflicts= towards shutdown.target but also an After= line for it, so that we
can be sure the new target is not started when the old target is still up.
Discovered in the context of #4733
(Also, exclude dependency generation if for shutdown.target itself. — This is
strictly speaking redundant, as unit_add_two_dependencies_by_name() detects
that and becomes a NOP, but let's make this explicit for readability.)
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Let's be a bit more careful when detecting chroot() environments, so that we
can discern them from namespaced environments.
Previously this would simply check if the root directory of PID 1 matches our
own root directory. With this commit, we also check whether the namespaces of
PID 1 and ourselves are the same. If not we assume we are running inside of a
namespaced environment instead of a chroot() environment.
This has the benefit that systemctl (which uses running_in_chroot()) will work
as usual when invoked in a namespaced service.
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set up a per-service session kernel keyring, and store the invocation ID in it
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Fixes:
```
$ ./libtool --mode=execute valgrind --leak-check=full ./test-fs-util
...
==22871==
==22871== 27 bytes in 1 blocks are definitely lost in loss record 1 of 1
==22871== at 0x4C2FC47: realloc (vg_replace_malloc.c:785)
==22871== by 0x4E86D05: strextend (string-util.c:726)
==22871== by 0x4E8F347: chase_symlinks (fs-util.c:712)
==22871== by 0x109EBF: test_chase_symlinks (test-fs-util.c:75)
==22871== by 0x10C381: main (test-fs-util.c:305)
==22871==
```
Closes #4888
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Fixes: #4402
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This adds two new settings BindPaths= and BindReadOnlyPaths=. They allow
defining arbitrary bind mounts specific to particular services. This is
particularly useful for services with RootDirectory= set as this permits making
specific bits of the host directory available to chrooted services.
The two new settings follow the concepts nspawn already possess in --bind= and
--bind-ro=, as well as the .nspawn settings Bind= and BindReadOnly= (and these
latter options should probably be renamed to BindPaths= and BindReadOnlyPaths=
too).
Fixes: #3439
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This is relevant as many of the mounts we try to establish only can be followed
when some other prior mount that is a prefix of it is established. Hence: move
the symlink chasing into the actual mount functions, so that we do it as late
as possibly but as early as necessary.
Fixes: #4588
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After all, these don#t strictly encapsulate bind mounts anymore, and we are
preparing this for adding arbitrary user-defined bind mounts in a later commit,
at which point this would become really confusing. Let's clean this up, rename
the BindMount structure to MountEntry, so that it is clear that it can contain
information about any kind of mount.
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This reworks handling of the read-only management for mount points. This will
become handy as soon as we add arbitrary bind mount support (which comes in a
later commit).
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All other tables got reindented, but one was forgotten. Fix that.
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This makes "systemd-run -p MountFlags=shared -t /bin/sh" work, by making
MountFlags= to the list of properties that may be accessed transiently.
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We want that systemd --user gets its own keyring as usual, even if the
barebones PAM snippet we ship upstream is used. If we don't do this we get the
basic keyring systemd --system sets up for us.
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Let's store the invocation ID in the per-service keyring as a root-owned key,
with strict access rights. This has the advantage over the environment-based ID
passing that it also works from SUID binaries (as they key cannot be overidden
by unprivileged code starting them), in contrast to the secure_getenv() based
mode.
The invocation ID is now passed in three different ways to a service:
- As environment variable $INVOCATION_ID. This is easy to use, but may be
overriden by unprivileged code (which might be a bad or a good thing), which
means it's incompatible with SUID code (see above).
- As extended attribute on the service cgroup. This cannot be overriden by
unprivileged code, and may be queried safely from "outside" of a service.
However, it is incompatible with containers right now, as unprivileged
containers generally cannot set xattrs on cgroupfs.
- As "invocation_id" key in the kernel keyring. This has the benefit that the
key cannot be changed by unprivileged service code, and thus is safe to
access from SUID code (see above). But do note that service code can replace
the session keyring with a fresh one that lacks the key. However in that case
the key will not be owned by root, which is easily detectable. The keyring is
also incompatible with containers right now, as it is not properly namespace
aware (but this is being worked on), and thus most container managers mask
the keyring-related system calls.
Ideally we'd only have one way to pass the invocation ID, but the different
ways all have limitations. The invocation ID hookup in journald is currently
only available on the host but not in containers, due to the mentioned
limitations.
How to verify the new invocation ID in the keyring:
# systemd-run -t /bin/sh
Running as unit: run-rd917366c04f847b480d486017f7239d6.service
Press ^] three times within 1s to disconnect TTY.
# keyctl show
Session Keyring
680208392 --alswrv 0 0 keyring: _ses
250926536 ----s-rv 0 0 \_ user: invocation_id
# keyctl request user invocation_id
250926536
# keyctl read 250926536
16 bytes of data in key:
9c96317c ac64495a a42b9cd7 4f3ff96b
# echo $INVOCATION_ID
9c96317cac64495aa42b9cd74f3ff96b
# ^D
This creates a new transient service runnint a shell. Then verifies the
contents of the keyring, requests the invocation ID key, and reads its payload.
For comparison the invocation ID as passed via the environment variable is also
displayed.
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