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non-fatal mount errors shouldn't be logged as warnings.
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If systemd is built with --enable-split-usr, but the system is indeed a
merged-usr system, then systemd-delta gets all confused and reports
that all units and configuration files have been overridden.
Skip any prefix paths that are symlinks in this case.
Fixes: #4573
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journalctl: fix memleak
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Fixes:
$ ./libtool --mode execute valgrind --leak-check=full ./journalctl >/dev/null
==22309== Memcheck, a memory error detector
==22309== Copyright (C) 2002-2015, and GNU GPL'd, by Julian Seward et al.
==22309== Using Valgrind-3.11.0 and LibVEX; rerun with -h for copyright info
==22309== Command: /home/vagrant/systemd/.libs/lt-journalctl
==22309==
Hint: You are currently not seeing messages from other users and the system.
Users in groups 'adm', 'systemd-journal', 'wheel' can see all messages.
Pass -q to turn off this notice.
==22309==
==22309== HEAP SUMMARY:
==22309== in use at exit: 8,680 bytes in 4 blocks
==22309== total heap usage: 5,543 allocs, 5,539 frees, 9,045,618 bytes allocated
==22309==
==22309== 488 (56 direct, 432 indirect) bytes in 1 blocks are definitely lost in loss record 2 of 4
==22309== at 0x4C2BBAD: malloc (vg_replace_malloc.c:299)
==22309== by 0x6F37A0A: __new_var_obj_p (__libobj.c:36)
==22309== by 0x6F362F7: __acl_init_obj (acl_init.c:28)
==22309== by 0x6F37731: __acl_from_xattr (__acl_from_xattr.c:54)
==22309== by 0x6F36087: acl_get_file (acl_get_file.c:69)
==22309== by 0x4F15752: acl_search_groups (acl-util.c:172)
==22309== by 0x113A1E: access_check_var_log_journal (journalctl.c:1836)
==22309== by 0x113D8D: access_check (journalctl.c:1889)
==22309== by 0x115681: main (journalctl.c:2236)
==22309==
==22309== LEAK SUMMARY:
==22309== definitely lost: 56 bytes in 1 blocks
==22309== indirectly lost: 432 bytes in 1 blocks
==22309== possibly lost: 0 bytes in 0 blocks
==22309== still reachable: 8,192 bytes in 2 blocks
==22309== suppressed: 0 bytes in 0 blocks
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/bin/kernel-install: line 143: return: can only `return' from a function or sourced script
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1391829
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systemd-analyze syscall-filter
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bash-4.3# journalctl --no-hostname >/dev/null
=================================================================
==288==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks
Direct leak of 48492 byte(s) in 2694 object(s) allocated from:
#0 0x7fb4aba13e60 in malloc (/lib64/libasan.so.3+0xc6e60)
#1 0x7fb4ab5b2cc4 in malloc_multiply src/basic/alloc-util.h:70
#2 0x7fb4ab5b3194 in parse_field src/shared/logs-show.c:98
#3 0x7fb4ab5b4918 in output_short src/shared/logs-show.c:347
#4 0x7fb4ab5b7cb7 in output_journal src/shared/logs-show.c:977
#5 0x5650e29cd83d in main src/journal/journalctl.c:2581
#6 0x7fb4aabdb730 in __libc_start_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x20730)
SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 48492 byte(s) leaked in 2694 allocation(s).
Closes: #4568
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Tree wide cleanups
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This reverts commit 75ead2b753cb9586f3f208326446081baab70da1.
Follow up for #4546:
> @@ -848,8 +848,7 @@ static int bus_kernel_make_message(sd_bus *bus, struct kdbus_msg *k) {
if (k->src_id == KDBUS_SRC_ID_KERNEL)
bus_message_set_sender_driver(bus, m);
else {
- xsprintf(m->sender_buffer, ":1.%llu",
- (unsigned long long)k->src_id);
+ xsprintf(m->sender_buffer, ":1.%"PRIu64, k->src_id);
This produces:
src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-kernel.c: In function ‘bus_kernel_make_message’:
src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-kernel.c:851:44: warning: format ‘%lu’ expects argument of type ‘long
unsigned int’, but argument 4 has type ‘__u64 {aka long long unsigned int}’ [-Wformat=]
xsprintf(m->sender_buffer, ":1.%"PRIu64, k->src_id);
^
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Just to make the whole thing easier for users.
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Now that the list is user-visible, @default should be first.
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This should make it easier for users to understand what each filter
means as the list of syscalls is updated in subsequent systemd versions.
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is set
Make sure that when DynamicUser= is set that we intialize the user
supplementary groups and that we also support SupplementaryGroups=
Fixes: https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/4539
Thanks Evgeny Vereshchagin (@evverx)
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Two testsuite tweaks
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If we encounter the (unlikely) situation where the combined path to the
new root and a path to a mount to be moved together exceed maximum path length,
we shouldn't crash, but fail this path instead.
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This reverts some changes introduced in d054f0a4d4.
xsprintf should be used in cases where we calculated the right buffer
size by hand (using DECIMAL_STRING_MAX and such), and never in cases where
we are printing externally specified strings of arbitrary length.
Fixes #4534.
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Add "perpetual" unit concept, sysctl fixes, networkd fixes, systemctl color fixes, nspawn discard.
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overly long description strings
This essentially reverts one part of d054f0a4d451120c26494263fc4dc175bfd405b1.
(We might also choose to use proper ellipsation here, but I wasn't sure the
memory allocation this requires wouöld be a good idea here...)
Fixes: #4534
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Preserve stored fds over service restart
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Reported by @evverx in #4493.
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more seccomp fixes, and change of order of selinux/aa/smack and seccomp application on exec
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Since service_add_fd_store() already does the check, remove the redundant check
from service_add_fd_store_set().
Also, print a warning when repopulating FDStore after daemon-reexec and we hit
the limit. This is a user visible issue, so we should not discard fds silently.
(Note that service_deserialize_item is impacted by the return value from
service_add_fd_store(), but we rely on the general error message, so the caller
does not need to be modified, and does not show up in the diff.)
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Let's propagate the error here, instead of eating it up early.
In a later change we should probably also change mount_enumerate() to propagate
errors up, but that would mean we'd have to change the unit vtable, and thus
change all unit types, hence is quite an invasive change.
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Fixes: #3870
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Let's make sure that our loopback files remain sparse, hence let's set
"discard" as mount option on file systems that support it if the backing device
is a loopback.
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Make the underlining between the header and the body and between the units of
different types span the whole width of the table.
Let's never make the table wider than necessary (which is relevant due the
above).
When space is limited and we can't show the full ID or description string
prefer showing the full ID over the full description. The ID is after all
something people might want to copy/paste, while the description is mostly just
helpful decoration.
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If we turn on red color for the active column and it is not combined with
underlining, then we need to turn it off explicitly afterwards. Do that.
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Let's place only one ternary operator.
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Let's only check for eof once after the fgets(). There's no point in checking
EOF before the first read, and twice in each loop.
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This way, we can get rid of a label/goto.
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Let's make missing write access to /proc/sys non-fatal to the sysctl service.
This is a follow-up to 411e869f497c7c7bd0688f1e3500f9043bc56e48 which altered
the condition for running the sysctl service to check for /proc/sys/net being
writable, accepting that /proc/sys might be read-only. In order to ensure the
boot-up stays clean in containers lower the log level for the EROFS errors
generated due to this.
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Now that have a proper concept of "perpetual" units, let's make the root mount
one too, since it also cannot go away.
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So far "no_gc" was set on -.slice and init.scope, to units that are always
running, cannot be stopped and never exist in an "inactive" state. Since these
units are the only users of this flag, let's remodel it and rename it
"perpetual" and let's derive more funcitonality off it. Specifically, refuse
enqueing stop jobs for these units, and report that they are "unstoppable" in
the CanStop bus property.
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(#4533)
Always initialize the supplementary groups of caller before checking the
unit SupplementaryGroups= option.
Fixes https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/4531
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This is a follow-up for 6309e51ea32d64524431ee65c49eecd44390da8f and makes sure
we compare test results with the right user identifier.
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Seccomp is generally an unprivileged operation, changing security contexts is
most likely associated with some form of policy. Moreover, while seccomp may
influence our own flow of code quite a bit (much more than the security context
change) make sure to apply the seccomp filters immediately before executing the
binary to invoke.
This also moves enforcement of NNP after the security context change, so that
NNP cannot affect it anymore. (However, the security policy now has to permit
the NNP change).
This change has a good chance of breaking current SELinux/AA/SMACK setups, because
the policy might not expect this change of behaviour. However, it's technically
the better choice I think and should hence be applied.
Fixes: #3993
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@resources contains various syscalls that alter resource limits and memory and
scheduling parameters of processes. As such they are good candidates to block
for most services.
@basic-io contains a number of basic syscalls for I/O, similar to the list
seccomp v1 permitted but slightly more complete. It should be useful for
building basic whitelisting for minimal sandboxes
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These system calls clearly fall in the @ipc category, hence should be listed
there, simply to avoid confusion and surprise by the user.
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The system call is already part in @default hence implicitly allowed anyway.
Also, if it is actually blocked then systemd couldn't execute the service in
question anymore, since the application of seccomp is immediately followed by
it.
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Timing and sleep are so basic operations, it makes very little sense to ever
block them, hence don't.
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